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 SUMMARY 
 
This thesis examines the relevance of Hegelian-Marxian theory to modern day 
philosophy of cognitive science. It is suggested that certain key Hegelian-
Marxian ideas and themes, such as ‘externalization’, ‘praxis’ and ‘dialectics’, 
have parallels in modern day cognitive science and that, in some instances a 
direct connection can be traced from Marxian theory to recent cognitive 
science, via intermediaries such as Vygotsky, Merleau-Ponty and Levins & 
Lewontin. 
 
It is also suggested that the overarching trajectory of cognitive science is one 
that can be usefully understood in Marxian terms as a ‘retreat from alienation.’ 
Taking this as one’s starting point enables one to unify otherwise disparate 
perspectives under a single banner. In addition it provides one with a means of 
evaluating individual accounts, such as Varela, Thompson and Rosch’s 
‘Embodied Mind’ and Clark and Chalmers’ ‘Extended Mind’. Conversely, some 
recent cognitive scientific accounts, such as Kirsh & Maglio’s work on 
‘epistemic action’, offer further illumination of ideas that are ambiguously 
expressed in Marxian theory. 
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Introduction 
Justifications 
 
The aim of this thesis is to explore the relevance of certain elements of Hegelian and 
Marxian theory to modern day philosophy of cognitive science. In particular the 
suggestion is that contemporary cognitive science is involved in a ‘retreat from 
alienation’, where the latter is understood in Hegelian-Marxian terms. Such an exercise 
might well seem in need of justification both to some of those involved in cognitive 
science and to some of those with Marxian sympathies. From the point of view of the 
former it might be questioned why we need to import more “German philosophy” 
(Brooks, 1991b) into cognitive science given the prominence of Heideggerian concerns 
in recent years. One answer to this is simply that the parallels and connections between 
Hegelian-Marxian theory and modern day cognitive science are there to be seen and 
that it would be difficult to justify ignoring them. However, the aim of this thesis is not 
just to highlight what is already present but also to suggest that Hegelian-Marxian 
(henceforth ‘Marxian’) theory might have a diagnostic role to play. In fact we offer a 
fourfold justification for bringing Marx and Hegel into cognitive science:  
1) There are interesting parallels between Marxian theory and modern day cognitive 
science. 
2) In some cases traceable influence can be found from Marxian theory to modern day 
cognitive science (via intermediaries such as Vygotsky, Merleau-Ponty and Lewontin.) 
3) The trajectory of modern day cognitive science can be understood in a useful way in 
terms of categories derived from Marxian theory (as a ‘retreat from alienation’). 
4) In some instances Marxian insights can be used to diagnose weaknesses or 
limitations of certain perspectives in modern day cognitive science (although this 
should not be taken as implying the inviolability of Marxian perspectives.) 
The first two points relate more to factual relations that are held to obtain between 
Marxian theory and cognitive science, the latter two relate more to a proposed use for 
Marxian theory as a tool for engagement with cognitive science. 
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These then are our justifications - to those involved in cognitive science - for bringing 
Hegel and Marx into the field. As for justifying this project to those with Marxian 
sympathies - hopefully the thesis itself will go some way towards achieving this. In 
advance we will merely make the following three points. Firstly if one has an interest in 
possibilities for social transformation then it is surely a legitimate exercise to try to get 
a better understanding of the essential nature of the individuals for and by whom such a 
transformation is to be carried out. As the Marxist biologists  Levins & Lewontin argue: 
“How can we say how society ought to be organized unless we claim to know what 
human beings are really like?”(Levins & Lewontin, 1985, p.254) It is one of the 
contentions of this thesis that recent cognitive science shows that what we “are really 
like” as cognitive agents gels well with Marxian conceptions of the human beings as 
creatures with the potential to realize themselves collectively through their “own 
spontaneous activity” (Marx, 1844a, p.80). 
Secondly cognitive science as a discipline should be of particular interest to Marxists 
because of some of the similarities it shares with Marxism. This is so not just because it 
is centrally concerned with human potential but because its reach similarly stretches 
over a diverse range of subject areas. Moreover, as with Marxian theory, whilst its 
interdisciplinary orientation crucially incorporates philosophical concerns, its emphasis 
on the empirical means that it maintains a healthy scepticism regarding the value of 
philosophy as a separate activity.  
Once this initial shared starting point is acknowledged it then becomes a question of 
significance whether there is some degree of inevitability in the way that the trajectory 
of cognitive science is one that has increasingly come to mirror Marxian perspectives. 
A concrete and all encompassing science of the human being might of necessity be 
drawn to dialectical concerns and to an endpoint of the unification of the individual as 
an active, embodied, intersubjective, material being. 
Lastly, although we have emphasized the utility of a Marxian perspective in diagnosing 
some of the limitations of current cognitive scientific accounts, it is also true that recent 
cognitive science contains much which concretizes what are, in some respects, rather 
vague ideas in Marxian theory. Thus, for example, certain features of a dialectical 
perspective find less ambiguous expression in dynamic accounts of cognition, and 
research into ‘epistemic action’ gives empirical grounding for a ‘praxis’ of sorts. 
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What kind of Marxism?  
We have attempted some brief justification to the cognitive scientist, then, for bringing 
more German philosophy into cognitive science, and to those with Marxian sympathies 
for why cognitive science should be of particular interest. A further worry that might be 
had by those who have no axe to grind with German philosophy, or with critical 
perspectives, is with the kind of Marxist outlook that underpins this thesis. ‘Marxism’ 
after all is sometimes associated with tyrannical regimes, and dialectics with dogma or 
doublethink. Meeting this worry involves making reference to some Marxian themes 
that we have yet to explore (as well as some that will not be explored in this thesis at 
all). Nevertheless, as there will be little space for developing a political tract in the main 
body of text, we will here attempt a brief characterization of the variant of Marxism 
which finds most favour with the author of this thesis, in the hope that the comments 
made will become more meaningful along the way. 
We will begin by emphasizing that the outlook in question is not an ‘orthodox Marxist’ 
one. By this we mean first and foremost that it is not to be identified with the rigidified 
interpretation of Marxism adopted in practice by official communist parties and statist 
regimes such as those that have existed in the Soviet Union and elsewhere. In saying 
this we express our opposition both to the mode of organization of such societies and to 
the ideological expression of this organization. As regards the former our objections are 
to the imposition of a ‘communist’ order from above. If a society which facilitates the 
“free development of all” (Marx & Engels, 1848, p.26) is a real possibility it must, we 
would argue, be an emergent, non-hierarchical phenomenon, predicated on the 
“spontaneous activity” (Marx, 1844a, p.80) of the mass of individuals. 
As regards the latter - associated with the term ‘orthodox Marxism’ are certain 
theoretical perspectives linked together by the general notion that Marxism is 
‘scientific’. Prominent amongst such perspectives are the set of propositions that make 
up ‘dialectical materialism’ (Engels, 1883, 1887 ; Lenin, 1908; Cornforth, 1952) as 
well as an overarching belief in historical or economic determinism. Our relationship to 
these perspectives is a little more nuanced. In the case of ‘dialectical materialism’, as 
will be seen in the main body of the thesis the position adopted is one that finds much 
of interest in the application of dialectical principles to material phenomena; and 
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attempts are made to relate this to later developments in cognitive science, particularly 
in the theories of dynamics and (to a lesser extent) enactivism. It should be stressed 
however that a belief in the usefulness of a dialectical perspective as applied to the 
material world does not imply endorsement of ‘dialectical materialism’ as a systematic 
or all-encompassing ‘science’. Moreover, as will be seen, some features of a materialist 
dialectical outlook – for example Engels’ interpretation of the ‘negation of the 
negation’ - seem fatally ambiguous.  
As for ‘determinism’ – the view of this author is one which sees ‘determinism’ as a 
problematic and not necessarily meaningful notion, and which therefore regards any 
qualified variant of this notion – be it ‘historical’ or ‘economic’ – as not usefully 
endorsable. In the main body of the thesis, insofar as the question of determinism is 
raised, we ignore such subtleties and simply come down ‘against determinism’. This is 
not to deny, however, that there could be certain principles which determine the range 
of possibilities in the unfolding of historical events, or that there are definite ways in 
which our conceptions and actions are inextricably bound up with our material 
situation.  
In place of orthodox Marxism the position taken here has something in common with a 
number of other Marxian and radical currents. Insofar as emphasis is placed on the 
notion of ‘alienation’, and in general on the self-realisation of the subject, the position 
taken has something in common with the diverse range of perspectives linked with the 
term ‘Marxist Humanism’ (e.g. Fromm, 1966 ; Fischer, 1968 ; Dunayevskeya, 1973 ; 
Levine, 1975). Insofar as the communism envisioned is one that is held to be 
incompatible with the maintenance of hierarchical power - and insofar as our analysis 
places emphasis on situated praxis, opposing itself to conceptions of the agent as first 
and foremost a ‘planner’ - it has something in common with libertarian communism 
(Velli,1972 ; Dauve & Martin ; 1974 ; Holloway, 2002) and even anarchism (Bakunin, 
1882 ; Malatesta, 1891).  
The Structure of the thesis 
Having attempted to give some justification for this project and some indication of what 
type of a Marxian outlook it is allied to, we ought also to give a brief summary of the 
structure of the thesis, as this is easily lost in the detail of the argument.  
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In chapter 1 we look at certain key concepts in Hegel’s work – emphasizing in 
particular the notions of alienation, externalization and dialectics.  
In chapter 2 we turn to Marx. Our account of Marx is one which places alienation at the 
centre and continues many of the themes found in our account of Hegel in chapter 1, 
albeit from a materialist perspective.  In addition other concerns are investigated (such 
as ‘praxis’ and the division of labour), concerns however which still relate to the 
Marxian project of surmounting alienation and reconstituting the ‘whole man’.  
In chapter 3 we offer brief summaries of later Marxist thinkers. Some time is spent 
looking at Marx’s collaborator Engels, and particularly at his detailed elaboration of 
dialectics. Of the other writers, three (Vygotsky, Merleau-Ponty, Levins & Lewontin) 
are selected because their work can be seen as forming a bridge between Marx & 
Engels and modern day cognitive science. The last writer (Sohn-Rethel) is included 
because of his own Marxian theory of cognition, and because of his novel approach to 
the idea of ‘abstraction’ which has some relevance to current debates about ‘online’ and 
‘offline’ cognition.  
In chapter 4 we make the move from Marxian theory to cognitive science. We have 
said that our aim is to diagnose a ‘retreat from alienation’ in cognitive science. A little 
needs to be said therefore about the characteristics of traditional cognitive science and 
why it might be thought alienated in the first place. This is the purpose of chapter 4, 
although it should be stressed that the treatment given there is far from exhaustive or 
systematic.  
In chapter 5 we then turn to the ‘retreat from alienation’ itself.  Here we give some 
indication of the different ways in which modern cognitive science, in its striving for a 
unified conception of the subject, and in its pursuance of dialectical themes, seems to 
be heading in a direction that meets such a description. 
The last three chapters look in more detail at particular areas of modern day cognitive 
science in relation to the theme of the ‘retreat from alienation’. In each case we find 
evidence of this retreat, through the incorporation of relevant Hegelian-Marxian themes 
and perspectives. In each case, however, we also find that the retreat is more or less 
limited, and a Marxian analysis is brought to bear on this fact. Specifically: 
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Chapter 6 looks at enactivism. In the first half of the chapter we argue that there are 
significant parallels between enactivism and autopoiesis and elements of Hegelian-
Marxian thought. However close examination of one influential, although idiosyncratic, 
enactivist text (Varela et. al., 1991) in the second half of the chapter reveals both 
parallels and divergences. An attempt is made to suggest that, in this instance, the 
respect in which the account diverges from Marxian accounts – its recommendation of 
an isolated, passive and contemplative solution to fragmentation - is also the respect in 
which its argument is at its weakest.  
In chapter 7 we turn to Clark and Chalmers’ (1998) Extended Mind hypothesis. Here it 
is suggested that some versions of the extended mind thesis are compatible with, and to 
some degree are indirectly influenced by, Hegelian Marxian conceptions of 
‘externalisation’. However it is argued that the ‘literal’ version of the extended mind 
thesis presents us with an alienated account of mind. Attention is also focussed on the 
‘cyborgian’ variant of the extended mind thesis which, it is suggested, fails to take 
account of issues raised by Marxian critiques of mechanized labour.  
Finally in chapter 8 we look at Kirsh and Maglio’s (1994) analysis of ‘pragmatic’ and 
‘epistemic’ action. It is argued that epistemic action has much in common with the 
Marxian notion of ‘praxis’ – understood as the unity of thought and practice, and 
indeed goes some way towards providing an empirically demonstrable exemplar of this 
notion. However it is also argued that the dichotomy between ‘pragmatic’ and 
‘epistemic’ action is problematic. 
Apologies 
That then is the structure of the thesis. Having started with justifications we might 
conclude with some apologies. Firstly although I have given this thesis the title of “the 
retreat from alienation in cognitive science”, this is perhaps misleading insofar as it 
suggests a comprehensive historical survey of cognitive science from a particular 
perspective. In fact the range of cognitive scientific concerns explored is fairly 
restricted and fall mainly within the ‘philosophy of cognitive science’ domain rather 
than that of empirical research (although the last chapter broaches one particular area of 
empirical research.) Secondly, because many of the works referred to in the first three 
chapters use the gender-specific term ‘Man’ to specify humanity, and ‘men’ to describe 
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individual human beings, the accompanying text, in order to aid readability, also 
follows this convention in many instances. Attempts have been made to rectify this in 
certain places but these attempts are probably not thorough enough. 
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Chapter 1 – Hegel on Alienation, Externalization and 
Dialectics 
 
Introduction 
 
Our aim in this thesis is to highlight what we see as a ‘retreat from alienation’ in 
cognitive science. Before we can do this however we need to look at certain theorists 
whose work can provide us with the tools and perspectives to diagnose this retreat.  In 
this chapter I will attempt to give a summary of those parts of Hegel relevant, directly 
or otherwise, to this diagnosis. As with other commentators who have attempted 
summaries of Hegel (e.g. Weiss, 1974; Taylor, 1975) it is perhaps necessary to plead 
mitigating circumstances in advance for the likely inadequacy of the resultant text. 
Firstly because of the notorious difficulty of certain of Hegel’s works, and in particular 
of the Logic and the Phenomenology of Spirit, much of the foregoing will be 
interpretative in nature. However hopefully consultation of various secondary sources 
will mean that the account given is at least not at odds with all interpretations. 
Secondly, the fact that this account is little more than a snapshot of particular fragments 
of the Hegelian system might itself be thought indicative of a falsification of Hegel’s 
ideas, at least if we adopt Hegel’s own holistic criteria according to which “the true is 
the whole”(Hegel, 1807, p.11). In defence of this all that can perhaps be said is that, for 
the purposes of this project, such fragmentation is unavoidable. However insofar as 
there are also ‘degrees of falsification’ we might say that it is probably better to have 
some space devoted exclusively to Hegel rather than make do with a vague impression 
of him as filtered through the work of Marx. 
 
The account is divided into three sections - ‘Alienation in the Phenomenology of 
Spirit’, ‘Externalization’ and ‘Hegelian Dialectics’. This is perhaps something of an 
arbitrary way of carving up Hegelian theory and much that is relevant to one section 
may fit just as well in the other. On balance, however, it seems more convenient and 
aids readability to impose some kind of structure on this summary. 
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(1) Alienation in the Phenomenology of Spirit 
 
Conceived in its narrowest sense the purpose of this part of our summary of Hegel is to 
provide an account of alienation as it appears in his writing. The work of Hegel’s which 
is most centrally identified with the concept of alienation (e.g. by Arthur, 1986, 
following Lukacs, 1975) and the project of transcending (or ‘superseding’) it – is the 
Phenomenology of Spirit (1807).  This is also the work of Hegel’s which is generally 
held to have had the most influence on Marx’s account of alienation, although there is 
some dispute about what passages Marx held to be significant (Arthur, 1983). Our 
summary of Hegel’s concept of alienation will therefore take the Phenomenology as its 
point of departure. It should be noted that, as with Marx, Hegel’s concept of alienation 
is intrinsically linked (‘internally related’) to a wealth of other philosophical ideas. 
Some of these ideas will therefore also have to be brought into the picture. Likewise 
there are parts of Hegel’s account which, whilst they do not deal directly with 
alienation, have had, or are held to have had, an influence on relevant features of 
Marx’s account. These too must be included. Specifically, then, our interest in the 
Phenomenology is limited to a) the overarching themes of alienation and its 
supersession b) points in significant ways connected with this theme, and c) any other 
sections or points which are held to have had an influence on relevant features of 
Marx’s own account. 
 
What is the Subject? 
 
Richard Norman describes the Phenomenology as “a necessary development through a 
sequence of forms of consciousness.”(Norman, 1976, p.18) Already we are here faced 
with an obvious question. What exactly do we mean by consciousness? Do we mean an 
individual human consciousness? Collective human consciousness? Consciousness as 
some supra human metaphysical entity? i.e. Who or what is the subject of the 
Phenomenology? There is perhaps no straightforward answer to this question. The 
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ultimate subject for Hegel is ‘Spirit’ (‘geist’) and the journey outlined in the 
Phenomenology is that of Spirit coming to know itself (Arthur, 1986, p.49). The 
‘different forms of consciousness’ that Norman (and Hegel) refer to can thus be seen as 
stages on Spirit’s own journey towards self-knowledge.  
 
However, in replacing ‘consciousness’ with ‘Spirit’ we have in some respects merely 
moved the problem up one level, for now we are faced with the question of what 
exactly ‘Spirit’ is. Much of Hegel’s own account seems to indicate that the term ‘Spirit’ 
should be taken literally as denoting immaterial being of some kind. In some passages 
this being seems closely identified with ‘mind’ (an alternative translation of ‘geist’) and 
in this respect we note that Hegel describes himself as having an ‘absolute idealist’ 
metaphysics, a metaphysics which he is keen to keep itself distinct from Kant’s mere 
‘subjective idealism’ (Hegel, 1817a, p.73). However, if we take him at his word, Hegel 
was also an orthodox Lutheran (McLellan, 1969, p.2) and since his own time there has 
been a tradition, amongst some, of interpreting (absolute) spirit religiously (e.g. Taylor, 
1975).  Either way, whether one takes ‘spirit’ to mean ‘mind’ or ‘God’ (or neither, or 
something which transcends both) it would seem reasonable to conclude that Hegel’s 
professed belief in Spirit as “self-supporting, absolute, real being” (Hegel, 1807, p.264) 
is indicative of a belief in the primacy of the immaterial over the material. This, as we 
shall see in the next chapter, is more or less Marx’s interpretation and one that he 
sought to supplant with a materialist analysis. 
 
However there are various grounds upon which such an interpretation needs to be 
qualified. For one thing, leaving aside the question of how ‘mind’ should be 
understood, Hegel’s version of both God and the material world are idiosyncratic. As 
regards the former, the type of God Hegel thought most conducive to the development 
of consciousness of freedom in Man was that which was least separate from “human 
actualities”. (Hegel, 1822/31, p.50) Here we already see two issues at play which count 
against a standard conception of God. Firstly an instrumental concern with the role God 
plays in the development of human freedom. This ties in with a generally ‘historicist’ 
approach to religion (Liebich, 1979), where different objects of worship are linked to 
different historical social formations, all of which are judged in accordance with how 
far they facilitate human freedom (“The conception of God, therefore, constitutes the 
general basis of a peoples character”, ibid)  Secondly, a conception according to which 
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the truest understanding of God is that which places him at least remove from Man, the 
logical conclusion of which would seem to be an approach that sees God as a human 
creation (a point we shall return to.) 
 
As regards the material world, in contrast to less sophisticated idealists Hegel did not 
view this as a merely illusory or ultimately unjustifiable construction (Taylor, 1975, 
p.109) – rather it was a necessary outgrowth of the development of spirit. As one 
commentator has put it “Spirit must posit itself in objective form” and this 
objectification is a “positive achievement” (Arthur, 1986, p.51)  We might add to this 
that Hegel was a man of science famously arguing that “to him who looks upon the 
world rationally, the world in its turn presents a rational aspect” (Hegel, 1822/31, p.11) 
Scientific endeavour, the discovery of the laws at work in material phenomena, was 
seen as a necessary step in the progression towards absolute knowledge. Thus, at least 
in those passages where Hegel is concerning himself with detailed analysis of particular 
features of the material world (e.g. in Philosophy of Nature) the metaphysical backdrop 
against which such investigations take place could, in the words of a modern 
philosopher, be viewed as “a difference that makes no difference” (Dennett, 1991. 
p.125) 
 
If the subject of the Phenomenology is immaterial being, then, this leaves open a range 
of possible interpretations concerning the nature of this being and of the material world 
from which it differentiates itself. We ought also to note that some commentators have 
gone further in offering what might be called – if somewhat problematically - ‘non 
metaphysical’ (Lumsden, 2008) interpretations of Hegel. With respect to the term 
‘spirit’ for example it has been suggested that this might denote intersubjectivity 
(Williams, 1987), “human consciousness” (Stern, 1990, p.43) or the “human 
community” (Westphal, 2003). Likewise with the material world – Westphal (ibid) has 
suggested that the Phenomenology is grounded in a ‘realist epistemology’, a position 
which echoes a declaration made many years earlier by the Marxist Herbert Marcuse 
that Hegel  “means to be dealing with real things.” (Marcuse, 1941, p.64).  
 
We will not pursue these matters further here, although it should be noted that 
ambiguities of interpretation regarding the ultimate subject of the Phenomenology and 
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the world it inhabits will inevitably have some impact on how we are to understand the 
concept of ‘alienation’ and its supersession in Hegel’s work.  
 
What is Alienation ? 
 
Returning, then, to Norman’s ‘necessary development through a sequence of forms of 
consciousness’, we might next ask both what the logic underlying this development is 
and how it is related to the concept of ‘alienation’. A clue is found in the concluding 
paragraph of the Introduction to the Phenomenology where Hegel states: 
 
In pressing forward to its true existence, consciousness will arrive at a point at which it 
gets rid of its semblance of being burdened with something alien…  (Hegel, 1807, 
p.56) 
 
Here we see one of the central themes of the Phenomenology -  that of consciousness, 
in various guises, surmounting the ‘otherness’ of the world in order it to make itself at 
home in that world. ‘The world’ – by which we may mean different things according to 
the context – appears to ‘consciousness’ – ditto - as something alien. Consciousness 
uses various strategies – be they practical or rational – to bring the world back to itself. 
This theme informs both specific episodes detailed in the book and its overarching 
narrative.  
 
Already, however, we are simplifying, for consciousness, says Hegel, does not merely 
find itself in an alien world. Rather it has created that alien world – it is that alien world 
– and the process whereby estrangement from that world is overcome is partly 
facilitated by consciousness’ recognition of that world as part of itself. Hegel outlines 
this dynamic in the preface to the Phenomenology: 
 
Experience is the name we give to just this movement in which the 
immediate…becomes alienated from itself and then returns to itself from this 
alienation, and is only then revealed for the first time in its actuality and truth…The 
disparity which exists in consciousness between the ‘I’ and the substance which is its 
object is the distinction between them, the negative in general….Although this negative 
appears at first as a disparity between the ‘I’ and its object, it is just as much the 
disparity of the substance with itself. Thus what seems to happen outside of it, to be an 
activity directed against it, is really its own doing, and Substance shows itself to be 
essentially Subject. When it has shown this completely, Spirit has made its existence 
identical with its essence...  (Hegel, 1807,  p.21) 
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We notice here that Hegel does not feel the need to explain the terms ‘alienated’ or 
‘alienation’, and the passage is not untypical in this respect. In fact nowhere in Hegel 
do we find an explicit definition of ‘alienation’. This is partly because, as Lukacs has 
pointed out, the term was common currency at the time of writing. In economics, for 
example, it was used “to betoken the sale of a commodity” and in natural law “to refer 
to the loss of an aboriginal freedom to the society which came into being as a result of a 
social contract” (Lukacs, 1975, p.538). However we should note that Hegel’s use of the 
term extends beyond this, for it implies not simply the ‘handing over’ of something but 
both the ‘externalization’ of something – making objective in the external world that 
which was previously a mere potentiality in the subject (see next section) – and the 
consequent subjective experience of estrangement which results from confrontation 
with this externality as an ‘other’. We shall see in the next chapter that both of these 
aspects of alienation reappear in Marx’s own account. 
 
In the above passage, Hegel goes on to describe not only this separation between 
subject and object but also its reunification. Although the terminology is rather 
confusing, the suggestion seems to be that there are two stages to this process. Firstly 
there is mere passive recognition - ‘substance shows itself to be essentially subject’ 
which we might loosely interpret as meaning that the object is recognized by the 
subject as being identical with it, or an extension of, or its own creation;  secondly there 
is active assimilation of subject and object (‘Spirit has made its existence identical with 
its essence’.)  
 
How we interpret Hegel’s account of the estrangement and subsequent reunification of 
subject and object partly depends on what scenario we apply it to and also on what 
metaphysics we attribute to Hegel. If our object is the whole of the Phenomenology and 
if we attribute a genuinely ‘objective idealist’ metaphysics to Hegel then this passage 
can be taken literally as a description of the process by means of which non-material 
Spirit realises itself. The progress of the Phenomenology is that whereby a non material 
entity posits a world exterior to itself, at first fails to recognise itself in that exteriority, 
and then through a process of ever more successful encounters is finally reunited with 
its other. Alienation is superceded and in the process ‘Absolute Knowing’ has been 
achieved (Hegel, 1807, pp. 479-493). However if we narrow our focus to specific 
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episodes in the Phenomenology less grandiose – and in some cases less ‘metaphysical’ - 
interpretations are possible. Below are three examples of such episodes (not given in 
chronological order of appearance) which to varying degrees, and in various senses 
approximate to the notion of a subject’s exteriorizing itself, confronting this exteriority 
as something ‘other’ and then achieving unification through recognition. We give these 
examples here primarily as a means of putting flesh on the bones of the idea of 
‘alienation’ and its supersession in Hegel’s work, but in some instances they contain 
additional elements which will become relevant to our account of Marx and/or of 
cognitive science. 
 
1) The Unhappy Consciousness 
 
Our first example is found in a section entitled ‘Stoicism, Scepticism and the Unhappy 
Consciousness’ (Hegel, 1807, pp.119-138).  In this section the protagonist is 
characterised in general terms as ‘consciousness’ although it is often suggested that the 
episodes described relate in various ways to specific historical episodes (Norman, 1976, 
pp.57-58; Stern, 2002, pp. 85-86). Consciousness is shown moving through a number 
of transitions in its relationship to the world. It begins with ‘Stoicism’, a position 
characterised as “withdrawing from the bustle of existence into the simple essentiality 
of thought” (Hegel, 1807, p.121). Hegel suggests that this form of consciousness, whilst 
initially liberating, proves to be inadequate insofar as its lack of engagement with the 
world results in thought that is merely “abstract” (ibid. p.122) and without real content. 
“Freedom in thought”, he argues “has only pure thought as its truth, a truth lacking in 
the fullness of life” (ibid). We will see later both how this notion of ‘abstraction’ is 
important in Hegel’s account and (in chapter 2) how Marx took up the idea of a critique 
of ‘pure thought’.  
 
Consciousness then moves on from Stoicism to ‘Scepticism’. Here Hegel appears to be 
envisioning a comprehensive doubting or denial of everything external to the subject, 
such that: “concrete thinking…annihilates the being of the world in all its manifold 
determinateness” (ibid. p.123).  This is a more active (theoretical) orientation to the 
world and so is less prone to the insipid abstractions of Stoicism. However inevitably, 
says Hegel, the Sceptic finds his/herself in a contradictory and untenable position. The 
 23 
dimensions of this contradiction vary according to what aspect of scepticism one is 
focussing on. Hegel makes reference to sense-perception, ethics, and more generally to 
the realm of “contingency” (ibid. p.125). A useful, if simplified, summary of the 
problematic situation of the sceptic, in terms of a contradiction between his/her denial 
of the external world and his/her involvement in it, is given by Taylor (1975): 
 
As embodied subjects we go on living in external reality. We may well declare its non-
being, it returns unceasingly and inescapably. So that in fact what we have is an 
oscillation between a sense of our own self-identity, and an equally acute sense of our 
dependence on a changing, shifting external reality. (Taylor, 1975, p.159) 
 
It is this uneasy predicament which gives rise to a third mode of being – that which 
Hegel characterizes as the ‘Unhappy Consciousness’. The Unhappy Consciousness is a 
“divided consciousness” (Hegel, 1807, p.129) which is aware of its own dividedness 
and “experiences itself as contradictory” (ibid. p.126). In some passages Hegel, in self-
referential fashion, appears to identify the Unhappy Consciousness with this awareness 
itself, rather than the subject of the awareness. Thus, for instance, he asserts that “it is 
the awareness of this self-contradictory nature of itself” (ibid. p.125, my italics). Such a 
strategy is perhaps to be expected from an absolute idealist standpoint that has no need 
to clearly differentiate between ideas and those who have them, but we will not pursue 
this issue here. 
 
The Unhappy Consciousness, then, is self-aware divided consciousness. We will see 
later that this characterization to some degree anticipates Marx’s own depiction of the 
alienated individual, particularly as ‘fragmented’ by the mental/manual division of 
labour (Marx & Engels, 1970b). Hegel then goes on to describe the Unhappy 
Consciousness’ attempts to confront its “deeply divided” (Taylor, 1975, p.160) nature. 
It yearns for stability, for something eternal and absolute. However whilst it recognizes 
within itself the potential for such qualities to be realized, paradoxically it does not 
recognize them as being realizable within itself (Hegel, 1807, p.127). This is because it 
conceives of itself as, and only as, part of the realm of contingent, changeable nature. 
Its idea of The ‘Unchangeable’ (ibid) is therefore projected outside of itself, onto a God 
who inhabits an “unattainable beyond” (ibid. p.131). This God in turn presents itself to 
the unhappy consciousness as “an alien Being” (ibid. p.127). 
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Here we have a characteristic example of the dynamic of alienation as outlined earlier. 
The subject apprehends certain qualities within itself but does not recognize them as 
part of itself. Instead it projects them onto an external entity – God – which then 
confronts it as something alien. As Norman says of this passage, the implication is that 
“religious consciousness is unsatisfactory just insofar as it fails to recognize in its ‘other 
world’ the externalization of its own self.”(Norman, 1976, p.60) 
 
Hegel appears to fall short of making the last logical move. The Unhappy 
Consciousness does not go on to recognize God as its own creation - a move which 
may not have been explicitly made until later ‘Left Hegelian’ interpretations of Hegel’s 
work  (Mclellan, 1969; Stepelevich, 1983)  - and so there is no clear equivalent to 
‘substance showing itself to be essentially subject’. The rest of the section instead 
shows the Unhappy Consciousness adopting a variety of strategies for transforming its 
alienated relationship with The Unchangeable into one “in which it becomes absolutely 
one with it” (Hegel, 1807, p.130) but none of these strategies is entirely successful. 
However, as various commentators point out (Taylor, 1975; Norman, 1976; Stern, 
2002) the section does finish by alluding to a later transition to ‘Reason’, where 
consciousness realises that “in its particular individuality it has Being absolutely in 
itself, or is all reality” (Hegel, 1807, p.138), a transition which could be interpreted as a 
‘return to self’ from (one form of) alienation. 
 
2) The Individual and Society 
 
A second, and relatively straightforward, account of alienation and its supersession can 
be derived from passages where Hegel considers the individual in relation to the state. 
We will look at these only very briefly here. Hegel argues that in societies where the 
individual is atomised and has no identification with the collectivity or the state, the 
laws and customs of that society impose on the individual as something other and alien: 
   
The Spirit whose self is an absolutely discrete unit has its content confronting it as an 
equally hard unyielding reality, and here the world has the appearance of being 
something external, the negative of self-consciousness. The world is, however, a 
spiritual entity, it is in itself the interfusion of being and individuality; this its existence 
is the work of self consciousness, but it is also an alien reality already present and 
given,  a reality which has a being of its own and in which it does not recognize itself.  
(Hegel, 1807 p.294) 
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This is to be contrasted with the situation in societies where the dichotomy between 
individual and state has been superseded and thus the individual perceives there to be 
no separation between the two: 
 
In a free nation, therefore, Reason is truth realized. It is a present living Spirit in which 
the individual not only finds his essential character, i.e. his universal and particular 
nature, expressed, and present to him in the form of thinghood, but is himself this 
essence, and also has realized that essential character.   (Hegel, 1807, p.214) 
 
We note in these two passages that equivalents of both ‘substance showing itself to be 
essentially subject’ and ‘spirit making its existence identical with its essence’ are 
implied. As regards the former, in the first passage the individual is alienated because 
he does not recognize the institutional paraphernalia that constitute his social 
surroundings as being of his own making (insofar as they are a human creation.) As 
regards the latter, in the second passage there is not mere formal recognition of this fact 
but also a lived experience whereby the (social) environment constitutes an extension 
of the individual’s being. We will return to this latter theme when we look at 
‘externalization’ in section 2. 
 
 
3) Sense Certainty 
 
A third variant on the theme of alienation and its supersession can be found in passages 
where Hegel deals with what might be called ‘epistemological’ issues. In particular in 
the first section of the Phenomenology, entitled ‘Consciousness’ (Hegel, 1807, pp.58-
103), Hegel outlines a transition made by the enquiring mind through different forms of 
consciousness when confronted with the material world. The first form of 
consciousness is called ‘sense certainty’. This is described as follows: 
 
The knowledge or knowing which is at the start or is immediately our object cannot be 
anything else but immediate knowledge itself, a knowledge of the immediate or of what 
simply is. Our approach to the object must also be immediate or receptive; we must 
alter nothing in the object as it presents itself. In apprehending it we must refrain from 
trying to comprehend it. (Hegel, 1807, p.58, author’s emphasis) 
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This type of ‘knowledge’, which recent commentators (e.g. Westphal, 2003, p.58), have 
compared with knowledge of sense data, or Russell’s ‘knowledge by acquaintance’ 
(Russell, 1912, pp.25-32) is subsequently found by Hegel to be wanting. The 
presuppositions upon which it rests do not hold up. To be immediate and non 
conceptualized this knowledge must be of particulars only, which Hegel tries to 
articulate in terms of indexicals such as ‘this’ and ‘here’ (Hegel, 1807, pp.58-68) but it 
soon emerges that knowledge without universals is either very impoverished or not 
possible. The ambiguity here arises because Hegel does not specify whether ‘sense-
certainty’ is itself a stage in our coming to know the world (e.g. a developmental stage) 
or a theory about our knowledge of the world which reflection proves to be ill founded, 
or again an historical phase in the development of Philosophy (Norman, 1976, p.36). 
Possibly Hegel, in a kind of metaphysical equivalent of ‘ontogeny recapitulates 
phylogeny’, might claim that this is a false distinction in the first place. Consciousness, 
wherever or however it manifests itself, will unreflectively or theoretically take ‘sense 
certainty’ as its starting point when trying to get to grips with the external world. This is 
perhaps another instance where Hegel’s refusal to be bound by the usual exclusive 
categories which underpin analytical philosophy makes summary of his position 
difficult, a point we shall return to when we look at ‘dialectics’ in section 3. 
 
Having highlighted the limitations of ‘sense certainty’, Hegel takes consciousness on 
through several further stages of orientation to its object.  These include ‘Perception’ 
which attempts to take Universals seriously but flounders on the problem of whether an 
object can be understood as a bundle of properties or as a substratum wherein those 
properties inhere (ibid, pp.67-79), and the ‘Understanding’ which, in this section, 
appears to be identified with scientific investigation (Norman, 1976, p.39) and the 
“realm of laws” (Hegel, 1807, p.91). The Understanding is likewise found to be 
inadequate, for reasons which we will investigate later, and the journey (in this section) 
ends with a reappearance of the ‘return to self’ theme: 
 
It is manifest that behind the so-called curtain which is supposed to conceal the inner 
world, there is nothing to be seen unless we go behind it ourselves, as much in order 
that we may see as that there may be something behind there which can be seen.   
(Hegel, 1807, p.103) 
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Here then we find some of the same elements that were also present in the Unhappy 
Consciousness story and in the highlighted remarks on individual and society. Although 
there is no explicit mention of alienation there is the suggestion of a unity (between 
subject and world) which is rent asunder – in the rejection of ‘immediacy’ – such that 
the world appears as other to the subject. Reunification later occurs when, after some 
hard work on the subject’s side, it discovers itself in the world. Some commentators 
have interpreted this later transition literally. Marcuse (1968), for example, sees in it 
Hegel’s belief in the revelation of the knowing subject behind the realm of appearances, 
a revelation which marks the departure of Hegel’s analysis from that of Kant which still 
clings to a belief in a separate ‘thing-in-itself’: 
 
Behind the curtain of appearance is not an unknown thing-in-itself but the knowing 
subject. Self consciousness is the essence of things.   (Marcuse, 1968, p.112) 
 
Marcuse, however, being a Marxian oriented materialist interprets this discovery as an 
Idealist expression of an unacknowledged material impulse to supersede alienation by 
transforming the world – “Hegel’s insistence that the subject itself be recognized 
behind the appearance of things is an expression of the basic desire of idealism that 
man transform the estranged world into a world of his own.” (ibid.  p.110).  For 
Marcuse Hegel is wrong insofar as he literally claims that self-consciousness is the 
essence of things, but his heart is in the right place insofar as the active appropriation of 
the object is at the centre of his account. 
 
Other commentators (Norman, 1976; Stern, 2002) have rejected the idea that Hegel 
need here be taken literally in the first place, whilst likewise stressing that the move to 
self-consciousness is for Hegel one of ‘active’ orientation of consciousness towards its 
object. Norman, for example, suggests that the starting point of ‘sense-certainty’ is one 
wherein “knowledge is entirely passive and…consciousness does not work actively on 
its object.” (Norman, 1976, p.30) The journey through Perception and the 
Understanding to Self-Consciousness is then one of progressive appropriation of the 
object via the active application of concepts. The sense in which consciousness 
subsequently discovers itself ‘behind the curtain’ is thus, on this interpretation, the less 
contentious one in which “these concepts are the production of consciousness, and 
therefore in knowing them consciousness knows itself” (ibid. p.45). 
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(2) Externalization 
 
Under the banner of ‘alienation’, then, we have looked at various instances wherein a 
subject is described as estranged or separated from some portion of the world, and 
wherein overcoming of this separation is contingent upon recognition that the object in 
question is in some sense oneself or a part of oneself. This latter act of recognition, we 
might say, implies a separate occurrence whereby some portion of oneself has already 
been posited in the world, whether or not it is recognised as such i.e. it implies an act of 
‘externalization’. It is to this notion that we now turn. Before proceeding, however, we 
should note that the distinction between externalization and alienation is rather 
problematic. For one thing, as Arthur (1986, p.47) points out, the German word 
‘Entäusserung’ in Hegel is sometimes translated as ‘alienation’ and sometimes as 
‘externalization’. In itself this need not present a problem since it is quite common for 
words in one language to have more than one interpretation in another according to 
context and use. However we should also note that in this instance certain theoretical 
issues hinge on the distinction between ‘alienation’ and ‘externalization’. In particular, 
one Marxian criticism of Hegel is that he fails to make this distinction, so that for him 
“to produce any real object in the real world is an act of alienation” (Rees, 1998, p.37). 
We will take up this issue later in this chapter and in the next chapter. For present 
purposes we will just say that, whatever controversy might attend such a distinction, it 
remains meaningful to separate externalization from alienation in Hegel’s work, at least 
insofar as the former can be used to describe cases where that which is posited in the 
world by the subject is not necessarily experienced as something ‘other’ or ‘alien’.  
 
Lord and Bondsman – Externalization through labour 
 
One noteworthy example of externalization can be found in Hegel’s account of the 
‘Lord and Bondsman’ (Hegel, 1807, pp.111-119). This account is located in the 
passage immediately preceding the description of the progression from Stoicism 
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through Scepticism to the Unhappy Consciousness. As Norman (1976, p.60) 
emphasizes, this fact is itself significant, for the divided nature of the Unhappy 
Consciousness is held to replicate the antagonistic relationship between Lord and 
Bondsman in some respects (Hegel, 1807, p.126). However in the following we will not 
explore this connection but will treat the account in a more or less free standing 
fashion. The  passage is also particularly significant for the influence it has had on 
Marxian thought (Taylor, 1975, p.156), and if there is disagreement concerning the 
amount of importance Marx himself attached to it (Arthur, 1983) it is nevertheless the 
case that it prefigures and illuminates many of Marx’s own concerns. These include the 
mental/manual division of labour which we shall look at in the next chapter. Finally we 
should also note that this passage is important because it provides an example of Hegel 
focussing on practical activity. In previous passages we stressed the activity of the 
subject in coming to recognise itself in the world on Hegel’s account. However, the 
activity alluded to was mainly of a mental sort – various conceptions of the world are 
grappled with intellectually until unification is achieved. This emphasis on 
consciousness appropriating the world through the power of thought reflects one of the 
central assumptions of the Phenomenology – that the supersession of alienation is 
primarily a rational or theoretical task. Making oneself ‘at home’ in the world is for the 
most part achieved by getting a better understanding of the world. As Stern notes 
(Stern, 2002, p.69) this viewpoint is expressed not just in the Phenomenology but also 
elsewhere. In Philosophy of Nature, for example, Hegel declares: 
 
Our intention…is to grasp, to comprehend Nature, to make her ours so that she is not 
something alien and yonder. (Weiss, 1974, p.203, my italics) 
 
Nevertheless, the Lord and Bondsman passage (as well as some passages in other 
works) show that Hegel was not exclusively concerned with the appropriation of the 
world through thought but also through practice. 
 
In the section in question Hegel begins by outlining one of the pre-requisites of a 
genuine ‘self-consciousness’, which is that it should receive recognition from another 
consciousness: 
 
Self-consciousness exists in and for itself when, and by the fact that, it so exists for 
another; that is, it exists only in being acknowledged. (Hegel, 1807, p.111) 
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He then spends some time examining the implications of this fact and the complex 
double edged configurations that must be considered if one is to understand the 
coming-into-being of mutual self recognition. Very loosely an individual first relates to 
another individual merely as an object in his world, and is related to in a likewise 
fashion. However when these individuals reciprocally become aware of their existence 
as objects for an other, a spiralling process of recognition of self-in-other and other-in-
self is set in motion – as Hegel puts it: “they recognize themselves as mutually 
recognizing one another” (Hegel, 1807, p.112). At this point Hegel introduces an 
element of antagonism. Although objectively the development of each self-
consciousness is dependent on it being recognized as such by another self-
consciousness, yet each self-consciousness seeks to preserve its own sense of self-
certainty  - to “raise their certainty of being for themselves to truth” (ibid. p.114) by 
annihilating the other as an independent being. Thus a “life and death struggle” (ibid) 
ensues which is only eventually resolved through an uneven distribution of power. In 
the resultant set up: 
 
One is the independent consciousness whose essential nature is to be for itself, the 
other is the dependent consciousness whose essential nature is simply to live or to be 
for another. The former is the lord, the other is the bondsman. (Hegel, 1807, p.115) 
 
This set up at first seems to serve the needs of the lord best. The lord ceases to be 
alienated from the natural world – ceases to confront it as a recalcitrant ‘other’ – for he 
has power over it. He uses the bondsman as his instrument – a mere extension of his 
own being – by means of which he is able enjoy the fruits of the world without having 
to confront it in its ‘immediacy’ (ibid). Meanwhile the bondsman seems to be 
spectacularly disadvantaged for he has no independent existence of his own. The world 
is to him an object of fear, a fear which has its source in his subjection to the lord. 
Moreover his very activity is initially a source of alienation for him, “for what the 
bondsman does is really the action of the lord” (ibid. p.116). 
 
However, the advantages enjoyed by the lord are fleeting. This is so, says Hegel, for a 
variety of reasons. Firstly, in terms of the ‘recognition’ that is necessary for the 
development of genuine self –consciousness, that which the lord derives from the 
bondsman fails to deliver the goods, for the bondsman has, in the eyes of the lord, been 
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reduced to a mere object. He is therefore incapable of seeing in the lord that which the 
lord sees in himself (to paraphrase Findlay, 1977 p.522). Conversely, in a difficult 
passage, Hegel seems to suggest that the all consuming fear and surrendering of 
identity to the lord experienced by the bondsman, paradoxically provides the 
groundwork for the development of a genuine self-consciousness. In a dialectical turn, 
Hegel argues that the bondsman in surrendering himself entirely to another external 
power – and so divesting himself of “everything solid and stable” (Hegel, 1807, p.117)  
in his own particular existence, experiences “a pure universal moment” (ibid) which 
opens the gateway to the development of genuine self-consciousness. Possibly, as 
Findlay (1977, p.522) seems to suggest, the idea here is that it is the bondsman, and not 
the lord, who manages to transcend the bare particularities of his individual existence 
because he identifies with something beyond himself which he experiences as an 
absolute power. 
 
Importantly, however, Hegel also suggests that the development of the bondsman’s 
self-consciousness is facilitated through practical activity. We have said that according 
to Hegel the bondsman does not experience his own activity as belonging to him but 
Hegel appears to imply that this alienation from activity is a temporary phase. The 
bondsman, through his working over of the objective world, confronts what he 
originally experienced as alien and in shaping it achieves power over it, and so becomes 
at home in the world as an individual in his own right: 
 
Through work, however, the bondsman becomes conscious of what he truly is…For in 
fashioning the thing, the bondsman’s own negativity, his being-for-self, becomes an 
object for him only though his setting at nought the existing shape confronting him. But 
this objective negative moment is none other than the alien being before which it has 
trembled. Now, however, he destroys this alien negative moment, posits himself as a 
negative in the permanent order of things, and thereby becomes for himself, someone 
existing on his own account.  (Hegel, 1807, p.118)  
 
In the Lord and Bondsman story, then, we have another variant on the theme of 
alienation and its supersession. The bondsman confronts the world as an alien and 
hostile other – partly because he experiences it as an extension of the Lord. However 
through practical activity he eventually surmounts the otherness of the world and finds 
himself in it.  
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It is the manner in which the bondsman does the latter which is of particular interest to 
us, for the sense in which he finds himself in the world is the sense in which he has 
externalized himself in that world. This applies as much to our previous examples as to 
this one, but it is clearer in the Lord and Bondsman story because of the emphasis 
placed on practical activity. It is through action, directed at the world, that the 
bondsman finds himself in that world. As Hegel puts it: “The bondsman realises that it 
is precisely in his work wherein he seemed to have only an alienated existence that he 
acquires a mind of his own” (ibid). The acquiring a mind of one’s own is co-occurent, 
in Hegel’s account, with extending one’s mind into the world. However it should be 
noted that Hegel does not seem to be promoting, what in modern parlance might be 
called, a cognitive developmental thesis. He is not arguing that cognitive powers are 
developed through manipulation of external nature, although some passages might 
encourage such an interpretation (Sayers, 2003, p.110). Rather his central concern 
seems to be with a more fundamental coming into being of self consciousness – of the 
individual’s developing awareness of itself as a being in the world. This ‘coming into 
being’ is partly facilitated by an enlargement of the physical territory over which the 
bondsman has power – that which the bondsman works on becomes an extension of his 
being despite its externality. As Hegel remarks: “the shape does not become something 
other than himself through being made external to him” (Hegel, 1807, p.118).  Linked 
with this is a further thesis that that the bondsman creates an image of himself, or 
“duplicates himself” (Hegel, 1835, cited in Sayers, 2003, p.110) in his product. This 
idea is not clearly developed in the Phenomenology but, as Sayers (2003) points out it 
receives greater attention elsewhere. One example can be found in Hegel’s Lectures on 
Fine Art.  The relevant passage is worth citing at some length as we will return to it in 
the next chapter: 
 
Man brings himself before himself by practical activity, since he has the impulse, in 
whatever is directly given to him, in what is present to him externally, to produce 
himself and therein equally to recognize himself. This aim he achieves by altering 
external things whereon he impresses the seal of his inner being and in which he now 
finds again his own characteristics. Man does this in order, as a free subject, to strip the 
external world of its inflexible foreignness and to enjoy in the shape of things only an 
external realization of himself.  (Hegel, 1835, p.31, cited in Sayers, 2003, p.111) 
 
Similar themes of extension and duplication can be found in earlier writings, pre-dating 
the Phenomenology, which were unpublished until the twentieth century (and so 
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unknown to Marx – Avineri, 1972). In System of Ethical Life, for example, Hegel 
describes the individual’s working over of the object as resulting in a “possession of the 
product” which entails “the entry of the subsuming subject into the reality of the 
object” (Hegel, 1802, p.3). Likewise in the Jena Lectures Hegel talks of “consciousness 
making itself into a thing” (Hegel, 1805-6b, p.1). Apropos of our earlier comment 
concerning the difficulties with the distinction between ‘alienation’ and 
‘externalization’ in Hegel’s work, we might note that in this latter text Hegel does not 
seem to clearly differentiate between the two, presenting both as a positive good: 
 
  In labouring I make myself immediately into the thing, a form which is Being. At the  
  same time I externalize this existence of mine, making something alien to myself, and  
  preserve myself therein. In the very same thing I see my being recognized.   (ibid. p.3) 
 
Whether or not we infer an ultimate equivalence between alienation and externalization 
from such passages, the main point in all of these accounts seems to be that on Hegel’s 
analysis it is precisely the activity of projecting oneself onto the external world through 
practical engagement with it that facilitates the coming into being of conscious mind. 
There is what recent enactivists would call a ‘reciprocal codetermination’ (Thompson, 
2007) here.  In Hegel’s case the productive individual is reproducing at a micro level 
the same dynamic that ‘spirit’ plays out at a macro level, for, as Arthur points out, it is 
also true that “spirit must posit itself in objective form” (Arthur, 1986, p.51) as part of 
its own development. 
 
Tools 
 
It should also be noted that Hegel’s account of externalization through labour makes 
some reference to the role of the ‘tool’ in the process. In early writings Hegel refers to 
the tool as a “middle term” (Hegel, 1802, p.8) between subject and object. He then 
rather mysteriously asserts that it “severs objectivity and its own blunting from itself” 
(ibid). By the latter he seems to mean that the dual sided ‘shaping’ (of the object and 
consciousness) that results from the activity of labour, can be conceived as giving rise 
to not only a physical ‘blunting’ of parts of the subjects body (e.g. stubbing of fingers) 
but also a corresponding psychological blunting (“hand and spirit are blunted by it i.e. 
they themselves assume the nature of negativity and formlessness” ibid.). The 
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introduction of the tool, however, allows the circumventing of this side effect to some 
degree. 
 
We will see later how Vygotsky takes up Hegel’s notion of the tool as a “middle term” 
(chapter 3), and also how Marx similarly relates tool use to externalization (chapter 2), 
in a way that may have been influential on Merleau-Ponty (chapter 3). 
 
Externalization in Property 
 
We have looked, then, at externalization through practical activity (labour) in Hegel’s 
account of the Lord and Bondsman, and in other writings. In some of those passages we 
noted that externalization involved a ‘recognition’ of oneself as extended/duplicated in 
one’s product (e.g. Hegel, 1835, p.31). A similar conception of things can be found in 
Hegel’s writings on ‘property’, which can be viewed as another instance of the 
externalization of the individual. In this case, however, the social dimension of the 
‘recognition’ involved is more explicitly described. Property is distinguished, in 
Hegel’s early writings, from mere ‘possession’ because the former implies recognition 
by another (Hegel, 1805-6a, p.2). Such recognition is not simple apprehension of the 
fact of possession i.e. it is not just an awareness, on the part of the propertyless 
individual, that the object in question is now out of one’s orbit. Rather it involves 
projection of certain qualities onto the owner of the object – a consciousness of his 
significance as a feature of the world: 
 
In taking possession, the question of recognition comes up again: I take that which 
could have become his. It merely could become his possession, but it is mine in 
actuality. His possibility comes after my actuality. He must recognize me as actual. 
(ibid) 
 
Hegel develops these themes in more detail in later work and particularly in the 
Philosophy of Right. His account there is first and foremost a justification for what is 
thought to be the “necessity of private property” (Hegel, 1821, p.53), a necessity which, 
as we will see in the next chapter, is to some degree disputed by Marx.. According to 
Hegel “mankind has the right to appropriate all that is a thing” (ibid. p.51). However by 
‘right’ here Hegel seems to mean something other than mere contractual obligation. In 
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fact he has in mind something more akin to a ‘need’, for he sees property ownership as 
a pre requisite for personal realisation: 
 
When I as a free will am in possession of something I get a tangible existence, and in 
this way first become an actual will (Hegel, 1821, p.51) 
 
Here the talk is of ‘will’ although elsewhere other mental epithets are used (e.g. 
“personality must find an embodiment in property”- ibid. p.56). As before the ‘tangible 
existence’ that property offers, is as much a tangible existence for others as for oneself. 
 
We find in Hegel’s remarks on property, then, another example of the individual’s self-
realisation through externalization in the material world. This point seems to be implicit 
in Patten’s (1999) suggestion that Hegel’s account can be broken down into two 
separate claims - what he calls the ‘self perception’ and ‘self development’ claims: 
 
The first is the claim that in property I am an object to myself … the second claim is 
that it is this experience of being an object to myself that allows me to ‘become an 
actual will’. It is through looking at myself in my property that I develop and reinforce 
the capacities and self-understandings that make up personality. (Patten, 1999, p.147) 
  
However Patten fails to make any connection between ‘self-realisation through 
property ownership’ and ‘self-realisation through labour’, the latter making no 
appearance in his analysis (although others have made this connection e.g. Marcuse, 
1968, p.76). He is thus unable to situate property ownership in relation to practical 
activity. We saw earlier that the appropriation of the world could either be conceptual 
(rational comprehension of the world) or physical (labour). The notion of appropriation 
through property ownership, however, seems to exist midway between the two. Thus: 
 
Taking possession is partly the simple bodily grasp, partly the forming and partly the 
marking or designating of the object. (Hegel, 1821, p.59) 
 
 
The reference to ‘marking’ here perhaps comes closest to a conceptual appropriation of 
the world for it appears to denote the merely formal act of designating the object as 
one’s own so that it is recognized as such by others. However we also find references 
both to the ‘bodily grasp’ of the object and, most significantly, to ‘forming’ – which we 
can assume entails making the object one’s own through physical manipulation. Thus to 
some extent there is a blurring between Hegel’s account of property ownership and his 
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account of labour. Indeed, in certain passages at least, Hegel seems to suggest that 
taking possession is most conducive to self- realisation the more like it is to labour. 
Hence, for example: 
 
The fashioning of a thing is the kind of active possession which is most adequate to the 
idea because it unites the subjective and the objective. (Hegel, 1821, p.61) 
 
It is difficult to gauge here, of course, whether, in making reference to ‘active 
possession’ Hegel conceives of himself as moving beyond the realm of property 
ownership strictly so called, or as offering an expanded conception of it. Either way, we 
might say that it at least illustrates the existence of a continuum from ‘possession’, to 
‘active possession’, to ‘active appropriation of the world through labour’. 
 
The Body 
 
Finally, in considering externalization through property ownership we ought also to 
briefly note how Hegel’s elaboration of such appears to reveal a surprisingly objectified 
account of bodily being. In particular, realisation of the will through property is not, on 
Hegel’s analysis, thought to be qualitatively different to realisation of the will through 
the body: 
 
My body is as to its content my universal undifferentiated external existence. It is the 
real possibility of all definite phases. But also as a person I have my life and body as I 
have other things, only insofar as they express my will.  (Hegel, 1821, p.53) 
 
Thus, in this context anyway, the body is felt to be no different to any of the other 
furniture of the world – it is a means by which my will can be expressed, but not the 
only means. Hegel later qualifies this by asserting that “in property my will is not so 
vividly present as it is in my body.”  (ibid. p.55) but this very qualification seems to 
support the idea that there is only a quantitative difference between expression of the 
will through the body and expression of the will through external media. Both are mere 
vehicles for the will. We will find a comparable literal mindedness about vehicles for 
mental contents when we come to look at Clark’s ‘Extended Mind’ in chapter 7. 
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(3) Hegelian Dialectics 
 
We have so far looked at alienation and externalization in Hegel’s work. In this last 
section we turn to ‘dialectics’. For this purpose we shift our attention from the 
Phenomenology to the Science of Logic. We should note however that a dialectical 
approach has been implicit in much of what has already been covered. Many of the 
transitions we have described or alluded to in the Phenomenology and elsewhere – 
whether they have involved Spirit, the Unhappy Consciousness or the bondsman – have 
in common the paradoxical idea that consciousness becomes itself by first becoming 
something other than itself. This can be seen as ‘dialectical’ in the sense that it implies 
a state of affairs wherein progress is made through the positing of an opposition, which 
is then resolved through supersession of that opposition. The antagonism between the 
bondsman and external nature, for example, is resolved when the former realizes 
himself in the act of changing the latter. Nevertheless it could be argued that in such 
transitions what we see is more a dialectic of events than of concepts. Perhaps relevant 
in this connection is Arthur’s (2004) distinction between two types of Hegelian 
dialectic: 
 
There are two different types of dialectical theory in Hegel. First is a dialectic of 
history. Hegel believed there is a logic of development underlying world history. But 
there is a second sort of dialectical theory found in writings such as the Science of 
Logic and Philosophy of Right. This may be termed ‘systematic dialectic’ and it is 
concerned with the articulation of categories designed to conceptualise an existent 
concrete whole. (Arthur, 2004, p.4) 
 
Arthur’s distinction between a ‘dialectic of history’ and a ‘systematic dialectic’ may not 
exactly match the distinction we want to make here. For one thing we have not placed 
much emphasis on questions of world history when looking at the Phenomenology. For 
another, although we likewise wish to shift our attention to the dialectic of the Science 
of Logic (ignoring for now the Philosophy of Right), it might be a little misleading to 
contrast what we find there with what we found in the Phenomenology on the grounds 
that the former is an attempt to “conceptualise an existent concrete whole” (my 
emphasis); for, as we shall see, our account of the Science of Logic (henceforth Logic) 
is also to some degree concerned with movement and transition. Nevertheless it is at 
least true that whereas the dialectical transitions of the Phenomenology manifest 
themselves through the actions of individuals, consciousness, or an anthropomorphized 
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spirit, those in the main body of the Logic are explicitly presented as part of an exercise 
in categorical analysis. 
 
The Understanding 
 
Turning to the Logic then, we might ask what are the main features of the dialectical 
outlook presented there. In fact it is perhaps easier to begin by noting what Hegel 
wishes to contrast such an outlook with. Hegel’s main concern is to overcome 
(‘supersede’) the ‘fixity’ or ‘rigidity’ of a conceptual outlook which he identifies with 
commonsense (and in some passages with certain aspects of the science of his day – 
Norman, 1976, p.39). This is the conceptual outlook, encountered earlier, which Hegel 
calls the ‘Understanding. Hegel emphasizes the limitations of the Understanding as 
follows: 
 
Thought, as Understanding, sticks to fixity of characters and their distinctness from one 
another: every such limited abstract it treats as having a subsistence and being of its 
own. (Hegel, 1817a, p.113). 
 
This “fixity” manifests itself most noticeably in rigid adherence to dichotomies. 
Examples given are many and varied, including ‘Being and Nothing’ (Hegel, 1817a, 
pp.124-133), ‘Quantity and Quality’ (ibid. pp.145-161), ‘Identity and Difference’ (ibid. 
p.166-169), ‘Cause and Effect’ (ibid. pp.215-219) and ‘Feeling and Thinking’ (Hegel 
1817c, p.93). Hegel argues that a belief in the mutually exclusive nature of such 
categories restricts one to a “partial” or “one-sided” (Hegel, 1817a, p.51) outlook, an 
outlook whose limited nature means that it cannot provide an adequate account of its 
object. 
 
We might say provisionally, and in keeping with common usage, that Hegel calls 
‘dialectical’ the style of thinking which is distinct from such one-sided thinking and 
which therefore has a better chance of grasping its object. Dialectical thought 
(sometimes also identified with ‘Reason’ per se) aims to confront the conceptual 
deliverances of the Understanding so as to undermine their fixity and rigidity: 
 
The battle of reason is the struggle to break up the rigidity to which the understanding 
has reduced everything.   (Hegel, 1817a, p.53) 
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How, then, does it achieve this? It does so partly by foregrounding the non-exclusivity 
of dichotomous pairs of predicates. For Hegel, we might say, demonstrating “the 
finitude of the partial categories of the understanding” (Hegel, 1817a, p.117) involves 
showing, amongst other things, that apparently contradictory predicates can be said to 
be true of the object under analysis and that this apparent contradiction is not something 
to be avoided but is rather to be ‘courted’ (Acton, 1967, p.23) for it moves thought on 
to a truer conception of its object. 
The Subject/Predicate Distinction 
Almost immediately, however, we ought to qualify this, for as it stands it suggests that 
a) Hegel had no issues with the standard subject/predicate distinction, and b) that 
Hegel’s position could involve jettisoning the ‘Law of (Non) Contradiction’ and/or the 
‘Law of Excluded Middle’ and therefore jettisoning standard logic. In fact a) is not true 
(Pippin, 1996; Hanna, 1996) and b) is a matter of some contention (Acton 1967; Pippin, 
1996; Hanna, 1996) 
 
To deal with the former point first, the subject/predicate distinction was for Hegel 
another example of a dichotomy that needed to be confronted. As Hanna argues (1996, 
p.261) Hegel objected to the ontological presuppositions he thought to be implicit in the 
formal attribution of predicates to a subject. In particular he objected to the separation 
posited between that which is predicated and that which it is predicated of: 
 
One’s first impression about the Judgement is the independence of the two extremes, 
the subject and the predicate. The former we take to be a thing or term per se, and the 
predicate a general term outside the said subject and somewhere in our heads.  (Hegel, 
1817a, p. 231, cited in Hanna, 1996, p.262) 
 
The grounds for Hegel’s objection to this independence are many and complex - we 
might briefly just mention three. Firstly – he objects just on principle to the assumption 
made of a separation between thought and its object. As Hanna puts it, for Hegel 
“thought and its object ...are never ontologically dichotomous” (Hanna, 1996, p.262). 
Indeed it is just such a predilection for unification, we might say, which underpins the 
various accounts of the supersession of alienation outlined earlier. 
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Secondly, and connectedly there is the idea that what is predicated of an object is in 
reality internal to that object and not just a mere property or quality to be attached to it. 
In this connection Pippin (1996) alludes to the fact that for Hegel the ‘is’ of predication 
and the ‘is’ of identity are not always conceptually distinct. As is often pointed out 
(Pippin, 1996; Westphal, 2003) some critics, most notably Russell (1914, p.48-9), have 
seen this as indicative of a significant flaw in Hegel’s reasoning. However Pippin 
suggests that it is not so much a flaw as a deliberate and conscious redrawing of 
conceptual parameters on Hegel’s part (Pippin, 1996, pp.249-251). That which 
logicians seek to attribute externally as a property of an object is (part of) that object.  
 
Lastly, and also connectedly, there is a holistic dimension to Hegel’s objection, as there 
is to the ‘dialectical’ outlook in general. Hanna combines this part of Hegel’s objection 
with the two previous objections in a fairly succinct manner when he says that for 
Hegel the correct conception of a thing “is not something over against the thing but is 
the thing itself considered in its structured fullness and total relatedness to other things” 
(Hanna, 1996, p.263). We will return to the question of holism later in this chapter, and 
also in chapter 3 when we look at the work of Engels and Levins & Lewontin. 
 
Contradiction and the Law of Excluded Middle 
As for the question of whether Hegel’s position involves jettisoning the Law of (non) 
Contradiction or the Law of Excluded Middle, and so effectively jettisoning standard 
bivalent logic, this is a difficult issue. Many commentators have argued that Hegel’s 
conception of ‘contradiction’ is a non-standard one. Acton, for example, points out that 
’contradiction’ for Hegel overlaps with other disparate phenomena such as 
“oppositions, conflicts, tensions and refutations.” (Acton, 1967, p.23); and taking this 
into account we might consider that Hegel is concerned with different matters to that of 
the formal logician. 
 
Along such lines Hanna (1996) likewise argues that Hegelian logic is not in 
competition with standard bivalent logic (or ‘common logic’ as Hegel refers to it.) 
Rather Hegel’s conception of ‘contradiction’ is one which extends beyond the limited 
conception of contradiction found in common logic, just as dialectical logic as a whole 
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extends beyond common logic. This ‘extending beyond’ involves taking common-
logical assumptions as a starting point: 
 
Hegelian logic is not a competitor of the common logic – not some grandiose 
alternative logic – but is rather the result of a more adequate ontological reflection on 
the common logic. (Hanna, 1996, p.281) 
 
Standard logic, with its rigid and static conception of contradiction, is annexed to the 
restricted outlook of the Understanding. This has its uses in certain domains, 
particularly formal domains. Problems arise however when we attempt to understand 
the real world in terms derived from the common logic, as composed of fixed elements 
that are externally related to each other, for then the implication becomes that “the 
things referred to by common-logical judgement will be as externally related as the 
terms in the proposition”. (Hanna, 1996, p.278). 
 
One, admittedly limited, way of understanding this might be as follows: In the detached 
realm of (bivalent) formal logic the mutual exclusivity of a predicate and its negation is 
a precondition for progress of any sort. It is one of the rules of the game that ‘A’ and 
‘Not A’ cannot both be true. This is what negation means and Hegel, as Hanna points 
out, is not denying that this is so. 
 
Outside of this realm, however, our predicates succumb to a certain fluidity. In any 
particular concrete case a sense can always be found where both the predicate and its 
negation can be applied, with success, to the same object. One (and only one) reason 
for this is that the meaning of a predicate is always relative to a particular standpoint or 
perspective. A tree is both ‘tall’ and ‘not tall’ relative to other objects in the world, to 
take a trivial example. Hegel’s rejection of ‘fixity’ and ‘rigidity’ in the categories with 
which we comprehend the world can thus, on this (albeit diminished) interpretation, be 
seen as questioning the assumption that the ‘fixed’ predicates and exclusive operations 
of formal logic are always usefully transposable to our interactions with the real world.  
 
We have said, then, that Hegel’s approach to contradiction, and to logic as a whole, is 
not necessarily in competition with standard bivalent logic. However insofar as the 
latter is felt to be acceptable only when it steers clear of dealings with the real world, 
we might remark that sense in which Hegel’s logic does not seek to supplant traditional 
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logic is a fairly weak one. This is particularly the case if we consider developments 
since Hegel’s time where syllogistic reasoning has been thought a contender in the race 
to develop artifacts which engage with and represent the external world. 
 
Mechanism and formal languages 
 
In relation to this latter point it is perhaps significant that Hegel’s criticisms of standard 
logic are sometimes framed in terms of a rejection of mechanism. Thus: 
 
In judgements and syllogisms the operations are in the main reduced to and founded 
upon the quantitative aspect of the determinations, consequently everything rests on an 
external difference, on mere comparison and becomes a completely analytical 
procedure and mechanical calculation. (Science of Logic, p.52 cited in Hanna, 1990, 
pp.269-270) 
 
Here we see the same critique as before but the reference to “mechanical calculation” 
adds an additional element, and one which draws our attention to a further feature of a 
dialectical outlook. We said earlier that part of the problem with common logic was that 
it failed to take account of the relative nature of predicate application. In expressing 
matters in this way we were placing emphasis on the cognizing subject. However it is 
as true to say that, on Hegel’s account, there is a similar fluidity, and holism, to be 
found in the world itself. It is for this reason, as much as any other, that a mechanized 
logic would be unable to represent the world as it actually is. In this connection Hanna 
argues that Hegel is not preoccupied with “a Luddite objection to the mere fact of 
Logical mechanization” but is rather concerned with the illegitimate imposition of the 
structures of common logic “onto ontological realms where they do not belong, namely 
the realms of organic relationships, dynamic processes and concrete truth.” (ibid. p.270) 
The world is a dynamic interrelated whole and the logic required to capture it must 
reflect this fact.  
 
It is on these grounds that Hegel also objects to Leibniz’s “language of symbols” 
(Science of Logic, p.684, cited in Hanna, 1990, p.270). Leibniz’s “subjection of the 
syllogism to the calculus of combinations and permutations” (ibid) seeks to represent 
the world by symbolic means, with a one-to-one correspondence between those 
symbols and elements of the world. However it is not the case that one can carve the 
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world up and then reanimate it in this mechanical fashion, for the elements, once “fixed 
in isolation” (ibid), will not have the same content that they had before. 
 
Holism 
 
We see above that Hegel’s critique of traditional logic leads us back to holism. The 
world cannot be adequately comprehended if its elements are “fixed in isolation”. We 
have already alluded to the holistic nature of Hegel’s dialectical outlook in several 
places. In our introduction, for instance, we noted that for Hegel “the true is the whole” 
(Hegel, 1807, p.11), and later we saw that Hegel’s objection to the isolation of subject 
and predicate was partly based on the idea that a thing is what it is by virtue of its 
relationship to other things. We will not spend space examining these ideas further 
here, particularly as we will be returning to the topic of holism again when we look at 
Engels and Levins & Lewontin. However we do want to highlight one additional 
feature of Hegel’s holistic outlook - that it does not just apply to static systems but to 
systems over time. As Rees puts it: 
 
The whole is not just the end result, the whole is the process of development through 
which the parts come to constitute the whole. (Rees, 1998, p.46) 
 
Thus an adequate conception of the object is not one that is based on a ‘snapshot’ of it 
at a particular moment, no matter how detailed and inclusive that snapshot might be. 
Holism has a temporal dimension and understanding one component of a whole does 
not just entail relating it to other co-existent elements, but also entails relating it to 
earlier and later (potential) events. 
 
Unity and Sublation 
 
We have said that Hegel rejected the fixity and rigidity of ‘The Understanding’ and that 
this rejection was partly made for dynamic/holistic reasons and partly because of an 
antipathy to exclusively dichotomous predicates. Returning to the latter point we should 
note that there is more to Hegel’s analysis of oppositional predicates than the 
observation that a pair of such predicates might both be truly applied to an object (or 
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process). There is also the further suggestion that in applying them in this way we (at 
least in some instances) make explicit their co-dependence or ‘unity’: 
 
The speculative stage, or stage of Positive Reason, apprehends the unity of terms 
(propositions) in their opposition. (Hegel, 1817a, p.119) 
 
To an extent the highlighting of this ‘unity’ can be seen as an exercise in conceptual 
clarification not that dissimilar to the project of ordinary language philosophers who 
wished to discharge certain philosophical problems by showing how they were rooted 
in a misunderstanding of everyday concepts (a point also made by Norman, 1976 and 
Stern, 2002). For example the insight that ‘presence implies absence’ can be used to 
lessen the force of particular philosophical puzzles which still resurface in 
contemporary philosophy of cognitive science. A case in point is Noë’s problem of ‘the 
whole cat’: 
 
A cat sits motionless on the far side of a picket fence. You have a sense of the presence 
of a cat even though, strictly speaking, you only see those parts of the cat that show 
through the fence. How is it possible that we can in this way enjoy a perceptual 
experience as of the whole cat?     (Noë, 2004, p.60) 
 
This puzzle has most force if one imagines that the notion of a ‘whole cat’ – a cat that, 
perceptually speaking, is entirely and only present - is meaningful in the first place.  
From a Hegelian perspective, however, such a notion is something of an abstraction; it 
implies pure ‘presence’ without any ‘absence’ and so misses the fact that seeing a cat 
just is the experience of having portions of a cat ‘present’ to us whilst other portions are 
‘absent’. From the point of view of perception, then,  a ‘whole cat’ is necessarily a 
‘unity’ of presence and absence. 
 
In some passages such unities are linked with the notion of “supersession” or 
“sublation”.  Hegel employs the German equivalent of the term 
‘superseding’(‘Aufheben’)  to give a sense of the dual nature of a movement of thought. 
‘Aufheben’ implies both ‘negating’ and ‘preserving’ (Hegel, 1807, p.68). That which 
was false in the original conception of things is negated whilst the true element is 
preserved and carried forth into a higher unity. Thus, with the case of contradictory 
categories, that which posited mutual exclusivity on either side of the divide is 
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jettisoned, and the resultant synthesis
1
 gives us a more accurate representation of a state 
of affairs. In some instances – though not all – this synthesis involves the positing of a 
third term which is held to incorporate the positive aspects of both of the previous 
terms.  
 
Below we will give three examples of such progressions from the Logic. It is important 
to bear in mind that Hegel considered the transition from one concept to the other to be 
as significant as the concepts themselves. This was another reason for his objection to 
standard bivalent logic which he thought held “two determinations over against one 
another and has in mind only them but not their transition, which is the essential point 
and which contains the contradiction” (Science of Logic, p.441, cited in Hanna, 1996, 
p.278). As always there is some ambiguity whether the ‘transition’ to which Hegel 
refers is a transition only in thought or in the objective world also, or both (and as usual 
we have to add the rider that this distinction is itself problematic with Hegel). 
Nevertheless we can say that it refers at least to the former. Hegel is concerned in the 
Logic with the transitions thought makes when presented with a particular concept. 
Thus Hegel’s criticism of the formal contradictions of bivalent logic hinges partly on 
the notion that movements in thought – rather than the results of thought – are relevant 
concerns for logic. It is for such manoeuvres, as Hartnack points out, that Hegel was 
accused of “bringing movement into logic” (Hartnack, 1998, p.14). 
 
Being, Nothing and Becoming 
 
Our first example of such a transition is that outlined in the ‘First Subdivision of the 
Logic’ (Hegel, 1817a, pp.123-169) as a progression from ‘being’ to ‘nothing’ and then 
to unification in ‘becoming’. Some of the obscurity of this movement might be 
removed if it is explained beforehand that Hegel’s intention was to concentrate on “the 
world of simple essentialities freed from all sensuous concreteness” (Harnack, 1998, 
p.15). Hence he wished to start out with talk of ‘pure being’ freed from any concrete 
determination.  
 
                                                 
1
 We should, however, be wary of attributing to Hegel an explicit adherence to a triad consisting of 
‘thesis, antithesis and synthesis’. Such a construction rarely if ever makes an appearance in his work 
(Mueller, 1996), although some commentators (e.g. Rees, 1998) see it as implied. 
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In considering ‘being’ per se, says Hegel, one is inevitably led on to consider its 
opposite ‘nothing’, for ‘being’ per se denotes nothing (Hegel, 1817a, p.127). In 
considering ‘nothing’ however we are drawn into considering its identity with being, 
insofar as both lack a referent. At this point Hegel takes a step back and notes that this 
movement back and forth (between ‘being’ and ‘nothing’) is itself significant and 
constitutes a third category which unites them both (‘becoming’ – being becomes 
nothing and vice-versa). ‘Becoming’ is thus the unity of ‘Being’ and ‘Nothing’ (ibid. 
p.128) 
 
Whatever we might think of this reasoning, it has additional significance for us insofar 
as it highlights the importance Hegel laid on the category of ‘becoming’. We have 
already alluded to this to some extent when we noted that Hegel’s holism had a 
temporal aspect. Here Hegel reinforces this idea with reference to the pre-socratic 
philosopher Heraclitus: 
 
Becoming is the first adequate vehicle of truth….When Heraclitus says ‘All is flowing’ 
he enunciates Becoming as the fundamental feature of all existence. (Hegel, 1817a, 
p.132) 
 
Hegel, then, understood the world in terms of process and the realization of potential. It 
is an intrinsically dynamic outlook, a point which is well made by Rees when he 
suggests that the supplanting of ‘being’ and ‘nothing’ by ‘becoming’ involves 
“replacing two static concepts with one dynamic concept” (Rees, 1998, p.50). 
 
Quantity, Quality and Measure 
 
A second example of the unification of two concepts via the interpolation of a third 
concept can be found in passages where Hegel deals with ‘quantity’, ‘quality’ and what 
he calls ‘measure’(Hegel 1817a, pp.135-161). Hegel goes into considerable 
mathematical detail in these passages, particularly when addressing the concept of 
‘quantity’ in relation to other connected concepts such as ‘unity and sum’, ‘ration’, 
magnitude’, ‘quantum’ and ‘degree’. We will bypass this detail and merely note in a 
general way that for Hegel the concepts of ‘quantity’ and ‘quality’ are reciprocally 
related and this relation is expressed through use of the term ‘measure’. In fact, as 
Inwood (1989) also notes, this term is itself used in a variety of ways and perhaps with 
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some equivocation (e.g. “God … is the measure of all things” – Hegel 1817a, p.157); 
but the key idea seems to be that the ‘measure’ of a particular quality is that quantity of 
it beyond which it passes into being a different quality: 
 
This process of measure, which appears alternately as a mere change of quantity and 
then as a sudden revulsion of quantity into quality, may be envisaged under the figure 
of a nodal (knotted) line. Such lines we find in Nature under a variety of forms.  
(Hegel, 1817a, p.160) 
 
Whereas elsewhere the question of whether dialectical transitions are a property of 
thought only or of the world also, seems bound up with metaphysical issues concerning 
the relation between the two in Hegel’s overarching system, here Hegel states 
unambiguously that this dialectical relation applies to natural phenomena. Examples 
given include “increase or diminution of the temperature of the liquid water” (ibid. 
p.159) resulting in ice or steam, as well as standard examples from Greek sorites 
paradoxes (“whether a single grain makes a heap of wheat or whether it makes a bald-
tail to tear out a single hair from the horses tail”- ibid. p.159).  
 
Cause, Effect and Reciprocity 
 
A third example of the sublation of two concepts by a third is that of ‘cause’, ‘effect’ 
and ‘reciprocity’. Hegel puts forward a variety of arguments for the inseparability of 
‘cause’ and ‘effect’ (Hegel, 1817a, pp.215-217),  These include a) that one cannot 
consider ‘cause’ without considering ‘effect’ b) that conceptually an effect is the cause 
of a cause’s being a cause, and vice versa c) that in certain specific cases the terms 
‘cause’ and ‘effect’ have the same denotation – for example: “the rain (the cause) and 
the wet (the effect) are the self-same existing water” (ibid. p.216), and d) that in some 
cases certain features of the object affected facilitate the resulting effect and so can 
likewise be seen as a cause. From such considerations, and particularly from d), Hegel 
concludes that “in this manner causality passes into the relation of Action and Reaction, 
or Reciprocity” (ibid. p.217). Hegel sees ‘reciprocity’ or ‘reciprocal action’ as 
providing a more adequate description of causal relations per se - “Reciprocal action 
realizes the causal relation in its complete development” (ibid. p.218). As was the case 
with Quantity, Quality and Measure Hegel proceeds to give real world examples, 
although in this instance they do not illustrate the transition itself but the 
appropriateness of the resultant synthesis. Thus for example only an explanation in 
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terms of reciprocity can answer the question of “whether the character and manners of a 
nation are the cause of its constitution and its laws or if they are not rather the effect.” 
(ibid. p.219) and likewise with living organisms: “the several organs and functions 
similarly seem to stand to each other in the relation of reciprocity” (ibid.) 
 
It should be noted that the notion of reciprocal interaction, although first developed in 
detail in response to specific puzzles about causation, is in fact central to Hegel’s whole 
system. Burbidge (2006) points out in this respect that ‘reciprocity’ is implicit in many 
of the conceptual progressions in the Logic, including those we have addressed: 
 
Being and nothing reciprocally interact in the concept of becoming, as do…quantity 
and quality in the concept of measure.  (Burbidge, 2006, p.79) 
 
Thus, ‘reciprocal action’ is both a move in a particular dialectical progression and a 
central feature of the dialectical approach itself. 
 
The dialectic within dialectics 
 
We have given, then, three illustrations of what we might call ‘dialectical progressions’ 
from the Logic. We should note here that, whilst in certain passages the term ‘dialectic’ 
is used in a general way to denote the entire modus operandi of developing thought 
(e.g. Hegel, 1821, p.37), when Hegel is being more precise about the mechanics of 
these progressions he reserves the term for only one of their stages. Hence in one 
passage the three ‘moments’ in a movement of thought are given as “a) the Abstract 
side, or that of the understanding; b) the Dialectical, or that of negative reason; c) the 
Speculative, or that of positive reason” (Hegel, 1817a, p.113) Burbidge gives a fairly 
succinct explanation of Hegel’s meaning here: 
 
Understanding isolates a concept as a unit of thought. It integrates a synthesis into a 
unity and marks out its determinate limits. Dialectical reason is the transition of thought 
that moves from a concept to its contrary. This direct shift, suggests Hegel, is the 
inevitable result of isolating a term from its context through understanding. Speculative 
reason is the work of reflection: it looks back over what has happened, sees the various 
moments as well as their connections and identifies the significance of what has gone 
on.  (Burbidge, 2006, p.41) 
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Given that we have already characterized the Understanding as all that is inadequate 
and one-sided in thought it is perhaps confusing that it is depicted here as ‘integrating a 
synthesis into a unity.’ The rationale behind this seems to be as follows: The initial one 
sided deliverances of the Understanding are countered by the intervention of the 
negative at the dialectical stage (e.g. it is shown that ‘cause’ also implies ‘effect’). The 
speculative stage is then concerned with synthesis, giving an account of the co-
dependent nature of these two components (in this case by positing ‘reciprocity’ as 
unity of cause and effect). The cycle then returns to the Understanding which once 
again has a single, discrete term as its starting point (‘reciprocity’), albeit one which 
now incorporates elements of the previously two separate terms. 
 
It will not be necessary to keep in mind this narrower conception of the term ‘dialectic’ 
for the remainder of this thesis. However it is perhaps worth noting the similarities 
between the above account and that of the ‘negation of the negation’, which we will 
encounter when we look at Engels’ work in chapter 3.  
 
Abstraction 
Some mention ought also to be made here of Hegel’s use of the term ‘abstract’ which 
we have already encountered in a few places. In an earlier passage we saw how the 
“pure thought” of the Stoic was regarded as ‘abstract’ and so lacking in real content. 
Likewise we have more recently seen how the limited outlook of the ‘Understanding’ is 
also considered abstract. As might be expected, clarification of this term is not 
straightforward. This is partly because Hegel does not always use this term in ‘the 
same’ way. Grier (1990), for instance, notes six possible interpretations of the term. 
Matters are further complicated (as Grier also notes)  by the fact that the fixed points 
against which one might hope to define a concept such as ‘abstract’ cease to be fixed in 
Hegel’s account. Thus for example, one might think that the distinction between 
‘abstract’ and its opposite ‘concrete’ could be anchored in some way to the traditional 
philosophical distinction between ‘universal’ and ‘particular’, but this particular 
distinction is itself developed in an idiosyncratic way in Hegel’s account, with both 
concepts themselves declared to be ‘abstractions’ in at least one passage (Hegel, 1821, 
p.18).  
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Nevertheless, simplifying somewhat we might say that sense of the term we are 
particularly interested in for current purposes is the fairly pejorative sense where the 
word is used not merely to describe a certain detachment from reality but also to imply 
that the deliverances of the understanding do not  - to adopt a common metaphor – 
‘carve reality at the joints.’ The concepts of the understanding are ‘abstract’ insofar as 
their very fixity means that they are unable to fix the phenomena at which they are 
directed. As Norman puts it an idea is abstract “not in being over generalized, but in 
being cut off – abstracted – from its relations to the other concepts which make it 
intelligible.” (Norman, 1976, p.43) and later he adds that abstractions are “concepts 
which are incomplete in themselves and require to be taken as moments in a totality” 
(ibid. p.64). The concept of ‘abstraction’ then, is also one which can only be understood 
in relation to Hegel’s holistic outlook. 
The Object of Dialectics 
 
At the beginning of this chapter we speculated about the subject of the Phenomenology. 
As we approach its end we might briefly address the issue of the object of the Logic. To 
what does ‘dialectics’ apply? Novack suggests there are three possible answers to this 
question. The first is that dialectics applies to nothing because it is “sheer metaphysics” 
and “meaningless verbiage” (Novack, 2002, p.189). The second is that it applies to 
“mental or social processes but not nature” (ibid). The last is that it applies to 
everything including nature. Which of these is true of Hegel?  
 
Burbidge’s account seems to imply that the last of these positions must follow from 
Hegel’s metaphysics. Taking as his starting point Hegel’s declared intention of 
superseding the Kantian dichotomy between the world as we experience it and the 
world as it is in-itself, he suggests that on Hegel’s analysis therefore “the study of the 
way pure thought thinks can also be read as an exploration of the ultimate principles of 
reality.” (Burbidge, 2006, p.15) and later continues “the concepts pure thought thinks, 
as well as the transitions it makes, capture the structures and processes of reality” (ibid. 
p.35). However Burbidge has perhaps blurred together two separate possible positions 
here. All that is needed to supersede the Kantian dichotomy is a position which states 
that dialectical reasoning helps us to understand the world as it is in-itself. This is not 
the same as the position which states that the dialectical reasoning helps us understand 
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the world as it is in-itself because that world is objectively dialectical – i.e. that it itself 
contains dialectical transitions etc.  
 
In fact, although there is a fundamental ambiguity concerning the over all ontological 
status of the transitions presented in the Logic, we do not need to resort to metaphysics 
in order to establish Hegel’s position on this question. We have already said that for 
Hegel the world was to be understood in a dynamic and holistic fashion, and we have 
seen, for example, how he thought that the transition from quantitative change to 
qualitative change revealed itself in natural phenomena. Thus there is little doubt that 
he thought that dialectical processes were ‘out there’ in as strong a sense as is possible, 
given an absolute idealist starting point. This realism about dialectical processes is 
evidenced by a smattering of other comments throughout the Logic (particularly in 
footnotes) dealing with empirical matters. We note for example his general statement 
that the purpose of ‘Dialectic’ is to “to study things in their own being and movement” 
(Hegel, 1817a, p.117). We note too his observations that “Everything around us may be 
viewed as an instance of dialectic” (ibid, p.118), “Life as life involves the germ of 
death” (ibid. p.117), “Matter…is the unity of attraction and repulsion is gravity” (ibid. 
p.204) “General experience shows us the extreme of one state suddenly shifting into its 
opposite” (ibid. p.118). As we shall see in chapter 3, later writers such as Engels (1883, 
1887) and Levins & Lewontin (1985) have taken such statements as a cue for the 
development of a full-fledged natural dialectics.  
 
 
Conclusion – Dialectics and Alienation. 
 
In this chapter, then, we have looked briefly at the concept of ‘alienation’ in Hegel’s 
work, conceived most generally as the separation of the subject from the object and the 
consequent presentation of that object as something alien to the subject. Alienation is 
‘superceded’ when the subject recognizes itself within that object and thereby achieves 
a unity with it. We have also looked at the concept of ‘externalization’ which, on our 
analysis at least, is a process implicit in but not identical with alienation. A subject 
externalizes itself by extending and/or duplicating itself in its environment. In doing so 
it simultaneously makes its own being more substantial. Lastly, we have looked at 
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Hegel’s dialectics. We have said this is characterized by a number of features including 
(but not exhausted by) holism, an anti-dichotomous approach, a dynamic view of the 
world and a belief in reciprocal action.  
 
We might conclude by noting that, on Hegel’s analysis, dialectical thought and the 
supersession of alienation go hand in hand. Dialectics, because of its inherently 
unfragmented and anti-dichotomous nature, is the style of thinking most suited to the 
unification of the subject with the object. This point is well made by Stern who argues 
that in the Phenomenology: 
 
…consciousness is faced by apparently intractable difficulties in making the world a 
‘home’, until at last it comes to recognize that what underlies these difficulties is its 
failure to think dialectically  (Stern, 2002, p.23). 
 
In later chapters our focus on the ‘retreat from alienation’ in cognitive science will take 
as given this co-dependence between dialectical styles of thinking and the project of 
developing a unified ‘unalienated’ conception of the agent. Before considering such 
matters, however, we must turn to Marx. 
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Chapter 2 – Marx on Alienation and Praxis 
 
Introduction 
 
In chapter 1 we looked at Hegel, focusing not only on material that deals explicitly with 
alienation but also on related material which we grouped together under the headings of 
‘externalization’ and ‘dialectics’. We now turn to Marx. Here again our analysis will 
extend beyond those elements of his work which might be thought to deal specifically 
with alienation. Our rationale for this is essentially the same as with our treatment of 
Hegel. The concept of alienation is internally related to a wealth of other concepts – 
which concepts are also of relevance to our analysis of cognitive science. Nevertheless 
the interpretation of Marx put forward is still one that views alienation as central to his 
account. In his philosophic work at least, all roads lead to alienation and its 
supersession. 
 
It should perhaps be made clear that such an interpretation has not just been 
manufactured for the convenience of this thesis but rather represents a particular strand 
in Marxian thought. Whereas some commentators (e.g. Althusser, 1969) have seen 
Marx’s interest in ‘alienation’ as being confined to a youthful ‘Hegelian’ period which 
was not representative of the main corpus of his work, others have seen it as central to 
his outlook. (e.g.  Fromm, 1966; Fischer, 1968 ; Mészáros, 1970).  In favour of the 
latter interpretation it is often pointed out (e.g. Mészáros, 1970 ; Humphries, 1971; 
Mclellan, 1979), that references to ‘alienation’ are not restricted to Marx’s earlier 
works. We will not debate this issue further here however. 
 
Turning Hegel ‘right side up’ 
 
Many of the themes we found in Hegel’s work, including the major ones of alienation, 
externalization and dialectics, reappear in the works of Marx. This is not surprising as 
much of Marx’s philosophy was developed in response to Hegel. He was not alone in 
this but was following a path travelled by his ‘young Hegelian’ contemporaries whose 
work also had an influence on Marx’s in various ways (McLellan, 1969; Stepelevich, 
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1987). Our concern here, however, is not with this latter relationship but with the 
relation pertaining directly between Hegel and Marx.  
 
A useful summary of this relationship, and one which highlights ways in which Marx is 
in simultaneous agreement and disagreement with Hegel, can be found in the hedged 
endorsement he gives of the stratagem adopted in the Phenomenology: 
 
The mystification which dialectic suffers in Hegel’s hands, by no means prevents him 
from being the first to present its general form of working in a comprehensive and 
conscious manner. With him it is standing on its head. It must be turned right side up 
again, if you would discover the rational kernel within the mystical shell. (Marx, 1873, 
p.15) 
 
Here Marx has taken Hegel at his own word and interpreted the subject of the 
Phenomenology as being that of ‘Spirit’ or ‘Mind’. This is the ‘mystification’ to which 
he refers. Hegel, according to Marx, has made the mistake of taking one aspect of 
human existence and placing it on centre stage as an entity in its own right – he has 
taken “the life process of the human brain i.e. the process of thinking” and has 
transformed it “into an independent subject” (ibid, p.14.) 
 
Nevertheless, says Marx, if one disregards the purported subject of the Phenomenology 
one can see the essential truth in Hegel’s position. Hegel is right in his diagnosis of an 
alienated subject. As he says elsewhere, Hegel “grasps the alienation of man, even 
though man appears only in the form of mind” (Marx, 1844a, p.100). Moreover, he is 
broadly correct in his description of the overarching process whereby this subject 
realizes itself and surmounts alienation through the resolution of antagonisms presented 
by the world. Turning Hegel ‘right side up’ however means restoring the subject to a 
fully fledged human being – “an embodied, living, real sentient objective being” (ibid, 
p.104) - and recognizing that the self-realization of this embodied subject is a practical, 
rather than rational, task. 
 
The Self-Creation of the Embodied Subject 
 
In fact, as we saw in the previous chapter, there are passages where Hegel himself also 
presents self-realization - or “self-creation” (ibid, p.101) -  as a practical rather than 
 55 
merely rational matter, as for example in the story of the Lord and Bondsman or in his 
analysis of labour in his early unpublished writings. Marx would not have been aware 
of the latter and there is some debate concerning his familiarity with the former (Arthur 
1983 ; Sayers, 2003). Nevertheless, even if these are acknowledged, the point for Marx 
would seem to be that, in the Phenomenology at least,  such concrete instances are 
presented as mere moments in the self-development of  an abstract ‘self-consciousness’ 
which ultimately realizes itself in an ideal, disembodied fashion (Marx, 1844a, pp.100-
101). Marx wishes to supplant this idealist account with a materialist one. 
 
What, then, are the constituent elements of the practical self-creation of the embodied 
subject in Marx’s account? In answering this we should begin by noting that, for Marx, 
man is an essentially productive creature. He is, as Avineri (1968, pp.65-95) puts it, 
‘Homo Faber’. Implicit in such a conception is not only the idea that man’s physical 
survival is dependent on labour, or even just that he finds satisfaction in labour, but that 
it is through this activity that man becomes what he is – he is the “result of his own 
labour” (Marx, 1844a, p.101). We should note that ‘labour’ here is not to be considered 
merely in terms of the narrowly prescribed activities that are allotted to the individual 
in the form of ‘work’ in modern industrial societies. Rather by ‘labour’ is meant a more 
generally conceived working over of the natural world for diverse ends - a working 
over which would ideally manifest itself as “free conscious activity” (Marx, 1844a, 
p.82 & see later).  This notion of the ‘self-creation through labour’ incorporates several 
theses which, albeit in a somewhat artificial way, can be considered separately.  
 
Firstly there is what we might call a ‘developmental’ thesis – the idea that the agent 
(‘man’) develops by acting on the material world: 
 
Through this movement he acts upon external nature and changes it, and in this way he 
simultaneously changes his own nature. (Marx, 1867, p.283) 
  
There is, then, a reciprocal interaction between Man and the material world – Man 
effects changes in the material world and in turn his ‘nature’ is affected by these very 
changes (and vice versa). There is a “dynamic relationship between man and nature” 
whereby “both poles are transformed” (Arthur, 1986, p.11). We should note that this 
transformation has a cognitive dimension, and thus one implication is that the cognitive 
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faculties of the agent are developed through the alteration of the external world in 
production of an artifact. As Fischer puts it - “As men changed the world they 
expanded and refined their ability to know it, and the growing capacity for cognition 
again enhanced their ability to change it ” (Fischer, 1968, p.p.152-153). This idea has 
been developed in various ways by other Marxists, including Marx’s contemporary 
Engels (1883, 1887), and later by the Russian Psychologist Vygotsky (1930, 1978). We 
shall return to these two theorists in the next chapter. 
 
Secondly there is implicit in the notion of ‘self-creation through labour’ what might be 
called a ‘duplication’ thesis – the agent’s sense of who s/he is, is reinforced by seeing 
him/herself in the works s/he has created: 
 
It is in the working over of the objective world that man first affirms himself as a 
species-being. This production is his active species-life. Through it nature appears as 
his work and his reality. The object of work is therefore the objectification of the 
species-life of man; for he duplicates himself not only intellectually, in his mind, but 
also actively in reality and thus can look at his image in a world he has created.  
(Marx, 1844a, p.82) 
 
Here, as Sayers (2003) also point out, we see clear echoes of Hegel’s idea, outlined in 
the previous chapter, that “man brings himself before himself by practical activity”. For 
Marx (or at least the young Marx), however, this process was linked with the idea of 
‘species being’ (and ‘species life’). This perhaps confusing, and variously used, term 
was originally derived from Feuerbach who was one of many to ask the question: 
“What constitutes the essential difference between man and the animal?” (Feuerbach, 
1841, p.97). According to Feuerbach the answer lay in the idea that only human beings 
are able to make their own species into an object of thought. This, on his analysis, 
provided the precondition for other qualities more typically taken as key indicators of 
humanity, such as consciousness and empathy: 
 
Strictly speaking, consciousness is given only in the case of a being to whom his 
species, his mode of being, is an object of thought… Man is in himself both “I” and 
“You”; he can put himself in the place of another precisely because his species, his 
essential mode of being – not only his individuality- is an object of thought to him.            
(Feuerbach, 1841, pp.97-98)                                        
 
In Marx’s case we might interpret ‘species being’ as denoting Man’s essence as a 
socially productive animal. This may be something of a simplification but to go into 
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any greater detail at this juncture would take us on too much of a detour. The point for 
present purposes is that with Marx, as with Hegel in the Lord and Bondsman parable, 
there is an intersubjective dimension to the self-creation of the subject - “the 
relationship of man to himself first becomes objective to him through his relationship to 
other men.” (Marx, 1844a, p.84).This intersubjective dimension expresses itself not 
passively but actively, for it is through productive activity that the relationship of 
agents to each other and themselves is established and developed.  
 
As regards the ‘duplication’ of the agent in his product, we might suggest two different 
‘social’ interpretations. Firstly we can say that the individual duplicates himself for 
others and that his sense of identity is therefore reinforced by its recognition by others 
as his product (Marx, 1844b, pp.121-122). Secondly in many instances the product 
itself might be the result of collective activity and thus the duplication could constitute 
an expression of social being. This latter will become important when we turn to 
discussion of the commodity. 
 
We have said then, that ‘development’ and ‘duplication’ are two facets of the self-
creation of the embodied subject through practical activity on a Marxian account. A 
third facet might be called ‘extension’. As with Hegel, Marx in various places suggests 
that the agent in acting on the environment extends into it. He asserts for example that 
“Nature is the inorganic body of man” (Marx, 1844a, p.81) As with Hegel again, there 
is some overlap here with the idea of ‘duplication’, for seeing oneself reflected in the 
surrounding environment or expressing oneself in ones’ products can both be taken as 
examples of agent extension. However Marx sometimes appears to mean more than 
this. One particularly significant example occurs in a discussion of the fashioning of 
tools from natural resources, where it is asserted that “nature becomes one of the organs 
of his [the productive individual’s] activity, one that he annexes to his own bodily 
organs” (Marx, 1867, p.285.) In this passage a tool serves more literally as an extension 
of the agent. It enlarges the domain of activities that the agent is able to carry out and so 
becomes effectively a proxy body part. We might surmise also that Marx intended a 
subjective element to be implied here – that the tool is experienced as a spatial 
extension of the body – for although no explicit comment is made to this effect in the 
cited passage, it is clear from material elsewhere that he was as much concerned with 
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the subjective experience of the interface between man and technology as with its 
objective repercussions (see section below – ‘The Machine’) 
 
The Material Basis of Thought 
 
One upshot of the fact that the embodied subject ‘creates’ or ‘realizes’ himself through 
practical interaction with the material world is that the way that productive activity is 
organized in a society (the ‘mode of production’) will affect who s/he is: 
 
The mode of production must not be considered simply as being the production of the 
physical existence of the individuals. Rather it is a definite form of activity of these 
individuals, a definite form of expressing their life, a definite mode of life on their part. 
As individuals express their life, so they are. (Marx & Engels, 1970b, p.42)  
 
Marx is partly just making what is almost a logical point here – from a third-person 
standpoint we are what we do, as a behaviourist might say, and therefore anything that 
impacts on what we do must also have an impact on who we are. However there is also 
a more cognitively significant implication. The manner in which production is 
organised affects not only who we are in a third person sense, but has repercussions for 
our subjective conception of the world. Marx expresses this idea in rather negative 
sounding terms as follows: 
 
The phantoms formed in the human brain are also, necessarily, sublimates of their 
material life process, which is empirically verifiable and bound to material premises. 
Life is not determined by consciousness but consciousness by life. (Marx & Engels, 
1970b, p.47) 
 
The ‘phantoms’ that Marx refers to here are the ideas that we have. We might separate 
out two fairly distinct, but related, arguments in this passage. Firstly there is the 
argument that the immediate subjective consciousness of each individual human being 
– the unreflective way he/she relates to the world - is affected by the type of 
productivity he engages in and more generally by his/her relationship to the world of 
production. What this might mean in the arena of modern industrial production we will 
look at shortly when we examine ‘alienated labour’.   Secondly there is the suggestion 
that the way production is organized in a society, and the way that society is organized 
by production, has a determinate effect on what theoretical ideas come to dominate. 
 59 
Certain outlooks, in the realms of philosophy or science for example, although they 
may make no explicit reference to particular forms of socio-economic organization, 
nevertheless reflect these forms in the assumptions they make. This idea is of course 
commonplace now – it serves as the starting point for ‘Marxist’ research in many areas 
of academia, particularly in social science and the humanities. One application of this 
idea from the realm of biology is Levins and Lewontin’s (1985) suggestion that 
Darwinian evolutionary theory could not have got a foothold in a feudal society based 
on “fixed hereditary relations” because in such a social world an outlook that “made 
change an essential feature of natural systems” would have been inconceivable (pp.11-
12). Only in a society in which productive relations had become revolutionized by 
capitalism could such ideas appear congenial. We will look further at the work of 
Levins and Lewontin in the next chapter. 
 
 Determinism 
 
In highlighting how Marx thought that ideas are ‘sublimates’ of productive relations 
(and the societies they produce) the question arises of whether Marx’s materialism is 
one that implies determinism. In fact there is some ambiguity here. It is often remarked 
that Marx rejected ‘crude determinism’ or ‘mechanical materialism’ (e.g. Engels, 
1887 ; Levine, 1975) and his work seems in the most part to confirm this. In this respect 
his position is perhaps best summed up by his dictum that that “circumstances make 
men, just as much as men make circumstances” (Marx & Engels, 1970b, p.59). 
Reversing the emphasis here we might observe that Marx does not think that human 
activity is dictated by material conditions via a one way causal chain – like the 
movement of a ball on a snooker table after collision with another ball. Rather man is a 
“conscious active agent” (Levine, 1975, p.8) whose practice reciprocally influences and 
is influenced by those conditions. This is a perspective which recognizes the 
autonomous, self-creating nature of the subject whilst also acknowledging his 
embeddedness in the physical world.  
 
Some commentators have seen in this perspective a potential threat to materialism 
insofar as equal weight appears to be attached to the realm of the self-determined agent 
as to the material environment. For this reason they have gone on to posit a material 
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‘first cause’ as a means of emphasizing the priority of physical circumstances. Thus 
Arthur (1970): 
 
Any Marxian attempt to resolve the apparent antithesis between mechanical 
determination and self conscious activity must include the point that in the first 
instance material circumstances condition us, however much we revolutionise those 
conditions later.  (p.25) 
 
Such speculation, however, seems a little misconceived for it is difficult to see how 
‘material circumstances’ if they can ‘condition us’ once (by which Arthur presumably 
means ‘determine us’) should fail to do so in an ongoing fashion. Arthur is here perhaps 
being ‘insufficiently dialectical’ in searching for an initiating material event which gets 
the ball rolling in standard linear causal fashion rather than accepting the inherently 
reciprocal nature of the relationship between agent and material world on a Marxian 
account. This is not to suggest, however, that it is an easy matter characterizing circular 
causal relationships such that questions of temporal priority cease to be a concern. We 
will return to this topic when we look at Merleau-Ponty in the next chapter. 
 
Nevertheless, whilst Marx does stress the autonomy of the self-creating subject, there 
are aspects of his work which are at least more amenable to a ‘deterministic’ 
interpretation. Some of his writings on historical development, for example, have been 
taken as implying, in Hegelian fashion, a degree of inevitability in the progression from 
one mode of social organization to another. (We will see an example of this when we 
look at the ‘negation of the negation’ in the next chapter.)  It is possible to see in such 
inevitability an historical determinist thesis which places limitations on the effective 
agency of human beings, as well as justification for placing limits on their actual 
freedom (see e.g. Popper, 1945.)  We will not discuss this complex issue further here. 
We will just stress that insofar as there are ‘two Marx’s’ with respect to this question -  
a non-determinist and a possibly more determinist one (Humphries, 1971) -  the 
perspective and sympathies of this thesis lie firmly with the former. 
 
Marx contra Hegel on Alienation 
 
We said earlier that on a Marxian analysis man is an essentially productive being, but 
that how he produces has a determinate effect on who he is and how he relates to the 
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world. It follows from this that terms like ‘production’ or ‘labour’, when presented in 
the abstract, do not sufficiently describe their likely effects on the agent. Productive 
activity, unqualified, might be a good or a bad thing for a human being. It is here that 
another area of disagreement between Hegel and Marx emerges. We saw in Hegel’s 
Lord and Bondsman story, that whilst the Bondsman initially experiences his 
productive activity and its object as something negative and alienating, over time it 
becomes a source of empowerment and affirmation. The bondsman both acquires a 
“mind of his own” (Hegel, 1807, p.119) and appropriates the world as part of himself.  
 
The problem, from a Marxian point of view, with this analysis is that the self-creation 
and affirmation occurs whilst the bondsman is still enslaved to the Lord, as though the 
latter fact will have no ultimate effect on the bondsman’s development or relationship 
to the world. Alienation is surmounted through perseverance and an accompanying 
change of perspective on the part of the bondsman, without any accompanying change 
in social relations. As Rees puts it : 
 
Only the bondsman’s consciousness has been transformed, not his real relation to the 
lord. There has been a revolution in thought but no revolution in social relations. (Rees, 
1988, p.39) 
 
Hegel is able to make this move because for him the distinction between alienated and 
unalienated labour is not tied to any particular material or productive arrangements but 
rather has to do with ‘externality’ per se (Lukacs, 1975 ; Rees, 1988 – although this is 
to some degree disputed by Sayers, 2003). Although many of the details of the 
individual accounts found in the Phenomenology and elsewhere – such as the earlier 
part of the Lord and Bondsman story, his account of the relation between individual and 
state, and the story of the Unhappy Consciousness – indicate that Hegel had an 
awareness of the particular concrete determinants of alienated consciousness, this is not 
his central concern. Rather the grand meta-narrative of the Phenomenology sees the 
‘thingness’ of the objective world itself as problematic, as the externalization of self-
consciousness and so as something to be “superseded and absorbed” (Marx, 1844a, 
p.103).  
 
On Hegel’s account, then, because alienation per se has no necessary link to any 
particular social configuration its supersession is not contingent on any change of social 
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relations. Marx’s account is very different in that he sees alienation – subjectively, the 
perception of the world as a separate and alien power – as arising only from particular 
social/productive arrangements, and its supersession is therefore contingent on the 
practical abolition of those arrangements. It has nothing to do with the externality of the 
material world as such. Indeed Marx emphasizes that the ‘thingness’ of the world plays 
a central role in our development as embodied agents – “the fact that man is an 
embodied, living, real, sentient objective being means that he has real, sensuous objects 
as the objects of his life expression” (Marx, 1844a, p.104), and suggests also that our 
‘nature’ is in this sense necessarily exterior to us – “A being that does not have its 
nature outside itself is not a natural being and has no part in the natural world” (ibid).  
 
 
Free conscious activity and the ‘whole man’ 
 
We have said that for Marx, unlike Hegel, alienation only arises in certain 
social/productive circumstances. Thus the individual’s productive activy is either 
alienated or unalienated according to those circumstances – more specifically it is either 
‘free conscious activity’ (Marx, 1844a, p.82) or 'alienated labour'.  We will look at the 
latter shortly. As regards the former – it is difficult to summarise Marx’s account of un-
alienated labour in a fashion that is any more concise than Marx’s own description of it 
in a passage from a text entitled On James Mill.  We will therefore reproduce that 
passage in full below as it will make a useful reference point both in this chapter and in 
later ones: 
 
Let us suppose that we had carried out production as human beings. Each of us would 
have in two ways affirmed himself and the other person.  
 
1) In my production I would have objectified my individuality, its specific character, 
and therefore enjoyed not only an individual manifestation of my life during the 
activity, but also when looking at the object I would have the individual pleasure of 
knowing my personality to be objective, visible to the senses and hence a power beyond 
all doubt.  
 
2) In your enjoyment or use of my product I would have the direct enjoyment both of 
being conscious of having satisfied a human need by my work, that is, of having 
objectified man's essential nature, and of having thus created an object corresponding 
to the need of another man's essential nature.  
 
3) I would have been for you the mediator between you and the species, and therefore 
would become recognised and felt by you yourself as a completion of your own 
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essential nature and as a necessary part of yourself, and consequently would know 
myself to be confirmed both in your thought and your love.  
 
4) In the individual expression of my life I would have directly created your expression 
of your life, and therefore in my individual activity I would have directly confirmed 
and realised my true nature, my human nature, my communal nature. 
 
Our products would be so many mirrors in which we saw reflected our essential nature.      
 (Marx, 1844b, pp. 121-122) 
 
 
We see, then, an all round sense of realization both of the expressive powers of the 
individual and of his, and others’, social being. Like Hegel’s spirit at the end of its 
journey, man is at home in himself and with the world. Unlike Hegel’s account, 
however, there is nothing unearthly about this scenario- it is an ‘at home-ness’ firmly 
grounded in materiality. The elements of this tableau, and their configuration, could be 
characterized and enumerated in a number of different ways; but for our purposes we 
will say that there is a tripartite relationship between three components – the individual, 
his/her product and other individuals. This relationship is mediated by productive 
activity; intersubjective relations are facilitated by practical relations. The outcome 
might be described as a “oneness” (Fromm, 1966, p.31) or a “unity” (Fischer, 1968, 
p.15) between the elements involved – ultimately reducible to a unity between ‘man’ 
and ‘nature’ (Arthur, 1986, p.11).  
 
Such a unity is sometimes characterized by Marx in more biological terms – for 
example as “the unity of living and active humanity with the natural inorganic 
conditions of their metabolic exchange with nature” (Marx, 1855, p.489), a point we 
shall return to in chapter 6. With respect to the individual it is also sometimes 
characterized in terms of the development or reconstitution of the “whole man” (Marx, 
1844a, p.91; Fisher, 1968, pp.15-30). When activity is free the fragmentation imposed 
by industrial labour is superseded and the individual is once again complete insofar as 
s/he is unified with his/herself, with others and with the material world. The communal 
and practical unity which ushers in this era of the ‘whole man’, however, is only 
attainable when the collective activity in question is “voluntary” (Marx, 1844a, p.80) 
and “spontaneous” (ibid.) rather than coerced or enforced by necessity. Human beings 
realize themselves through practical activity but such activity must be allowed to unfold 
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in an unrestricted fashion, for the “free development of each is the condition for the free 
development of all.” (Marx & Engels, 1848, p.26). 
 
The idea of attaining a unity or ‘wholeness’ through practical activity becomes more 
meaningful once we contrast it with Marx’s account of ‘alienated labour’. We will now 
turn to this. 
 
Alienated Labour 
 
Marx uses the term ‘alienated labour’ to characterise the productive activity of human 
beings in modern industrial societies We should note that ‘alienation’ has both 
objective and subjective connotations in Marx’s work (Sayers, 2012), referring both to 
the fact of separation - the loss of unity between subject and object - and to the 
subjective perception of that separation. The ‘separation’ itself is as multi faceted as the 
unity described in the passage from On James Mill. In the Economic and Philosophic 
Manuscripts Marx outlines four ways in which labour is alienated, although, as we shall 
see, it might be argued that not all of these ‘ways’ are completely distinct. 
 
Alienation from the product of labour 
 
The first dimension of alienated labour is ‘alienation from the product of labour’. It is a 
bare material fact that the object upon which the industrial worker works is not in any 
sense his own. Rather it belongs to the company or individual who has purchased his 
labour.
2
 The labourer is thus merely a means to an end for the Capitalist, a tool through 
which the Capitalist realizes his own projects. On this analysis the result of the 
labourer’s activity, the product, is an expression of the Capitalist’s own desires or 
requirements. Just as an artist might use a paintbrush to create a painting and still claim 
the result as his/her own so the Capitalist might use a labourer to produce a commodity 
and still claim the result as his own. As with the bondsman in the early part of Hegel’s 
parable, the labourer is a mere extension of the Capitalist. 
 
                                                 
2
 Technically his ‘labour power’, but this need not concern us here. 
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Nevertheless the labourer has invested his own being into the object – for, as outlined 
above, that is the nature of productive activity. It is through productive activity that we 
become ourselves and, as Marx puts it, the result of that activity “is merely the 
summary of the activity of production” (Marx, 1844a, p.80). The individual realises 
himself through his activity and the product of his activity is thus an expression of his 
being. Such is the process of human self-creation, founded on “man’s ability to create 
objects in which he realizes his subjectivity.” (Avineri, 1970, p.85). 
 
This combination of factors, that the labourer’s product is not his own and that 
individuals realise themselves through productive activity, leaves the labourer in a 
rather uncomfortable position whereby the product of his labours appears to him as “an 
alien being, as a power independent of the producer.”(Marx, 1844a, p.78) Marx 
elaborates on this point in terms of what we might call a feedback loop between man 
and the natural world. Whereas, when things are going well, as we suggested earlier, 
this loop acts as a catalyst for the development of human powers, when things are out 
of kilter the opposite effect can result: 
 
The more the worker externalizes himself in his work, the more powerful becomes  the 
alien, objective world that he creates opposite himself, the poorer he becomes in his 
inner life, and the less he can call his own…The greater this activity, the more the 
worker is without an object. What the product of his labour is, that he is not. So the 
greater this product the less he is himself. The externalization of the worker in his 
product implies not only that his labour becomes an object, an exterior existence but 
also that it exists outside him, independent and alien, and becomes a self sufficient 
power opposite him, that the life that he has lent to the object affronts him, hostile and 
alien. (Marx, 1844a, p.79) 
 
 
 
Alienation from one’s own productive activity 
 
We get a greater understanding of why this should be the case if we move on to the 
account given by Marx of the second dimension of alienated labour – the alienation of 
the worker from his own productive activity. Just as the end result of the worker’s 
activity does not belong to him, so that activity itself does not belong to him. If 
production was carried out in a ‘human’ way, according to Marx it would develop 
naturally out of the spontaneous (individual and collective) desires and needs of human 
beings; it would be a means of fulfilling those desires and needs, both in itself and 
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through whatever change to the material world resulted. Production in Capitalist 
societies, however, cannot meet such criteria because work is organised in conformity 
to the needs of the Capitalist class and in accordance with their blueprint. Here there are 
two points, firstly that there are features of the way work is organized under Capitalism 
which are held to be at odds with human fulfilment – a point we shall return to later – 
and secondly that the very fact that the content of productive activity is pre organised 
and imposed upon the individual labourer means that it cannot be in accord with the 
worker’s “own spontaneous activity”. (Marx, 1844a, p.80) 
 
The result of this imposition of a way of organizing productive activity is that “labour is 
exterior to the worker, that is, it does not belong to his essence. Therefore he does not 
confirm himself in his work” (ibid). Marx again goes on to describe this situation in 
terms of what might be called ‘reversals’. The worker “is at home when he is not 
working, and when he works he is not at home” (ibid). Whereas, in a free society, work 
itself would be a means of self fulfilment and desirable in its own right, under 
capitalism “it is not the satisfaction of a need, but only a means to satisfy needs outside 
itself” (ibid). Marx, however, goes even further than this. Because Man is ‘homo faber’ 
(Avineri, 1970), because his essence is productive activity, so an antipathy towards the 
content and result of one’s own activity can be said to result in an alienation from self: 
 
This relationship is the relationship of the worker to his own activity as something that 
is alien and does not belong to him; it is activity that it passivity, power that is 
weakness, procreation that is castration, the worker’s own physical and intellectual 
energy, his personal life (for what is life except activity?) as an activity directed against 
himself, independent of him and not belonging to him. It is self-alienation, as above it 
was the alienation of the object. (Marx, 1844a, p.81) 
 
 
Alienation of man from man 
 
Alienation from the product of labour, and alienation from one’s own productive 
activity (‘self alienation’) are, then, two aspects of alienated labour presented in Marx’s 
Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts. A third aspect is man’s alienation from his 
fellow men. We saw in the passage from On James Mill that productive activity, when 
undertaken freely, constitutes, amongst other things, the affirmation of the individual as 
a social being. We have also seen that if productive activity is not undertaken freely 
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then it is not the affirmation of the individual at all because neither the activity itself 
nor the object it produces belong to that individual. Thus alienation from the product of 
labour brings with it a third type of alienation – for if the object produced is not an 
expression of the power of the productive individual then it must be an expression of 
someone else’s power, that of its owner – “if he [the producer] relates to the product of 
his labour, his objectified labour, as to an object that is alien, hostile, powerful and 
independent of him, this relationship implies that another man is the alien, hostile 
powerful and independent master of this object.” (Marx, 1844a, p.83) Hence implicit in 
the alienation of the individual from the object he produces is the alienation of man 
from man. This is because, from the point of the productive individual, “the alien being 
to whom labour and the product of labour belongs, whom the labour serves and who 
enjoys  its product, can only be man himself.” (Marx, 1844a. p.84). 
 
One might think here that such an account would hardly give us ‘alienation of man 
from man’ on a generalized basis. After all, all that we have described is the alienation 
of individual productive agents from those who own or control the means of 
production. Within that mass of individuals, it might be suggested, intersubjective 
relations could continue relatively uncontaminated. However it is perhaps no accident 
that Marx chose to describe this set up as ‘alienation of man from man’, rather than, for 
example, as ‘alienation of productive individuals from the owners of the means of 
production’, for the suggestion seems to be that it is the relationships one develops 
through productive activity that determine one’s relationship to one’s fellow men. This 
is perhaps one meaning of Marx’s comment that “in the situation of alienated labour 
each man measures his relationship to other men by the relationship in which he finds 
himself placed as a worker.” (Marx, 1844a, p.83) We might speculate too that Marx 
intended this also to apply to ‘man’ in the abstract - that it is primarily in the arena of 
productive activity that the relationship of individual men to ‘man’ in the general is 
developed (similar points are made by Meszaros, 1970; Ollman, 1971) On this reading 
we might perhaps say that the productive individual’s fundamental experience of ‘man’ 
would be as the organising principle of his activity, and thus as something negative, 
antagonistic and ‘other’. 
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Alienation from Species Being 
 
Talk of alienation of the productive agent from ‘man’ in the abstract brings us to the 
fourth and final facet of alienated labour on Marx’s account – alienation from ‘species 
being’. Earlier we interpreted the term ‘species being’ as meaning something like 
Man’s essence as a social and productive animal. On this interpretation ‘alienation from 
species being’ might be viewed as a ‘cover all’ term that combines all the other forms 
of alienation – alienation from the object of production, alienation from productive 
activity itself and alienation from other human beings – and one that does not add much 
else except the suggestion that the reunification of these elements corresponds with 
Man’s essence. In fact, however, Marx (in 1844a) does in some places seem to use 
terms like ‘species being’, ‘species life’ and ‘species characteristic’ to suggest more 
than this, but there seems to be no clear consistency in meaning within these different 
uses. This is reflected in the diverse range of interpretations of ‘species being’ given by 
later commentators, ranging from “the essence of humanity” (Fromm, 1966, p.43) to 
“the ability of the species man to receive sensation” (Levine, 1975, p.3). Taken together 
these difficulties perhaps explain why some commentators have omitted mention of 
‘alienation from species being’ altogether when enumerating the different aspects of 
alienated labour in Marx’s work (e.g. Kamenka, 1969, pp. 19-20). We will not adopt 
that tactic here, but neither will we attempt a lengthy elaboration of the different uses of 
the terms ‘species being’, ‘species life’ etc. in order to understand what alienation from 
them might entail. Instead we will merely draw attention to a couple of passages which 
contain additional elements that will become relevant when we turn to look at the 
‘retreat from alienation’ in cognitive science. The first passage is as follows: 
 
Man makes his vital activity itself into an object of his will and consciousness. He has a 
conscious vital activity. He is not immediately identical to any of his characterizations. 
Conscious vital activity differentiates man immediately from animal vital activity. It is 
this and this alone that makes man a species-being.  (Marx, 1844a, p.82) 
 
Here the suggestion seems to be that although, as essentially productive creatures, ‘we 
are what we do’ we are not, like other animals, to be identified with any one facet of 
our activity. As conscious creators we are able to learn and develop, and hence take on 
all manner of productive activity. In this sense, as Marx says, we produce in a 
‘universal’ (ibid) fashion. Interpreting the passage in such a way one implication of 
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‘alienation from species being’ would be an enforced frustration of our potential to 
engage in a diverse range of productive activities. We will return to this theme when we 
look at the ‘division of labour’ in the next section. 
 
The second passage suggests that also within the remit of our ‘species life’ is nature 
itself: 
 
Both with man and with animals the species-life consists physically in the fact that man 
(like animals) lives from inorganic nature, and the more universal man is than animals 
the more universal is the area of inorganic nature from which he lives. From the 
theoretical point of view, plants, animals, stones, air, light etc form part of human 
consciousness, partly as objects of natural science, partly as objects of art; they are his 
intellectual inorganic nature….From the practical point of view, too, they form a part of 
human life and activity. (Marx, 1844a, p.81) 
 
 
We perhaps need not interpret too metaphysically Marx’s intent when he says that 
nature ‘forms part of human consciousness’. For purposes of this thesis at least the 
point is just that from a Marxian perspective, as well as being an essentially embodied 
and social animal, it is also part of his ‘species being’, his human essence, that Man is 
embedded in the natural world, a natural world which, as we have said, constitutes his 
“inorganic body” (Marx, 1844a, p.81). Moreover, as Man develops so he expands the 
range of natural resources through which he realizes himself (a point we will return to 
in chapter 5.) 
 
Alienated labour is then presented as co-opting this relationship between Man and 
nature, turning his conscious vital activity against him and thereby alienating him from 
“his own body, nature exterior to him, and his intellectual being, his human essence.” 
(Marx, 1844a, p.83)  It thus reverses the natural (or at least ‘desirable’) order of things 
– that conscious productive activity through which Man in appropriate circumstances 
would realize himself as a social being becomes a mere means to an end.  “Life itself 
appears merely as a means to life” (Marx, 1844a p.82) because, from the point of view 
of the individual, productive labour is used not to realize his/her humanity in a free and 
collective fashion but is undertaken simply to sustain his/her individual existence. 
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Division of Labour 
 
Closely related, and to some degree implicit, in Marx’s critique of alienated labour is 
his critique of the ‘division of labour’. With this phrase Marx is not objecting to any 
differentiation of tasks per se, which might arise for a variety of reasons (Marx & 
Engels, 1970b, p.51). Rather his specific target is the bifurcation of productive activity 
which comes into being with the mental/manual division of labour. This is the scenario, 
as neatly encapsulated in Hegel’s Lord and Bondsman parable, wherein the activity of 
one group of individuals is restricted to intellectual tasks whilst that of another is 
restricted to physical tasks. 
 
Marx’s objections are fourfold. The first is of least interest to us (in this thesis) as it 
relates to the inequality inherent in the mental/manual division of labour – differential 
relations to the production process imply that “enjoyment and labour, production and 
consumption – devolve on different individuals” (Marx & Engels, 1970b, p.52). 
 
Of more interest to us is a second objection which links the division of labour to 
alienation. The work regime engendered by the division of labour is inherently 
alienating because it is not entered into voluntarily – “As activity is not voluntarily, but 
naturally, divided, man’s own deed becomes an alien power opposed to him, which 
enslaves him instead of being controlled by him.” (Marx & Engels, 1970b, p.54) Thus 
the division of labour is alienated, in part, because it does not flow from conscious 
choice but is imposed on the individual. We have already mentioned how alienated 
labour stands opposed to the “free development” (Marx & Engels, 1848, p.26) of the 
individual, and this account sits well with that conception of things. We shall ignore for 
now Marx’s potentially problematic use of the term ‘naturally’, which appears to 
suggest an opposition between the ‘voluntary’ and the ‘natural’. Although this raises 
interesting issues, there is not space to explore them here. 
 
A third and connected objection to the division of labour is simply that it forces an 
“exclusive sphere of activity” (Marx & Engels, 1970b, p.54) onto the productive agent. 
The individual “is a hunter, a fisherman, a herdsman or a critical critic and must remain 
so if he does not want to lose his means of livelihood.”(ibid). Marx contrasts this with a 
possible state of affairs in communist society: 
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In communist society, where nobody has one exclusive sphere of activity but each can 
become accomplished in any branch he wishes, society regulates the general production 
and thus makes it possible for me to do one thing today and another tomorrow, to hunt 
in the morning, fish in the afternoon, rear cattle in the evening, criticise after dinner, 
just as I have a mind, without ever becoming hunter, fisherman, herdsman or critic.       
(Marx & Engels, 1970b, p.54) 
 
 
The suggestion is, then, that the self-realization of the subject necessitates a 
transcendence of the narrow spheres of activity allowed within societies wherein a 
division of labour dominates.  
 
We notice that here Marx’s target is not restricted to the mental/manual division of 
labour but seems to be directed at the enforcement of any narrow specialism. Elsewhere 
Marx develops this idea particularly in relation to factory production insofar as it 
involves the breaking up of whole tasks into small component tasks. Enthusiasts for this 
‘detailed division of labour’ (Braverman, 1974) included not only Adam Smith but also 
the ‘father of computing’ Charles Babbage who was one of the first to recognise that 
“dividing the craft cheapens the parts” (ibid, p.80), a principle that became known as 
“Babbage’s great principle of economical production” (ibid). Boden (2006) points out 
in this respect that it was the architecture of the computing device which informed 
Babbage’s ideas about the organization or production, rather than vice versa: 
 
[Babbage’s work] discussed the organization of a factory or other large institution. 
Babbage said it had grown from the ideas he’d had while designing his ‘calculating 
engine’. (Boden, 2006, pp.134-5) 
 
 
For Marx, whose own account of the division of labour in factories was considerably 
influenced by Babbage (Wendling, 2009), the point, however, was that the 
fragmentation of productive activity to this degree brought with it the fragmentation of 
the subject who becomes “further dismembered” (Marx, 1846, p.136) as a result. We 
will return to this topic when we look at mechanized labour in the next section. 
 
The fourth objection to the division of labour – specifically the mental/manual division 
of labour - is not of a kind with the first three, and is to some degree more of an 
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observation than an objection. Marx argues that the arrival of mental/manual division of 
labour facilitates the development of ‘pure theory’: 
 
From now on consciousness is in a position to emancipate itself from the world and to 
proceed to the formation of “pure” theory, theology, philosophy, ethics etc. (Marx & 
Engels, 1970b, p.52)  
 
Here Marx is being simultaneously serious and ironic. He is being serious because he 
really does think that the separation of mental and manual tasks was a material 
prerequisite for the development of ‘pure’ theory.  He is being ironic, however, because 
he is sceptical of the value of theory which has flown free from its material base, for 
this separation is reflected in the content of the theory itself which consequently is 
unable to grasp the world as it actually is. Hence the sense in which theory 
‘emancipates’ itself by separating itself from the material world is questionable. With 
this latter point we can perhaps see echoes of Hegel’s own critique of the “pure 
thought” of the stoic who detaches himself from the world. It will be remembered that 
in that instance the resultant ideas were dismissed as abstract and “lacking in the 
fullness of life” (Hegel, 1807, p.122). We might say that Marx sees the same result as 
arising on a systematic basis with the mental/manual division of labour. There is 
perhaps additional irony, however, in the fact that Marx’s particular target here is 
German Idealism (Marx & Engels, 1970b, p.118)  no better exemplar of which is there 
than Hegel – in whose work mind or spirit  literally takes on a life of its own. 
 
In outlining how the mental/manual division of labour devolves different forms of 
activity – in particular mental activity and physical activity – on different individuals, 
and engenders an ineffectual realm of pure thought in the process, we find ourselves 
back in the realm of the ‘whole man’. The separation of thought and activity between 
individuals brings with it a conception of the individual agent as likewise 
compartmentalized. As Sohn-Rethel puts it : 
 
The class antagonism of capital and labour is linked intrinsically with the division of 
head and hand.   (Sohn-Rethel, 1978, p.37) 
 
The practical reunification of the agent - whereby mental and manual tasks are 
reintegrated in “free conscious activity” – is thus concomitant with a re-
conceptualization of the agent as a unified being i.e. with the “unity of head and hand” 
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(ibid. p.139). The material reconstitution of the ‘whole man’ is in this way linked with a 
theoretical reconstitution of the agent whereby thought and practical activity are no 
longer considered in essential separation. We will explore this idea further when we 
look at ‘praxis’ later in this chapter. 
 
The Machine 
 
When we were looking at the division of labour we said that the ‘detailed division of 
labour’ - wherein tasks are broken down into component parts and each individual task 
is allotted to a separate individual – also has a fragmenting effect on the individual. One 
place where Marx makes remarks of this kind is in a more general discussion of 
‘methods for raising the social productivity of labour’ (Marx, 1867, p.799). Such 
methods, he says, 
 
distort the worker into a fragment of a man, they degrade him to the level of an 
appendage of a machine. (ibid)  
 
Because human beings realize themselves through productive activity, if that 
productive activity is then reduced to a series of repetitive movements then, so the 
argument goes, the producer himself is also reduced to a fragment of a human being.  
 
However we also notice a further feature in the above quote, one which relates 
specifically to large scale mechanized labour. It is not just that it stultifies the 
experience of the productive individual by severely limiting his/her sphere of activity, it 
is that the individual becomes in some sense an extension of the machine. Marx 
expands on this train of thought in a separate passage where his object is not the 
individual worker but the mass of workers, represented as ‘labour’. When production is 
mechanized, labour “appears merely to be a conscious organ, composed of individual 
living workers … it is itself only a limb of the system, whose unity exists not in the 
living workers but in the living (active) machinery” (McLellan, 1977, p.374) 
 
We said earlier that, on Marx’s account, human beings in various ways extend 
themselves into the environment through productive activity – that nature becomes their 
“inorganic body” (Marx, 1844a, p.81)  and that tools become “annexed” as a kind of 
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proxy body part. Here, however a reversal seems to have taken place. In the case of the 
tool “the worker animated it with his own skill and activity” (McLellan, 1977, p.373) 
whereas here, as Marx says, “it is the machine which possesses skill and strength in 
place of the worker, is itself the virtuoso, with a soul of its own in the mechanical laws 
acting through it” (Marx, 1855, p.693) 
 
A clear distinction has to be made, then, between the individual’s relationship to the 
tool and his relationship (in the context of mechanized labour) to the machine. From the 
point of view of the worker at least, this is not a difference in scale but a difference in 
function: “In no respect is the machine the means of labour of the individual worker. Its 
distinctive character is not at all, as with the means of labour, that of transmitting the 
activity of the worker to its object.” (McLellan, 1977, p.373). Rather the worker has 
himself become a means of transmitting the activity of the machine to the object. 
 
We should note, however, that the machine itself has no purpose or knowledge of its 
own. That which it seems to have is derived from its creators and owners, (from whose 
perspective it is a kind of tool.) Marx points out that this serves as another source of 
alienation for the worker:  
 
The knowledge that obliges the inanimate parts of the machine, through their 
construction, to work appropriately as an automaton, does not exist in the 
consciousness of the worker, but acts upon him through the machine as an alien force, 
as the power of the machine itself. (McLellan, 1977, p.374)  
 
Thus, we might say, the displaced intelligence of the ‘masters’ of the machine 
manifests itself as actual (and malevolent) machine intelligence to those whose activity 
it governs. Wendling (2009) talks in this connection of “machine fetishism”, 
emphasizing how human qualities which the worker is unable to realize in his/her own 
practical activity are manifest in the operations of the machine: 
 
Machine fetishism is a product of technological alienation. Not only do workers use 
means of production that seem to operate by mystical and occult properties 
incomprehensible to the workers themselves, these machines increasingly display the 
very functions of which the worker is progressively deprived. (Wendling, 2009, p.57) 
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Wendling includes 'mobility, diversification of task and skill' (ibid.) amongst such 
functions, but it is 'intelligence' itself which is of more interest to us. We will return to 
this theme in chapter 4. 
 
Commodity Fetishism 
 
We saw in the earlier passage from On James Mill that for Marx the externalization of 
the agent in his product is an inherently social phenomenon because production itself is 
an inherently social phenomenon. Nevertheless, we might say, there is social and there 
is ‘social’. Some types of product – e.g. physical tools – can be used in relative 
detachment from the social world, at least in principle.  Other types of product have 
only a social existence. One such product is money. Insofar as money is money – rather 
than merely a round metal object, or a piece of paper, or pixels on a computer screen – 
it is entirely socially constituted. To reverse a point once made by Wittgenstein (1953, 
p.94), one cannot have private money (money for use by one person only) any more 
than one can have a private language (see also, Marx, 1855, p.84). Money, as a social, 
symbolic medium only exists in relation to a certain social practice and it is that social 
practice which determines what money is.  
 
The social practice which defines what money is, is ‘exchange’ and in Marxian 
terminology the fact that it only has this role and no other practical attribute can be 
expressed by stating that it has ‘exchange value’ but no ‘use value’. This is to be 
contrasted with the situation of commodities which have both ‘use value’ and 
‘exchange value’ (Marx, 1867, p.126) – they can be exchanged (i.e. bought and sold) 
and also used in various ways. Having made this statement, however, we need to 
qualify it, for, at an economic meta-level, money is also a commodity (it can be bought 
and sold). Nevertheless the point remains that it is a special kind of commodity – one 
which functions as the ‘universal equivalent’ (Marx, 1867, p.181) of other 
commodities.  
 
We will not here go into too much detail about Marx’s analysis of ‘exchange value’. 
We do however want to emphasize one important feature of Marx's account, namely 
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that money and commodities, as repositories of (exchange) value, are not what they 
appear to be.  According to Marx, in the act of commodity exchange 
 
…the definite social relation between men themselves…assumes here, for them, the 
fantastic form of a relation between things. (Marx, 1867, p.165) 
 
This is the idea known as “the fetishism of the commodity” (Marx, 1867, p.163) where 
Marx compares the relationship that human beings have to commodities with that 
which they once had with mythical gods. In both cases “the productions of the human 
brain appear as independent beings endowed with life, and entering into relationship 
both with one another and with the human race.” (ibid) Here we find repeated many of 
those same elements which were present in the accounts of alienation outlined earlier. 
Once more that which is in fact a human product, an externalization of human 
properties, appears disguised as something ‘other’. On this basis some commentators 
(e.g. Fromm, 1966, p.43) have viewed commodity fetishism as a straightforward 
example of the alienation of the worker from his/her product. However, it should be 
noted that with commodity fetishism it is not so much that the product is viewed as 
'alien and hostile' (although this may be the case) but rather that the product appears to 
take on a life of its own. Marx gives the example of a table made out of wood. As a use 
value it is an “ordinary sensuous thing” (ibid), but viewed as a commodity it is 
transformed into something else: 
 
As soon as it emerges as a commodity, it changes into a thing which transcends 
sensuousness. It not only stands with its feet on the ground, but, in relation to all other 
commodities, it stands on its head, and evolves out of its wooden brain grotesque ideas, 
far more wonderful than if it were to begin dancing of its own free will. (Marx, 1867, 
pp.163-4) 
 
What, then, is the sense in which commodities take on a life of their own?  
 
From the point of view of production the suggestion seems to be that although human 
beings might be bound together physically by the production process, subjectively they 
remain atomized because their labour is not free or genuinely collective. "They do not 
know themselves as social beings", as Ollman puts it (Ollman, 1971, p.208). Thus their 
social being instead manifests itself in “mystical” (Marx, 1867, p.164) form through 
their products. These products take on the appearance of “social” things (ibid. p.165) 
because they are enmeshed in a particular social relationship (exchange). 
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Turning to exchange itself: If we imagine the simple act of buying and selling between 
two individuals we might say that in this act we have two human beings who stand in a 
concrete social relation to one another. However the logic which determines the 
unfolding of their interaction is determined by the abstract property of ‘value’ which 
they perceive as inherent in the objects that bring them together (and particularly in the 
money object, which has no other useful properties). Whilst ‘value’ is in fact a social 
relation between human beings (Ollman, 1971, p.195) it conceals itself as a relation 
between objects before which the individuals stand as passive spectators. Thus a 
reversal has taken place. Whereas, as outlined in On James Mill, when individuals 
produce freely their products exist as an extension and affirmation of their being, in the 
process of commodity exchange “the persons exist for one another merely as 
representatives… of commodities” (Marx, 1867, pp.178-9). 
 
This is a difficult analysis and we almost certainly have not done it justice here. 
Nevertheless for our purposes the main point can be relatively simply summarized: In 
the case of commodity fetishism the externalization of the agent involves the 
(mistaken) attribution of human properties to human artifacts, a process which serves to 
conceal the real social origins of those properties. 
 
Property 
 
In the previous section we looked at the artifacts that are generated by the agent's 
productive activity from the point of view of exchange i.e. as commodities. We ought 
also to consider them, if only briefly, from the point of view of ownership i.e. as 
property. 
 
We saw in chapter 1 that Hegel (1821) seems to have viewed property both as a ‘right’ 
of mankind and, in some passages at least, as on a continuum with labour as a means of 
self-realisation via appropriation of the external world. As regards the former, we are 
less concerned in this thesis with the political/ethical dimensions of property ownership 
from a Marxian perspective. Nevertheless we might note in this respect that Marx was 
not impressed in general with the language of ‘rights’ which he saw as applicable only 
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to “egoistic man, man separated from other men and the community” (Mclellan, 1977, 
p.52). Moreover, far from viewing private property as a human necessity or entitlement 
he saw it as internally related (Ollman, 1971) to other components of the capitalist 
labour process (division of labour, commodity production) and so as something that 
would be swept away by a communist revolution (Marx & Engels, 1848). 
 
We need to be clear here however that the ‘abolition of private property’ for Marx was 
not about the forcible re appropriation of the personal possessions of individuals but 
was rather about the collective abolition of a system of property relations that allowed 
one individual to buy (or otherwise control) the labour of another: 
 
Communism deprives no man of the power to appropriate the products of society; all 
that it does is to deprive him of the power to subjugate the labour of others by means of 
such appropriations. (Marx & Engels, 1848, p.20) 
 
In this sense it might be thought that Marx’s position on property is not so antithetical 
to Hegel’s as first appears, for Marx allows that an individual can ‘appropriate’ social 
products, and the passages from Hegel that we examined made reference only to the 
appropriation of personal property as an expression of will, personality etc…and not to 
the subjugation of others’ labour. Nevertheless Marx would object to the central role 
property ownership plays in Hegel’s account. It is not just that Hegel talks of ‘property’ 
in the abstract and so makes no reference to the extent of property ownership or how it 
was acquired, it is the idea that individual ownership of property is itself a means of 
realization for the individual that runs counter to Marx's own outlook. It is this aspect of 
his critique that is of more interest to us. 
 
In Marx’s account ‘appropriation’ of the world in its fullest sense – the “sensuous 
appropriation by and for man of human essence and human life” (Marx, 1844a, p.91) – 
is a multi-faceted activity. It involves, or can involve, the deployment of “all human 
senses and qualities” (ibid. p.92).  Marx includes amongst these - “seeing, hearing, 
smell, tasting, feeling, thinking, contemplating, willing, acting, loving …”(ibid. p.91), 
which he also describes as “organs of man’s individuality”. It has, in addition, a social 
or communal dimension - in participating in social activity “I can appropriate the senses 
and enjoyment of other men.” (ibid. p.92) 
 
 79 
Here we are back with the “whole man” (ibid. p.91) i.e. the unified individual who is no 
longer alienated in the production process or reduced to a fragment of a human being 
by the division of labour. His realization is contingent upon the demise of Capitalism, 
which demise includes “the positive supersession of private property” (ibid. p.91). 
However, this is so not just because private property is internally related to other 
components of the capitalist order. Rather there is something limiting per se in the 
mode of human realization that private property permits. In the institution of private 
property: 
 
All physical and intellectual senses have been replaced by the simple alienation of all 
these senses, the sense of having.  (Marx, 1844a, p.92) 
 
Private property, says Marx, presents us with a particularly impoverished version of 
appropriation’. Mere ‘having’ is a static, lifeless orientation to the material world.  It 
does not engage man’s range of faculties as a complete, unified being, and by its nature 
it precludes the possibility of man realizing himself as a communal being. Thus, 
although there is nothing reprehensible in the fact of individuals having their own 
personal property, pace Hegel, property ownership should not be elevated as a means or 
model of self realization. 
 
Praxis – the unity of thought and action 
 
Finally we come to one of the portions of Marx’s account that is most difficult to 
articulate, but at the same time one which will become particularly significant when we 
turn to modern day cognitive science. This is the notion of ‘praxis’. We have said that 
on a Marxian analysis man, as 'Homo Faber', is an essentially practical creature. As 
Kitching puts it – in albeit a rather one-sided way – “if Marx had to pick an essential 
definition of human beings it would not be ‘those creatures which think’ but ‘those 
creatures which act” (Kitching, 1988, p.27). Likewise we have also said that it is 
through practical activity that man creates himself, a dynamic which Arthur 
summarises as follows: “Man produces himself in and through this mediator 
[productive activity]; he develops new powers and needs in the dialectic of this 
practice” (Arthur, 1986, p.37). Expressed in world historical terms this means that 
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“…world history is nothing but the creation of man by human labour and the 
development of nature for man” (Marx, 1844a, p.95). 
 
In emphasizing the centrality of practical activity to human existence we have already, 
to some degree, given an account of what Marx means by ‘praxis’. However the term is 
commonly taken to have additional implications. Elaboration of such implications is 
somewhat hindered by the fact that the term seems to be associated with “a chaotic 
array of meanings” (Bernstein, 1999, p.79) in the work of Marxian commentators, and 
neither does it help that in Marx's own work “the terms ‘praxis’ and ‘practice’ have 
often been used interchangeably” (Jha, 2010, p.208). Nevertheless we might say that 
one key idea suggested by the term ‘praxis’ is that thought and action in some way 
form a “unity”. ‘Praxis’ can thus be seen as another example of an Hegelian synthesis, a 
dialectical “unity of opposites” (Meszaros, 1970, p.17). Although the term itself has a 
long history (Bottomore, 1991, pp.435-440), it was first used in something approaching 
this fashion by the Hegelian theorist August Cieszkowski (1814-1894). Thus McLellan, 
for example, talks of the “synthesis of thought and action for which Cieszkowski 
coined the term...praxis” (McLellan, 1969, p.10). However it was Marx who took up 
and developed the idea in a thoroughgoing way. For him it was the antidote to the 
separation imposed on the individual by the division of labour. Earlier we made 
reference to the relation between the separation of thought from activity and the 
separation of mental from manual labour. This relation is well summarised in a passage 
by the communist theorist Pannekoek:  
 
In human labour, the material, physical side and the mental side are inseparable….Only 
because under capitalism the division of labour separated these two parts into functions 
of different classes….did intellectuals come to overlook their organic and social unity. 
(Pannekoek, 1937, p.448) 
 
There is, then, the general idea of the inseparability of the mental and physical in 
practical activity. “All thought is inextricably part of human activity” (Kitching, 1988, 
p.28) and vice versa. It is only the division of labour which distorted our view of this 
fact.  
 
Related to this general conception of a unity between thought and activity are some 
more specific theses which detail different senses in which they interpenetrate. Four of 
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these theses are outlined below. They are presented as elaborations of the central 
concept of ‘praxis’; however it should be noted that this schematization is entirely our 
own. Other accounts of praxis might add elements that are here omitted, omit elements 
that are included here, or combine or separate elements that are here separated or 
combined. 
 
1) Ideas are generated from practical activity  
 
We saw in the section on ‘the material basis of thought’ that Marx referred to ideas as 
“sublimates” of a “material life process”. (Marx & Engels, 1970b, p.47) In that 
discussion our emphasis was on the way in which the content of thought might be 
affected by this ‘material life process’. Here our emphasis is more on the question of 
the direction of causation between ideas and material activity.  Marx’s main target in 
this respect is what he and many subsequent Marxists see as a defining feature of 
Idealism - the notion that human practical activity issues forth from the detached and 
privileged sphere of thinking, that ‘ideas’ are necessarily prior to activity, and activity 
is just the realization of ideas. As McLellan (1969) notes, such a conception was still 
common amongst Marx’s Hegelian contemporaries and was particularly well 
encapsulated in Heine’s maxim that “thought preceded action as lightning did thunder” 
(Heine, 1832, cited in McLellan, 1969, p.8). In place of this Marx wished to emphasize 
the priority of practical activity – thus:  
 
[materialism] does not explain practice from the idea but explains the formation of 
ideas from material practice. (Marx & Engels, 1970b, p.58) 
 
There is a way of understanding this statement which might take one in a determinist 
direction. For example Pannekoek suggests that Marx’s critique of Idealism is that it 
“explains the events of history as caused by the ideas of men” (Pannekoek, 1937, 
p.449). Whilst this undoubtedly is part of his critique (if articulated with the appropriate 
emphasis and clarified with additional explanation) it should not be taken to mean that, 
on a Marxian analysis, ideas themselves have no role to play in human practice. As 
Fromm says, Marxian materialism “does not pretend that ideas or ideals are not real or 
potent” (Fromm, 1966, p.19). Rather the point seems to be that thought does not bring 
action into being in a vacuum, but instead thoughts themselves are generated by the 
practical activity in which they are enmeshed. Clearly such an idea can be developed in 
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different ways. On one analysis we might still retain the ultimate separability of thought 
and action, but maintain that episodes of each are necessarily interleaved in purposeful 
activity. This seems to be the position of the nineteenth century Marxist Antonia 
Labriola (1897) who interpreted Marx’s ‘philosophy of praxis’ as propounding a “unity 
of theory and practice where a cyclical movement of theory and practice will go on in a 
continuous pace.”(as cited in Jha, 2010, p.208). Alternatively it may be that thought and 
activity form a unity at a more fundamental level. We will return to this topic when we 
look at ‘epistemic action’ in chapter 8. 
 
2) Understanding human beings in their active relation to particular material 
circumstances facilitates answers to philosophical questions 
 
Marx’s position here is partly a response to various accounts of the human being which 
present ‘Man’ in the abstract. These include Feuerbach’s account which, as we earlier 
suggested, influenced Marx’s own adoption of the concepts ‘species being’, ‘species 
life’ etc.. Feuerbach (1841) had himself offered a critique of religious alienation which 
restored ‘man’ to the centre of the universe, but for Marx ‘man’ still remained an 
abstract category if considered in separation from the particularities of his active 
existence (Fromm, 1966, p.23; Meszaros, 1970, p.219). To understand what ‘man’ is 
one needs to look at the concrete active lives of real individuals: 
 
The first premises from which we begin are not arbitrary ones but real premises from 
which abstraction can only be made in the imagination. They are the real individuals, 
their activity and the material conditions under which they live, both those which they 
find already existing and those produced by their activity. (Marx & Engels, 1970b, p. 
42) 
 
and later: 
Where speculation ends – in real life – there real positive science begins: the 
representation of the practical activity, of the practical development of men.  (ibid. 
p.48) 
 
We might observe, as others have also done (e.g. Rubinstein, 1981, p.125), that the 
tactic adopted by Marx here is somewhat similar to that adopted by the later 
Wittgenstein (1953). In both cases an examination of the concrete practices of 
individuals is recommended as an antidote to approaches which attempt to formulate 
explanatory concepts in the abstract – although in Wittgenstein’s case the practices 
under examination are confined to linguistic ones. In fact the similarities between Marx 
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and Wittgenstein go much deeper than this, but here is not the place to examine them 
(see, Rubinstein, 1981; Easton, 1983; Kitching, 1994; Kitching & Pleasants, 2002.)  
 
Once one has a concrete approach to the study of man as he actually is, in his active 
material life, the dissolution of certain philosophical puzzles follows: 
 
All mysteries which lead theory to mysticism find their rational solution in human 
practice and in the comprehension of this practice. (Marx, 1970a, p.122) 
 
The ‘mysticism’ that Marx refers to is not (only) religious or spiritual mysticism but the 
‘mysticism’ of  philosophy itself which Marx conceives of as moving around in 
abstractions (in a bad Hegelian sense)  and so as unable to deal with the concrete 
particularities of material life. More specifically, the puzzles which philosophy 
generates often arise as a result of a failure to take into account man’s active 
relationship to the world. Instead it presents that relationship in terms of the passive 
contemplation of sense objects (Marx, 1970a, p.121). We will return to this topic in 4) 
below. 
 
3) Practical activity itself provides a solution to philosophical questions 
 
In the section above we said that, according to Marx, an understanding of man’s 
practical relationship to the world could facilitate solutions to philosophical puzzles. 
However the citation we supplied suggested more than this. It is not just that “mysteries 
which lead theory to mysticism” (Marx, 1970a, p.122) find their solution in the 
comprehension of human practice, but that in some cases human practice itself provides 
a solution. There are perhaps two interpretations of this. On one interpretation, Marx is 
here recommending participation in practical activity as a means of facilitating 
solutions to philosophical problems. This seems to be Kitching’s interpretation when he 
argues that: 
 
It is human activity which, as it were, ‘joins’ thought to the world. Conversely, it is 
speculating … in abstraction from practice, from activity, which creates nearly all 
philosophical puzzles.” (Kitching, 1988, p.29) 
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This interpretation is perhaps similar to the position we outlined in 1) where we said 
that on a Marxian account of praxis, ideas are generated by practical activity. Here, we 
might say, the same idea is expressed as a recommendation rather than an observation. 
 
There is however a stronger possible interpretation of Marx’s intent. This interpretation 
is not necessarily in competition with that given above but rather might be seen as a 
supplementary thesis – the thesis that practical activity can itself sometimes constitute 
an answer to philosophical problems. 
 
In some passages this has the appearance of a purely normative call to action, as though 
Marx were recommending the abandonment of thinking per se. Thus the famous 
eleventh thesis on Feuerbach: “The philosophers have only interpreted the world in 
various ways; the point is to change it.”(Marx, 1970a, p.123) However underlying this 
seems to be both a critique of philosophical theory as an effective means of solving all 
of the problems that it poses, and the suggestion that such solutions might be enacted 
rather than articulated. This is particularly the case when the theoretical problems 
manifest themselves as an intractable dichotomy: 
 
It can be seen how the solution of theoretical opposition is only possible in a practical 
way, only through the practical energy of man, and their solution is thus by no means 
an exercise in epistemology but a real problem of life that philosophy could not solve 
just because it conceived of it as a purely theoretical task. (Marx, 1844a, p.93) 
 
We have, then, the idea of a practical answer to a theoretical question. Resolution of 
certain theoretical conundrums is possible “only through practical means” (Fromm, 
1966, p.29). We can perhaps detect in this notion faint echoes of Hegel’s own 
manoeuvre in the Logic. It will be remembered that Hegel was accused of ‘bringing 
movement into logic’ because the transitions which he depicted (e.g. from ‘being’ to 
‘nothing’ to ‘becoming’ – Hegel, 1817a, p.128) were temporal transitions arising from 
the mind’s contemplation of the categories in question. He had thus, we might say, 
attempted to posit as a valid solution to the problems generated by a static logic (its 
inability to grasp relations in the real world), the action of the mind itself. Marx’s 
strategy, we might say, is similar but replaces the ‘mind’ with real human beings and 
‘thought’ with physical activity. 
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4) The world is brought forth through practical activity 
 
We have said in several places that on a Marxian account, the individual subject creates 
himself as he alters the world. Reversing the order of priorities here we might perhaps 
also say that the subject does not submit to the world as he finds it but rather 
restructures it in accordance with his own needs, desires and perceptions (needs, desires 
and perceptions which are in turn transformed by this new material state of affairs.) 
There is nothing necessarily ‘metaphysical’ about this account – it is not a corollary of 
this position, for example, that - as normally construed in idealist terms – reality is a 
construct of the subject. 
 
Nevertheless we should note that when Marx’s topic is philosophy itself, his account of 
our active relationship to the material world, because it appropriates the language of 
philosophy, can appear to be putting forward a more ‘metaphysical’ position. One 
notable example of this is the first thesis on Feuerbach, where it is asserted that: 
 
The chief defect of all hitherto existing materialism (that of Feuerbach included) is that 
the thing, reality, sensuousness, is conceived only in the form of the object, or of 
contemplation, but not as sensuous human activity, practice... (Marx, 1970a, p.121) 
 
As Marcuse has remarked, Marx’s position here bears some similarities with Hegel’s 
own rejection of ‘sense certainty’ as “the final criterion of the truth” (Marcuse, 1968, 
p.271). In both cases an analysis in terms of our active relationship to the world is 
recommended. Some have seen in this, and similar, passages evidence of a stronger 
thesis whereby the activity of Man determines the objectivity of the world. Kitching 
comes close to this when he remarks that: 
 
For Marx, it does not make sense to conceive of ‘sense objects’ as Feuerbach does, as if 
they were simply ‘there’ in reality. On the contrary they only become ‘sense objects’, 
objects known to human beings, when such beings actively appropriate them as part of 
their purposive life. (Kitching, 1988, p.28) 
 
Rubinstein, influenced in part by Avineri (1970), goes even further than this, arguing 
that on Marx’s account “reality is a product of the dialectical interaction of nature and 
human nature” and that therefore Marx has found a “middle ground between the 
materialist conception of the mind as a ‘mirror’ and the idealist reduction of the world 
to our idea of it.” (Rubinstein, 1981, p.170) 
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We need to be careful here, however. As regards Kitching’s point for example, whilst it 
is true, as Avineri argues, that “according to Marx, nature cannot be discussed as if it 
were severed from human action” (Avineri, 1970, p.70), it is not clear that Marx would 
have had any quibble with the idea that the material constituents of the world are 
“simply ‘there’ in reality” (Kitching, 1988, p.28). His concern, we might say, was more 
with a correct description of those material constituents in terms of our relationship to 
them. Some versions of materialism had typically presented the world as made up of 
statically conceived objects to which we stand as passive spectators. As suggested in 2) 
above, this gives rise to seemingly intractable philosophical puzzles centred on the 
separation of the subject and the object. These puzzles dissolve once one depicts the 
world and our relationship to it in a dynamic fashion. We will see an example of this 
when we come to look at the work of Alva Noë in chapter 5. 
 
Similarly with Rubinstein’s argument – whilst the notion that Marx’s account occupies 
ground midway between materialism and idealism sounds pleasingly anti-dichotomous, 
it may not be true. Marx does not appear to have thought that “mind”, conceived in the 
abstract, had any role in bringing forth “reality” (Rubinstein, 1981, p.170) conceived in 
the abstract. What he did believe was that real embodied individuals shaped the world 
in which they lived and were in turn shaped by it. This latter description seems to be 
entirely consistent with a materialist outlook. 
 
Conclusion 
 
In this chapter, then, we have looked at the philosophical portion of Marx’s work, with 
particular emphasis on his conception of man as an embodied, practical agent who 
creates himself through productive activity. As a ‘whole man’ this agent has the 
potential for unification with his material and social environment through free 
conscious activity. However certain features of industrial societies – in particular the 
organisation and imposition of mechanized and fragmented labour for the purposes of 
commodity production – result in a disunified agent who is alienated from his own 
activity, from his product and from other human beings. In addition, the division of 
mental and manual labour gives rise to a disunified conception of the agent whereby 
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thought and action are considered always in separation. It is this disunity which Marx 
attempts to surmount via the concept of ‘praxis’. 
 
Many of theses themes have direct relevance to the field of cognitive science, but 
before we examine these connections we need to look briefly at some later Marxian 
theorists whose work also, in different ways, has a bearing on modern day cognitive 
science. This will be the topic of the next chapter. 
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Chapter 3 – ‘The Bridge to Cognitive Science’ - Engels and 
later Marxists 
 
Introduction 
 
In the following we look briefly at the work of six theorists who are to varying degrees 
Marxian in their outlook. One of these (Engels) has been selected mainly because his 
work develops and explains further some of the themes we have already highlighted in 
the work of Hegel and Marx, and which will become particularly significant when we 
turn to look at contemporary cognitive science. Four others (Vygotsky, Merleau-Ponty, 
Levins & Lewontin) are included because they have had an acknowledged influence on 
recent cognitive science. The final thinker (Alfred Sohn-Rethel) has not had any 
documented influence on cognitive science but his idiosyncratic interpretation of one 
aspect of Marx’s analysis seems relevant to one particular issue in cognitive science 
(the ‘online/offline’ dichotomy – see chapter 5) The accounts given of these theorists 
are in no way meant as representational summaries of their work. Rather in each case 
we will only be looking at one or two key points from each that are relevant to the 
project at hand. 
 
 
 
Friedrich Engels (1820 – 1895) 
 
We have already made reference to Engels in the previous chapter because some of the 
works by Marx we cited were also co-authored by him. Engels was Marx’s 
contemporary, friend and sponsor. Nevertheless, for better and worse, Engels has also 
made his own distinctive contributions to Marxist theory.  McLellan summarises such 
contributions as follows – “Engels’ contribution to the legacy of Marx culminated in 
the decisive role that he played in the tendency to transform Marx’s views into a 
Weltanschauung, a philosophical system, an interpretation of the world.” (McLellan, 
1977, p.72).  Reading between the lines, McLellan’s suggestion here is that Engels’ 
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contribution was a mixed blessing. Engels was a systematizer and tended to develop the 
ideas that existed in a more fluid, impressionistic form in Marx’s own work, into rather 
rigid and dogmatically expressed formulae. This has both advantages and 
disadvantages. As regards the latter the biggest disadvantage has perhaps been for the 
world in general, for it was Engels’ systematizing which helped pave the way for the 
ideology of ‘dialectical materialism’ (see e.g. Cornforth, 1952) beloved of Marxist 
dictatorships everywhere. For this reason some commentators have tried to disassociate 
Engels’ outlook from Marx’s completely. Levine, for instance, argues that a distinction 
should be made between Marxism and ‘Engelsism’ (Levine, 1975, p.xiv), and suggests 
that the success of soviet bolshevism was partly dependent on the presentation of a 
false unity between the two (ibid. p.xvi). 
 
Nevertheless, Engels cannot entirely be blamed for the way his system was taken up. 
Moreover there is an advantage for us in that systematicity and rigidity brings with it a 
degree of explicitness. Whilst it is not exactly true, as we shall see, that Engels’ 
arguments are always easy to follow – his language is less obscure than Hegel’s, and 
less resonant with manifold meanings than Marx’s.  
 
Importantly, his work also contains some interesting and relevant insights, even if some 
of his scientific speculation misses the mark (Levins & Lewontin, 1985). In the 
following our focus will mainly be on Engels’ contribution to ‘dialectics’, but before 
turning to this we will look very briefly at some of his remarks  on ‘human 
development’ and ‘planning’. 
 
Human Development 
 
Engels follows Marx in positing a reciprocal developmental relationship between man 
and nature. This is evidenced, for example, in a passage from the Dialectics of Nature 
where Engels asserts that: 
 
Natural science; like philosophy, has hitherto entirely neglected the influence of men’s 
activity on their thought. It is precisely the alteration of nature by men, not solely 
nature as such, which is the most essential and immediate basis of human thought, and 
it is in the measure that man has learned to change nature that his intelligence has 
increased.   (Engels, 1883, p.172) 
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We note however that the Hegelian notions of ‘duplication’, ‘self-realization’ etc… 
which Marx developed in his own work have here been supplanted by the more 
everyday notion of ‘intelligence’. This is perhaps symptomatic of Engels’ more 
‘scientific’ orientation, for what seems to have interested Engels most was the 
possibility of a scientifically plausible story detailing how a readily comprehensible 
property such as ‘intelligence’ could be augmented through interaction with nature. 
Although no such account is developed in any detail in Engels’ work there are a few 
attempts at preliminary sketches towards this end. In some such passages it is the role 
of the hand which takes centre stage. The hand develops through human labour and 
concomitant with this comes development of the human brain: 
 
Step by step with the development of the hand went that of the brain…the hand alone 
would never have achieved the steam engine if the brain had not attained a correlative 
development with it and parallel to it, and partly owing to it. (Engels, 1883, p.18) 
 
Questions of plausibility or otherwise aside (although see e.g. Wilson, 1999 for a 
summary of more recent hypotheses along these lines) this account is at least interesting 
as an early description of a dynamic relationship between hand and brain acting to 
facilitate cognitive development.  
 
Planning 
 
As a consequence of this development, human beings, on Engels’ account become 
further removed from other animals and are able to “make their own history 
consciously” (Engels, 1883, p.18) This, for Engels entails planning. The actions of 
conscious human beings become progressively less subject to “unforeseen effects and 
uncontrolled forces” (ibid) because their enhanced cognitive capabilities make it more 
likely that the results of their actions will “correspond to the aim laid down in advance” 
(ibid). It is noteworthy that, having given in outline this description of a feature of 
human cognition, Engels then makes a transition to a description of a political state of 
affairs which he thinks corresponds to it – a mode of social organization based on 
‘planning’: 
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Only conscious organisation of social production, in which production and distribution 
are carried on in a planned way, can lift mankind above the rest of the animal world as 
regards the social aspect…  (Engels, 1883, p.19) 
 
Although - taken at face value – the above description might be compatible with a 
number of modes of social organization, it is clear, particularly with the benefit of 
hindsight, that it gels well with some form of state socialism – i.e. a ‘planned 
economy’. Thus we might say that, on Engels’ analysis, planning agents and planned 
economies fit together. As implied in our introduction, the version of Marxism which 
underpins this thesis is one that runs counter to imposed state planning, and thus, to 
some extent, counter to Engels’ position here. However Engels’ suggestion that there is 
a link to be made between a conception of the agent as a ‘planner’ and the perceived 
necessity for imposed social planning is very relevant to our concerns. We will return to 
these points in the next chapter. 
 
Dialectical Laws 
 
We have said that Engels was more of a systematizer than Marx and was also more 
oriented to what he believed was a ‘scientific’ outlook. This is no more clear than in his 
treatment of dialectics. Although, as we have seen, a dialectical perspective informs 
Marx’s work in a number of ways and Marx occasionally addresses the subject directly 
- for example when he is discussing the strengths and weaknesses of Hegel’s account 
(Marx, 1844a, pp.96-109) - it is Engels who explicitly foregrounds dialectics as a 
subject in its own right (Ollman, 1971). It is at the centre of his major 
philosophical/scientific work The Dialectics of Nature, and also plays a significant role 
in another of his works, Anti-Duhring.  
 
Engels argues that there are three laws of dialectics, laws which he claims that Hegel 
developed “in his idealist fashion” in the Logic (Engels, 1883, p.26).  There is no 
ambiguity about the status of these laws, for Engels is quite clear that they are both 
derived from and apply to nature, society and human thought: 
 
It is…from the history of nature and human society that the laws of dialectics are 
abstracted. For they are nothing but the most general laws of these two aspects of 
historical development, as well as of thought itself. (ibid) 
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The laws are given as: 
 
1) The law of the transformation of quantity into quality and vice versa. 
2) The law of the interpenetration of opposites. 
3) The law of the negation of the negation.                                (Engels, 1883, p.26) 
 
We have seen aspects of these ‘laws’ already in our treatment of Hegel in chapter 1. 
The transformation of quantity into quality maps more or less directly on to Hegel’s 
treatment of ‘quantity’, ‘quality’ and ‘measure.’ The interpenetration of opposites is 
perhaps implicit in Hegel’s treatment of various antinomies such as ‘cause’ and ‘effect’. 
The negation of the negation is a little more difficult to locate but, according to Engels 
underlies the progression in the Logic itself (ibid).  To explain what Engels intended 
with each of these three laws it will help to look at some of his own examples. 
 
The law of the transformation of quantity into quality 
 
As we have said, this is familiar as it departs least from Hegel’s own account. It is 
essentially the idea that qualitative changes take place on the basis of quantitative 
changes. However Engels attempts to couch his version in physics-like language. Thus: 
“For our purposes we could express this by saying that in nature, in a manner exactly 
fixed for each individual case, qualitative changes can only occur by the quantitative 
addition or subtraction of matter or motion (so-called energy)”(ibid).  Engels takes one 
of Hegel’s own examples as an illustration. As this is an example that will become 
significant when we later look at dynamic systems we will reproduce it here: 
 
…Thus for instance the temperature of water is first of all indifferent in relation to its 
state as a liquid; but by increasing or decreasing the temperature of liquid water a point 
is reached at which this state of cohesion alters and the water becomes transformed on 
the one side into steam and on the other into ice. (Engels, 1883,  p.30) 
 
The law of the interpenetration of opposites  
 
This is somewhat more wide-ranging in Engels’ account. It includes for example both 
the idea that two categorically opposed properties of an object or process are internally 
related to each other - e.g. that you can’t have a positive charge without a negative 
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charge (Engels, 1883, p.163) - and the idea, already encountered in our summary of 
Hegel, of ‘sublation’, whereby what were considered two opposing properties are 
viewed as a unity denoted by a third term (Hegel’s cause, effect and ‘reciprocity’ - 
Hegel, 1817a, pp.215-219). It also seems to be linked with the idea of simultaneous 
‘identity and difference’. Thus, in the case of organic beings Engels says –  
 
Every organic being is every moment the same and not the same; every moment it 
assimilates matter supplied from without, and gets rid of other matter; every moment 
some cells of its body die and others build themselves anew… (Engels, 1887, p.35) 
 
Here the antinomous properties of the object under question arise from the fact that it is 
in flux. Engels does not think that a description in terms of (what would today be 
called) discrete state transitions (see chapter 4) adequately captures the matter, for the 
fluid transitional nature of the object is part of its being (an idea derived from  Hegel’s 
concept of ‘becoming’). It is what it is by virtue of the fact that it is continually 
changing over time. It can therefore be justifiably be described as ‘the same and not the 
same’ at any particular ‘moment’. We will not investigate the logic of this argument 
here. 
 
The law of the negation of the negation  
 
This expresses the idea that a thing (an organic being, a social system, thought 
processes etc.) may move through a set of transitions, each of which can be conceived 
as ‘negating’ the previous one, with the last transition restoring the thing to its original 
mode of being but at a “higher level of development” (Cornforth, 1952, p.212).  
 
We might turn back to Marx for a well known example of the ‘negation of the 
negation’. In the first volume of Capital Marx describes the process that (he thinks) 
precedes the arrival of communism. The starting point is an economic organisation of 
society wherein artisans and land owning peasants have some of their own personal 
property and a relative degree of freedom in using them – “the worker is the free 
proprietor of the conditions of labour, and sets them in motion himself” (Marx, 1867, 
p.927). Despite the relative freedom this brings it becomes, after progressing to a 
certain point, restricting for human (economic) development. Production is relatively 
isolated and the mode of social organizations means that, although the material 
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technology is available to produce on a grander scale this potential is never realized. 
Thus “at a certain stage of development, it brings into the world the material means of 
its own destruction” (ibid. p.928). It is at this stage that the private property of 
individuals (land, tools etc.) is “supplanted by capitalist private property” (ibid). The 
self-employed worker is no longer the owner of his own individual means of production 
but has these means expropriated and is forced, by circumstance, to work en masse for 
the benefit of the capitalist. This, according to Marx, is the first act of ‘negation’. 
However Capitalism too brings with it the seeds of its own destruction. After a certain 
point the private ownership of the means of production by individual capitalists 
becomes a “fetter” on the further development of production by the centralized mass of 
workers who have been brought together by this mode of economic organisation. It is 
time for the ‘expropriators to be expropriated’. (ibid. p.929). This, says Marx,  
 
is the negation of the negation. It does not re-establish private property, but it does 
indeed establish individual property on the basis of the achievements of the capitalist 
era: namely cooperation and the possession in common of the land and the means of 
production produced by labour itself.  (Marx, 1867, p.929) 
 
Engels spends many pages defending the ‘negation of negation’, particularly as 
represented in Marx’s account, as it had come under attack from the philosopher Eugen 
Dühring (1833 -1921).  The latter had accused Marx of using “a stupid analogy 
invented by Hegel, borrowed from the sphere of religion and based on the story of the 
fall of man and his redemption” (Engels, 1887, p.195) In Engels’ counter attack 
examples from a wide range of areas are brought together, with varying degrees of 
success. One such example is the negation of ‘primitive materialism’ by idealism, 
followed by the negation of idealism by ‘modern materialism’ (ibid. p.190). Another, in 
part derived from Hegel (Rees, 1998, p.46),  concerns the process whereby a grain of 
barley is ‘negated’ by its development into a plant, which is in turn ‘negated’ by the 
appearance of many grains of barley, and hence the return of the grain of barley at a 
(quantitatively) ‘higher level’ (Engels, 1887, p.187). We might also note a further 
example involving mathematics: 
 
Let us take any algebraic quantity whatever: for example, a. If this is negated, we get –
a (minus a). If we negate that negation, by multiplying –a by –a , we get +a², i.e. the 
original positive quantity, but at a higher degree, raised to its second power. (Engels, 
1887, p.188) 
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This example seems questionable. It is not clear, for instance, in what sense a negated 
number is further ‘negated’ by multiplication. Nevertheless there is something of 
relevance to cognitive science in the idea that dialectical processes can be thought to be 
at work in arithmetical operations. We shall come back to this point shortly. 
 
Other features of Engels’ dialectical outlook 
 
As well as the three laws of dialectics Engels makes reference to two other features of a 
dialectical outlook which, although possibly derivable from these laws are perhaps best 
outlined explicitly.  
 
 
Process and Movement 
 
Engels emphasizes that a dialectical outlook is concerned with things in movement or 
as processes. Such an outlook, as he says, is derived from Hegel according to whom: 
 
the whole world, natural historical, intellectual is represented as a process i.e. as in 
constant motion, change, transformation, development; and the attempt is made to trace 
out the internal connection that makes a continuous whole of all this movement and 
development. (Engels, 1887, p. 37) 
 
and, like Hegel, Engels also makes reference to Heraclitus’ maxim that “everything is 
fluid, is constantly changing, constantly coming into being and passing away.” (ibid. 
p.33)  
 
For Engels, however, there is a need to materialize this outlook and give it a scientific 
appearance. He is thus primarily concerned with process and movement as properties of 
matter. To this end he asserts that “motion is the mode of existence of matter” (Engels, 
1887, p.86) i.e. it is not just a contingent fact that matter moves but rather this is its 
essential characteristic. From this starting point he is able to suggest that it is matter in 
motion which eventually gives rise to consciousness. Such motion, he stresses, should 
not be conceived ‘mechanically’ in the way of primitive materialism but rather should 
be conceived dialectically, with quantitative changes facilitating the emergence of 
qualitatively new properties:  
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The motion of matter is not merely crude mechanical motion, mere change of place, it 
is heat and light, electric and magnetic stress, chemical combination and dissociation, 
life and, finally, consciousness. (Engels, 1883, p.21) 
 
Included in this critique of “mechanical materialism” was also the idea, derived from 
Hegel, that the shift from quantitative change to qualitative change is not uni-
directional but reciprocal – qualitative change brings about quantitative change and vice 
versa. (Engels, 1887, p.321). Thus there is an overlap of two dialectical motifs – that of 
“reciprocal action” (ibid) and that of ‘quantitative-qualitative co-dependence’. A 
dialectical, rather than mechanical, conception of processes incorporates both, 
according to Engels. 
 
We should note that Engels was keen to find a mathematics that would be suitable for 
expressing such dialectical processes. We have already seen how he thought that the 
‘negation of the negation’ could be manifest in rudimentary algebraic operations. In the 
case of process and movement he makes frequent reference to the ‘differential calculus’ 
and observes that “the differential calculus for the first time made it possible for natural 
science to represent processes mathematically and not only states: motion.” (Engels, 
1883, p.251)  He also remarks that “in its operations with variable quantities 
mathematics itself enters the field of dialectics” (Engels, 1887, p.168). Although some 
have questioned Engels’ own competence as a mathematician (Van Heijenoort, 1948) it 
is significant that here he is willing to countenance the expression of an all 
encompassing dialectical view of the world – one which he thinks applicable to myriad 
social, natural and cognitive processes – in terms of a differential calculus. We will 
return to this theme when we look at Levins and Lewontin later in this chapter, and also 
when we look at ‘dynamics’ in chapter 5. 
 
Holism 
 
Finally, as was the case with Hegel, holism is key to Engels’ version of dialectics. In 
fact this feature rarely appears in separation from emphasis on processes and motion - 
thus, for example: “dialectics… comprehends things in their essential connection, 
concatenation, motion, origin and ending.” (Engels, 1887, p.36) To get a better sense of 
what Engels means by ‘understanding things in their essential connection’ it is useful to 
look at the perspective against which Engels is pitching himself. This is the perspective 
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which he calls ‘metaphysics’ and which he identifies to some extent with the outlook of 
non dialectical science: 
 
[scientific method] has left us as us as legacy the habit of observing natural objects and 
processes in isolation, apart from their connection with the vast whole; of observing 
them in repose, not in motion, as constants not as essentially variables…To the 
metaphysician, things and their mental reflexes, ideas, are isolated, are to be considered 
one after the other and apart from each other, are objects of investigation, fixed, rigid, 
given once for all.    (Engels, 1887. p.34) 
 
Here, then, Engels’ conception of non-dialectical, ‘metaphysical’ thought is very 
similar to Hegel’s conception of the ‘Understanding’ (also identified to some degree 
with the science of the time - Norman, 1976, p.39). In both cases non-dialectical 
thought is unable to understand its object in its essential movement and 
interconnectedness and so produces a static, fragmented and thus inadequate conception 
of this object.  
 
Engels, again like Hegel, however also suggests that non-dialectical thought has its uses 
up to a point. Indeed he goes so far as to say that it is “justifiable and necessary” 
(Engels, 1887, p.35) in a number of domains. Thus for example cause and effect are 
held to be “good in their application to individual cases”. (ibid) Nevertheless when one 
goes beyond the individual case and examines things in their “general connection with 
the universe as a whole” (ibid. p.36) such conceptions are found wanting. Metaphysical 
thought reaches its limit “beyond which it becomes one-sided, restricted, abstract, lost 
in insoluble contradictions” (ibid. p.35)  
 
 
 
Lev Vygotsky  (1896 – 1934) 
 
From Engels we turn to Lev Vygotsky. The contrast between these two theorists is 
quite marked. Whereas Engels sought to incorporate all human, social and material 
processes within a grand dialectical schema, Vygotsky was more focussed, less 
ideological and perhaps more genuinely empirical in his approach. Vygotsky was a 
psychologist who began his career in the early years of the Soviet Union. Some have 
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seen in this fact the possibility that Vygotsky might have been a Marxist out of 
necessity rather than choice, and therefore that the Marxian elements of his account 
might be inessential decoration rather than core ingredients. Veresov for example, 
suggests that some of Vygotsky’s major influences were not Marxist thinkers but 
thinkers from the ‘silver age of Russian culture’ (Veresov, 2005, p.32).  However 
whilst it may be true that “it was not only Marxism which influenced Vygotsky” (ibid. 
p.45) it is clear that many of Vygotsky’s ideas, as well as being explicitly presented as 
the product of a Marxian outlook, actually have content consistent with a keen 
knowledge of and interest in Hegelian and Marxian concerns. As Cole & Scribner put it 
“Vygotsky clearly viewed Marxist thought as a valuable scientific resource from very 
early in his career” (1978, p.6). Similarly, as Toulmin has said: 
 
Vygotsky was more than happy to call himself a Marxist…the general form provided 
by a ‘historical materialist’ philosophy gave him the basis he needed for developing an 
integrated account of the relations between developmental psychology and clinical 
neurology, cultural anthropology and the psychology of art…(Toulmin, 1978, no page 
ref) 
 
In our short account we will not be investigating Vygotsky’s output in all of these areas 
but instead we will look briefly at just two of his key ideas - those of ‘psychological 
tools’ and the ‘social origin of higher mental functions’. 
 
Psychological Tools 
 
In a 1930 lecture Vygotsky notes that: 
 
In the behaviour of men we encounter quite a number of artificial devices for mastering 
his own mental processes…these devices can justifiably and conventionally be called 
psychological tools or instruments.  (Vygotsky, 1930, p.1) 
 
Vygotsky has a wide ranging conception of the sorts of things that can be called ‘tools’ 
in this sense – they include language itself as well as various numeric systems, 
mnemonic techniques, diagrams ands maps and “other conventional signs” (ibid.) He is 
clear that although the description of such items as ‘tools’ is an analogy, and therefore 
like all analogies has its limits, it is capable of being used with some precision in the 
sense that one can outline exactly what the commonalities and differences between 
standard (‘technical’) tools and psychological tools are. In particular, following Hegel, 
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Vygotsky thinks that tools of both kinds can be characterized as a ‘middle term’ (ibid. 
p.3) – a means of ‘mediation’ - between ‘the activity of man’ (ibid. p.4) and the object.  
However where psychological tools differ from technical tools is in the outcome of 
such mediation. Whereas technical tools are used with the intention of creating changes 
in the external physical world, psychological tools are meant to “act upon mind and 
behaviour” (ibid), facilitating “activity toward oneself, and not toward the object” 
(ibid). Thus, for example ‘a knot in a handkerchief’ (ibid. p.2) is used as an aid to 
memory rather than to (directly) bring about change in the external world.  
 
The use of psychological tools, says Vygotsky, “enhances and immensely extends the 
possibilities of behaviour” (ibid. p.5) for it makes available to everyone an external 
resource by means of which increasingly sophisticated cognitive strategies can be 
deployed. Vygotsky sees in such a process confirmation of the Marxian thesis that “by 
acting on external nature and changing it [man] at the same time also changes his own 
nature…” (ibid p.4) This enabling function of psychological tools is often discussed 
under the heading of ‘scaffolding’ (e.g. Toulmin, (1978), Clark (1997)), a convention 
which we will adopt later in this thesis. However it perhaps should be made clear that 
Vygotsky himself did not use this term, and as others have pointed out (e.g. Shah-
Shuja, 2008) the term was probably first used in a thoroughgoing Vygotskyan sense by 
Cazden (1979).  
 
The social origin of higher mental functions 
 
We have said already that language itself can be viewed as a psychological tool 
according to Vygotsky. It acts as such in a number of ways but Vygotsky seems to 
suggest that it is through ‘internalization’ that its role as a problem-solving tool 
becomes most significant: 
 
The greatest change in children’s capacity to use language as a problem solving tool 
takes place … when socialized speech (which has previously been used to address an 
adult) is turned inward. Instead of appealing to the adult, children appeal to themselves. 
(Vygotsky, 1978, p. 27). 
 
Vygotsky’s argument is that verbal thought, or “inner speech” (Vygotsky, 1934, p.35) 
has its origins in social speech. Signs and words are initially used only for purposes of 
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social contact. Subsequently however children will then find themselves using speech 
when alone as a means of guiding and focusing their activity. This “egocentric speech” 
(ibid) then finally metamorphoses into verbal thought – which we might loosely call 
‘thinking’ (ibid p.36). Hence what was originally a medium that facilitated social 
interaction (speech) has “become the basis of a new and superior form of activity” 
(Vygotsky, 1978, p.28).  
 
In this description, then, the process whereby verbal thought comes into being is one 
that starts from the outside-in so to speak. As Vygotsky puts it “in our conception, the 
true direction of the development of thinking is not from the individual to the social, 
but from the social to the individual.” (Vygotsky, 1934, p.36), an outlook in keeping 
with the Marxian maxim that “the relationship of man to himself first becomes 
objective to him through his relationship to other men” (Marx, 1844a, p.84). This is a 
frequent theme in Vygotsky’s work applying not only to the transition from speech to 
verbal thought but to other operations as well, including ‘voluntary attention’, ‘logical 
memory’ and concept formation (Vygotsky, 1978, p.57). In all of these cases what at 
first functions as an interpersonal relation re-establishes itself as an “intrapersonal 
process” (ibid). We will return to this topic when we critically examine Andy Clark’s 
conception of ‘The Extended Mind’ in chapter 7. 
 
 
 
Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1908 – 1961) 
 
Merleau-Ponty and Marxism 
 
Our third Marxian theorist is the philosopher Maurice Merleau-Ponty. Merleau-Ponty 
has had a significant influence on the development of cognitive science. His work on 
embodiment is frequently cited not only by recent cognitive scientists (e.g. Varela et al., 
1993; Clark, 1997; Noe, 2004; Gallagher, 2005; Thompson, 2007) but also by earlier 
critics of ‘cognitivism’ (most notably Dreyfus, 1972).  What is less commonly 
acknowledged in the arena of cognitive science, however, is Merleau-Ponty’s Marxist 
outlook. 
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In fact, as other commentators have pointed out (Miller, 1976; Potter, 2008), Merleau-
Ponty’s Marxism was not a fixed quantity but rather varied throughout his career. The 
(comparatively) younger Merleau-Ponty who wrote Humanism and Terror in 1947 was 
a committed ‘orthodox’ Marxist, at least in the sense that he was willing to countenance 
the possibility that Stalinist purges and show trials might be an historical necessity if it 
transpired that by such means one could “create a society without violence” (Merleau-
Ponty, 1947, xxxvii). Such a position, we might remark, now seems only marginally 
more defensible than Heidegger’s own support for national socialism a decade earlier 
(see e.g. Wolin, 1993). In Merleau-Ponty’s case it was indicative of an outlook which, 
while it rejected any crude deterministic notions of an objective historical process 
separate from the self-conscious activity of human beings themselves (Merleau-Ponty, 
1947, p.17) nevertheless thought, in Hegelian fashion, that there was a History to be 
realized, and in the light of which acts of state violence might come to be vindicated. 
 
By 1955, with the publication of Adventures of the Dialectic, however Merleau-Ponty 
had become disillusioned with orthodox Marxism, and especially with an ‘essentialist’ 
conception of the proletariat (Miller, 1976, pp. 110-11) according to which those 
human beings who stood in a certain relation to the means of production had a 
predisposition to realize communism. As Miller (somewhat amusingly) expresses it: 
 
He came to question whether the proletariat in fact had a genuine commitment 
to radical social change. (1976, p.122) 
 
 
Moreover, this later Merleau-Ponty began to see in Marxism a significant ambiguity on 
the question of human agency, which posited on one side a dialectic between subject 
and object but on the other a materialist determinism (ibid. p.125) expressing itself, for 
example, in the idea that there are “objective conditions” (Merleau-Ponty, 1955, p.208) 
which usher revolution onto the stage of world history.  Miller views this change of 
perspective as the coming to fruition of a tension that had always existed between 
Merleau-Ponty’s Marxism and his phenomenological work. Merleau-Ponty, he says, 
was “torn between phenomenology and a neo-Hegelian account of the meaning of 
History” (Miller, 1976, p.109). The former, according to Miller, placed its emphasis on 
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“the contingency and open-ended nature of meaning” (ibid. p.110) whereas an 
Hegelian-Marxian conception of history, though sometimes cloaked in the language of 
autonomy, leads in the direction of determinism. 
 
Whilst there may be much in this analysis, we should not also ignore the possibility that 
aspects of Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenological work may in fact have been facilitated 
by other – non-deterministic – elements of an Hegelian-Marxian outlook, elements, 
incidentally, which seem as evident in Merleau-Ponty’s later work as his earlier.  Below 
we will look briefly at examples of such ‘elements’ in two works that have since 
become relevant to cognitive science, The Structure of Behaviour (1942) and The 
Phenomenology of Perception (1945). 
 
The Structure of Behaviour 
 
Merleau-Ponty’s work The Structure of Behaviour is notable for its dialectical 
character. Within cognitive science, Thompson (2007) has acknowledged that this is the 
case but he has not accredited the ultimate source of this perspective. In fact it becomes 
apparent that Merleau-Ponty has reproduced many of the dialectical themes found in 
Hegel and Engels. Thus for example Merleau-Ponty’s conception of ‘forms’ is both 
holistic and dynamic, being that of “total processes whose properties are not the sum of 
those which the isolated parts would possess” (Merleau-Ponty, 1942, p.47) Moreover 
his description of the changes which ‘physical form’ undergoes in certain 
circumstances is familiar: 
 
 
It can happen that, submitted to external forces which increase and decrease in a 
continuous manner, the system, beyond a certain threshold, redistributes its own forces 
in a qualitatively different order, which is nevertheless only another expression of its 
immanent law. Thus, with form, a principle of discontinuity is introduced and the 
conditions for a development by leaps or crises, for an event or for a history, are given.  
(Merleau-Ponty, 1942, p.137) 
 
Thompson, linking this description with autopoietic theory (see chapter 6), recognizes 
that the ‘principle of discontinuity’ forms part of a generalized ‘dialectical’ perspective 
in Merleau-Ponty’s work (Thompson, 2007, pp.66-87). However he does not establish 
its provenance in Hegel’s and Engels’ work, or acknowledge that it has previously been 
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given a name – the ‘law of the transformation of quantity into quality’. Neither does he 
appear to notice the Marxian overtones of the notion of an historical “development by 
leaps or crises”. 
 
Reciprocal causation 
 
The Structure of Behaviour is also noteworthy for its references to ‘circular causality’, a 
key notion, as we have seen, in Hegelian and Marxian accounts. This is prominent, for 
example, in Merleau-Ponty’s characterization of the relationship between the organism 
and its ‘mileu’. In a section entitled ‘The Human Order’ (Merleau-Ponty, 1942, pp.160-
184) we find strong echoes of Marx’s and Engels’ account of the reciprocal relationship 
between agent and material world, but with more explicit detail about the underlying 
causal story.  
 
In this section Merleau-Ponty distinguishes his own dialectical account of the 
agent/environment relation from one which bases itself on “mechanical action” (ibid. 
p.160). In the case of mechanical action “the cause and effect are decomposable into 
real elements which have a one-to-one correspondence” (ibid). This is the view of 
‘cause’ and ‘effect’ that Hegel had attributed to the Understanding and which Engels 
linked to ‘metaphysical’ (i.e. abstract, fragmented) reasoning. On this view of things 
“the cause is the necessary and sufficient condition of the effect” (ibid. p.161). 
Merleau-Ponty notes that even when one acknowledges some degree of reciprocal 
influence, within this framework any such reciprocity becomes decomposable into “a 
series of uni-directional determinations” (ibid), where, at any particular moment and in 
reference to any specifiable feature of either of the two relata, no feature can be playing 
the role of both cause and effect. Here we are perhaps reminded of how Labriola (1897) 
sought to unify ‘theory’ and ‘practice’ by interleaving them (see chapter 2.) In contrast, 
according to the dialectical conception of things, says Merleau-Ponty, “one cannot 
assign a moment in which the world acts on the organism, since the very effect of this 
‘action’ expresses the internal law of the organism” (ibid).  
 
The latter portion of this statement is a little difficult to interpret– for it is not 
immediately clear why temporal indeterminacy of the world’s actions should follow 
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from the fact that their effects express an “internal law of the organism”. As this is an 
important issue we might spend a little time discussing it here. 
 
One interpretation (derived in part from Thompson, 2007, pp.69-70) seems to be that 
the actions of the world cannot be specified as ‘inputs’ in separation from the state of 
the organism itself. The features of the world that act on the organism are not things-in-
themselves but rather, as causal objects, are only are what they are in relation to the 
organism. Such an idea recalls some of Hegel’s own arguments for the unity of cause 
and effect – e.g. that certain features of the object affected facilitate the resulting effect 
- as well as the more general Marxian argument that “nature cannot be discussed as if it 
were severed from human action” (Avineri, 1970, p.70). We might note that in the case 
of Merleau-Ponty, one of the relevant features of this causal situation, expressive of the 
‘internal law of the organism’, is that “physical stimuli act upon the organism only by 
eliciting a global response which will vary qualitatively when the stimuli vary 
quantitatively” (Merleau-Ponty, 1942, p.161) – hence it is the ‘law of the 
transformation of quantity into quality’ which comes into play as one determinant of 
the organism’s response.  
 
However, whilst such an argument might go some way towards clarifying what sort of 
thing an ‘internal law of the organism’ might be, and how it can be used as part of a 
description of a material unity between cause and effect, it is not clear how this need 
have a bearing on questions of temporal indeterminacy or unity. That an action or 
stimuli might bring about different effects according to the properties or state of the 
organism, (perhaps as modified by the history of previous interactions between world 
and organism) does not tell us that we cannot pinpoint in objective time when that 
stimuli occurred. 
 
The same issue seems to hold even when we break down the boundaries between 
organism and mileu completely. Just as Marx thought that nature was the “inorganic 
body of man” (Marx, 1844a, p.81) so Merleau-Ponty appears to think that organism and 
mileu form a unity of some kind. This is suggested, for example, in his assertion that 
“the mutual exteriority of the organism and the mileu is surmounted along with the 
mutual exteriority of the stimuli” (Merleau-Ponty, 1942, p.161), as well as in the idea 
that the dependency between organism and mileu is so great that they “participate in the 
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same structure”(ibid). Again, however, this only seems to give us a material unity. It 
does not well articulate the notion of temporal indeterminacy. Things are perhaps better 
explained in an earlier passage from the book: 
 
When the eye and the ear follow an animal in flight, it is impossible to say “which 
started first” in the exchange of stimuli and responses. Since all the movements of the 
organism are always conditioned by external influences, once can if one wishes, treat 
behaviour as an effect of the mileu. But in the same way, since all stimulations which 
the organism receives have in turn been [made] possible only by its preceding 
movements which have culminated in exposing the receptor organ to the external 
influences one could also say that the behaviour is the first cause of all the stimulations. 
(Merleau-Ponty, 1942, p.13) 
 
Like Engels, Merleau-Ponty is willing to concede that the partial view of a particular 
scientific approach - which in this instance is that which sees behaviour as a response to 
external stimuli – can have its uses. However in airing the converse view as part of an 
either/or dichotomy Merleau-Ponty’s intention is the same as Hegel’s in the Logic, i.e. 
to show that each option is as ‘one-sided’ as the other and that the true picture of things 
can only be attained by viewing the interchange between organism and mileu as a 
reciprocal unity. Events are “co-determinate all the way down” so to speak, and thus 
the standard order of precedence by means of which we normally differentiate ‘cause’ 
from ‘effect’ ceases to be relevant. 
 
This perhaps stills leaves open the question of a possible distinction between not being 
able to differentiate what came first in a chain of events and actual simultaneity of 
events, but we will not pursue this here. 
 
Phenomenology of Perception 
 
Turning, then,  to The Phenomenology of Perception, we will confine our attention to 
one passage from this work which has gained considerable attention in cognitive 
science (most recently, Clark, 2008; Rowlands, 2010)  In this passage ( Merleau-Ponty, 
1945, pp.175-177) Merleau-Ponty describes the activity of “learning to find one’s way 
among things with a stick” (ibid p.175). There are, for the purposes of this thesis, three 
points of interest in this account. Firstly there is the general point that for Merleau-
Ponty such an activity is simultaneously a motor habit and “equally an example of a 
 106 
perceptual habit” (ibid). Without further elaboration this is already significant as a 
challenge to the type of dichotomous reasoning which would seek to keep the two 
terms apart – as such it can be seen as another example of an attack on the ‘fragmented’  
perspective of the Understanding (Hegel) or metaphysics (Engels).  
 
We might then move on to consider Merleau-Ponty’s actual description of stick use. 
Here he notes that “once the stick has become a familiar instrument, the world of 
feelable things recedes and now begins, not at the outer skin of the hand, but at the end 
of the stick.”(Merleau-Ponty, 1945, p.176). Thus the stick becomes an extension of the 
agent – “it is no longer an object perceived by the blind man, but an instrument with 
which he perceives it. It is a bodily auxiliary, an extension of the bodily synthesis.” 
(ibid) At this point comparisons might typically be made with Heidegger’s notion of 
equipment as ‘ready to hand’ (Heidegger, 1927). However an equally strong 
comparison can be made with the much earlier Marxian conception of externalization 
in tool use. According to this conception, as we noted earlier, “nature becomes one of 
the organs of his [the productive individual’s] activity, one that he annexes to his own 
bodily organs” (McLellan, 1977, p.456).  Given Merleau-Ponty’s Marxian outlook it 
seems likely that this account is at least as relevant here. 
 
Finally, we might note the general lesson that Merleau-Ponty draws from the stick story  
- which is that “in the gaze we have at our disposal a natural instrument analogous to 
the blind man’s stick” (Merleau-Ponty, 1945, p.177). Here the stick has become part of 
an analogy for the active nature of perception itself. Perception is not a passive process 
but an active relation to the world which “questions, ranges over or dwells on” (ibid.) 
the objects in that world. This line of reasoning, as we shall see, has been taken up in 
recent cognitive science most notably by Alva Noë (2004). It is also seems to extend 
one of the themes in the Marxian notion of ‘praxis’. Although as we saw in the previous 
chapter, the concept of praxis was mainly posited as a counter to the dichotomy 
between thought and action – certain of Marx’s arguments have relevance also to the 
perception / action dichotomy. This is particularly the case with Marx’s criticism of 
traditional materialism in the ‘First Theses on Feuerbach’ wherein “the thing, reality, 
sensuousness, is conceived only in the form of the object, or of contemplation, but not 
as sensuous human activity, practice...” (Marx, 1970a, p.121) Whilst this passage 
makes no concrete reference to perception, the notion that, to understand the world as it 
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actually is, is not to take a passive, contemplative stance towards the object but an 
active, practical one, seems to gel well with the notion that perception is an active 
process. Merleau-Ponty, of course, was well acquainted with the concept of ‘praxis’, 
making extensive reference to it in Adventures of the Dialectic, and in one passage 
defining it specifically in relation to the ‘First Thesis on Feuerbach’ (Merleau-Ponty, 
1955, p.48). It would therefore seem reasonable to assume that his concept of ‘active 
perception’ was heavily influenced by his Marxian outlook. (We will return to the topic 
of ‘active perception’ when we look at Noë in chapter 5.) 
 
Alfred Sohn-Rethel (1889 – 1990) 
 
Our fourth Marxian theorist is Alfred Sohn-Rethel. As was noted earlier, Sohn-Rethel, 
unlike the other Marxist thinkers in this chapter, cannot be said to have had any 
influence on cognitive science, acknowledged or unacknowledged, direct or indirect. 
Nor can it be said that amongst current views in cognitive science there is anything 
which mirrors his views to any significant extent (although there are some interesting 
comparisons to be made with Lakoff and Johnson – see chapter 5). Nevertheless he is 
included here because he is explicitly concerned with a theory of cognition, and 
because certain elements of his analysis would seem to have something of relevance to 
say to modern day cognitive science .We will not be able to explore the rather dense 
and intricate arguments given in his major work (Sohn Rethel, 1978) in any great detail. 
Rather our concern is with a specific concept at its centre – namely that of ‘real 
abstraction’. However, in order to get to this centre some summary of the arguments 
that lead up to it are necessary. 
 
A stated aim of Sohn-Rethel’s work is to give “the true historical explanation of the 
enigmatic ‘cognitive faculties’ of civilized man” (ibid. p.34). Sohn-Rethel expresses 
sympathy with Kant insofar as he agrees with him that there are conceptual pre-
requisites for advanced cognition and that these cannot be derived empirically from the 
world  i.e. they cannot be “traced to the physical and sensorial capacity of experience” 
(ibid. p.38). However he disagrees with Kant that such conceptual pre-requisites are to 
be located in an ‘a priori’ transcendental subject. Indeed he thinks that such a 
perspective is itself a product of the “division between head and hand” (ibid. p.37) 
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brought about by the mental/manual division of labour. Instead he suggests that the 
abstract tools which facilitate our advanced conceptual abilities can be traced to the 
concrete practice of commodity exchange, and as such are neither passively empiricist 
nor idealist in origin. 
 
We saw in the previous chapter that for Marx a commodity has a two-fold existence. As 
a substantial object it can be considered in relation to its physical properties as a ‘use 
value’. However considered only as a commodity per se it is an ‘exchange value’. In 
this latter guise all physical properties are abstracted from the object – as Marx puts it: 
“Not an atom of matter enters into the objectivity of commodities as values; in this it is 
the direct opposite of the coarsely sensuous objectivity of commodities as physical 
objects” (Marx, 1867, p.138).  Sohn-Rethel sees in this abstraction from concreteness in 
the commodity, the origins of conceptual abstraction in cognition.  
 
At this point we should perhaps note a certain ambiguity in Sohn-Rethel’s argument, 
for he seems to equivocate between talk of ‘the concept of abstraction’ and talk of 
‘abstract concepts’. Clearly these are intimately related and it might be argued that one 
cannot have the one without the other, but it is worth pointing out that there is a 
distinction to be made.  Examples given by Sohn-Rethel seem to straddle both 
categories. Thus, for example, the Greek philosophical notion of ‘abstract universals’ is 
held to be to be dependent on the arrival of coinage, for in the coin we find ‘value’ 
embodied as “an immutable substance, substance over which time has no power, and 
which stands in antithetic contrast to any matter found in nature” (Sohn-Rethel, 1978, 
p.59). Likewise ‘atomicity’ (in Democritus for example) can be seen as derivable from 
the value relation. As a physical object the commodity is a solid thing with particular 
differences to other objects, but as commodities all objects are equally and ‘infinitely’ 
divisible in terms of their value. This divisibility of value is again materially 
instantiated in money, which “must be divisible in order to leave the commodities 
undivided” (ibid. p.53). Similarly, though perhaps less abstractly, ‘solipsism’ is seen as 
derived from the act of commodity exchange, for this transaction is one which 
reinforces the separateness of its participants through their exclusive interest in and 
claim to the commodities being exchanged – in exchange “the action is social, the 
minds are private” (ibid. p.29) 
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These concepts, then, along with many others (including ‘Abstract time and Space’, 
‘Substance and Accident’, ‘Abstract Movement’ and ‘Strict Causality’) are all 
“derivatives from material being” (ibid. p.201). This is not the empiricist ‘material 
being’ of “external nature and the material world” but rather is “social being” (ibid.) as 
manifest in the social practice of exchange.  Conceptual abstraction has its roots in the 
practical activity of exchange in accordance with the Marxian materialist principle 
whereby the ideas of individuals are “sublimates of their material life process” (Marx & 
Engels, 1970b, p.47). 
 
It is at this juncture that ‘real abstraction’ enters the story for, says Sohn-Rethel, the 
exchange of commodities itself constitutes an ‘abstraction in practice’ which occurs 
outside of the conscious awareness of participants. Indeed its success is dependent on 
participants not focussing on the abstract element of their interaction: “Were the 
abstractness to catch their minds their action would cease to be exchange and the 
abstraction would not arise” (Sohn-Rethel, 1978, p.27). The participants, instead, are 
motivated by, and occupied with, the individual uses to which their respective 
commodities (money or object) will be put. Thus, according to Sohn-Rethel, in 
exchange ‘abstraction’ inheres in the practice itself – “it is the action of exchange and 
the action alone that is abstract” (ibid. p.26). This is the meaning of ‘real abstraction’. 
 
By use of this phrase Sohn-Rethel says that he hopes to “dispose of the idea that 
abstraction is the exclusive privilege of thought” (ibid. p.7). This description of his 
project is perhaps a little misleading, for it would seem to imply that Sohn-Rethel’s 
concern is with establishing that abstraction can take different forms, conceptual or 
practical, whereas his actual concern is also to show that an order of priorities exists in 
the origin of abstraction. As with Vygotsky, he appears to believe that the phenomenon 
under scrutiny existed first in social practice and only later as a property of individual 
minds. Nevertheless, for the purpose of this thesis, our main interest is in the idea itself. 
Abstraction can be a feature of practical activity as well as contemplative activity. We 
will return to this idea in chapter 5. 
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Richard Lewontin (1929–present) and Richard Levins (1930–present) 
 
Finally we turn to Richard Lewontin and Richard Levins. Lewontin and Levins 
(henceforth ‘L&L’) are biologists who take an explicitly Marxist stance in several of 
their works, and most notably in the book The Dialectical Biologist (1985). Although 
chronologically they are the furthest removed from Engels in this chapter, it is they who 
are closest to him in spirit, offering what might be seen as an updated ‘dialectics of 
nature’. Their work has had some significant influence on cognitive science, 
particularly on Varela, Thompson and Rosch (1993), although the Marxian nature of 
this influence is, with one honourable exception (Faith, 2000), rarely acknowledged in 
the field. In the following we shall try to summarise a few of L&L’s key points. 
 
Against the Metaphor of Adaptation 
 
One of L&L’s main arguments is directed against the Darwinian “metaphor of 
adaptation” (Levins & Lewontin, 1985, p.4). According to this view, say L&L: 
 
Organisms adapt to a changing external world, which poses problems that the 
organisms solve through evolution. (ibid) 
 
L&L suggest that such a perspective places the organism in too passive a role. 
Organism and environment are presented as having “separate existences, separate 
properties”. As a result the former becomes an “alienated object of external forces.” 
(ibid) We might note that L&L’s use of the term ‘alienated’ in this passage does not 
seem to imply the attribution of a subjective sense of estrangement to the organism (as 
in Hegel and Marx’s accounts). Rather the suggestion is that the organism is ‘alienated’ 
in the objective sense that it has become separated, theoretically, from the network of 
dialectical relations that make it what it is. It is thus in this sense ‘estranged’ by an 
analysis which fails to see it in its actual connections with the world. (We will return to 
this point when we look at ‘holism and emergence’ below.) There is, however, the 
additional suggestion that such a theoretical manoeuvre is itself a reflection of 
subjectively experienced alienated social relations in the real world. As L&L note – 
“human beings see the natural world as a reflection of the social organisation that is the 
dominant reality of their lives” (ibid. p.12). Hence the depiction of the organism as a 
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plaything of external forces over which it has no control can be seen as an unconscious 
mirroring of the situation faced by human beings in their productive lives. 
 
In place of an adaptationist perspective L&L wish to stress that “the organism is both 
the subject and object of evolution” (ibid. p.204). Implicit in this conception are a 
number of connected theses. These include that organisms do not merely find 
themselves in an environment but select that environment (ibid. p.53) and also that they 
modify the environment they find themselves in (ibid. p.54). This view of things recalls 
those aspects of Marxian theory which stress the active, productive nature of the human 
agent’s relationship to the world; and L&L themselves trace their position back to 
Engels’ own position on evolution: 
 
Engels captured the essential feature of human evolution; the very strong feedback 
between what people did and how they changed. He saw ‘environment’ not as a passive 
selective force external to the organism, but rather as the product of human activity. 
(ibid. p.253) 
 
In some passages L&L go further than mere selection and modification, suggesting that 
the organism creates its environment in toto: 
 
It is impossible to avoid the conclusion that organisms construct every aspect of their 
environment themselves. They are not passive objects of external forces but the 
creators and modulators of these forces. The metaphor of adaptation must therefore be 
replaced by one of construction. (ibid. p.104). 
 
Nevertheless, L&L do not intend to reverse the direction of causality as such but rather 
to suggest a reciprocal relation between organism and environment. As the organism 
modifies the environment so it, in turn, is modified by it. Thus organism and 
environment “actively co-determine each other” (ibid. p.89). In this respect L&L’s 
account is not too dissimilar to Merleau-Ponty’s account of the organism and its 
‘mileu’, for L&L likewise characterize this relationship as one wherein “there is no 
longer a neat separation between cause (the environment) and effect (the organism)” 
(ibid. p.106). However whereas Merleau-Ponty’s focus is on a lived reciprocity 
between subject and object, as evidenced for example in the ‘animal in flight’ story 
(Merleau-Ponty, 1942, p.13), L&L’s focus is on reciprocity over evolutionary 
significant lengths of time, the reciprocity of a “co-evolutionary system.”(ibid.).  
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Differential Equations and the end of Alienation 
 
We have seen how L&L acknowledge their debt to Engels in their active account of 
evolutionary processes. They also follow Engels in a desire to express dialectical 
relations mathematically. Taking up his suggestion that “in its operations with variable 
quantities mathematics enters the field of dialectics” (Engels, 1887, p.168) L&L argue 
specifically that the reciprocal relation between organism and environment can be 
expressed through the use of differential equations:  
 
[The dialectical view which] breaks down the alienation between object-organism and 
subject-environment must be written as a pair of coupled differential equations. (L&L, 
1985, p.105, authors’ emphasis) 
 
We will not here go into a detailed analysis of coupled differential equations. Suffice to 
say that they offer a mathematical means of describing the mutual interaction and co-
evolution of two components (e.g. organism and environment) over time. The 
reciprocal nature of the interaction, and thus the internal relation between the two 
components, is captured in the fact that “the equation describing the evolution of each 
component contains a term that factors in the other system’s current state” (Clark, 
1998b, p.10). 
 
What is particularly significant about L&L’s account is that it centrally incorporates 
reference to the end of alienation in this context. To understand the reciprocal nature of 
the relation between organism and environment is to understand them in a non-
alienated fashion i.e. in their essential unity rather than in separation from each other; 
and this unity can be expressed in mathematical terms. Thus the project which started 
with Hegel, the end of alienation through the union of subject and object, finds its 
mathematical culmination in a pair of coupled differential equations. We will return to 
this topic when we look at ‘dynamics’ in chapter 5. 
 
Holism and Emergence 
 
We have already alluded in various ways to the fact that, as with Hegel, Engels, and 
Merleau-Ponty, L&L’s dialectical outlook is also ‘holistic’. L&L’s particular version of 
holism is pitched against what they call ‘Cartesian Reductionism’ (ibid. p.269), of 
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which they consider the Darwinian view to be an example (ibid. p.4). There are, 
according to L&L, four components of such a view: 
 
   1)   There is a natural set of units or parts of which any whole system is made. 
2) These units are homogenous within themselves, at least insofar as they affect the  
whole of which they are parts.  
  3)   The parts are ontologically prior to the whole… 
  4)   Causes are separate from effects…                    (ibid. p.269) 
 
As regards condition 3) this is taken as implying that parts exist in isolation, with their 
own intrinsic properties, but that they can come together to make wholes. L&L add that 
this model allows that in complex cases the interaction of the parts might produce 
additional properties for the whole. As regards 4), like Merleau-Ponty, L&L agree that 
this standard view allows for a two way influence between relata but that in such cases 
“there is no ambiguity about which is causing subject and which is caused object.” 
(ibid) 
 
We will not here investigate whether such a view is genuinely ‘Cartesian’, although we 
might perhaps remark that Descartes seems to be attributed an increasingly wide variety 
of views by critics, not all of which can be true of him. More significant, for our 
purposes is L&L’s subsequent characterization of this view : 
 
We characterize the world described by these principles as the alienated world 
[author’s italics], the world in which parts are separated from wholes and reified as 
things in themselves, causes separate from effects, subjects separated from objects. It is 
a physical world that mirrors the structure of the alienated social world in which it was 
conceived. (ibid. p.270). 
 
Again, then, we have the use of the term ‘alienated’ to imply separation and 
fragmentation. An alienated worldview, on L&L’s interpretation, is one which runs 
counter to holism by considering things in separation. We also note in this passage 
reference to the Marxian concept of ‘reification’. This term, which Petrovic suggests 
denotes “a ‘special case’ of alienation” (Petrovic, 1991, p.463) is used by L&L to 
describe the way in which living relations become objectified as things. We will return 
to this term in chapter 7.  
 
In contrast to the alienated worldview, say L&L, a holistic, dialectical world view is 
one that acknowledges that “part implies whole and whole implies part” (ibid. p.272). 
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L&L see in this reciprocity between part and whole, amongst other things, a different 
perspective on the concept of ‘emergence’ than is offered by standard accounts. It is not 
merely that new properties may arise from the interaction of the parts of a whole, 
which, as we saw earlier, was allowed by the traditional account, but that the properties 
of the parts themselves are also dependent on such a combination – “the properties [of 
the parts] come into existence in the interaction that makes the whole” (ibid. p.273).   
 
Connectedly, another feature of L&L’s dialectical holism is that, in contrast with 2) 
above, it does not attribute ‘homogeneity’ to component parts. Whilst “reductionist 
science” adopts such a strategy, from a dialectical point of view “things are assumed 
from the beginning to be internally heterogeneous at every level” (ibid. p.272). It is 
perhaps not quite clear what L&L’s intention is with this remark. One might think that 
‘homogeneity’ and ‘heterogeneity’ are relative terms anyway. A group of items are or 
are not homogenous according to certain criteria. There thus seems to be something a 
little ‘one-sided’ in positing a generalised internal heterogeneity per se. At the very 
least, we might say (somewhat flippantly) the parts must be homogenous in being 
equally heterogeneous. We will return to this topic in chapter 5. 
 
An historical approach 
 
We have said that L&L attack the fragmented, ‘alienated’ viewpoint of reductionist 
Darwinian science. We should add however that they temper this critique in one 
respect. Arguing from an ‘historical’ perspective they suggest that Darwinism was a 
necessary step in the development of science. Here the parallel is less with Engels’ 
concession that Metaphysics has its uses up to a point, and more with the Marxian 
‘negation of the negation’ in the history of forms of social organisation. Just as 
Capitalism replaced Feudalism and is in its turn replaced by Communism, in a 
sequence of necessary stages, so Darwinian reductionism replaced creationism, and is 
in its turn to be replaced by a dialectical approach (although in some places L&L 
present this as the ‘completion’ of Darwinism – ibid. p.106). In the case of Darwinian 
reductionism the idea seems to be that it was necessary to get a clear view of things in 
separation from each other before one could then work out their essential connections - 
“Only by alienating organism from environment and rigorously separating the 
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ontogenetic forces of natural selection could Darwin put evolutionary biology on the 
right track” (ibid). 
 
Conclusion 
 
In this chapter, then, we have looked at a number of Marxian theorists, whose work can 
collectively be thought of as constituting a bridge to cognitive science. Considered 
individually, in Engels’ case the influence on cognitive science is an indirect one most 
evident in – though not restricted to – the dialectical naturalism of Levins and 
Lewontin; and in Sohn-Rethel’s case, as we have said there is no chain of influence, 
direct or indirect on cognitive science, but his work is included both because it is 
already a theory of cognition, and because his concept of ‘real abstraction’ has 
something to say to recent cognitive science. In the case of Vygotsky, Merleau-Ponty 
and Levins & Lewontin, their work has had a direct and acknowledged influence on 
cognitive science.  
 
In our next chapter we turn at last to cognitive science itself. 
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Chapter 4 – Alienation and Cognitive Science 
 
Introduction 
 
In the last three chapters we have spent quite some time looking at the work of Hegel, 
Marx, and Engels as well as at later Marxian thinkers. Our aim in doing so was to 
supply the theoretical resources, and to a small degree the historical justification, by 
means of which the current movement in cognitive science can be understood in a new 
light, as a ‘retreat from alienation’. However before examining current cognitive 
science in terms of such a retreat, we need to spend some time looking at the object 
which engendered such a counter-movement, and at the question of why it might be 
thought to be alienated in the first place. This will be the aim of the current chapter – 
which will focus on what might loosely be called ‘traditional’ cognitive science.  
 
A couple of points ought to be made clear at the outset. Firstly the account given of 
‘traditional’ cognitive science is a) rather brief and b) presented largely from the point 
of view of its critics. In part mitigation we can only say that a), we have already spent a 
substantial portion of this work on summary rather than analysis, so a more fulsome 
account may not be appropriate at this juncture and b), the account given at least 
corresponds to the object as perceived by certain of its critics. 
 
Secondly our breakdown in this chapter of different ways in which traditional cognitive 
science might be viewed as ‘alienated’ is not meant to be exhaustive. Nor are all 
elements of this account intended to correspond with counter elements in the 
hypothesized ‘retreat’. In particular, as regards this latter point, some elements of the 
diagnosis in this chapter - e.g. the ‘alienation from product’ perceived as present in 
‘Strong AI’ -  have no principled anti thesis in the counter movement of recent 
cognitive science. Conversely, when we come to look at the positive theses of current 
cognitive science in the next chapter, we will get some additional insight into the sense 
in which the earlier conceptions of cognitive science might be thought ‘alienated’.  
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Traditional Cognitive Science 
 
It is no easy matter to try to summarise the key assumptions of ‘traditional’ cognitive 
science, for there are many complicating factors that need to be taken into account. 
First of all one would ideally like to avoid historical simplification. As Boden (2006) 
has pointed out not all cognitive scientists prior to a particular date seem to have held to 
all of the main tenets of a ‘traditional’ approach and conversely many of the 
perspectives now promulgated as part of a new wave of cognitive science were to some 
degree anticipated by the earliest AI researchers. Moreover if one wants to talk of a 
sustained critique of the core vales of traditional cognitive science within a framework 
conducive to the development of an ‘embodied’, ‘situated’ etc. perspective , then such 
an approach can be traced back to the sixties in the work of Hubert Dreyfus (1965, 
1972). 
 
There are also apparently terminological difficulties, which in fact relate to deeper 
theoretical issues about philosophy of cognitive science. It is convenient to use 
Haugeland’s (1985) term ‘GOFAI’ (Good Old Fashioned Artificial Intelligence) to 
refer to those aspects of traditional cognitive science which have come under attack in 
recent years. The term is both less unwieldy than ‘traditional cognitive science’ and 
focuses our perspective more readily on certain key features of the classical approach 
(which is not to say that there is not debate about what ‘GOFAI’ means - see e.g. 
Chrisley, 2003, Boden, 2006). However in using the term we run the risk of suggesting 
either that our main interest is in AI research (a topic which I am barely qualified to 
discuss) or that we accept without question the assumption that the subject matter of AI 
is identical with that of psychology, neither of which is true. 
 
In this chapter – and in the rest of this thesis - I will use the terms ‘GOFAI’ and 
‘traditional cognitive science’ in a fairly unrigorous, sometimes overlapping way but 
will try to be explicit about the intended meaning in contexts where the distinction has 
significance. 
 
In attempting to define traditional cognitive science we might begin with the relatively 
uncontroversial statement that it views mind either as a digital computer or as like a 
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digital computer in important respects. More specifically it views mind as a symbol 
processor. In this connection we note Newell and Simon’s well known ‘Physical 
Symbol System Hypothesis’: 
 
A physical symbol system has necessary and sufficient means for general intelligent 
action. (Newell & Simon, 1985,  p.87) 
 
If we add that the symbols of a physical symbol system are “meaningless tokens”(ibid 
p.88; Harnad, 1990) processed on the basis of syntactic structure in accordance with 
explicit rules then it might theoretically be possible to end our definition of traditional 
cognitive science here; for on one view all of the other features of GOFAI are deducible 
from, or internally related to, this one, and traditional cognitive science, we might say, 
is just GOFAI applied across the board. Thus Haugeland, for instance, is quite happy to 
state that “GOFAI is a fairly coherent research tradition, based on a single basic idea: 
thinking as internal symbol manipulation” (Haugeland, 1996, p.25). However 
commentators will generally spell out other of its assumptions, whether or not they are 
derivable from this initial one (and differences of interpretation, e.g. on the question of 
where to place connectionism, suggest they are not so derivable.) How these 
assumptions might be described depends on whether the commentator is a critic or a 
friend, whether their concern is with AI or Cognitive Science (and relatedly whether 
they are concerned with machines or minds), and whether they are focussing on 
specifics or generalities. 
 
One such assumption is of the temporal separation of ‘thinking’ processes from other 
processes. What these other processes are depends on the kind of agent we are talking 
about, but if we are talking about robots or human beings then prominent amongst these 
processes are perception and action. Although the quotation (above) from Newell and 
Simon might be read as suggesting that ‘action’ is at the root of their conception of 
intelligence, it is only so as an outcome. The symbol crunching which underpins 
intelligent thought on a GOFAI model takes place subsequent to any processing of 
perceptual input and prior to the symbol crunching which directly generates action.  
Hurley, talking generically about ‘minds’, has referred to this as the ‘classical 
sandwich’: “Perception and action are not just separate from one another, but also 
separate from the higher processes of cognition. The mind is a kind of sandwich, and 
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cognition is the filling” (Hurley, 2001, p.3). Torrance has described the temporal 
relationship between the last two components of this sandwich in an even more prosaic 
fashion as “working solutions to problems out in the intellect or in the head prior to 
putting them into practice in the ‘real world’” (Torrance, 1999, p.53), a description 
perhaps pitched at the level of conscious processes. A more robotics-oriented 
description can be found in Brooks’ notion of a “sense-model-plan-act framework” 
(Brooks, 1991a, p.570). Brooks recounts actual cases of robots designed in accordance 
with this architecture as follows: “They all sensed the world and tried to build two or 
three dimensional world models of it. Then, in each case, a planner could ignore the 
actual world, and operate in the model to produce a plan of action for the robot to 
achieve whatever goal it had been given” (ibid). 
 
The temporal separation of ‘thinking’ processes (a description perhaps most 
problematic when applied to the Brooks example) from perception and action goes 
hand in hand with other sorts of separation. Again how one characterizes these other 
types of separation depends upon the precise nature of one’s object and what one’s 
priorities are. At the level of the processing unit(s) of a robot – or ‘equivalently’ at the 
level of the brain - the separation of ‘thinking’ processes from other process might be 
conceived of not only as temporal but as ‘modular’. Thus Brooks describes how in a 
classical system “the perceptual modules deliver a symbolic description of the world 
and action modules take a symbolic description of desired actions and make sure they 
happen in the world. The central system, then is a symbolic information processor” 
(Brooks, 1991b, p.402). Typically the notion of ‘modularity’ implies (amongst many 
other things) that separate functional units have fixed locations (although these 
locations may be distributed across the system). Thus, for instance, Fodor claims that in 
the case of brains there is an “intimate association of modular systems with neural 
hardwiring” (Fodor, 1983, p.98). 
 
At the level of the whole functioning (biological) system it is sometimes the complete 
brain that is regarded as the central processor and the locus of cognition. The 
‘separation’ in this instance thus becomes that between brain and body – or if we are to 
keep up with the tripartite ‘sandwich’ metaphor (and if we are to replace processes with 
objects all the way through) – then it is between world (input), brain (processing) and 
body (output). An example along these lines is given by Clark when considering the 
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processes involved in catching a ball – “In the traditional model the brain takes in data, 
performs a complex computation that solves the problem (where will the ball land?) 
and then tells the body where to go” (Clark, 1999b, p.6). 
 
At a higher level of abstraction the term ‘brain’ is often replaced by ‘mind’, and the 
traditional approach is described (more typically, although not always, by critics) as 
centrally involving a separation of mind from body. Iverson and Thelen, for example, 
argue that “from a cognitivist point of view the body is an output device that merely 
executes commands generated by symbol manipulation in the mind” (Iverson and 
Thelen, 1999, p.19). Once traditional cognitive science is conceived of in this way it is 
inevitable that one of its defining features is felt to be a Cartesian ‘dualist’ outlook 
(although the dualist metaphor perhaps does not sit easily with the tripartite ‘sandwich’ 
metaphor.) Characterizations in these terms are very common (e.g. Searle (1980); 
Gardner (1985); Varela (1993); Damasio (1994); Anderson (2003), Wheeler (2005)). 
However it should be noted that there are great differences, often acknowledged, in 
how this dualist heritage is interpreted
3
.  
 
In noting that traditional cognitive science is often taken as positing, for explanatory 
purposes, a separation between mind and body we ought also to note that it has often 
been regarded as having close affinities with a ‘functionalist’ outlook, and particularly 
with the notion of ‘multiple realizability’ (Putnam, 1967.) The descriptions of 
cognitive/computational processes it offers are such as to be divorced from any 
particular mode of physical instantiation. “The same algorithm may be implemented in 
quite different technologies”, as Marr (1982, p.24) puts it. Thus, in the case of living 
beings, it is not necessary to have an understanding of physiological matters in order to 
have an understanding of cognition: “Cognitive processes can be understood in full 
abstraction from their physiological embodiment” (Gallagher, 2005, p.134). 
 
Moving away from strictly architectural considerations, traditional cognitive science is 
also more generally characterized as emphasizing certain types of mentality. In the case 
of GOFAI, for example, these might be “higher level competences such as thought, 
reason, planning and problem solving” (Chrisley 2003, p.3). Here we have to separate 
                                                 
3
 ..which perhaps makes questionable the usefulness of talking about the Cartesian roots of Cognitive 
Science.  
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the question of what types of mindfulness students and practitioners of cognitive 
science have historically been concerned with (see e.g. Boden (2006) p.10-18) from the 
question of what types of mindfulness cognitive scientists have seen as most significant 
for agents. Although obviously closely related it is the latter of these two that is of 
relevance to us. 
 
Once again characterizations of this sort vary in their level of generality and modes of 
individuation. Clark suggests that traditional cognitive science viewed “mind as a kind 
of logical reasoning device coupled with a store of explicit data – a kind of combination 
logic machine and filing cabinet” (Clark, 1997, p.1). Ignoring the storage/filing cabinet 
portion of this description for the time being, we might say that the ‘logic machine’ 
component has (at least) two implications. Firstly there is the idea that thinking is 
similar or identical to the kind of symbol manipulation described by Newell and Simon 
– a point we have already alluded to. Secondly, and quite separately, there is the further 
idea that the activity of the ‘mind’ as a whole can be reduced to such processes. All 
mentality is thinking
4
, a conception of things which, as Torrance has pointed out, is 
“enshrined in the very name of Artificial Intelligence” (Torrance, 1999, p.48). Torrance 
refers to this second feature as ‘intellectualism’ (which he sees as complementary to 
‘computationalism’) and describes it as that which “takes the ratiocinative, sequential, 
symbol-manipulating varieties of mental activity as the defining feature of mind” (ibid.) 
 
A similar account is given by H&S Dreyfus, although they prefer to use the term 
‘cognitivism’ – a term taken up by other commentators (e.g. Freeman & Nunez, (1999); 
Anderson (2003); Froese (2007)) but not always with the exact same connotations. For 
H&S cognitivism is the view that “all mental activity is cognitive – that perception, 
understanding, learning and action are all to be understood on the model of fact 
gathering, hypothesis formation, inference making and problem solving”(Dreyfus, 
2002, p.1) a view which they see as the “culmination of the rationalist philosophical 
tradition” (ibid). On the Dreyfus’ account in particular then, traditional cognitive 
science is portrayed not just as an approach which emphasizes higher order processes 
                                                 
4
 Here, in fact, we have skipped a stage – that “all thinking is logic like” – but these stages cannot be 
rigidly defined because their components – terms like ‘cognition’, ‘thinking’ etc – are themselves not 
rigidly defined.  
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but as one which seeks to understand all skilful activity as emanating from these 
processes.  
 
So far we have given a brief characterization of ‘traditional cognitive science’ in terms 
of some of the features it held to be significant for both biological and artificial minds. 
In doing so we have at least implied a certain cross fertilization across domains. 
Strategies used to generate ‘intelligent’ output from artifacts were theorized as 
strategies also used by biological minds, with the latter being viewed as more 
‘computer-like’ as a result. Conversely, assumptions about the intelligent action of 
biological agents (e.g. its emanation from disembodied, ‘high-level’ processes) were 
transposed to the artifactual world with the resultant artifacts being viewed as more 
‘mind-like’ for that reason. In the latter case we ought  to note how some adherents of 
GOFAI have not stopped short at positing the ‘mind-likeness’ of artifacts but have gone 
on to suggest that such artifacts have the potential to become genuine minds – or at 
least genuine intelligences.  
 
This is the position that Searle (1980) calls ‘Strong AI’ – the idea that “the 
appropriately programmed computer really is a mind in the sense that computers given 
the right programs can be literally said to understand and have other cognitive states” 
(p.183 – author’s italics). For some this assumption should be included as one of the 
central tenets of GOFAI. Boden (2006, p.702), for example, argues that a version of 
this assumption seems to be implicit in Newell and Simon’s own position (see p.118), a 
physical symbol system having both “necessary and sufficient means for general 
intelligent action” (where the latter is taken to indicate “the same scope of intelligence 
as we see in human action” (Newell & Simon, p.87)).  
 
However in noting this we ought also to note that there is perhaps some ambiguity in 
the notion of ‘Strong AI’. Firstly there is an issue with the way that the phrase ‘really is 
a mind’ should be taken in Searle’s account (and how similar phraseology should be 
taken in other accounts.) It is not clear that such a phrase itself is amenable to any one 
definitive interpretation, and neither does further elaboration along the same lines (e.g. 
that a computer can “be literally said to understand”) necessarily help5 That there are no 
                                                 
.
5
 Here we are perhaps reminded of Wittgenstein’s comment “It is as if I were to say: "You surely know 
what 'It is 5 o'clock here' means; so you also know what 'It's 5 o'clock on the sun’ means”. 
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accepted criteria for deciding whether a machine ‘really’ has a mind, despite various 
attempts from Turing (1950) onwards, leaves it open as to how such phrases are to be 
taken. 
 
Secondly and connectedly, pace Boden, it also not clear that Newell & Simon’s 
adherence to the belief that an artifact can exhibit “the same scope of intelligence as we 
see in human action” is the same as adherence to the belief that an “appropriately 
programmed computer really is a mind”; or, to take another example, it is not even 
clear that a later, stronger claim of Simon’s – that “a computer simulation of thinking 
thinks” (Simon 1995, cited in Boden 1419) is identical to such a belief. Neither 
genuinely intelligent action nor genuine thinking need be identifiable with genuine 
‘mind’. Here there does at least seem to be some space for gradations of ‘Strong AI’. 
(We might note in this connection, that Chrisley (1995) makes use of the terms ‘Strong 
AI’ and ‘Weak Strong AI, although for different purposes.)   
 
We will say no more, in an unqualified way, about traditional cognitive science, 
although further of its features will emerge in our assessment of it, to which we now 
turn.  
 
Mind Thinking About Mind 
 
In what sense or senses, then, could the above account be described as ‘alienated’? As a 
starting point it might be useful to step back from the details of that account in order to 
make the general observation that the activity of cognitive science is one wherein mind 
thinks about mind, or, to be slightly more specific, wherein the minds of cognitive 
scientists think about mind. By itself this need not distinguish cognitive science from 
other endeavours such as psychoanalysis, meditation or even English Literature. 
However there is perhaps something distinctive in the way that cognitive science thinks 
only about mind - its object over all, whatever the particular practical purposes of 
individual projects and disciplines within cognitive science, is just the understanding of 
mind per se. Its declared interest is in mind ‘in itself’ rather than as a means to some 
other end. Whilst we may not want to make too much of this, we can perhaps already 
see Hegelian possibilities in such a description. For a thoroughly modern Hegelian, 
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who was also convinced of the central importance of cognitive science, it might be 
tempting to argue that cognitive science is self-conscious mind coming to know itself. 
Mind externalizes itself – makes itself into an object - in cognitive science, with the aim 
that it will eventually achieve unity through ‘absolute knowledge’ of itself. On this 
analysis Margaret Boden’s recent two volume history of cognitive science (2006) could 
perhaps be seen as the contemporary equivalent of the Phenomenology. 
 
Less fancifully, although we might not be convinced of the central role of cognitive 
science as the ‘becoming’ of human mind, there is perhaps a more acceptable 
interpretation of the above position which dispenses with metaphysics but allows that 
there might be a dialectic at work in cognitive science. In fact there seems to be more 
than one possible candidate for this role. We might suggest, for example, that cognitive 
science is dialectical in its methodology. We said in our brief summary of traditional 
cognitive science that there was a cross fertilization between the investigation of mind 
as a computer and the investigation of computers as mind. This relationship can be seen 
as dialectical both insofar as it is reciprocal and insofar as this reciprocity results in a 
‘unity’ of sorts. The latter is evidenced to some extent by the deliberate synthesis of 
man and machine in the concept of the ‘agent’. It is part of the strategy of cognitive 
science that it remains neutral in this respect so that commonalities can be established 
between human being and machine. We might observe, however, that when this 
neutrality in practice is taken as an identity in fact, the resultant world view could be 
construed as an alienating one. This is one of the points we hope to establish in this and 
later chapters. 
 
More relevant to our Hegelian story above, however, is not this methodological 
dialectic, but the idea that cognitive science could be subject to an ‘historical dialectic’ 
(Arthur, 2004) - that certain dialectical patterns, if not ‘laws’, might be manifest in the 
transition from traditional cognitive science to more recent cognitive science. In order 
to explore this idea we need first to say something about the content of recent cognitive 
science. Thus we will postpone development of this train of thought until the next 
chapter. 
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Idealism 
 
To return to the content of our earlier summary then, if cognitive science in general is 
‘mind thinking about mind’, traditional cognitive science can be viewed as mind 
thinking about ‘mind’ in a narrowly mentalistic way i.e. as viewing all intelligent 
human behaviour as the outgrowth of ‘cognition’, considered in separation from any 
particular material manifestation or activity. In practice, if not in its manifestos, the 
essence of being human for a traditional cognitive scientist is being a thinker. Man is 
‘Homo Cogitans’ rather than ‘Homo Faber’ (Ingold, 1987, p.62). Like the idealist 
philosophies that Marx denigrated, it might thus be seen as reproducing the 
assumptions of the mental/material division of labour – in particular the essential 
separation of ‘head and hand’ (Sohn-Rethel, 1978, p.37). Similarly, like  Hegel’s own 
idealist project, it is open to the criticism that it sets out from an alienated starting point 
by taking “the life process of the human brain i.e. thinking” and transforming it “into an 
independent subject” (Marx, 1873, p.14).  
 
Of course traditional cognitive science does not in a literal sense propose that thought 
has an existence independent of the material world and so cannot be accused of 
metaphysical idealism. However in giving priority to ‘the mind’ in general, and to 
cognitive processes specifically, it does display some of the features which Marxists 
describe as ‘idealist’ in a weaker sense. In particular its emphasis on the temporal 
priority of cognition over action mirrors at the level of individual agency what Marxists 
attribute to idealism at the level of history wherein events are represented as “caused by 
the ideas of men” (Pannekoek, 1937).  For traditional cognitive science, as for, Heine, 
“thought preceded action as lightning did thunder” (Heine, 1832, cited in McLellan, 
1969, p.8).  
 
In contrast with this a Marxian account does not maintain that thought has temporal 
priority over action. The Marxian conception of ‘praxis, as we have argued in chapter 2, 
is one wherein the direction of causation is as often from action to ideas as vice versa, 
or is one wherein thought and action are held to form a unity. A Marxian approach, we 
want to say, is precisely not one that emphasizes, in a one-sided way,  “working 
solutions to problems out in the intellect or in the head prior to putting them into 
practice in the ‘real world” (Torrance, p.53), but rather is one which stresses, in various 
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ways, that practice itself can provide solutions to theoretical problems. Its outlook thus 
does not conform to the linear ‘sense-model-plan-act’ approach of traditional cognitive 
science. 
 
Planning - GOFAI Marx vs. Praxis Marx  
 
In arguing that a Marxian account is one that does not give temporal priority to thought 
but instead places emphasis on ‘praxis’, we are also arguing for a version of Marx 
which does not conceive of the agent as first and foremost a ‘planner’. Our motivations 
here are partly ‘political’. Like Levine we wish to emphasize the “humanistic, creative, 
spontaneous aspects of Marx” (Levine, 1975, p.xvi), because we believe that the 
conception of the agent it favours is one that is more conducive to a genuinely free 
society. However it should be stressed that this is only an interpretation of Marx. We 
have already seen (in the previous chapter) how Engels had a more planning-oriented 
conception of the agent, from which he deduced the appropriateness of social planning. 
Likewise Levins & Lewontin argue that according to ‘classical Marxism’: 
 
What seems to be unique to humans is the conscious planning, the imagining of the 
result before it is brought into existence by deliberate teleological action. (Levins & 
Lewontin, 1985, p.255) 
 
This interpretation does find potential support in a few passages of Marx’s own work, a 
fact which, perhaps surprisingly, has also been noticed within cognitive science. 
Margaret Boden (2006) talks of an aspect of Marx’s work which she thinks wholly 
amenable to the project of traditional cognitive science. In fact she goes as far as to 
assert that “The NewFAI researchers, one might say, had been committed Marxists” 
(p.1029). Here, by way of clarification, we should point out that Boden prefers to use 
the term ‘NewFAI’ – New Fangled AI – to refer to classical artificial intelligence 
research, as she thinks the term ‘GOFAI’ has pejorative overtones.6 The explanation for 
Boden’s attribution of Marxist ideas to classical AI researchers is her belief that Marx 
too had “stressed the role of anticipatory planning in intelligent labour” (ibid). In 
                                                 
6
 Rather confusingly Haugeland (1996,  pp.21-28) uses the same term to describe connectionism and 
embodied/embedded AI. 
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support of this contention she cites a well known passage from Capital Volume 1. We 
will reproduce this citation, as she has presented it, in full: 
 
[Man] sets in motion the natural forces which belong to his own body, his arms, legs, 
head and hands, in order to appropriate the materials of nature in a form adapted to his 
own need…[So do animals – but human labour is different.] A spider constructs 
operations which resemble those of the weaver, and a bee would put many a human 
architect to shame by the construction of its honeycomb cells. But what distinguishes 
the worst architect from the best of bees is that the architect builds the cell in his mind 
before he constructs it in wax…Man not only effects a change of form in the materials 
of nature, he also realizes his own purpose in those materials.  (Marx, 1867, pp.283-
4; cited in Boden, 2006, p.1029). 
 
This passage, then, appears to reveal a ‘planning’ Marx, a Marx who envisions offline 
cognition as a necessary prelude to online activity. There are possibly some points that 
one could make by way of mitigation here. One could certainly argue, for instance, that 
Marxian praxis – in all its variant forms – does not exclude an element of planning per 
se. Indeed it would be strange if it did for one could then only account for the 
effectiveness of an agent’s actions by recourse to good luck or ‘precognition’. The 
point, we might say, is that planning and action are mixed up in a reciprocal way, with 
each facilitating the development of each other. As Suchman puts it: “plans are 
themselves located in the larger context of some ongoing practical activity” (Suchman, 
1987, p.49). On this version of things human beings are not first and foremost detached 
planners, for it no more makes sense to explain action, in one-sided fashion, exclusively 
as the outcome of planning than it does to explain planning exclusively as the outcome 
of action. 
 
Our line of defence here, then, is that Marx’s apparent emphasis on planning in the 
above passage is not incompatible with his more fluid ‘praxis’-oriented view of the 
agent. A similar tack also seems to have been adopted by Ollman who suggests that “in 
Marx’s defense it must be added that the terms ‘purpose’ and ‘plan’ (‘design’) are 
generally used in their weak senses” (Ollman, 1971, p.111), although rather 
problematically Ollman then goes on to specify that these weak senses include “simply 
that man knows what it is he is going to produce, and which actions and implements 
will produce it” (ibid). 
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However, it does seem that Boden has a point. Insofar as it is possible to derive any 
account of individual agency from this particular passage, it would appear to be one 
that supports in a general way a GOFAI perspective – for the notion that “the architect 
builds the cell in his mind before he constructs it in wax”, even if it constitutes an 
example of Marx exaggerating for effect, seems fairly unambiguous. There is no 
mention, for example, of the architect formulating the plan in a dynamic way using the 
tools at his disposal. The planning, as characterized, is as offline, passive and fully 
comprehensive as it could be and thus presents a rather non-praxis oriented account of 
agency. We are thus forced into recognizing that just as there are more or less 
determinist versions of Marx, so there are more or less planning oriented versions of 
Marx. Here we can only reiterate that, as far as this thesis is concerned, it is the praxis-
oriented Marx that is of interest to us. 
 
 
Alienation from productive activity  
 
We have asserted, then, that the account of the praxis-oriented Marx is at odds with that 
of traditional cognitive science on the question of the necessary temporal priority of 
thought, (or more specifically ‘planning’), to intelligent action. We have presented this 
in terms of the Marxian critique of ‘idealism’. However it is perhaps also possible to re-
describe it in terms of one of the aspects of alienated labour outlined in chapter 2 – 
alienation from productive activity.  
 
We have already said how, on a Marxian outlook, Man is an “embodied, living, real, 
sentient objective being” (Marx, 1844a, p.104) who creates himself through his 
productive engagement with the material world.  On this analysis activity is not 
ancillary to human intelligence but is central to it. We might contrast this with the 
perspective of traditional cognitive science which tends to view practical activity as 
mere output and as such not integral to the agent considered as a cognitive being. As 
Haugeland puts it, “all the ‘action’ is within the system, rather than being an integral 
part of a larger interaction with an active body and an active environment” (1996, p.25).  
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Hence we might say that traditional cognitive science presents an ‘alienated’ account of 
an agent’s relationship to his activity at least in the sense, as employed by Levins and 
Lewontin (1985), that it posits an objective separation between on the one side 
‘cognition’ and on the other ‘activity’. Here we have to be clear about what we are 
saying. Traditional cognitive science does not describe a scenario wherein an agent is 
alienated from his activity because such activity has been imposed upon the agent and 
has certain characteristics inimical to his self-development. What it does do is provide a 
fragmented conception of the agent which mirrors schematically, and presents as 
intrinsic to human agency, what a Marxian outlook describes as a temporary product of 
a particular form of social organisation.  
 
As outlined earlier, this severance of thought from activity – as well as from other 
aspects of material existence - can also be viewed in relation to the separation of ‘head 
and hand’ that arises with the mental/manual division of labour. We might add that it 
perhaps provides some justification for such a separation.   Whilst we do not want to 
overly concern ourselves with normative matters in this thesis, we might suggest that 
whereas the Marxian account views man first and foremost as an active producer, and 
so is equipped to diagnose the cognitive repercussions of particular modes of 
organizing his productive activity, the traditional cognitive scientific account sees 
nothing essential in activity or production itself, and so is compatible with an 
organization of human productive activity which shares this lack of concern. We will 
return to this topic in the next chapter.  
 
Alienation of Man from Man 
 
If the separation between cognition and action can be aligned to the alienation from 
activity, this raises the question of whether there are analogues for other aspects of 
alienated labour in the assumptions made by traditional cognitive science. Whilst, 
because of its fundamental ambiguity, it would prove unrewarding to attempt this 
exercise in any depth with ‘alienation from species being’, there are comparisons to be 
made with the two remaining aspects of alienated labour. We might first turn to the 
‘alienation of man from man’.  
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In fact, any reference to ‘social’ matters – of inter-agent interaction – was noticeable by 
its absence from our summary of traditional cognitive science. From this it might be 
possible to conclude that traditional cognitive science is agnostic on such issues. 
However it is also possible to see this very absence as significant. As we have said 
Marx’s ‘Homo Faber’, was not only a productive animal but an essentially socially 
productive animal whose relationship to his own self  “first becomes objective to him 
through his relationship to other men” (Marx, 1844a, p.84). The individual agent, for 
Marx, is constituted as a social being. For traditional cognitive science, however, the 
agent is essentially a “thinker”.  Moreover this thinking is construed as an entirely 
individual activity, the internal processing of symbols. It may be that the environmental 
effects of other agents’ actions provide inputs to this symbol processing activity, but 
there is nothing which qualitatively differentiates the way such inputs are handled from 
the way other inputs are handled, and they have no bearing on the agent’s integrity as a 
self-contained entity. As Froese and Di Paolo put it: “all social phenomena, including 
social cognition, is reducible without remainder to individual mechanism” (Froese and 
Di Paolo, 2004, p.3). Speaking loosely, then, we might say that there is no essential 
connection between one agent and another on a traditional cognitive scientific 
approach. Just as there is a principled separation between an agent and his activity, so 
there is a principled separation between agents. We might, therefore, as before, see in 
this separation a mirroring of the alienated relations posited in Marx’s account of 
alienated labour, in this instance the ‘alienation of man from man.’ 
 
In some respects, however, the relationship between Marx’s alienation of man from 
man and traditional cognitive science’s separation of agent from agent might be viewed 
as a stronger one than this. Whilst our short summary of traditional cognitive science 
contained no mention of interactions between agents, if cognitive science is construed 
in a broader sense as including, or at least having an interest in, developmental 
psychology, then attempts to describe such relations abound. Insofar as such attempts 
reproduce the classical assumption of the intrinsic separation of agents, they seem 
‘alienated’ in a more palpable sense. Thus, for example, Harnad states that: 
 
It has been found that children after a certain age, and certain animals, have 
considerable skill in detecting or inferring what others (usually members of their own 
species) are feeling and thinking… Let us note right away that this sort of mind reading 
is a form of Turing-testing: inferring mental states from behaviour…We know… since 
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at least Descartes, that the only mind that we can read other than by Turing-testing is 
our own.   (Harnad, 2003, pp.72-3)                                                
 
The assumption made here is similar to that made in philosophical accounts of the 
‘problem of other minds’ and in a proposed solution to that problem known as the 
‘argument from analogy’ (see e.g. Mill 1889). It is also more directly a reference to the 
perspective adopted in psychological accounts of ‘theory of mind’ (see e.g. Baron 
Cohen et al, 2000), and in particular a version of (or explanation) of theory of mind 
known as ‘theory theory’. In all of these accounts the unquestioned starting point is that 
of a problematic separation between individual agents which goes beyond mere 
physical separation. The suggestion is that whereas agents have direct access to their 
own mental states they have no ‘direct’ access to the mental states of others. A solution 
is then posed in terms of detached inferential mechanisms which take outward 
behaviour as evidence for inner mental states. 
 
Such accounts, we might say, bring to mind the subjective aspect of Marx’s ‘alienation 
of man from man’, a point that some commentators have already made in relation to 
philosophical ‘other minds scepticism’ (e.g. Fann, 2002).  The assumption of a 
fundamental separation between individuals makes the normally unreflective 
interchanges between those individuals seem strange and problematic – this is implicit 
in the very term ‘mind-reading’ which invites (if only by suggestion) comparison 
between the predicament of the average human being when trying to understand his 
conspecifics and that of the telepath who uses his powers to gain direct access to 
another’s mind. On these accounts what is, on a Marxian analysis, man’s “essential 
nature” (Marx, 1844b, p.122) as a social being, appears as something mysterious and in 
need of explanation via recourse to an external mechanism. 
 
A Mechanical Robinson Crusoe 
 
The principled separation of the agent from other agents, then, mirrors the alienation of 
man from man, and when applied in the field of developmental psychology gives rise to 
analyses which appear very much like descriptions of the subjective alienation of man 
from man. We might also note that this separation can be seen as generating a further 
issue for traditional cognitive science, and one which has some relevance to a Marxian 
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outlook. This issue will not be pursued in depth as to do so would involve opening a 
whole can of worms on the subject of the social character of ‘representation’. 
Nevertheless it is worth giving a brief summary here. 
 
Marx’s perspective, as we have seen, is one which does not take the “isolated 
individual” (Grundrisse, p.83) as its starting point, for the individual, considered as 
anything more than a physical organism, is a social entity – “the human being is … not 
merely a gregarious animal, but is an animal which can individuate itself only in the 
midst of society.” (ibid). In this context the attempt, by traditional cognitive science, to 
pitch explanations of cognitive phenomena only at the level of the mental processes of 
the individual agent can be viewed as being as flawed as the attempts by classical 
economists to project economic qualities onto the isolated individual. Adam Smith’s 
conception of ‘Homo Economicus’ , for example, was that of an individual who 
confronted the world as a fully formed free marketeer with a natural “propensity to 
truck, barter and exchange” (Smith, 1776, p.117).  According to Marx such accounts 
belonged “among the unimaginative conceits of the Robinsonades” (Marx, 1855, p.83) 
i.e. they depend upon a ‘Robinson-Crusoe-like’ conception of the individual, 
inexplicably fully formed with social properties yet without recourse to social bonds.  
 
We have, then, a parallel between individualized economic qualities and individualized 
cognitive properties. We might note that in both cases reference to a symbolic medium 
is implied. With Smith’s ‘Homo Economicus’ his predisposition to exchange is 
dependent on exchange value as manifest ultimately in a social, symbolic medium of 
exchange – money. With the GOFAI agent, cognitive abilities reside in formal symbol 
manipulation. We might add to this mix Marx’s reference to a third representational 
medium – language. In considering the possibility of production performed by a single 
individual, living outside of society, Marx came to the conclusion that this would be: 
 
…a rare exception which may occur when a civilized person in whom the social forces 
are already dynamically present is cast by accident into the wilderness – [but] is as 
much an absurdity as is the development of a language without individuals living 
together and talking together.    (Marx, 1855, p.84)    
 
The comparison of individualized production with individualised language, and the 
judgement that both are absurd, anticipates to some degree Wittgenstein’s private 
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language argument. In this respect we might note that Wittgenstein also drew parallels 
between the idea of individualized economic properties and that of individualized 
linguistic abilities. Thus, for example, he attempts to demonstrate the incoherence of 
the notion of a necessarily private language by asking “Why can't my right hand give 
my left hand money?” (Wittgenstein, 1953, p.94) In response to this, it is perhaps 
significant that individualist oriented defences of a private language again invoked 
‘Robinon Crusoe’ scenarios. Thus, for example, Ayer: 
 
Imagine a Robinson Crusoe left alone on his island while still an infant…He will 
certainly be able to recognize many things upon the island…Is it inconceivable that he 
should also name them?...Surely it is not inconceivable that someone uninstructed in 
the use of an existing language makes up a language for himself. After all, some human 
being must have been the first to use a symbol. (Ayer, 1954, p.259) 
 
These threads might be brought together in the following way: Just as traditional 
cognitive science thought cognition explicable in terms of the internal symbol 
processing powers of the isolated agent, so classical economists (or at least some of 
them) saw an individual ‘innateness’ in the propensity of the agent to manipulate 
external symbols (money);
7
 and likewise again so pro-private language theorists saw no 
contradiction in the idea of linguistic symbol manipulation in a vacuum. In each of 
these instances the essential practical-social character of symbol usage was ignored. 
 
In the case of GOFAI this manifested itself as the “symbol grounding problem” 
(Harnad, 1990) – the problem of how “the meanings of … meaningless symbol tokens, 
manipulated solely on the basis of their (arbitrary) shapes [can] be grounded in 
anything but other meaningless symbols.” (p.335.) The “pure thought” of idealist 
philosophy which, on a Marxian analysis, exists in complete detachment from the realm 
of ‘sensuous activity’ and so has no chance of forming an adequate conception of its 
object, thus finds an earthly counterpart in the meaningless tokens of GOFAI. Like a 
mechanical Robinson Crusoe the agent as envisioned by traditional cognitive science is 
doomed to processing in a symbolic medium that has no purchase on the real world.  
                                                 
7
 Also of relevance here is Marx’s remark that “Logic is the money of the mind” (Marx, 1844a, p.99). 
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Alienation from the Product  
 
We have argued that there are analogues for the alienation of man from his activity and 
for the alienation of man from his fellow men, in traditional cognitive science. We 
might pursue this line of enquiry by asking if there is anything in traditional cognitive 
science corresponding to the alienation of man from the product of his activity. 
 
In fact our earlier suggestion that the separation of cognition from activity -  where such 
activity is considered as mere ‘output’ – ‘mirrors’ the alienation of man from his 
activity, perhaps already implies that a similar story can be told about the ‘product’ of 
this activity. Indeed, insofar as ‘product’ and ‘output’ are synonyms the exact same 
story can be told. Whatever takes place after cognition, or in separation from cognition, 
whether or not it materially alters features of the external world, is peripheral to 
cognition on the traditional account. Hence the separation of cognition from output 
could also be said to ‘mirror’ the alienation of man from the product of his activity. 
 
However there is a more obvious and substantial equivalent of the ‘alienation of man 
from his product’ to be found in traditional cognitive science - the notion, outlined 
earlier, of ‘Strong AI’. The suggestion that appropriately programmed computers 
literally have minds, whatever exactly that might mean, seems to reproduce the 
essential features of the alienation of man from his product. This is so, we might 
suggest, not only in the restricted sense – implied in Marx’s passages on alienated 
labour – where the product in question is the immediate result of the agent’s activity, 
but also in the broader sense which underlies both Hegel’s and Marx’s various accounts 
of the alienation of the subject from his object. In all of those accounts man (or 
consciousness) externalized him/itself in his/its products – which might equally be God, 
or the commodity as a recently completed artifact – and then confronted those products 
as something ‘other’. Likewise we might say that in the case of ‘mind-like’ artifacts it 
is the intelligence of the agent which is transferred to the artifact and becomes its 
intelligence. As with those other examples of externalization, the nature of this 
transference remains hidden from the agent, who views this human product as endowed 
with a life and energy of its own.  
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We might also draw perhaps comparisons specifically with Marx’s account of 
commodity fetishism at least insofar as, in that scenario, the alienation of man from 
man was accompanied by the projection of human properties onto objects.  In the case 
of traditional cognitive science, as we argued earlier, an individualist conception of the 
agent makes intersubjective relations problematic; nevertheless it is at the same time 
willing to consider the application of mental predicates to artifacts. Thus, albeit 
speaking imprecisely, we might say that in traditional cognitive science an ‘other minds 
scepticism’ about human agents is accompanied by an ‘other minds liberalism’ about 
machines. 
 
Viewing ‘Strong AI’ as an instance of the alienation of man from his product perhaps 
puts a new slant on John Searle’s arguments. Searle attempted to demonstrate that 
“such intentionality as computers appear to have is solely in the minds of those who 
program them and those who use them” (Searle, 1980, p.199). Like Hegel, we might 
say, Searle believes that “behind the curtain of appearance is not an unknown thing-in-
itself but the knowing subject” (Hegel, 1807, p.112). The mind of the computer is our 
own mind.  
 
However there are respects in which Searle’s argument is perhaps not entirely 
harmonious with a Marxian perspective. Although he does at one point come quite 
close to putting his analysis of Strong AI in a wider context of externalization through 
labour, noting that the general practice of attribution of intentionality to artifacts “has to 
do with the fact that in artifacts we extend our own intentionality; our tools are 
extensions of our purposes..” (Searle, 1980, p.188), this analysis is never developed. 
Instead he prefers to view such attributions as mere “metaphor and analogy” (ibid. 
p.180) on the part of the layman, with the implication that the Strong AI enthusiast has 
made the simple mistake of taking such figurative speaking literally. 
 
We might contrast Searle’s approach here with that of Dennett. His ‘intentional stance’ 
view, on one reading, comes perilously close to Strong AI. For Dennett any organism 
or artifact which can be usefully treated as a “rational agent” is, for all intents and 
purposes, a rational agent. Thus: “Any system whose behaviour is well predicted by 
this strategy is in the fullest sense of the word a believer” Dennett, 1981, p.59). On this 
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basis Dennett argues that different degrees of intentionality might be rightfully 
attributed to everything from thermostats and clams up to sophisticated robots and 
human beings. However this is not mere detached rationalistic prescription on 
Dennett’s part – for he sees himself as describing a pre-existing human practice, the 
justification for which lies in the fact that it works: “Even when we are surest that the 
strategy works for the wrong reasons, it’s nevertheless true that it does work, at least a 
little bit” (ibid p.66). To this extent Dennett’s position also has something in common 
with a Marxian account insofar as it likewise roots such attribution in human social 
practice and material circumstance. It is, we might say, as difficult to avoid adopting 
the ‘intentional stance’ as it is to avoid externalizing oneself in one’s products. 
 
Thus a Marxian view can perhaps be seen as incorporating features of both accounts. 
Searle’s position is correct, it would be argued, insofar as it reveals the intentionality of 
the artifact to be nothing more than the intentionality of the (human) agent, 
unrecognized as such; but it is wrong insofar as it portrays such projection as mere 
accident or habit. Dennett’s view, by contrast, is correct insofar as it suggests that there 
is something materially significant in the compulsion to attribute different degrees of 
intentionality to artifacts of all sorts, thus illustrating that the ‘Strong AI’ hypothesis is 
not different in kind to the general practice of applying a more restricted set of mental 
attributes to thermostats etc. However it is wrong insofar as it implies the literal truth of 
artifactual intentionality. From the standpoint of alienation the compulsion to attribute 
intentionality to a range of artifacts is explained (in part) by experience of such artifacts 
as separate powers. As we saw in chapter 2, insofar as an artifact is an externalized 
product of another human being or group of human beings, operates by means of a 
mechanism that is not understood by the ‘user’ (or worker) and imposes the logic of 
that mechanism on the lived experience of that user, it is viewed as an objective 
intelligence. This is what Wendling referred to as “machine fetishism” (Wendling, 
2009, pp.55-60). This tendency, we might argue, takes on its most concrete, extreme 
and literal form in the case of Strong AI where human intelligence manifests itself as a 
complete, self contained ‘other’ and is consciously feted as such by human agents.  
 
In putting forward such a perspective, however, we do not wish to imply that Dennett’s 
account of the intentional strategy should be replaced by an analysis which emphasizes 
only human alienation from ‘intentional’ artifacts. It is difficult to quibble with that 
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portion of Dennett’s account which seeks to show the utility of the application of 
intentional terms to artifacts. Moreover Dennett is free to argue that this usage of 
intentional terms is as legitimate as any other – that it is not simple ‘metaphor’, as 
Searle has suggested. However his suggestion that these terms can be applied to 
artifacts in the exact same sense as they are applied to human beings is what is in 
dispute, or from a Marxian standpoint we might say that it is only correct in the 
convoluted sense that such artifacts are the products of externalized human intelligence. 
That man externalizes himself in his artifacts does not imply that those artifacts literally 
have mental properties, a point we shall return to in Chapter 7. 
 
Mechanism 
 
We have suggested various senses in which traditional cognitive science might be 
characterised as ‘alienated’ or as offering an alienated conception of the agent. These 
have included its general idealist orientation -  in particular its emphasis on the 
temporal precedence of ideas over action - and its mirroring to different degrees the 
alienation of the agent from his activity, the product of his activity and his fellow 
agents.  
 
However, although some of these features can be related to a ‘computational’, and 
hence loosely ‘mechanistic’ account of mind, and whilst we have already described the 
GOFAI agent, in passing, as a ‘mechanical Robinson Crusoe’, we have not yet 
broached the topic of ‘mechanism’ per se.  
 
As we have seen, both Hegelian and Marxian accounts tended to be pejorative about 
“mechanistic” perspectives in general. It is true that it is not always clear that there is 
unanimity in the definition of ‘mechanism’ underlying such critiques. Some Marxist 
critics of mechanism - particularly Engels - have themselves been accused of a 
‘mechanistic’ outlook by other Marxists (e.g. Levine, 1975) suggesting a degree of 
fluidity in the use of this term. Nevertheless, given that traditional cognitive science has 
as its explicit project the representation of ‘mind as machine’ (Boden, 2006) we need to 
ask if there are any clearly specifiable Hegelian/Marxian senses in which a critique of 
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traditional cognitive science might be related directly to a critique of its ‘mechanistic’ 
nature. 
 
The Cognitive Production Line 
 
One relevant feature of traditional cognitive science in this respect is its commitment to 
a linear, unidirectional conception of cognitive processing. This was evident, for 
example, in Brooks’ (1991a) ‘sense-model-plan-act’ cycle. Van Gelder provides a 
succinct summary of cognitive systems viewed from a similar standpoint: 
 
They interact with their environments in a cyclic process that begins with input 
transducers producing symbolic representations in response to the environment, 
continues with sequential internal computations over symbolic structures and ends with 
output transducers affecting the environment… (van Gelder, 1996, p.438) 
 
 
What can perhaps be argued here is that such architectures reflect, to a certain degree, 
the organisation of tasks in the ‘detailed division of labour’. Like a factory, we might 
say, the cognitive system has its input of raw materials and outputs a finished product. 
In between are various stages of processing which may be envisaged on a par with 
alterations made to the developing product on a production line. Of course such a 
conception of cognitive processing has its most obvious roots in the serial processing of 
a digital computer rather than in the detailed division of labour. However, as we saw in 
chapter 2, the two are not unrelated for both were developed in tandem in the work of 
Charles Babbage. Thus, whilst the connection between the detailed division of labour 
and a serial processing conception of cognition might not be a straightforward instance 
of a mental model “mirror[ing] the structure of the alienated social world in which it 
was conceived” (Levins & Lewontin, 1985, p.270), there is a significant material 
linkage here. The isomorphism is not coincidental. 
Minsky  
 
It should be noted at this juncture that the exercise of critically relating certain 
conceptions of mind to particular modes of organising production, is not something 
new to cognitive science. Marvin Minsky (1985), for example, put forward an explicit 
critique of a ‘factory’ oriented conception of mind: 
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In earlier times, we could usually judge machines and processes by how they 
transformed raw materials into finished products. But it makes no sense to speak of 
brains as though they manufacture thoughts the way factories make cars. The difference 
is that brains use processes that change themselves – and this means we cannot separate 
such processes from the products they produce. (Minsky, 1985, p.288) 
 
Here, we might say, Minksy occupies an interesting middle ground between ‘alienated’ 
and ‘unalienated’ conceptions of mind. His desire to highlight and debunk a factory 
metaphor of mind shows some affinities with a Marxian outlook. Moreover his 
suggestion that ‘brains use processes that change themselves’ is in keeping with the 
Marxian notion of the self-creation of the agent through reciprocal interaction with the 
environment. It also, we should note, prefigures some ‘enactivist’ ideas (see chapter 6) 
and indeed, Varela, Thompson and Rosch make extensive use of Minsky in outlining 
their own position (e.g. V.T.R., 1991, pp.138-9). However, the sticking point is perhaps 
Minsky’s focus on the brain itself. It is the brain and not the agent which constitutes 
itself through its own productive processes. Hence insofar as Minsky sees the brain as 
the locus of action – in isolation from embodied, social, “sensuous human activity” 
(Marx, 1970a, p.121) – his analysis can still be said to reinforce the fragmentary 
outlook of traditional cognitive science.  
 
Dahlbom 
 
Minsky is not the only cognitive scientist to examine mind in relation to industrial 
production. Another is Bo Dahlbom. Dahlbom is more explicit than Minsky in 
postulating a causal link between modes of social/productive organisation and models 
of mind, going so far as to suggest that theoretical conceptions of the mind are typically 
“more revealing about the society of their protagonists than about the human organism” 
(Dahlbom, 1993, p.3). One of his targets is Dennett’s (1991) ‘multiple drafts’ theory of 
consciousness: 
 
‘Multiple drafts’ – what a wonderful way to summarize the anarchistic liberalism of a 
free market! Dennett is inviting us to apply “postfordism” to consciousness, to give up 
thinking of mind as a centralized, bureaucratic organization of Ford production lines, 
and begin thinking of it, rather, as a decentralized, flexible, organic organisation.   
(Dahlbom, 1993, p.4) 
 
The political outlook underpinning Dahlbom’s criticism of Dennett, we might note, is 
different to that underpinning this thesis. For Dahlbom there appear to be only two 
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possible social models – a planned economy or a free market economy (and he seems to 
favour some version of the former.) Hence accounts of mind which dispense with 
centralization are thought to be allied to a competitive free market outlook. Whilst this 
might be true of Dennett’s own outlook, it ignores the existence of a third possibility – 
that “decentralized, flexible, organic organisation” might be compatible with the 
absence of a market altogether. It is such a reading of Marx – one which emphasizes a 
free society without centralized planning, nor any kind of market – which informs this 
thesis. 
  
Politics aside however, given that we accept, in accordance with a Marxian outlook and 
in agreement with Dahlbom, that modes of social/productive organisation are reflected 
in models of mind – what does this tell us about the viability or otherwise of those 
models of mind? In our own case, if a serial processing conception of cognition can be 
convincingly linked to the detailed division of labour, does this count for or against 
such a conception (or neither)? Dahlbom’s own answer to this question is rather 
surprising. Starting from the general premise that minds are embedded in societies he 
suggests that “if mind is a social phenomenon rather than a brain process, then the use 
of social concepts in a theory of mind may not be metaphorical after all” (ibid. p.6). He 
fleshes this position out as follows: 
 
Theories like … Dennett’s Multiple Drafts model are more obvious expressions of 
contemporary American self-understanding: free competition in a free market. To the 
extent that they are true of that society, it is likely that they are true of the minds in that 
society…If mind is in society there is no difference here.   (ibid) 
 
This argument seems to present some difficulties. Firstly there is the problem that, 
although members of a particular type of society might be more predisposed to project 
particular organizational assumptions onto their mental models, there is no reason to 
think that these mental models might be ones which have any practical connection or 
compatibility with life in that society. Citizens of a very hierarchical society might be 
inclined to think that mind is also hierarchical, but a hierarchical mind and a 
hierarchical society may have nothing in common apart from a certain formal 
isomorphism at a particular level of description. Thus, for example, even if “mind is 
social” there are no ‘a priori’ grounds for thinking that “hierarchical minds” are best 
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suited for life in a hierarchical society. (We are of course being deliberately vague 
about what sort of thing a “hierarchical mind” might be.) 
 
Secondly, and connectedly, there is the danger that Dahlbom’s argument conflates 
“having a particular conception of mind” with “having a particular type of mind”. We 
are in agreement that certain modes of social organization are more likely to give rise to 
certain conceptions of mind but having a particular conception of mind need not be 
having a certain type of mind. In atomized societies, for example, we may be more 
predisposed to think we have (or could have) a ‘private language’, but this is not the 
same as actually having a private language. That we think we have a private language 
could be mere ‘false consciousness’ from a Marxian standpoint. (This is not to say that 
there might not be certain mental states - e.g. anxiety - where thinking that you have it 
is the same as having it.) 
 
Lastly, and again connectedly, there are at least some features of ‘mind’ which, even 
given facts about our susceptibility to environmental influences, are not likely to be 
dependent on social organization or social agreement. Neither, however, need they be 
adequately characterized as “brain processes” (ibid). One such feature might be 
cognitive architecture. It seems plausible to suggest that if cognition were internal 
symbol processing then no re-organization of society or productive relations would be 
likely to change this fact. At the same time, although symbol processing might be 
realized in a brain, it cannot be identified with a brain process, at least insofar as, 
according to the principle of multiple realizability, it might equally be realized 
elsewhere, or in a different way. 
 
Dahlbom’s argument, then, does not give us any grounds for supposing that a 
‘production line’ conception of cognition could become true if it were not true in the 
first place. This, however, does not bring us any closer to understanding whether, from 
a Marxian perspective, such a conception is viable. We have so far only said that such a 
view mirrors structurally a certain mode of production. We have yet to specify what it 
is about its mechanistic nature which warrants Marxian disapprobation. 
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Reciprocity vs uni-directionality 
 
Answering this question involves returning to ground already covered in earlier 
discussions of planning and praxis. We said that, from a Marxian viewpoint, traditional 
cognitive science was susceptible to some of the same criticisms as idealism, because it 
likewise gave priority to thought. This ‘priority’ might be considered in two ways. One 
is just the general sense in which thought is held to be the most significant feature of an 
intelligent agent’s being; the other is the more specific sense in which thought 
(cognition) is held to be temporally prior to action. In countering this latter conception 
we said that a praxis oriented view was one that did not give thought necessary 
temporal priority over action. Action is as much a condition for thought as vice versa, 
and in this way it might be said that action and thought form a reciprocal ‘unity’.  
 
If we turn now to a serial processing view of cognition, considered from the standpoint 
of mechanism, the same point might be made again but with less reference to ‘thought’ 
and ‘action’, and with a greater emphasis placed on countering uni-directionality per se. 
We have seen in chapter 3 how both Engels and Merleau-Ponty presented criticisms of 
a mechanistic outlook. Engels sought to differentiate “mechanical materialism” 
(Engels, 1887, p.321) from a dialectical version of materialism on the grounds that the 
latter incorporates a reciprocal relation between qualitative and quantitative change. 
Merleau-Ponty similarly distinguished his own dialectical account of 
agent/environment interaction from one based on “mechanical action” (Merleau-Ponty, 
1942, p.160) on the grounds that the latter could not accommodate genuine reciprocal 
interchange between agent and environment. On both accounts, then, albeit in slightly 
different ways, ‘mechanism’ is partly characterized in terms of uni-directionality and 
lack of reciprocal causal relations. 
 
On this basis we might say that one of the ways in which serial processing views of 
cognition, as exemplified in the ‘sense-model-plan-act’ architecture, are mechanistic in 
a negative Marxian sense, is that in which they too are unidirectional and fail to account 
for a more fluid reciprocal interaction between agent and environment. Although such 
architectures are cyclical insofar as actions give rise to updated sensory input which can 
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then be used to generate plans for additional actions (Russell & Norvig, 1995, pp. 31-
52), this fragmented cyclicity cannot be identified with genuine reciprocal interaction 
because at each point in the proceedings we can isolate discrete episodes which, in uni-
directional fashion, are the “necessary and sufficient condition” (Merleau-Ponty, 1942, 
p.160) for the subsequent episode in the sequence.  
 
Discreteness and continuity 
 
In arguing that a serial processing view of cognition is mechanistic, and therefore 
undialectical, because it does not accommodate reciprocal causal relations, we have 
made reference to the discrete episodes that compose it. Although the dichotomy 
between discreteness and continuity is integrally bound up with that between linear 
causality and reciprocal causality, we might treat ‘discreteness’ here separately, as a 
second component of a mechanistic outlook attributable to traditional cognitive science. 
 
Discreteness is at the heart of traditional cognitive science. The “discrete symbols” 
(Eliasmith, 2001) of a physical symbol system require the operations of a “discrete state 
machine” (Turing, 1950), such as a computing device, to process them. Such a machine 
is one that: 
 
[moves] by sudden jumps or clicks, from one quite definite state to another. These 
states are sufficiently different for the possibility of confusion between them to be 
ignored. (Turing, 1950, p.35) 
 
We might notice two things about this description. Firstly, the character of the 
transitions of the discrete state machine is not held to be important to the machine or to 
the user of the machine. It is not informationally significant. All that one needs to know 
is that a transition has been made. That they are ‘sudden jumps or click’ emphasises 
their status as empty spaces between states. Secondly, these states themselves stand in 
separation from each other and are independently specifiable as such. 
 
A dialectical critique of such an account - as a description of the workings of the human 
mind - is partly suggested by Turing’s own later remark that “strictly speaking there are 
no such machines. Everything moves continuously” (ibid. pp.35-6). This comment, 
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possibly deliberately, echoes the maxim attributed to Heraclitus that “everything is in 
flux” (Barnes, 1987, p.114-117),8 a maxim taken up as a guiding principle by both 
Hegel and Engels. Their dialectical analysis, as we have seen, was one which 
understood the world as in “constant motion, change, transformation, development” 
(Engels, 1887, p.37).  
 
However there is more to a dialectical critique of discrete state transitions than the mere 
acknowledgement that things move and change in a continuous fashion. In this 
connection we might recall the progressions described in Hegel’s Logic. These can be 
regarded as a series of state transitions, at least in the sense that ‘states’ of knowledge 
are implied at each juncture. One thing we note about such states is that they are not 
discrete. They cannot be understood in separation from each other but rather each state 
brings forth the next and the latter state is only what it is in relation to the former. In 
this way, ‘Being’ and ‘nothing’, for example, are internally related.  
 
Moreover, not only are these states not discrete but the transition from one to the other 
is held to be as significant as the states themselves. Thus the transition to a third state, 
‘becoming’, only arises when mind considers the transition from ‘being’ to ‘nothing’ 
and sees in it a ‘becoming’. Here, the importance of ‘transition’ itself is underlined by 
the fact that the earlier transition from ‘being’ to ‘nothing’ is taken into account as 
significant and a determining factor of the successive state. In this particular case it is 
also underlined by the fact that the successive state is itself labelled ‘becoming’, 
thereby expressing the centrality of ‘transition’ to Hegel’s dialectical outlook.  It is the 
transition “which is the essential point”, as Hanna puts it (Hanna, 1996, p.228). 
Somewhat figuratively we might add that if ‘being’ and ‘nothing’ correspond to the 
ones and zeroes of a digital machine, ‘becoming’ emphasizes the importance of the 
transition from the one to the other. 
 
We might take it, then, that a dialectical critique of mechanism as applied to cognition 
implies also a critique of the discrete state transitions upon which symbol processing 
depends. A dialectical outlook emphasizes not only continuity and change in a general 
way, but also the dependent relations between states (‘determinations’) and the central 
                                                 
8
 A version of this maxim is attributed to Heraclitus by both Hegel and Engels, but is not to be found in 
surviving fragments of his work. 
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importance of the transitions themselves. The discrete state transition perspective could 
therefore be characterized as ‘alienated’ at least in the sense employed by Levins and 
Lewontin (1985, p.270) that it presupposes the essential separation of the relevant 
states, and so imposes an unwarranted fragmentation on cognition. 
 
Bivalence and Holism 
 
 
In our analysis of ‘mechanism’ in traditional cognitive science we have so far looked at 
two features of a ‘production line conception’ of cognition – unidirectionality and 
discrete state transitions – and have said that both are at odds with a dialectical 
approach. This does not, however, exhaust the ways in which traditional cognitive 
science might be viewed as mechanistic in a sense that an Hegelian or Marxian 
perspective could find objectionable. We might remember Hegel’s critique of the 
“judgements and syllogisms” of formal logic, that the rational operations they 
facilitated were “completely analytical…and mechanical” (Science of Logic, p.52 cited 
in Hanna, 1990, pp.269-270). Implicit in this critique were two arguments that are at 
least separable in theory, a critique of the bivalence of standard logic and a critique of a 
lack of holism in a “language of symbols” (ibid p.270). 
 
As regards the former, insofar as computers can be viewed as mechanized formal 
systems (Haugeland, 1996, p.11), incorporating in particular the principles of standard 
bivalent logic, and insofar as traditional cognitive science involves the positing of this 
mechanization as a means by which the essentials of human cognition can be 
understood, it would seem fair to suggest that the latter might be offering a conception 
of Mind or Reason antithetical to that of Hegel. GOFAI, we might say, has taken the 
non-dialectical ‘either/or’ of the Understanding and has used it to create artificial minds 
which are then taken to be reflections of our selves. 
 
As regards holism, we have already said how a notion of continuity in, and internal 
relatedness between, states or components of a process, forms part of a dialectical 
critique of mechanism. These are all implicated in the ‘temporal holism’, outlined in 
chapter 1, where, on an Hegelian account, to understand something in its totality is to 
understand it both in relation to the whole of which it is currently a part, and as a 
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process over time (Rees, 1998, p.46). With this viewpoint in mind we might say that an 
Hegelian critique of Newell’s ‘physical symbol system hypothesis’ would be the same 
as that which he directs at Leibniz’s “calculus of combinations and permutations” 
(Hanna, 1990, p.270). A physical symbol system is unable to provide an adequate 
representation of the world because it abstracts from that world certain features which 
are then reconstituted in fixed and isolated fashion as symbols. The mechanical re-
animation of a collection of such symbols cannot capture the world considered as a 
“realm of organic relationships, dynamic processes and concrete truth” (ibid) because 
those symbols lack the requisite fluidity and connectedness. 
 
Base or Superstructure? 
 
We have attempted, then, to give some indication of senses in which traditional 
cognitive science might be considered mechanistic in a way that runs counter to the 
outlook of Hegelian-Marxian theory. We have said that insofar as it has a conception of 
cognition that is unidirectional, is founded on the presuppositions of bivalent logic and 
involves discrete operations on fixed symbols, it is intrinsically undialectical in nature. 
Where dialectics emphasizes reciprocity, continuity and holism, GOFAI emphasizes 
linearity, fixity and discreteness.  
 
It should perhaps be noted, however, that we have only touched upon these issues and 
that further probing might reveal a wealth of unanswered questions. It is easy, for 
example, to talk in a general way about the mechanization of standard logic forming the 
groundwork upon which the edifice of traditional cognitive science is erected, but 
things get a little trickier if we try to be specific. If, for instance, our concern is with the 
inherently bivalent nature of standard formal logic, are we referring to the incorporation 
of bivalent logical principles in the very structure of a computing device (e.g. in its use 
of ‘And gates’ and ‘Or gates’), to the incorporation of these principles into the 
programming languages used by such machines (e.g. the “if, else” structure in high 
level languages) or to analogues of such structures and languages in the human mind or 
brain? 
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Moreover, we need to make a clear distinction between the bivalence and discreteness 
at the heart of mechanical computing, and the implementation of programs which may 
appear to lack these features. It seems arguable, for example, that there are ‘dialectical’ 
elements, elements which transcend the ‘one sided’ perspective of standard formal 
reasoning, to be found in the holism of connectionist networks (Rumelhart, 
McClelland, et al., 1986), in the triadic evolutionary strategy of genetic algorithms 
(Holland, 1975) and in instances of artificial ‘emergence’ in cellular automata (Dennett, 
2003). Each of these can be implemented on standard computer hardware using 
standard programming languages.
9
  
 
There is nothing prima facie problematic about either of these instances. However it 
should be noted that there is often a fundamental ambiguity in cognitive science 
concerning the level of explanation at which any particular model of cognition is 
pitched (Fodor & Pylyshyn, 1988). This ambiguity is further exacerbated by the fact, as 
stated earlier, that such models are used to describe both machines and minds, and it is 
not always clear how one transposes from the one to the other. Insofar as this ambiguity 
is intrinsic to philosophy of cognitive science it probably also infects our own analysis 
above. 
 
Conclusion 
 
We have said that traditional cognitive science has something in common with the 
Marxian version of Idealism insofar as it places emphasis on the agent as a thinker and 
gives thought temporal priority over action. We have said too that it can be 
characterized as alienated insofar as it reproduces elements found in Marx’s account of 
alienated labour. Lastly, we have said that its ‘production line’ conception of cognitive 
processing not only mirrors the detailed division of labour structurally, but is 
intrinsically mechanistic, and so undialectical, in several respects. In the next (and 
subsequent) chapters we will consider more recent cognitive scientific accounts which, 
                                                 
9
 We might also note that the author of this thesis once experimented with the implementation of a 
‘dialectical engine’ – an attempt to mechanize non bivalent dialectical reasoning – using the same 
resources – Queen Mary, 2001.) 
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it will be maintained, offer a less alienated account of the agent to the extent that they 
avoid various of the above pitfalls. 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 149 
Chapter 5 – The Retreat from Alienation  
 
A spectre is haunting the laboratories of cognitive science, the spectre of embodied cognition.  
                   (Goldman & De Vignemont, 2009) 
 
Introduction 
 
Over the last 25 years or so there has been a well documented (see e.g. Clark, 2001; 
Boden, 2006; Froese, 2007; Robbins & Aydede 2009) sea change in cognitive science. 
Traditional approaches to mind and cognition have found a rival in a collection of 
views which stress that mind and cognition are in various ways ‘embodied’, ‘extended’, 
‘embedded’ and ‘enacted’. It is our central contention that this development might 
usefully be characterised as a “retreat from alienation.”  
 
In characterizing current cognitive science in this way we wish to draw attention to 
certain parallels between themes and perspectives found in Hegelian/Marxian theory 
and those found in recent cognitive science. Our intent in doing so is not just to indulge 
in an exercise in arbitrary and selective pattern matching. Rather we wish to show that 
viewing recent developments in (philosophy of) cognitive science through a Marxian 
prism can be theoretically useful. It both allows us to see a common thread in an 
otherwise disparate cluster of perspectives (see below) and may help us to diagnose 
weaknesses and limitations in some of those perspectives (see below & chapters 6-8.) 
As regards this latter point, however, it should be made clear that we are not proposing 
the inviolability of an all-encompassing and omniscient Marxian perspective - the 
‘diagnostic’ exercise can work both ways, with recent theoretical advances in cognitive 
science also helping to expose some limitations of a Marxian perspective (see e.g. 
section on ‘Embodiment and Materialism’, below) or providing more concrete accounts 
of ideas that are to some degree ambiguous on Marxian accounts (see e.g. section 
below on ‘van Gelder’, and chapter 8 on epistemic action).  
 
As well as proposing the utility of a Marxian perspective on cognitive science we are 
also proposing a degree of historical justification for such an approach. As has already 
been suggested in chapter 3, in some cases it can be shown that there is a direct line of 
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descent from Marxian ideas to certain ideas in current cognitive science, and therefore 
that the influence of German philosophy on current cognitive science is not restricted to 
the work of Heidegger (see e.g. Kiverstein & Wheeler, 2012). We will not treat this 
idea separately in the following, but will allude to it in particular cases where 
appropriate. 
 
From Separation to Unification 
 
If there was one theme which ran through our account of traditional cognitive science 
and our diagnosis of it as ‘alienated’ in a Marxian sense, it was that of ‘separation’. 
Mind, on the traditional account, was viewed as essentially separate from the material 
world (whether that material world be taken as the body of the agent, or external 
nature), from action in that material world, and from the social world. In this way it 
reproduced the separation experienced by the Marxian productive agent – characterized 
in the Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts as alienation from productive activity, 
from the result of that productive activity and from fellow productive agents (Marx, 
1844a, pp 75-111). Similarly, insofar as traditional cognitive science could be said to 
have something in common with Idealism – in its elevation of cognitive processes 
above material being, and in its assumption of the temporal priority of thought over 
action – this too could be said to be expressive of a separation, the separation of thought 
from “sensuous human activity” (Marx, 1970a, p.121), which on a Marxian analysis 
has its roots in the separation imposed by the mental/manual division of labour. Lastly, 
separation was also implicit in a mechanistic (‘production line’) conception of cognitive 
processing, which was unidirectional and involved discrete operations on fixed 
symbols.  Such an account was at odds with a dialectical approach which stressed unity 
of cause and effect (‘reciprocity’ – Hegel, 1817a, p.217) in interactions between agent 
and environment, emphasized continuous process in the place of discrete state 
transitions, and maintained a holistic view of the world resistant to representation by a 
mechanized “language of symbols” (Hanna, 1990, p.270).  
 
In contrast to this, if there is one theme which unites approaches in the ‘new’ cognitive 
science it is supersession of this fragmented outlook. Like Hegel’s Spirit, the new 
cognitive science is against ‘separation’ and for ‘unification’ – the unification of the 
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human subject. Like Marx, modern cognitive science has as its aim the reconstruction 
of the “whole man” (Marx, 1844a, p.91). 
 
This striving for unity is manifest most obviously in the content of various accounts 
which portray the human agent (or mind) as embodied, enactive, embedded or 
extended. Thus we might say that ‘embodied’ perspectives aim at superseding the 
dichotomy between mind and body. Contra the idealist orientation of traditional 
cognitive science, they too declare that “man is an embodied, living, real, sentient, 
objective being” (Marx, 1844a, p.104). Examples, amongst many others, include 
Gallagher, whose comprehensive survey of the field makes extensive reference to 
Merleau-Ponty and has the ultimate aim of showing that “nothing about human 
experience remains untouched by human embodiment” (Gallagher, 2005, p.247), 
Lakoff (Lakoff, 1980; Lakoff & Johnson, 1999; Gallese & Lakoff, 2005), who offers a 
variety of theses relating embodiment to concept formation (see below), and Damasio 
(1994, 2000) whose account of the role of emotions in rational decision-making utilizes 
an embodied conception of the former (see below).  
 
Turning from ‘embodied’ perspectives to ‘enactive’ ones, we might say that the latter 
aim, in various ways, at superceding the dichotomy between cognition and action, and 
so run counter to that alienation of the agent from his productive activity which we 
found to be mirrored in the outlook of traditional cognitive science.  Examples here 
include Kirsh and Maglio’s (1994) concept of ‘epistemic action’ which can be viewed 
as undermining the idealist assumption of the temporal priority of thought by positing a 
praxis-like unity between thought and action (see chapter 8). Another example is Noë’s 
account, influenced by Merleau-Ponty (1945), which argues that “perceiving is a way 
of acting” (Noë, 2004, p.1) which points to a unity of sorts between perception and 
action. We will examine Noë’s account shortly. 
 
In making the claim that Noë’s enactivism adopts a unifying strategy by attempting to 
supercede the dichotomy between action and cognition we should be aware (as 
Torrance, 2005, points out) that the term ‘enactivism’ is often also used to describe a 
wider perspective which, whilst it incorporates a critique of the action/cognition 
dichotomy (“All doing is knowing, all knowing is doing”, Maturana & Varela, 1987, 
p.26) is centrally concerned with several other theses. Some of these theses have a 
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strongly Hegelian/Marxian flavour, and are to some degree descended from the 
Marxian accounts of Merleau-Ponty and Lewontin. We will discuss this further in 
chapter 6. 
 
If ‘embodied’ perspectives aim at unifying mind and body, and ‘enactive’ perspectives 
(on a restricted definition) aim at unifying action with cognition, then ‘embedded’/ 
‘extended’ perspectives aim at unifying agent and world, whether the latter is conceived 
of as the world of other agents (Thompson, 2001; Gallagher, 2005; Gallese 2001, 2003; 
Gallese & Lakoff, 2005) or as the material world (Clark& Chalmers, 1998, 2008; 
Rupert, 2009). Thus, for instance, Gallese’s account (see below) calls into question the 
natural necessity of the ‘alienation of man from man’ by positing an active, practical 
and pre-theoretical linkage between agents, whilst Clark and Chalmers ‘extended mind’ 
hypothesis recalls elements of the Hegelian-Marxian concept of externalization by 
suggesting that “mind extends into the world” (Clark & Chalmers, 1998, p.12). 
 
In some accounts this striving towards unification is consciously articulated as such and 
takes place on more than one front. Thus Clark (1997), in a wide-ranging account 
which draws in part on a particular interpretation of Vygotskyan notions of 
‘scaffolding’, has as his explicit purpose “putting brain, body and world together 
again”, a theme which is also clearly presented in some dynamical accounts (e.g. van 
Gelder, 1995, 1996 – see below). In other accounts it is less well articulated and more 
restricted in its scope, and perhaps less successful. As regards this latter point we will 
argue below that Noë’s (2004) attempt to unify perception and action is more 
thoroughgoing and successful – and in some sense more ‘Marxian’ - than Damasio’s 
(1994) attempt to unify emotion and reason.  Nevertheless, whether or not the striving 
for unity is consciously articulated, and irrespective of the differing degrees of success 
met by different practitioners, it is our contention that the various projects of many of 
those involved in the field of philosophy of cognitive science, when taken together can 
be viewed as forming such an enterprise.  
 
We have argued that this striving for unity is manifest most clearly in the content of 
embodied, enactive, embedded, extended accounts of cognition, further illustration of 
which will be given in subsequent sections of this chapter and in chapters 6, 7 and 8. 
However it is manifest also in the theoretical orientation taken towards this content 
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which, in various respects and to various degrees, can be regarded as ‘dialectical’.  We 
said in chapter 1 that from a Hegelian viewpoint dialectical thought is the style of 
thinking most suited to the project of unifying subject with object. As the unification of 
spirit with the world was, on Hegel’s account, primarily a rational enterprise anyway – 
a process whereby the world is finally fully comprehended – dialectical thought could 
be seen as sufficient in itself to bring about the end of alienation. It is a matter of debate 
(see chap.2) to what extent Marx’s concretizing strategy was in conflict with this i.e. to 
what extent a Marxian account should be regarded as placing dialectics in the spheres 
of practical action and/or material phenomena, and how far this deviates from the spirit 
of Hegel’s own account. Nevertheless we might at least say that a dialectical account of 
the predicament of the human agent was, for Marx, a prerequisite for any satisfactory 
theoretical understanding of how alienation might be ended – even if that end itself 
could only be brought about through action. Thus on both accounts the project of the 
unification of the human agent was inextricably linked to a unifying mode of theorizing 
i.e. to a ‘dialectical’ approach. 
 
The dialectical dimension of modern day cognitive science reveals itself in two ways. 
One is that whereby the attempt to achieve unification on different fronts (i.e. the 
attempt to unify the human subject with different objects) is accompanied in each case 
by the contestation of the legitimacy of particular dichotomous categories.  Thus, as we 
have shown above, on one reading at least ‘embodied’ accounts aim to resolve the 
dichotomy between mind and body, enactive accounts aim to resolve the dichotomy 
between cognition and action and embedded/extended accounts aim to resolve the 
dichotomy between agent and world. We say ‘on one reading’ here not because there is 
an alternative reading for which the dichotomy resolving interpretation is less 
appropriate, but because there is a certain amount of flexibility about how terms like 
‘embodied’, ‘enactive’ etc. are thought to map onto different theoretical perspectives 
(see e.g. Wilson, 2002; Anderson, 2003; Ziemke, 2003; Torrance, 2005; Goldman & 
De Vignemont, 2009). 
 
The second way in which the new cognitive science specifically engages with 
dialectical themes is that in which some perspectives incorporate a number of elements 
associated with a dialectical outlook. We will examine this in more detail when we look 
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at ‘Enactivism and the Embodied Mind’ (next chapter) and ‘Dynamics and Emergence’ 
(see below).  
 
A Unifying Concept 
 
In suggesting that a move to unification (and away from alienation) informs the 
trajectory of recent cognitive science the intention, in part, is to provide an answer to 
the question of  what it is that the perspectives variously labelled as ‘embodied’, 
‘extended’, ‘embedded’ and ‘enactive’ (as well as ‘situated’, ‘dynamic’ etc.) have in 
common. Without the unifying motif of “unification” itself there is arguably no 
necessary connection between e.g. an argument for the neurological basis of empathy 
(Gallese) , the hypothesis that emotions may play a part in rational deliberation 
(Damasio), and the characterization of a certain type of action as ‘epistemic’ (Kirsh & 
Maglio). Clark’s attempt to articulate a commonalty in terms of “an escalating retreat 
from the inner symbol” (Clark, 2001, p.120) whilst useful in many respects, does not 
account for the breadth of the movement and excludes significant contributions made 
by those who see no problem with inner symbols (e.g. Damasio, and to some extent 
Gallese).  
 
Meanwhile analytical accounts such as Wilson’s (2002) take us in the opposite 
direction. Although Wilson declares (perhaps ironically) that “a movement is afoot in 
cognitive science” (p.623) she alights on just one facet of that movement (“embodied 
cognition”) and then proceeds to dissect it further into six distinct claims, most of 
which when analysed in isolation do not seem defensible. This fragmentary strategy, 
which has also been adopted by others (e.g. Ziemke, 2003), whilst again undoubtedly 
useful in some respects, takes us further away from any sense of a movement with a 
single underlying thread. Our objection here is perhaps similar to Hegel’s objection to 
the modus operandi of the ‘Understanding’ (Hegel, 1817a, p.113) or Engels’ objection 
to a ‘metaphysical’ approach (Engels, 1887. p.34). In considering the components of a 
whole in separation from, and in contradistinction to each other, the cause of analytical 
precision is advanced, but a price is also paid insofar as an understanding of the 
relatedness of the component parts is lost. 
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Currently, then, the theorist who wants to characterize the movement in cognitive 
science is forced either to do so by listing a long string of adjectives (‘embedded’, 
‘embodied’ etc…) or must try to subsume as many features as possible under one 
heading (e.g. ‘situated’) and jettison those aspects of the movement which can’t be 
made to fit even on the broadest definition (e.g. Robbins and Aydede, 2009, pp.3-
10).Whilst it is not our contention that a phrase such as ‘unalienated cognition’ or 
‘unified cognition’ can act as a replacement for any of these terms, it is our contention 
that an understanding of the movement as one which is towards unification (and away 
from alienation) can help to highlight features and connections that would otherwise 
remain obscure.  
 
An Historical Dialectic? 
 
At this point the question might arise of whether this movement towards unification and 
away from alienation can itself be understood dialectically. Is there - as we suggested 
was possible in the previous chapter - an ‘historical dialectic’ at work in cognitive 
science, a dialectic which expresses itself through the transformations which cognitive 
science has undergone in its development over time?  
 
Whilst such an idea sounds appealing, elaborating on it in any detail seems problematic. 
We could perhaps characterize the shift of perspectives from traditional cognitive 
science to modern cognitive science as a ‘crisis’ or a ‘revolution’ (Newell, 1995; 
Boden, 2006; Di Paolo et al, 2010). We might then see in this fact confirmation of the 
dialectical view that change over time (in thought or nature) is not a smooth, continuous 
process but one which involves “qualitative leaps” (Engels, 1887, p.67; Cornforth, 
1952, p.61), an idea which, on Engels’ analysis at least, seems to be linked with the law 
of the transformation of quantity into quality. The problem with such an account would 
seem to be that by itself it is not really telling us very much, or anything very distinct 
from other, albeit much later, accounts of scientific revolution such as that provided by 
Kuhn (1962).  
 
Alternatively, again following Engels’ lead, we could perhaps see the revolution in 
cognitive science as indicative of a ‘negation’ of the previous state of affairs, with 
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current cognitive science offering an anti-thesis to the thesis of traditional cognitive 
science. It is not clear from Engels’ own account whether ‘qualitative leaps’ and 
‘negations’ can co refer or whether we have to choose between these two analyses in 
any particular instance.  We might note however that the latter may offer difficulties for 
our own perspective. If current cognitive science is the ‘negation’ of previous cognitive 
science this suggests the immanence of a further ‘negation of the negation’, which in 
turn implies the one-sidedness of current cognitive science. Our aim, however, is to 
show that modern cognitive science is in ‘retreat from alienation’, a position which is 
somewhat undermined if the totality of its current outlook is reduced to one side of a 
dialectical coin. 
 
We could perhaps surmount this problem by changing our time scale slightly. The 
relevant ‘dialectic of mind’ we might suggest, did not begin with cognitive science but 
rather began at some earlier point, for example with behaviourism.  Here we might note 
Newell’s own observations on the relation of early cognitive science to behaviourism. 
He (and Herbert Simon), he suggests, were not motivated “to react against 
behaviourism” because they were not “deeply involved in psychology” (Newell, 1995, 
p.150). Nevertheless he allows that “a scientific group has as its principle the reaction 
against the previous one – in a dialectic way” and that, as an example of this, the 
revolution in cognitive science was “essentially a revolution against behaviourism” 
(ibid).  
 
Traditional cognitive science, with its ‘cognitivist’ outlook, then, could be seen as the 
negation of behaviourism – insofar as it emphasized the importance of internal 
symbolic processes to an explanation of human intelligent action. The arc would then 
be completed by recent cognitive science, playing the role of the ‘negation of the 
negation’, reasserting the importance of bodily action, and thus signalling “a return to 
the beginning but at a higher level of development” (Cornforth, 1952, p.112). 
 
However, whilst much of interest could be derived from such an analysis there is also 
surely a degree of arbitrariness about it. We have shifted the starting point of the 
dialectic to suit a particular explanatory purpose, but we cannot justify such a starting 
point independently. We could, for example, just as easily have started the ‘dialectic of 
mind’ with ‘introspectionism’ or ‘phrenology’. Moreover, for the sake of theoretical 
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elegance we have posited cognitivism as the negation of behaviourism and 
contemporary embodied cognitive science as the negation of cognitivism, but there are 
likely to be many ways in which the relationship between these approaches does not 
conform to, and is not well explained by, such a model. 
10
 Such problems, we might 
observe, seem endemic to historical conceptions of a dialectic rooted in the rather 
vague notion of the ‘negation of the negation’.  
 
Nevertheless, we should perhaps not take this vagueness as an indication that there are 
not patterns present in the historical unfolding of cognitive science which cannot be 
fruitfully considered in dialectical terms. We might argue, for example, that there is at 
least a basic dialectic of sorts already implicit in our notion of a ‘retreat from 
alienation’. In chapter 4 we dismissed as fanciful the idea that the trajectory of 
cognitive science could itself be recast as that of Mind coming to know itself. However, 
even if we attach little relative significance to the strivings of cognitive science on the 
stage of world history, we can still characterize it as a subject with a mind (constituted 
by the minds of various cognitive scientists), which also takes mind as its object. On 
this basis if traditional cognitive science shows this mind thinking about itself in a 
narrowly mentalistic way, then contemporary cognitive science shows this mind 
rediscovering itself in the sensuous physical world. That which had previously seemed 
other (or at least peripheral) to it – the physical body and its activity, the physical 
world, other people – has now become reincorporated as part of it.  
 
Here, then, the retreat from alienation within cognitive science can also be recast as the 
retreat from alienation of cognitive science. The movement of cognitive science is the 
movement of its (collective) mind freeing itself from alienation by recognizing itself in 
the objectivity of the world. Such an account would seem to have some descriptive 
value provided that one does not take too literally the personification of cognitive 
science involved.  It should be noted however that it is not central to the perspective of 
this thesis. 
                                                 
10
 For example, ‘functionalism’ – which has many affinities with a classical cognitive scientific outlook – 
might on one analysis be seen as a synthesis of behaviourism and identity theory.  
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Damasio & Noë – Anti-Dichotomous Theorists 
 
Returning to the retreat from alienation within cognitive science – we have so far said 
that this can be further characterized as involving a striving for unification, and that the 
pursuance of such a project is sometimes accompanied by additional dialectical 
elements. In the remainder of this chapter (and in later ones), we will look in greater 
detail at particular examples of these unifying approaches within contemporary 
cognitive science. 
 
In this section we will consider briefly the accounts of two theorists, Antonio Damasio 
(1994, 2000, 2003) and Alva Noë (O’Regan & Noë, 2001; Noë, 2002, 2004), both of 
which can be considered as ‘anti-dichotomous’. Damasio’s account goes some way 
toward confronting the dichotomy between ‘reason’ and emotion, whilst Noë’s 
confronts that between perception and action. These case studies are chosen as much 
for their differences as similarities. We might say that if there were a continuum 
running from ‘alienated perspectives’ to ‘unified perspectives’ then Damasio’s account 
would be significantly further away from the ‘unified’ end than Noë’s. We will begin 
with Damasio. 
 
Damasio 
 
Damasio’s account might be taken as belonging to the ‘embodied’ camp insofar as the 
dichotomy it deals with can be regarded as a subset of the more general ‘mind/body’ 
dichotomy. Damasio is specifically interested in the traditional separation between 
‘reason’ and ‘emotion’ where the latter is interpreted in terms of bodily events. 
However his unificatory strategy is the reverse of that of cognitivist theories which seek 
to establish that “emotions essentially involve cognitions” (Prinz, 2005, p.10); instead 
he wishes to demonstrate that cognition is to some degree facilitated by emotion.  His 
argument runs roughly as follows: We often find ourselves, he says, in a situation 
where we have to make a decision and where there are a range of possible practical 
outcomes depending on which decision we make. Furthermore such situations are often 
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time constrained – we need to make a decision fast. Damasio gives the following, very 
un-Marxian, example: 
 
Imagine yourself as the owner of a large business, faced with the prospect of meeting 
or not with a possible client who can bring valuable business but also happens to be the 
arch enemy of your best friend, and proceeding or not with a particular deal.  (Damasio, 
1994, p.170) 
 
In such situations we may not have the time or the memory capacity to make a decision 
purely on rational grounds; we can’t, for example, do a cost benefit analysis which 
takes into account all the possible consequences of a decision one way or the other and 
the probabilities of their occurrence: 
 
At best, your decision will take an inordinately long time, far more than acceptable if 
you are to get anything else done that day. At worst, you may not even end up with a 
decision at all because you will get lost in the byways of calculation. Why? Because it 
will not be easy to hold in memory the many ledgers of losses and gains that you need 
to consult for your comparisons   (ibid. p.172) 
 
Yet typically we are able to make such decisions, and often with successful outcomes - 
the question is how? According to Damasio, when considering a range of options 
certain of these options (or images of the outcomes of these options) are accompanied 
by negative or positive bodily feelings which help to guide the individual’s choice. 
These bodily feelings are the ‘somatic markers’. 
 
 In trying to understand exactly what a ‘somatic marker’ is it is useful to consider this 
account as in many respects an attempt to make respectable the commonplace 
observation that we often act ‘on gut feeling’ (Damasio, 2003, p.147). However it 
should perhaps be noted that the ‘bodily feelings’ which constitute somatic markers are 
a little out of sync with our everyday conceptions of feelings insofar as it is in no way 
necessary to the existence of the former that they are felt. Somatic markers, says 
Damasio, can “operate covertly” and “do not need to be perceived consciously.” 
(Damasio, 1994,  p.180). 
 
We will not here look closely at the question of the origins of these entities. We will 
merely note that although Damasio seems to suggest some primitive grounding in 
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primary emotions, he also seems to think that the form they take can largely be 
explained by “education and socialisation” (ibid. p.177). What we do want to draw 
attention to, however, is (what we might call) the logical mechanics of the story.  
Damasio is very clear that the somatic marker does not do our thinking for us. Rather it 
intervenes at crucial moments to cut down the number of choices we have to act upon. 
This ‘pruning’ mechanism allows us to carry on with our rational deliberation with a 
greater chance of success: 
 
The automated signal protects you against future losses, without further ado, and then 
allows you to choose from among fewer alternatives. There is still room for using 
cost/benefit analysis and proper deductive competence, but only after the automated 
step drastically reduces the number of options…Somatic markers do not deliberate for 
us. They assist the deliberation by highlighting some options (either dangerous or 
favourable) and eliminating them rapidly from subsequent consideration. (Damasio, 
1994, pp.173-174) 
 
Postponing, momentarily, criticism of the details of this story we might say that 
Damasio’s undoubted achievement is to make credible the idea that a 
neurological/biological story can be told which might undermine the conception of 
reason as essentially separate from embodied emotion. From the point of view of the 
‘retreat from alienation’ his account is both in keeping with the spirit of the project of 
human unification and adopts an anti-dichotomous strategy to achieve this end – 
although in both cases to a very limited extent. Insofar as this is the case it also appears 
to be to some degree consistent with one of Hegel’s own observations on the subject of 
‘feeling’ - that: 
 
The difficulty for the logical intellect consists in throwing off the separation it has 
arbitrarily imposed between the several faculties of feeling and thinking mind… 
(Hegel, 1817c, p.93). 
 
Nevertheless there are problems with Damasio’s account. Perhaps surprisingly, given 
the subject matter of this thesis, these problems are not primarily connected with his 
focus on business scenarios or his reduction of rational thought to cost-benefit analysis. 
Although a case can be made that his market-oriented outlook does have some strong 
relation to the more abstract features of his argument, we will not pursue this line of 
reasoning here. Instead we will concentrate on those abstract features themselves. 
Below I will outline two of the problems that Damasio’s account seems to present. This 
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will, on the face of it, involve a substantial departure from any Marxian related 
considerations. However I hope to then show that these problems are ultimately 
amenable to a Marxian analysis (even if a rather sketchy one.) 
 
Problem 1  
 
One initial response to Damasio’s account might itself be cast in terms of a ‘gut 
feeling’. Anyone with a modicum of sympathy for the approach of the later 
Wittgenstein might well feel some unease at Damasio’s introduction of a hypothetical 
inner entity/process, not necessarily accessible to consciousness, whose main role is to 
help in the completion of an otherwise seemingly intractable cognitive task. There is a 
characteristic argumentative structure used by Wittgenstein (1953) which might be 
labelled ‘the transitive argument’. This argument is of the form: ‘You say that a 
system’s ability to get from A to C can be explained in terms of an intermediary stage 
where it goes from A to B, but in your example you are presupposing in this ability to 
get from A to B, the self same skills/knowledge that were required to get from A to C in 
the first place.” 
 
An example of this transitive argument is found in his treatment of the question “How 
does an individual know what colour to pick when he hears the word ‘red’?” 
Wittgenstein imagines someone replying that an individual will know what colour to 
pick because he can pick the colour “whose image occurs to him when he hears the 
word”. Wittgenstein’s response to this is: 
 
But how is he to know which colour it is whose image occurs to him’? Is a further 
criterion needed for that?    (Wittgenstein, 1953, p.88) 
 
In other words the ‘inner image’ has no role to play. That which would allow me to 
unfailingly identify an inner image as red ought also to allow me to unfailingly identify 
a red object as red without the help of the inner image. Therefore it makes no sense to 
say that I typically identify red objects by means of a red inner image. (Here we are 
reminded of Brooks’ remark that “it turns out to be better to let the world serve as its 
own model” – 1991b, p.396).  This argumentative structure, we might note, has also 
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been used more recently by Dennett in relation to a debate about the ability of the brain 
to ‘fill in’ detail of the world which is not provided by our perceptual apparatus. Noë 
summarises Dennett’s argument as “If the brain knows what it needs to fill in, then for 
whose benefit is the operation of filling in performed?” (Noë, 2002, p.3) 
 
A question that might concern us, then, is whether Damasio’s somatic marker argument 
might also be susceptible to a similar ‘transitive argument’. Is the somatic marker “a 
wheel that can be turned though nothing else moves with it?’(Wittgenstein, 1953, p.95) 
i.e. an explanatorily useless part of any hypothesis? 
 
In fact it is pursuit of an adequate formulation of a transitive argument in this context 
that exposes one of the weaknesses of Damasio’s account. If we take the ‘colour’ 
argument (above) as saying :  “If I know how to identify an ‘inner’ red then I should 
know how to identify an ‘outer’ red directly” then an equivalent for the somatic marker 
hypothesis would seem to be: “ If I know how to use somatic markers to prune my 
choices then I should  be able to circumvent that process by not considering certain 
choices in the first place”.  Here however we immediately notice a problem in the use of 
the phrase “If I know…” A supporter of somatic markers might quite rightly point out 
that the use of this phrase exposes a flaw in the reasoning.  Somatic markers are not the 
result of my ‘knowing’ anything; they do not result from any kind of strategy employed 
at the personal level.  Rather the somatic marker just makes its presence felt (or unfelt) 
and I am the beneficiary. The somatic marker precisely is able to ‘circumvent the 
process’ but this does not mean that ‘I’ am able to.  In response to this we must therefore 
amend our original formulation to eliminate mention of knowing selves. Suppose we 
alter it to “If the system knows where to use somatic markers it should know how to 
restrict choices without using them”? Does this argument work? 
 
Again, a defender of Damasio’s account might here claim that somatic markers are not 
merely distinct from the strategies of selves but distinct from ‘the rational strategy of the 
system’.  In a way this seems like it must be trivially true. The whole point of the 
hypothesis is to show that merely rational means cannot achieve the desired ends so 
some other element must be involved in our decision making processes. This other 
 163 
element is by definition ‘not rational’, so if by ‘distinct from the rational strategy of the 
system’ we just mean ‘not rational’ there cannot be any argument here. However it 
seems on this limited interpretation we are still free to interpret the somatic marker as 
being part of the ‘deliberative strategy’ of the system – just not the rational strategy. 
What this might mean is not entirely clear but we might assume for instance it means 
that we could still model the system with somatic marker included.  In this case we can 
still ask “If the system has the wherewithal (however characterised) to apply somatic 
markers to particular choices –why need it throw up those choices in the first place?” 
 
If a defender of the somatic marker hypothesis is to attempt any kind of counter-
argument to this it seems that they could only do so by excluding the somatic marker 
from ‘the deliberative system’ altogether – and indeed this seems to be implied by 
Damasio’s comment that “somatic markers do not deliberate for us” (Damasio, 1994, 
p.174) On this view the somatic marker would be more like an environmental variable, 
acting blindly and external to the system. Choices are pruned ‘out there’ (just as the 
wind might prune the branches of a tree) and the system then gets to work on the result. 
This version of things would seem to defeat the transitive argument, but at what price? 
We now have a complete separation of emotional and rational processes – with ‘reason’ 
clearly at the centre of things once more. Any attempt at unification has gone out of the 
window. 
 
 
 
Problem 2  
 
Moreover this division of labour between the work of the somatic marker and that of 
the deliberative system makes problematic the account of how the rational system gets 
its job done. Damasio suggests that the somatic marker had to be called in because of 
our limited time resources and memory capacity, the suggestion being that the somatic 
marker does its work by reducing a large amount of choices (and hence decision paths 
to consider) to a smaller more manageable amount. Thus the problem is presented as a 
quantitative one, but once the problem is presented in this way there seems to be 
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something arbitrary and unconvincing in the idea that a non-rational mechanism for 
reducing the amount of choices will be able to provide a solution. Is there a third 
mechanism, for example, which guarantees that the somatic marker will prune away 
just enough choices every time to make the operations of the rational agent feasible? 
 
One suspects, in fact, that the problem Damasio’s account is circling around is not a 
quantitative one at all but the in principle one of how a purely rational agent is able to 
decide on a course of action in a world of unending possibilities.  The difficulty we are 
alluding to here is similar to that which has surfaced in AI as ‘the frame problem’ 
(McCarthy & Hayes, 1969; Dennett, 1984) and in Philosophy as ‘the rule following 
paradox’ (Wittgenstein, 1953; Kripke, 1982). Like the agent in those two scenarios 
Damasio’s decision-maker seems to be faced with great difficulties in answering the 
question ‘How do I know what to do next?’ The rational resources that she has at her 
disposal (facts, rules, inferential mechanisms etc.) are not sufficient to determine an 
outcome in any particular situation. To his credit Damasio therefore looks elsewhere – 
to non-rational resources – for a solution. However, as these non-rational resources are 
only given a quantitative role to play – the reduction of the number of choices – it is 
hard to see how they can impact significantly on the qualitative problem of ‘choosing’ 
itself. 
 
This difficulty is further highlighted by Damasio’s characterization of the decision 
making process as one which involves selection from a range of ‘images’. In deciding 
whether or not to do business with the arch enemy of our best friend, for example, we 
are faced with a number of representations of future outcomes: 
 
Examples of what the images would depict include meeting the prospective client, 
being seen in the client’s company by your best friend and placing the friendship in 
jeopardy; not meeting the client; losing good business but safeguarding the valuable 
friendship, and so forth. (Damasio, 1994, p.170) 
 
Let us allow that this description of things makes sense, that there are a finite amount of 
such outcome images and that the somatic marker can effectively prune away the 
majority of them (which may be allowing too much). Suppose then we imagine an 
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ensemble of negative somatic markers attaching to all future outcome images except 
one – perhaps we only feel good (or don’t feel bad) about an image which somehow 
illustrates continued friendship (an image of my friend and I having a drink together?). 
Where does that leave the rational system? Is what it is to do next determined by the 
selection of this image? It is difficult to see how this could be the case, for, again in 
Wittgensteinian fashion we might point out that the image does not bring with it a set of 
rules determining how it is to be applied in all future circumstances. Moreover, even if 
it did, we might need rules to interpret these rules and so on (Wittgenstein, 1953, pp.75-
88). In short no amount of image pruning by the somatic marker need do anything to 
lessen the interminable amount of decisions faced by a purely rational system.    
 
A dialectical solution? 
 
We have highlighted, then two possible problems with the somatic marker hypothesis. 
Firstly, if it manages to evade the ‘transitive’ argument it only does so by isolating in a 
problematic fashion the ‘somatic’ element of decision making. Secondly, insofar as 
there is a problem with rational decision making it seems unlikely that such a problem 
could be solved by a quantitative ‘pruning’ of choices. 
 
Both of these problems, we might argue, stem (in part) from the separation that still 
persists between the rational and the somatic in Damasio’s account. Whilst the 
incorporation of a somatic element with a role to play in deliberation is a positive 
move, the restriction of the somatic and rational to their own isolated arenas of 
operation is less so. In dialectical terms there is little exploration of ways that these two 
components might “interpenetrate” or form a reciprocal unity. The attempt to “break up 
the rigidity” (Hegel, 1817a, p.53) between feeling and thinking is not thoroughgoing 
enough. 
 
Of course, Damasio might well suggest that the examples he gave were deliberately 
simplified and that in any real life situation there is always a to–ing and fro-ing back 
and forth between rational and somatic components – a little theorizing, followed by a 
bit of pruning, then back to theorizing again and so on. In this way he might argue that 
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he too believes that the somatic and the rational are inextricably ‘mixed up’ together. 
However from our point of view this would still be a relatively un-dialectical kind of 
mixing up. Like Merleau-Ponty’s conception of ‘mechanical action’ it reduces the 
interaction between emotion and reason to “a series of uni-directional determinations” 
(Merleau-Ponty, 1942, p.161). 
 
A more unified account, we might speculate, would not be one where the agent, as 
identified with a rational/deliberative system, is influenced from without by a somatic 
mechanism. Instead the deliberative system itself would be seen as incorporating the 
‘rational’ and ‘emotional’ in a more integral way, with the notion of a ‘purely rational’ 
choice being revealed as something of an abstraction.
11
  
 
Such an account might go some way towards offering a solution to the problems 
outlined above. If the somatic marker – or however it might need to be re-characterized 
in a unified system – were fully integrated with the process of rational decision making 
i.e. if ‘choosing’ itself were viewed as a partially somatic/affective/emotional process, 
then the ‘transitive argument’ could no longer apply. There would no longer be a 
confusing dichotomy between the ‘deliberative system’ and some other part of the 
mechanism which appears to be deliberating but isn’t, and so we would no longer feel 
compelled to question the role of the latter. Likewise, the rejection of the idea that a 
“purely rational agent” has to confront the world alone at any point in the proceedings 
helps us bypass the difficulties which externalized somatic pruning was designed to 
solve but would be unable to solve i.e. frame problem/rule following type problems 
which follow on from a purely rational conception of decision making. 
 
                                                 
11
 This is hardly a new idea of course. Ron Chrisley, for example, argues that “The notion of a ‘purely’ 
rational AI system is a distraction. It’s questionable whether any implemented AI system has ever been 
purely rational, or whether such would even be possible.”(2003, p.138)  He seems however to be making 
a slightly different point to me. His suggestion, as far as I understand, is that it is hard to imagine an 
embodied system where every significant physical difference gives rise to a rational difference, whereas 
the point here is that outside the realm of artificial agents it may not always be useful to consider rational 
and non-rational processes in separation. 
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These remarks are, of course, necessarily vague and impressionistic. It might be 
possible to put more meat on the bones of our analysis both by more detailed 
speculation and by reference to existing accounts which have attempted to unify 
emotion and reason in a more fundamental way, either in the context of a general 
philosophical holism (e.g. Dreyfus, 1972) or in relation to neurological research (e.g. 
Hardcastle, 1999). Our aim here, however, is not to put forward or review theories of 
the relationship between emotion and cognition in any depth but rather to present 
Damasio’s account as an example of a weak attempt at unification – a case wherein an 
author has successfully identified a tension within a particular dichotomy but has made 
no sustained attempt to resolve that dichotomy. 
 
Noë 
 
In this respect Damasio’s account is to be contrasted with that of Noë (O’Regan & Noë, 
2001; Noë, 2002; Noë, 2004) – for Noë does try to confront a dichotomy head on and 
the results are more far-reaching as a consequence. 
 
Although Noë’s work covers a lot of ground one of his main targets is the “classical 
sandwich” (Hurley, 2001) model of cognition described briefly in our previous chapter. 
According to this model perception and action stood at opposite ends of a linear 
sequence separated by cognition. Noë’s “enactive approach” (Noë, 2004, p.2) 
challenges this serial conception of things by questioning the separateness of action and 
perception. Influenced greatly by Merleau-Ponty’s (1945) own active account of 
perception, he argues that perception is not separate from action but rather is a type of 
action: 
 
Perceiving is a way of acting. Perception is not something that happens to us, or in us. 
It is something we do. (Noë, 2004, p.1) 
 
Central to this account of perception are the notions of ‘sensorimotor contingencies’ 
and ‘sensorimotor knowledge’. What enables coherent perceptual experience in relation 
to a particular object is the distinct pattern of sensory changes that arise from the 
perceptual probing of that object with a particular sensory modality. Such patterns 
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constitute the ‘sensorimotor contingencies’ and (practical) knowledge of them is 
prerequisite for meaningful perceptual content (O’Regan & Noë, 2001; Noë, 2004). 
 
We can already see, then, that Noë goes further than Damasio in confronting the 
dichotomy at the centre of his investigation. Whereas the latter had posited a mere 
external relatedness between emotion and reason Noë, in a more Hegelian spirit, wants 
to unify perception and action in a principled way. His ‘constitutive claim’ is not just 
that perception is bound up with action but that perception is a kind of action. We 
should note here how he explicitly wants to put some ground between his own account 
and other accounts in this respect: 
 
Most recent work on the relation of perception and action stop short of making the 
constitutive claim that defines the enactive standpoint. It does not treat perception as a 
kind of action or skilful activity (or as drawing on a kind of sensorimotor knowledge), 
rather it treats (a good deal of) perception as for the guidance of action.  (Noë, 2004, 
p.18) 
 
In fact this distinction between teleology and constitutiveness is perhaps both a 
weakness and a strength in Noë’s account. That he feels the need to exclude ‘perception 
for action’ from his own version of enactivism suggests a certain level of 
fragmentedness in his approach – for it is surely the case that ‘perception for action’ 
and ‘perception as action’ are related to some degree. (Similar considerations seem to 
motivate Torrance’s own observations concerning the lack of teleology in O’Regan & 
Noë’s brand of enactivism – Torrance, 2005, p.7). Nevertheless that Noë wishes to 
posit an essential unity of some kind between perception and action counts as a tick in 
the dialectical box. 
 
Moreover, this unity between perception and action also recalls some of the features we 
grouped under the heading of ‘praxis’ in chapter 2. This is perhaps no accident since, as 
we have said, Noë’s account is to some degree influenced by Merleau-Ponty’s work. It 
will be remembered that Merleau-Ponty’s own account of ‘active perception’ could in 
turn be convincingly related to Marx’s conception of the active relationship of the agent 
to the environment, and in particular to his critique of Feuerbach’s materialism 
according to which: 
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…the thing, reality, sensuousness, is conceived of only in the form of the object, or of 
contemplation, but not as sensuous human activity, practice (Marx, 1970a, p.121) 
 
Like Marx and Merleau-Ponty, then, Noë’s account of perception as skilful activity also 
emphasizes an active relationship to the world and so is at odds with classical 
materialism which “presents the world as if it were a merely passive object of 
perception” (Avineri, 1970, p.75). 
 
There is more of interest to us in Noë’s enactive account, however, than the simple fact 
that he characterizes perception as a type of action. There is the additional fact that he 
uses this position to tackle a number of related puzzles of perception. For example the 
‘grand illusion’ argument (which Noë credits to Dennett, 1991, and Blackmore et al. 
1995) – that phenomena such as change blindness and blindspots indicate that visual 
perception does not give us instantaneous access to a detailed and complete picture of 
the world, and that therefore that “we are mistaken in our assessment of how things 
seem to us to be” (Noë, 2004, p.54) – is shown to arise from a mistaken ‘snapshot’ 
conception of visual experience. It is not that we are deluded into thinking that we have 
better visual access to the world than we really have. In fact we do have full access to 
all the detail of the world but such access is not to be understood on a model according 
to which the agent is a passive spectator to a static given (nor, says Noë, is this the 
layman’s conception of things anyway). Rather we have such access to the world over 
time as active explorers of that world: 
 
My visual world is not the field available to the fixed gaze. The visual field rather is 
made available by looking around. (ibid. p.57) 
 
Likewise Noë uses his sensorimotor approach against more traditional philosophical 
problems of perception. One such is the ‘argument from illusion’ (see e.g. Ayer, 1956). 
According to this argument cases of non-veridical perception are taken as evidence that 
we never have direct perceptual access to the world. A plate, for example, may look 
small and elliptical from a certain distance and angle, when it is actually large and 
circular. The ‘look’ of the plate must therefore be something separate from the plate 
itself for it presents the plate as possessing properties that it does not in fact have. Such 
‘looks’, it is argued, are instances of ‘sense data’ and it is with them – rather than the 
world itself - that we have direct perceptual acquaintance. 
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From Noë’s point of view this line of reasoning is misguided. The fact that objects 
change in appearance as we explore them perceptually does not warrant the conclusion 
that we do not have access to objects as they actually are. Rather it is through this 
pattern of sensory changes that we ascertain the actual size and shape of the object: 
 
It is in the possible changes in P shape that the real shape is encountered.   (Noë, 2004, 
p.86) 
 
We expect (or discover) a circular object to look elliptical to a greater or lesser degree 
from different angles for these are the sensory patterns typical of a circular object: “We 
see its circularity in the fact that it looks elliptical from here” (ibid p.84). There is 
therefore no distinction to be made between the object as it appears to us and the object 
as it actually is, and in this sense perspectival properties “are perfectly ‘real’ or 
‘objective’” (ibid. p.83). 
 
We have said already that Noë’s account of perception is praxis-like in its emphasis on 
an active orientation to the object. Here his use of an enactivist position to provide 
solutions to philosophical puzzles recalls further elements of Marx’s philosophy of 
practice. It will be remembered that Marx’s account included not only ideas about the 
active practical nature of man, but also theses concerning the relationship between 
practical activity and philosophy. This is one respect, we might say, in which a Marxian 
approach differs from a merely phenomenological one (such as a ‘skills’ oriented 
Heideggerian account e.g. Dreyfus, 1972; Wheeler, 2005). Practical activity is seen not 
just as a crucial category for understanding human ‘being-in-the-world’ but as a source 
of solutions to philosophical problems (and ultimately as a means of dispensing with 
philosophy altogether). This was one of the implications of Marx’s assertion that: 
 
All mysteries which lead theory to mystification find their rational solution in human 
practice and in the comprehension of this practice.  (Marx, 1970a, p.122) 
 
Taken in conjunction with Marx’s emphasis on our active relationship to the world and 
its contents, this position has the following consequence: philosophical problems which 
arise from a passive conception of our relationship to the world dissolve once one has a 
fuller comprehension of our active relationship to the world – and in some instance 
solutions to these problems are brought about by action in the world. 
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We can see how this applies to Noë’s account. Noë does not advocate action itself as a 
means of superceding the fragmented outlook of detached theory – for this we have to 
turn to Varela et al. (1991 - see next chapter). However he does use an active 
conception of our relationship to the world to dissolve puzzles that had previously 
arisen as a result of a passive, static conception of our relationship to the world. The 
‘mystifications’ implicit in the ‘grand illusion’ argument and the ‘argument from 
illusion’ are thereby revealed for what they are – the by-products of an outlook that 
failed to view things “in their own being and movement” (Hegel, 1817a, p.117) and 
which failed to characterize human beings in accordance with their “real, active” nature 
(Marx & Engels, 1970b, p.47).  The scenarios they present are precisely of the sort that 
Marx would have labeled ‘abstract’ insofar as they leave out all that is essential about 
our ongoing interaction with the world and posit instead a picture of the agent as static 
receptacle of sense impressions. Noë overturns this picture – replacing man as a passive 
spectator with man as active producer of his own perceptions. 
 
Intersubjectivity & Mirror Neurons 
 
Damasio’s and Noë’s accounts, then, are both attempts to tackle dichotomies which 
militate against the unification of the agent. In Damasio’s case the dichotomy was that 
between emotion and reason and in Noë’s case it was that between action and 
perception. Noë’s account was both more successful in this respect and incorporated 
additional Marxian elements. We might now turn to another unifying thread in current 
cognitive science – its concern with intersubjectivity – which can also be expressed in 
terms of the resolution of a dichotomy, the dichotomy between self and other. 
 
We saw in Chapter 4 how traditional cognitive science had an individualistic outlook 
on mind and cognition, and that this had consequences particularly for its approach to 
the question of ‘other minds’. In an epistemological equivalent to Marx’s ‘alienation of 
man from man’ the relationship of individuals to each other was viewed as problematic 
and the gulf that separated individual minds was seen as bridgeable only indirectly 
through inference or some similar theoretical procedure. 
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More recently many researchers and theorists within cognitive science (e.g. De Jaegher 
& Di Paolo, 2007; Froese & Di Paolo, 2009; Gallagher, 2005; Gallese 2001, 2003; 
Thompson, 2001, 2007; Torrance & Froese, 2011; Zahavi, 2001) have focussed on 
intersubjective or interpersonal dimensions of cognition. In various ways the idea has 
been expressed that it is unviable to take individual self-contained minds as a starting 
point or, in some cases, as a given. As Thompson, in a wide ranging survey of the field 
as it was ten years ago, put it: 
 
What recent cognitive science has begun to drive home is that the embodied 
mind is intersubjectively constituted at the most fundamental level. 
(Thompson, 2001, p.4)                                                                  
 
Such approaches bypass the need to explain how the gulf between self and other is 
bridged for they either deny the existence of such a gap, or at least that it is of the sort 
imagined by traditional philosophy of mind and theory theorists. As Thompson points 
out, their grounds for doing so range from purely phenomenological considerations - 
for example that any kind of sense experience presupposes an ‘open intersubjectivity’ 
(ibid. p.15) – to speculative interpretations of research in developmental psychology - 
e.g. “that human agents possess, at birth, interpersonal body schemas for emotional 
contagion and facial imitation” (ibid. p.7 - in reference to Meltzoff and Moore, 1999.) 
 
Some later work (De Jaegher & Di Paolo, 2007; Froese & Di Paolo, 2009; Torrance & 
Froese, 2011) has focussed not just on the primacy of intersubjectivity but on the 
dynamic characteristics of interactions between individual agents. Such an interaction 
can have “an autonomy of its own which is separate from the autonomy of the 
individual participants” (Torrance & Froese, 2011, p.25) and so can facilitate or hinder 
the actions of individuals irrespective of their intentions (ibid. pp.25-27). This 
description of ‘participatory sense making’ (De Jaegher & Di Paolo, 2007) perhaps 
brings to mind Sohn-Rethel’s account of commodity exchange wherein “the action is 
social, the minds are private” (Sohn-Rethel, 1978, p.29). 
 
However whilst the fact of this intersubjective turn in cognitive science is of interest to 
us in principle and constitutes one dimension of a ‘retreat from alienation’, there is 
perhaps not much to be gained in detailing the myriad ways it has been developed by 
various researchers and theorists, particularly when such developments may in some 
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cases have been effectively theorized in relation to non-Marxian forebears such as 
Husserl and Heidegger (see e.g. Zahavi, 1999; Thompson, 2007; Froese & Di Paolo, 
2009). What is of particular relevance to our case is that the turn to intersubjectivity is 
often accompanied by an awareness of its internal relation to other unifying 
conceptions of the agent as embodied, enactive etc. Thus Thompson posits a single 
“enactive” perspective whose elements include ‘self-other co-determination’, 
embodiment and emergence (Thompson, 2001, 2007). We will look at other aspects of 
this version of enactivism in more detail in the next chapter. 
 
Gallese 
 
Also of interest to us are certain accounts which contain additional features particularly 
relevant to a Marxian perspective. One such is that of Gallese (Gallese 2001, 2003; 
Gallese & Lakoff, 2005), whose work we shall now briefly examine. Gallese’s main 
interest is in the neurological mirroring systems found in humans and other primates. In 
the case of macaque monkeys he describes how: 
 
A particular set of neurons activated during the execution of purposeful, goal related 
hand actions, such as grasping, holding or manipulating objects, discharge also when 
the monkey observes similar hand actions performed by another individual. We 
designated theses neurons as ‘mirror neurons’.   (Gallese, 2001, p.35) 
 
Roughly equivalent (at least for our purposes) results for human beings are also 
discussed. These show that humans too have a ‘mirror matching system’ – motor 
circuits in the human brain are activated both when an action is observed and when it is 
performed: 
 
When we observe goal related behaviours executed with different effectors, different 
specific sectors of our pre-motor cortex become active. These cortical sectors are those 
same sectors that are active when we actually perform the same actions.  (ibid., p.37) 
 
Gallese sees in this, and other, data evidence of a neurological basis for a “shared 
meaningful intersubjective space” (Gallese, 2003, p.517) that we all inhabit. There are 
(we might argue) two components to his argument. 
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One is the general idea that neurological mirroring of any sort supplies us with an 
answer to the question of how, on a subpersonal level, it is possible to bridge the gap 
between ‘observer and observed’. If we redescribe the traditional ‘problem of other 
minds’ argument in Wittgensteinian terms we might say that it is an instance of the 
problem of the lack of a ‘criterion for the same’. The adherent of analogical reasoning, 
as exemplified by Theory Theory (Baron Cohen et al, 2000) or the traditional 
‘argument from analogy’ (Ayer, 1954), likes to suggest that the gulf between self and 
other and can be crossed through the imaginative transposition of first person states to 
others, but this strategy presents us with a problem: On what basis are we to assume 
that third person states are ‘the same’ as first person states? More radically, what can it 
even mean to say that another person is in ‘the same’ state as me, when such states are 
for me, by definition first person states? Wittgenstein expresses this problem as 
follows:  
 
If one has to imagine someone else’s pain on the model of one’s own, this is none too 
easy a thing to do: for I have to imagine pain which I do not feel on the model of the 
pain which I do feel.    (Wittgenstein, 1953, p.101, author’s emphasis) 
 
Wittgenstein’s solution to this is to deny that, in the typical case, ‘mind-reading’ (if we 
are to use this term) is based on inference or the imaginative transference of first person 
states, and thus that there is a problem of this sort to deal with. Nevertheless, given that 
we accept that a non-inferential account of intersubjective relations is correct, this still 
leaves space for a story to be told about the subpersonal processes that enable non-
inferential interaction – we still need a subpersonal  criterion for ‘the same’. It is this, 
we might say, which neurological mirroring systems provide. They imply a hard-wired 
means of establishing identity between that which is experienced in the first person and 
that which is observed in others.  
 
At this general level of abstraction, then, the idea of neurological mirroring might be 
thought applicable to a broad range of intersubjective encounters including those which 
are not specifically concerned with the practical engagement of the agent. In this 
context we note, for example, research into pain-related areas of the brain (specifically 
the right dorsal anterior cingulated cortex) which indicate common neuronal response 
to the pricking of a subject’s hand and the observation by that subject of another’s hand 
being pricked (Hutchinson et al 1999; Morrison et al, 2004) thereby implying (at least 
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for Morrison) “a common neural substrate for felt and seen pain” (ibid. p.273). Here it 
is possible to talk (with or without justification) of a neurological basis for ‘empathy’ 
without making any essential reference to the agent’s practical involvement in the 
scenario. 
 
The second component of Gallese’s argument, however, goes beyond this, and it is this 
component which seems particularly amenable to a Marxian interpretation.  Although 
Gallese gives some mention to pain related mirroring (in 2001, 2003) it is not the 
existence of mirroring systems per se which interests him but specifically mirroring 
systems located in motor areas, for this implies (for him) an action related mirroring 
which serves as the foundation for intersubjective relations: “Through a process of 
‘motor equivalence’ a meaningful link between agent and observer is established” 
(Gallese, 2001, p.42). The suggestion would seem to be that neither inference, nor even 
a statically conceived ‘empathy’ – which still reduces agents to the passive roles of 
‘observer’ and ‘observed’ – is sufficient as a connector. Rather it is through action, and 
our readiness for it, that we are linked with our fellow human beings at the most 
fundamental level:  
 
Action is the ‘a priori’ principle enabling social bonds to be initially established.”  
(Gallese, 2001, p.41) 
 
We have of course to bear in mind here that Gallese’s original subjects were not human 
beings but macaque monkeys, but his point is surely that insofar as an organism is 
capable of forging “social bonds”, such bonds are to be understood as grounded in 
action rather than in passive cognition. 
 
Such a perspective fits well with Marx’s account of the human agent. As we saw in 
chapter 2, for Marx man was a quintessentially social being, and his social essence was 
not realized passively but rather through productive activity. The term ‘species being’ 
(Marx, 1844a), although used in a variety of ways, was to be partly understood in this 
connection as denoting man’s essence as a socially productive animal. It is in this sense 
too that the different facets of alienated labour were only separable in the abstract, for 
alienation from activity and its product goes hand in hand with alienation of man from 
man. Conversely realization of man’s social essence is simultaneously his realization 
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through “free conscious activity” (Marx, 1844a, p.82). It is through such activity, 
undertaken in the presence of others, that man confirms his “communal essence”. 
(Marx, 1844b, p.122) 
 
We might say then that Gallese’s interpretation of the significance of motor based 
mirror neurons, whether of not it is warranted by the evidence, is one that is congenial 
to a Marxian outlook. The suggestion that purposeful action and intersubjectivity form 
a unity at the most basic (neurological) level is consistent with a theory which asserts 
that human agents realize themselves as social beings through practical activity. For 
both Marx and Gallese social bonds are fundamentally practical in nature. 
 
In arguing for a Marx-friendly interpretation of Gallese, however, we do not mean to 
imply agreement with all aspects of his account. We have, for example, omitted 
reference to certain details concerning the mechanism by which mirror matching 
systems are thought to facilitate access to a shared intersubjective space – namely that 
of ‘embodied simulation’, which in later work (Gallese & Lakoff, 2005) is held to play 
a role in understanding and concept formation. This portion of his argument seems 
problematically representation-oriented in its outlook. Likewise we have also omitted 
reference to one of Gallese’s explanations of the evolutionary function of mirror 
matching systems – that “social cognition has action control as one of its main 
purposes, namely controlling the action of others” (Gallese, 2001, p.39). This 
interpretation of the data seems to incorporate unwarranted assumptions about the 
inevitability of human competition, somewhat reminiscent of those made in the early 
stages of Hegel’s parable of the ‘Lord and Bondsman’ (Hegel, 1807, pp.111-119). We 
will not develop these points further here however. 
 
 
Objective Dialectics – Dynamics and Emergence 
 
We have so far looked at examples of dichotomy resolution in the accounts of Damasio 
and Noë, with the latter being characterized as both more thoroughgoing and more 
praxis-oriented. We have also looked at examples of intersubjective accounts of the 
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agent, concentrating specifically on Gallese, whose emphasis on a pre-theoretical, 
action based link between agents mirrors Marx’s conception of man as an active 
creature who realizes his social being through practical activity. We turn now to 
another significant thread in modern cognitive science, dynamic systems’ perspectives. 
Dynamical accounts (henceforth ‘dynamics’) are of interest to us because they 
incorporate some of the dialectical elements we outlined in the work of Hegel and 
Engels (and later Marxists). In doing so they also present a picture of cognition at odds 
with the mechanistic ‘production line’ conception we outlined in chapter 4. There we 
said that whereas GOFAI emphasized linearity, discreteness and fixity, dialectics 
emphasizes reciprocity, continuity and holism. These latter elements are also central to 
dynamics. 
 
The following account is not comprehensive and will not include analysis of many of 
the concepts one might associate with dynamics (e.g. there is no mention of ‘state 
spaces’ or ‘attractors’). Instead we will look briefly at a few features of particular 
relevance to this thesis – ‘change, motion and continuity’, ‘emergence’, and ‘reciprocal 
causation’ – before moving on to consider how some of these features, and others, are 
presented in one particular dynamical account (van Gelder & Port, 1995; van Gelder, 
1995, 1996). 
 
Change, Motion and Continuity 
 
In order to emphasize the similarities between dynamics and Hegelian-Marxian 
dialectics it is perhaps useful to begin with the general observation that both dialectics 
and dynamics are centrally concerned with change and motion. It will be remembered 
(chapter 3) how, on Engels’ account, a dialectical view of the world was one which 
represented it as in “constant motion, change, transformation, development” (Engels, 
1867, p.37). This emphasis on process was meant as an antidote to the ‘metaphysical’ 
perspective which viewed the objects of the world “in repose, not in motion, as 
constants not as essentially variables” (Engels, 1867, p.34). Whilst a metaphysical 
perspective did have its limited uses, it was the dialectical perspective which grasped 
the world as it actually was because, amongst other things, it understood that “motion is 
the mode of existence of matter” (Engels, 1867, p.86). This conception of things was 
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indebted to Hegel’s own account in the Logic where there was a similar emphasis on 
processes in time, as expressed in the idea that ‘Becoming’ is the “fundamental feature 
of all existence” (Hegel, 1817a, p.132). 
 
Dynamics is likewise concerned centrally with processes and change, and as with 
Engels’ dialectical outlook, its aim (in the arena of cognitive science) is not just to offer 
additional insights otherwise neglected by the classical view, but to show that cognition 
is only fully comprehensible in these terms. As Thelen and Smith put it “there is only 
process” (Thelen & Smith, 1994, p.39) and later – in a remark reminiscent of Marx’s 
eleventh thesis on Feuerbach – “the central theoretical problem is not stability but 
change” (ibid, p.42). Such a perspective is also sometimes accompanied by Hegelian 
terms and references. Thus, for example, Kelso notes that “becoming is a process of 
change” (Kelso, 1995, p.5) and opens his book with a passage which recalls Heraclitus’ 
maxim that ‘it is not possible to step twice into the same river’: 
 
I envisage it [the brain] as a constantly shifting dynamic system, more like the flow of a 
river in which patterns emerge and disappear, than a static landscape. (ibid, p.1) 
 
One component of this general orientation towards change and process is the idea that 
‘continuity’ is significant to cognition. Dynamicists have a “strong belief in the 
relevance of continuity to providing accurate descriptions of cognitive systems” 
(Eliasmith, 2001, p.422). Thus, as with the dialectical critique presented in the previous 
chapter, dynamical accounts oppose themselves to the discrete mechanistic models of 
mind as represented by the “sudden jumps or clicks” of discrete state machines (Turing, 
1950, p.35; van Gelder & Port, 1995, p.2).  
 
However, in identifying both dialectics and dynamics with a preference for the 
continuous over the discrete, we are to some degree talking ‘abstractly’ ourselves. In 
the real world the dichotomy between continuity and discreteness is not fixed. Discrete 
systems can be understood dynamically – thus for example, “the symbolicist Turing 
Machine is a dynamical system” (Eliasmith, 1996, p.456). Likewise, as we saw in 
chapter 1,  Hegel’s conception of a dialectical relation between quantity and quality is 
one which envisages relatively discrete states “under the figure of a nodal (knotted) 
line” (Hegel, 1817a, p.160) emerging out of a process of continuous change. The point 
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however is that the discreteness posited by traditional GOFAI mechanisms is not of the 
real world but is such as can only exist in abstraction, or in treating concrete devices 
abstractly. It has been part of the role of dynamics to point this out.  
 
Internally related to this hostility to modelling mind as a series of discrete state 
transitions is an emphasis on the importance of time. There are various ways in which 
one might understand the significance of temporality to dynamics (Clark, 1998b), but 
on one reading the emphasis on time is just the flipside of the emphasis on continuity. 
Understanding a process in continuous real time, rather than the “arbitrary ‘step’ time” 
(Port & van Gelder, p.2) of discrete machines, allows one to consider it in the entirety 
of its movement, rather than as a series of fragmented moments presented in isolation 
from each other. In this way, for dynamics as for Hegel, it is the transition “which is the 
essential point” (Hanna, 1996, p.228). 
 
Emergence 
 
A second concept linked with dynamical accounts is that of ‘emergence’. The term 
‘emergence’ – used to characterize phenomena not too dissimilar to those which 
interest modern cognitive scientists - has an independent history which can be traced 
back at least to the eighteenth century (Corning, 2002). It is also perhaps as central to 
enactivism - which we will look at in the next chapter - as it is to dynamics. 
Nevertheless we are justified to some degree in discussing it here as part of a dynamics 
perspective, for the two are held to be intimately related on many accounts (e.g. Varela 
et al, 1991; Thelen & Smith 1994;  Kelso, 1995; Clark, 1997; Walmsley, 2003).  
 
Varela et al. note that “there is no unified formal theory of emergent properties” (1991, 
p.88) and to this we might add that even if we jettison requirements for formalism the 
term ‘emergence’ seems to be deployed in multifarious ways. Of course we expect 
there to be diversity both in the types of properties/behaviours susceptible to 
explanation in terms of the concept of emergence – e.g. ‘mind’ (Minsky, 1986), 
behaviour warranting the application of intentional terms (Dennett, 2003), symbolic 
computation (Varela et al., 1991; van Gelder 1996) – and in the types of dynamic 
substrate thought capable of supporting emergence – e.g. finger movements (Kelso, 
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1995), limb movements, (Thelen and Smith, 1996), neurons (Varela et al., 1991), 
people (Minsky, 1986) and cellular automata (Dennett, 2003). It is in its breadth of 
application that the usefulness of the concept resides. However some differences of 
application also imply a difference in concept. 
 
In this connection we might note that Brooks is prepared to use the term ‘emergence’ to 
explain the apparent intelligence of both traditional and ‘behaviour based’ AI systems. 
In each case “intelligence emerges from the interaction of the components of the 
system” (Brooks, 1991b, p.418). However Brooks goes on to make the point that the 
way it emerges in both cases is “quite different” (ibid. p.419). The nature of this 
difference is examined by Clark (1997, 2001) who argues that a crucial distinction must 
be made between ‘componential explanation’ and ‘emergent explanation’. In the former 
“we explain the capacities of the overall system by averting to the capacities and roles 
of its components, and the way they interrelate” (Clark, 1997, p.104). This mode of 
explanation is appropriate for explaining “the workings of a car, a television set, or a 
washing machine” (ibid) as well as the workings of a classical modular AI program. 
Truly emergent explanations, however, seem to involve more than this on most 
accounts. 
 
In pursuance of a correct account of genuine emergence Clark notes that definitions of 
emergent phenomena in terms of processes which are “unexpected’ or “unpredictable”, 
are unsatisfactory, for such concepts, are subjective – “what is unexpected to one 
person may be just what someone else predicts” (Clark, 1997, p.109). Likewise, says 
Clark, definitions in terms of “controlled” and “uncontrolled” variables (Steels, 1994) 
are also problematic. On such an analysis emergent properties are those which are not 
controlled by any simple input parameters to the system (“controlled variables”) and 
which can thus be viewed as “uncontrolled variables”. The problem here, according to 
Clark, is that many classic examples of emergent phenomena (such as Kelso’s 
convection rolls in boiling oil, see below) could be tracked to changes in simple, 
isolatable input parameters (in this case, variations in temperature.) Clark thus plumps 
for an alternative definition – “a phenomenon is emergent if it is best understood by 
attention to the changing values of a collective variable” (Clark, 1997, p.112). 
However, he admits that even this characterization is “weakly observer dependent” 
(ibid. p.113). 
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Contra Clark, Walsmsley (2003) has suggested that reference to unpredictability needs 
to be kept, but must be squared with the fact that the covering laws of dynamic systems 
theory imply the predictability of the phenomena they describe.  He thus makes a bold 
attempt at resolution of this antinomy: 
 
There could conceivably be cases, however, where the dynamical covering law which 
features in dynamical explanation is itself emergent in the sense that it cannot be 
derived from the laws of physics.  (Walmsley, 2003, p.12) 
 
In such cases, he says, it would be “the law itself which emerged” (ibid).  This is an 
interesting position but there is surely something obscure in the idea of an emergent 
law. Moreover, even if it is a workable idea it does not seem to mesh well with our 
usual conception of what emergence should be about – i.e. the phenomenon itself. 
 
Emergence, then, is difficult to pin down. It is in this respect that the highlighting of a 
parallel with dialectical theory might prove useful. In dynamical accounts emergence is 
often associated with the idea of “self-organising systems” (Kelso, 1995; Thelen & 
Smith, 1996). Such a system is: 
 
..one in which some kind of higher level pattern emerges from the interaction of 
multiple simple components without the benefit of a leader. (Clark, 1997, p.73) 
 
We will bypass for the time being the question of whether ‘self-organization’ and 
‘emergence’ are synonyms, and concentrate instead on the idea that the components are 
“multiple” and “simple”. It is here, we might suggest, that a comparison with dialectics 
first suggests itself, for what is characterized as ‘emergence’ in this instance seems 
remarkably similar to what we have earlier seen described as “the transformation of 
quantity into quality” (Engels, 1883, p.26). In both cases that which emerges does so on 
the basis of changes in a quantitatively specifiable substrate but exhibits qualitative 
properties which are not fully describable merely by reference to these changes. In 
support of such a parallel we might perhaps note that Kelso and Hegel favour similar 
illustrations of their respective principles: 
 
The temperature of water is, in the first place, a point of no consequence in respect of 
its liquidity: still, with the increase or diminution of the temperature of the liquid water, 
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there comes a point where this state of cohesion suffers a qualitative change and the 
water is converted into steam or ice.     (Hegel, 1817a. p.158/9) 
 
 
Take a little cooking oil, put it in a pan, and heat it from below. If the temperature 
difference between the top and bottom of the oil layer is small there will be no large-
scale motion of the liquid. Notice the liquid contains very many molecules, and the heat 
is dissipated among them as a random micromotion…..This is an open system, 
activated by the application of a temperature gradient that drives the motion. As this 
driving influence increases an instability occurs. The liquid begins to move as a 
coordinated whole, no longer randomly but in an orderly rolling motion.    (Kelso, 
1995, p.6/7) 
 
Provisionally, then, we might suggest that emergence can be usefully understood 
dialectically as qualitative change which arises on the basis of changes to what we have 
called a ‘quantitatively specifiable’ substrate. In the above examples the latter can be 
identified with the relatively homogeneous mass of molecules composing the water or 
cooking oil.  
 
It will be remembered, however, that we have already made a link between dialectics 
and emergence, for we saw in chapter 3 how Levins & Lewontin had developed their 
own account of emergence based on consideration of dialectical principles. In drawing 
attention to this account we highlight a potential problem, for, as we saw, Levins & 
Lewontin’s version of emergence was precisely one which did not posit the 
homogeneity of component parts (L&L, 1985, p.272). Likewise we might also note that 
in more recent dynamical accounts homogeneity is not always thought to be a requisite. 
Thelen and Smith (1996), for instance, argue that “the central tenet of dynamic systems 
is that order, discontinuities and new forms emerge precisely from the complex 
interactions of many heterogeneous forces” (p.37, my emphasis). We might thus 
question whether our analysis of emergence in terms of the “transformation of quantity 
into quality” is always an appropriate one. If quantity is linked to homogeneity then the 
absence of the latter might suggest the absence of the former. 
 
In the case of Lewontin we suggested that his preference for characterizing constituent 
parts as heterogeneous failed to account for the relativity of the notions of 
‘homogeneity’ and ‘heterogeneity’. However, whilst there is some (dialectical) truth in 
this it does not provide us with a satisfying solution to our current problem, for we were 
happy to use a one-sided notion of ‘homogeneity’ when we thought it would serve our 
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purpose of identifying emergence with the shift from quantity to quality. A better 
solution is perhaps derived from the consideration that the shift from quantity to quality 
need not only be predicated on the homogeneity of constituent parts. In order to arrive 
at something that looks like the transformation of quantity into quality, we can just as 
easily focus on the quantitative changes in a heterogeneous substrate – in which case 
‘homogeneity’ would still reside in the discrete regularity of changes in control 
parameters. Thus we might say that whilst the applicability of the notion of the   
‘transformation of quantity into quality’ is most clearly illustrated in instances where 
both conditions apply – where the components are homogeneous enough to be 
susceptible to quantification and those components are subject to quantitative change 
(as in Hegel and Kelso’s examples above) – this is not a necessity. 
 
Viewing emergence as qualitative change which occurs on the basis of quantitative 
change perhaps gives us an additional means of characterizing what has proved to be a 
definitionally elusive (Clark, 1997, p.106) phenomenon. Whilst we are not proposing 
that it will be applicable in all circumstances it at least avoids some of the problems 
outlined in Clark and Walmsley’s accounts above. It is not particularly reliant on 
subjective psychological evaluation, does not entail the exclusion of standard examples 
of emergence and does not involve the reclassification of the type of phenomena which 
can be said to be emergent. 
 
Reciprocal causation 
 
Consideration of the nature of emergent phenomena leads us once more to the concept 
of ‘reciprocal’ or ‘circular’ causation. We have seen how this concept has been central 
to dialectical thought since its first articulation in Hegel’s Logic (1817a), reappearing in 
the works of Marx, Engels, Merleau-Ponty and Lewontin. In the literature on dynamics 
it figures prominently in two areas. In discussions of emergence (e.g. Kelso, 1995, 
Clark, 1997) it is used to describe the bidirectional influence that substrate and 
emergent have on each other, whilst on some other accounts (e.g. van Gelder, 1995, 
1996) it used to characterize the interaction of coupled systems, both of which are 
specifiable at the same level of description. 
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As regards the former, Kelso refers to the reciprocal relation which holds between 
collective variables (or ‘order parameters’) – those variables which track development 
in higher level emergent processes – and changes in the substrate. In the case of boiling 
oil: 
 
..the order parameter is created by the cooperation of the individual parts of the system, 
here the fluid molecules. Conversely it governs or constrains the behaviour of the 
individual parts. This is a strange kind of circular causality (which is the chicken and 
which is the egg?) but we will see that it is typical of all self-organizing systems.  
(Kelso, 1995, p.9) 
 
Here we find reference to a number of themes that we have already encountered. In the 
notion that the order parameter “governs or constrains the behaviour of the individual 
parts” – sometimes referred to as ‘downward causation’ (Campbell, 1974) – we find an 
active equivalent of Lewontin’s holistic principle that “the properties [of the parts] 
come into existence in the interaction that makes the whole” (Lewontin, 1985, p.273). 
Likewise in the question concerning temporal priority at origination (“which is the 
chicken and which is the egg”) we find a return to a dialectical issue already explored 
in relation to Arthur (1970) and Merleau-Ponty (1945). 
 
We might also note how, like Engels (1883) and Merleau-Ponty (1947), contemporary 
commentators on dynamics have been keen to differentiate cases of genuine circularity, 
as above, from mere ‘mechanical’ bi-directional cause and effect. Clark for instance 
contrasts reciprocal causal explanation with “catch and toss explanation” (Clark, 1997, 
p.105). The latter, whilst paying lip service to the bi-directional nature of causal 
influence, can still be broken down into discrete episodes of unidirectional causation. 
Thus, for example, in the case of a relationship between an agent and an environment, a 
clear separation is posited between processes that input to the brain and processes that 
output to the world: 
 
The world tosses inputs to the brain, which catches them and tosses actions back. The 
actions may alter or simplify subsequent computations, by causing the world to toss 
back more easily usable inputs and so on. (Clark, 1997, p.106) 
 
Both Clark and Kelso argue that this – feedback oriented - approach is inadequate for 
many types of real world interaction, and their grounds for saying so hinge on 
recognition of a further shift from quantity to quality. When interactions between 
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systems (or processes) become too numerous or too complex (in a quantitatively 
specifiable way) the utility of linear causal explanation simply breaks down (Kelso, 
1995, p.9). 
 
Clark’s analysis of the way in which accounts of cognition rooted in continuous 
reciprocal causation (which he abbreviates to CRC) cause “problems” for “standard 
cognitive scientific models of analysis and understanding” (Clark, 1998b, p.6) is also 
noteworthy for its distinct similarity to dialectical analyses. It will be remembered that 
Hegel’s critique of the Understanding was that, in contrast to a holistic, reciprocal, 
process-oriented approach, it stuck to the “fixity of characters and their distinctness 
from one another” (Hegel, 1817a, p.113). This critique reappeared in Engels’ own 
attack on the ‘metaphysical’ method of non-dialectical science, which, he argued, 
observed things “in isolation, apart from their connection with the vast whole…as 
constants not as essentially variables” (Engels, 1887, p.34). It was also evident in 
Levins and Lewontin’s description of “the alienated world” of “Cartesian 
reductionism” in which “parts are separate from wholes and reified as things in 
themselves, causes separate from effects, subjects from objects” (L&L, 1985, p.270). 
Likewise Clark notes that systems which are considered from a CRC perspective “are 
unusually resistant to the kind of divide and conquer approach taken by computational 
cognitive science” (Clark, 1998b, p.6) because the latter “proceeds by isolating a 
number of distinct sub-mechanisms, assigning them specific roles and plotting the 
chains of causal influence that flow between them” (ibid). Clark’s analysis of CRC here 
was made with one particular dynamical account in mind, that of van Gelder (van 
Gelder & Port, 1995; van Gelder, 1995, 1996), and it is to this that we now turn.  
 
 
van Gelder 
 
Van Gelder describes the following problem faced by eighteenth century industrialists 
(van Gelder, 1996, pp. 422-424). A steam powered flywheel is used to drive machinery 
such as a weaving loom. It is important that the speed of the flywheel remains relatively 
constant. However changes in steam pressure or workload can affect the speed of the 
flywheel. To keep this speed constant the amount of steam entering the pistons can be 
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controlled by a throttle valve. The problem is how to ensure that appropriate 
adjustments are made to the throttle valve as and when necessary. In theory this task 
could be carried out by a human mechanic but that would be an expensive and 
inefficient solution. 
 
Two other solutions are conceivable says van Gelder The first is to design a device 
which measures the speed of the flywheel, compares it with the desired speed and, if 
necessary adjusts the throttle valve accordingly. This, says van Gelder, is the 
“computational” solution (ibid. p.426). It involves the utilisation of representations (e.g. 
the speed of the flywheel) and the making of calculations (e.g. comparing the actual 
speed of the flywheel with the desired speed) These operations form discrete subtasks – 
they can be conceptualized in separation from each other and may even be devolved to 
different components of the device. Moreover the subtasks would be carried out in a 
sequence, a sequence which would repeat itself in a ‘cyclical’ fashion. 
 
A solution such as this would not have been possible in the eighteenth century, and 
more importantly, says van Gelder, would not have been as “direct and elegant” (ibid. 
p.424) as the solution eventually arrived at. This solution – the ‘Watt Governor’ - can 
be described as follows: 
 
A vertical spindle is attached to the flywheel. The spindle has two arms on hinges and 
on the end of each arm is a metal ball. As the flywheel spins the spindle also rotates, 
driving the arms outwards and upwards by centrifugal force; the faster the flywheel 
spins the higher the arms are raised. This arm motion is linked directly the to the 
throttle valve, affecting the extent to which it opens or closes. Thus if the speed of the 
flywheel increases, the arms will raise and close the throttle valve a corresponding 
amount, restricting the flow of steam and bringing the speed back down again. 
Likewise if the speed of the flywheel decreases below a certain point the arms will 
come down, thereby opening the valve, increasing the flow of steam and bringing the 
speed up to the desired point again. 
  
This latter approach to the governing problem is a ‘dynamic’ approach and it stands 
counterposed to the stepwise, algorithmic computational approach. There is no 
compartmentalization of discrete subtasks carried out in a linear and cyclical fashion. 
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Nor are there any representations and so its “processing cannot be a matter of the rule-
governed manipulation of symbolic representations” (ibid. p.427). Instead there is a 
mutual dependency between the activity of the arms and that of the throttle valve which 
is ongoing and fluid – each is “simultaneously determining the shape of each other’s 
changes” (ibid). 
 
At this point we might pause to note that van Gelder’s account is already interesting to 
us, if only because it takes as its central metaphor one of the most significant artifacts 
from the industrial revolution. In this respect it would perhaps not be out of place in 
Engels’ Dialectics of Nature – and indeed would outshine many of the examples found 
there in its detail and clarity. Engels does in fact make reference in this work to the 
steam engine as “the instrument which more than any other was to revolutionise social 
conditions throughout the world” (Engels, 1883, p.294) and alludes to significant 
improvements made by Watt (ibid. p.81). There is also, as we have seen, some 
suggestion of embodied cognitive developmental interplay between artifact and 
emerging human powers: 
 
The hand alone would never have achieved the steam engine if the brain of man had 
not attained a correlative development with it, and parallel to it, and partly owing to it. 
(ibid. p.18) 
 
Engels, however, fails too see any instantiation of his own ‘dialectical laws’ in the 
operation of the steam engine or any of its components. It is difficult to say whether this 
might indicate a failure of imagination or whether he took the “mechanical motion” of 
such artifacts to be at odds with the dialectical principles which were to be reserved for 
human and natural processes only. The latter position would seem difficult to sustain 
given that he sought to uncover dialectical laws, such as the ‘negation of the negation’, 
in mathematical operations (Engels, 1887, p.188). There is perhaps the additional 
possibility that as the most prominent symbol, and practical source, of factory 
mechanization (Marx, 1867, pp.496-499) he would have thought it perverse to link the 
steam engine with dialectics.  
 
Returning to van Gelder, however, it is, not merely the use of a significant industrial 
artifact that makes his account of interest to us, it is the fact that he believes that 
“people bear deeper similarities” (van Gelder, 1996, p.439) to this artifact than to its 
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computational equivalent. We have already touched on some of his reasons for thinking 
so in earlier sections. For example the Watt Governor is continuous rather than discrete: 
“its entire operation is smooth and continuous, there is no possibility of dividing its 
changes over time into distinct manipulations” (ibid. p.438).  It is also centrally 
incorporates reciprocal causal relations. We should notice here, however, that unlike 
Kelso’s convection rolls example, reciprocal causation is not characterized in terms of 
‘downward causation’. Rather it is a more democratic “coupling” that obtains between 
the two main components of the system. There is a dependency between “coupled 
variables” which “simultaneously, interdependently co-evolve” (ibid. p.437) - and 
which van Gelder thinks can be applied in a variety of contexts to human systems. Of 
particular interest is how it is held to apply to agent-environment interaction. Cognitive 
processes are not considered as one component of the interchange, but rather are 
implicated in the overall process: 
 
In this vision, the cognitive system is not just the encapsulated brain, since the nervous 
system, body and environment are all constantly changing and simultaneously 
influencing each other, the true cognitive system is a single unified system embracing 
all three. (van Gelder, 1995, p.185)  
 
We can see how this description recalls the Marxian account of human development 
arising from the reciprocal interaction between productive agent and environment. The 
co evolution of coupled variables maps onto the co evolution of agent and environment 
which is at the root of the Marxian account of man’s developing nature. The notion of a 
unity between agent and environment mediated by physical activity recalls both the 
process of externalization we outlined in Hegel and Marx’s account, as well as the 
supersession of alienated labour as presented in On James Mill. In this respect, as we 
shall see in the next chapter, it shares some common ground with enactivist accounts, 
which have consciously incorporated dynamicist elements (Thompson, 2007, pp.38-
43). There is however a way of interpreting the notion of an ‘extended cognitive 
system’ too literally – a topic we will return to in chapter 7.  
 
Van Gelder’s analysis also brings with it other elements which mirror to some extent 
features of Hegelian/Marxian perspectives. That he is concerned with the 
agent/environment interaction considered as a totality means that his account, like 
dialectical accounts – and for essentially the same reasons – can be considered 
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‘holistic’. This holism manifests itself most clearly in the notion of “total state” (van 
Gelder & Port, 1995, pp.14-15) explanations. As Clark summarises it:  “the dynamicist 
chooses to focus on changes in total state over time” (Clark, 1998b, p.11). Thus for the 
dynamicist, as for Hegel, “the true is the whole” (Hegel, 1807, p.11) and the 
methodology can thus likewise be articulated as an attempt “to trace out the internal 
connection that makes a continuous whole of … movement and development” (Engels, 
1887, p.37).  
 
As with Hegel too, an emphasis on holism, continuity and reciprocity, gives rise to a 
scepticism concerning the usefulness of a static symbolic medium. As we saw in 
chapter 1, one of Hegel’s objections to “logical mechanization” (Hanna, 1996, p.270) 
was that its representational elements were “fixed in isolation” (ibid) and so inadequate 
to the task of capturing the world in its fluidity and interrelatedness. A similar position 
is adopted by van Gelder, for whom the continuous nature of reciprocal coupling 
renders inappropriate cognitive architectures founded on the manipulation of “tokens 
interpretable as symbolic representations” (van Gelder, 1996, p.437). As Eliasmith 
remarks, “‘coupling’ thus replaces the idea of ‘representation passing’ for dynamicists” 
(Eliasmith, 1996, p.445). 
 
We should also note that in talking of “coupled variables” (van Gelder, 1996, p.437) 
van Gelder is alluding more specifically to the use of differential equations as a tool in 
the dynamicist armoury for understanding cognitive systems. In this respect his position 
parallels Levins & Lewontin’s suggestion that an account which “breaks down the 
alienation between the object-organism and the subject-environment must be written as 
a pair of coupled differential equations in which there is co-evolution of the organism-
environment pair” (L&L, 1985, p.105, author’s emphasis). We will not make too much 
here of the fact that L&L’s account appears to predate that of van Gelder and other 
dynamicists in cognitive science (e.g. Thelen & Smith, 1994; Kelso, 1995), for a case 
could be made that L&L, unlike their successors, are not directly addressing the topic 
of ‘cognition’. Nor are we implying that L&L have had any significant influence on 
these dynamicists (despite the odd references in relation to other topics, e.g. Thelen & 
Smith, 1994, p.145) as they have had on some enactivists (see next chapter.) 
Nevertheless, that L&L arrive separately at the same conclusion as the result of an 
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explicitly dialectical analysis does drive home the appropriateness of the comparison 
between dynamics and dialectics.  
 
As for L&L’s suggestion that the reciprocity expressed through coupled differential 
equations is one that tracks the break down of alienation between subject and object, 
this perhaps raises a question concerning the senses in which we might also take 
dynamics to be promoting an ‘unalienated’ view. We have the fact that, as with L&L’s 
account, it presents agent/environment interaction as a unity, and so as ‘unalienated’ in 
L&L’s objective, holistic sense whereby lack of separation equates with lack of 
alienation (L&L, 1985, p.270). However, insofar as there is a normative dimension of 
alienation, the question perhaps remains of whether the various parallels between 
Marxian and dynamic conceptions of the agent have radical implications in a wider 
sense. There is perhaps no necessary route from the ‘is’ of cognitive models to the 
‘ought’ of social change, but a case can at least be made that the non-algorithmic agent-
environment interactions described by dynamicism are not only incompatible with a 
production-line conception of cognition but with the production-line itself. We have 
noted how the Watt Governor is not pre-programmed in any meaningful sense, and how 
its operations are “smooth and continuous” (van Gelder, 1996, p.438). As regards the 
latter, this smoothness is of course entirely mechanical in nature, but as a metaphor 
(Eliasmith, 1996, pp.447-449) for the unfolding of intelligent human behaviour it is 
intended to refer to a non-mechanical human reality.  
 
This reality, we might argue, includes the fact that the “self-creation” (Marx, 1844a, 
p.101) of the embodied human subject is a fluid process, not one composed of discrete 
pre-programmed steps. It is thus a reality at odds with the imposed and discrete 
processes of the production line as dictated by the ‘detailed division of labour’, just as 
the facts of embodiment are at odds with the mental/manual division of labour. Whilst 
the restricted rhythms of the production line might be describable in dynamical terms, 
in the same way that the repetitive swings of a pendulum can be, we might say that the 
spirit of van Gelder’s account of agent activity, as non-algorithmic and fluid, is more in 
accord with Marx’s conception of man’s potential as a freely developing being (Marx 
& Engels, 1848, p.26). Hence, although there is no deductive necessity in the step from 
dynamic accounts of cognition to the proposition that man is most himself when 
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unfettered by the division of labour, it is at least plausible to suggest that accounts such 
as van Gelder’s are more congenial to this conception of things. 
 
Hierarchy, Planning and Self-Organization – A Political Interlude 
 
As an addendum to the above discussion of the socio-political implications of 
dynamical theory, we might also say a little to unify a number of related themes that we 
have alluded to in various places on the subjects of planning and emergence. 
 
In our introduction we said that, according to our version of Marxian theory, a society 
which facilitated the free development of its members must be an “emergent non-
hierarchical phenomenon”. We can perhaps see how such a conception of social 
possibilities might find sustenance in accounts of self-organized systems where global 
properties emerge “without the benefit of a leader” (Clark, 1997, p.73). In this respect, 
the type of social order envisioned is less like an orchestra under the control of a 
conductor and more like “playing improvised jazz in a small combo” (as Clark 
describes continuous reciprocal causation, 1998b, p.2).  
 
However, if such a social order is a genuine possibility then, we would argue, certain 
facts must follow about the agent. We have already touched on this point in various 
guises at different junctures in this thesis. For example, in chapter 3 we expressed 
disagreement with Engels’ emphasis on the human agent as a ‘planner’ (Engels, 1883, 
p.18), although we noted as significant his apparent derivation from this of the 
appropriateness of a planned economy. Similarly, in chapter 4 we saw how Boden had 
drawn attention to GOFAI sounding passages in Capital where Marx had differentiated 
the human agent from other organisms on the basis of his planning capabilities (Boden, 
2006, p.1029). There we argued that, although this did represent one strand of Marx’s 
thought, the Marx we were interested in was a ‘praxis’ oriented Marx. On this 
interpretation human beings are not first and foremost ‘planners’ at a cognitive level. 
Planning does not explain human intelligence but is one activity of many which arises 
out of the more fundamental human capacity for social praxis. 
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Underlying the positions taken in these two instances is the idea that, an emergent non-
hierarchical social order is only a real possibility if it can be shown to be so for the 
individual agent. In particular it must be demonstrated that the cognitive architecture of 
the agent is not such as to preclude intelligent spontaneous activity from the outset. It is 
our contention that certain threads in current cognitive science go some way towards 
fostering such an outlook. For all of our criticism of Damasio’s ‘somatic marker’ 
hypothesis (Damasio, 1994, 2000, 2003), for instance, this analysis does at least 
consider non-rational grounds for intelligent action. Likewise the move away from an 
algorithmic conception of cognition in dynamical theory (van Gelder – see above), 
from an emphasis on planning based architecture in Brooks’ account of his artificial 
‘creatures’ (Brooks, 1991b), and from detached planning as a necessary precursor to 
effective action in Kirsh & Maglio’s account of ‘epistemic action’ (see chapter 8) are 
all, in different ways, friendly to this perspective. 
 
In certain respects, then, the retreat from alienation also incorporates a ‘retreat from 
planning’, and on our interpretation of Marx it is necessary that it does so. 
 
Embodiment and Materialism 
 
In this chapter we have so far looked at various ways in which recent cognitive science 
has adopted ideas and strategies consonant with a Marxian perspective and with our 
overall theme of a ‘retreat from alienation’. In doing so we noted one instance where 
cognitive science offered an improvement on Marxian theory - van Gelder’s clear and 
detailed account of the operations of the Watt Governor provided an example of a 
materialist dialectics which was superior to many of the examples found in Engels’ 
work.  
 
Another instance of cognitive science improving on Marx, or at least offering 
supplementary material for Marxists to consider, can be found in the hypothesis that 
concepts are often grounded in the facts of human embodiment. A clear expression of 
this position can be found in Lakoff and Johnson (1999) where it is argued that “the 
very structure of reason itself comes from the details of our embodiment…” (ibid. p.4) 
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According to this version of embodiment theory it is not just that our conceptual 
apparatus need to be physically instantiated somehow or other but that 
 
…the very properties of concepts are created as a result of the way that the brain and 
body are structured.  (Lakoff & Johnson, 1999, p.37) 
 
Such a position, we might say is not just consistent with Marxian theory, it also 
supplements it with an insight unanticipated by Marx or later Marxian theorists. We 
saw in chapter 2 how Marx, in a general way, related the genesis of ideas to our active 
material being – “the phantoms formed in the human brain are also, necessarily 
sublimates of their [i.e. human beings’] material life process” (Marx & Engels, 1970b, 
p.47). Nevertheless, although Marx recognized that man is an “embodied, living, real, 
sentient objective being” (Marx, 1844a, p.104) he failed to make any explicit 
connection between the generation of ideas and the embodied nature of individual 
human beings. Instead he preferred to source our conceptual framework in the wider 
arena of material social production (Marx & Engels, 1970b, p.42).  
 
As we noted in chapter 3, this approach was then taken up and developed in a particular 
direction by Sohn-Rethel (1978). Sohn-Rethel wished to establish, amongst other 
things, that our abstract concepts were neither passively empirical nor a priori 
transcendental in origin. Instead they must be “derivates from material being” (Sohn-
Rethel, 1978, p.201). On Sohn-Rethel’s account this material being was located in the 
practical act of commodity exchange (we will return to this topic in our next section.) 
 
What Lakoff and Johnson’s argument shows us, we might suggest, is that, pace Marx 
and Sohn-Rethel, ‘material being’ is not only to be located in our productive or 
economic activities, but also in the fact of our individual embodied existences. The 
embodiment thesis can thus be seen as an additional route out of the impasse between 
empiricism and transcendental idealism. As Lakoff and Johnson themselves put it: 
 
Reason is not, in any way, a transcendent feature of the universe or of disembodied 
mind. Instead it is shaped crucially by the peculiarities of our human bodies. (Lakoff & 
Johnson, 1999, p.4) 
 
At the same time, we might note that it is the separation of Lakoff and Johnson’s 
account from other recent cognitive scientific perspectives which prevents it from 
 194 
developing into a more comprehensive materialist outlook. Were their hypothesis to be 
hybridized, for instance, with accounts which extend the agent’s material being into the 
environment (van Gelder & Port, 1995; Clark & Chalmers, 1998) the result might be 
something approaching Marxian materialism, with ideas supervening on a wider 
agent/environment ‘body’.  
 
Not Just Online 
 
Lastly in this chapter we come not to an example of recent cognitive science mirroring 
Hegelian-Marxian theory – or providing it with supplementary insights – but of a 
possible Marxian critique of one assumption frequently made by current cognitive 
science. 
 
Modern (philosophy of) cognitive science will often make reference to a distinction 
between ‘online’ and ‘offline’ cognition (e.g. Clark & Grush, 1999; Wilson, 2002; 
Wheeler, 2005). Online cognition (or intelligence) is felt to have something to do with 
immediate interaction with world, such as to produce “a suite of fluid and flexible real-
time adaptive responses to incoming sensory stimuli” (Wheeler, 2005, p.12). Offline 
cognition, by contrast, is more like Hegel’s “pure thought” (Hegel, 1807, p.122) or 
Marx’s “pure theory” (Marx & Engels, 1970b, p.52), divorced from a particular 
material base. It takes place in separation from direct engagement with the world and 
may include activities like “planning, remembering, and day dreaming, in contexts not 
directly relevant to the content of plans, memories or day-dreams” (Wilson, 2002, 
p.626).  It is linked in different accounts to abstract thought (ibid. p.625), “internal 
representations” (Clark & Grush, 1999, p. 9) and reflection (ibid. p.13), and it is 
sometimes claimed that it can be identified by the fact that its objects are “distant in 
time and space” (Wilson, 2002, p.635). 
 
Wheeler notes that the offline-online distinction might pose some difficulties insofar 
“there will be all sorts of hard-to-settle intermediate cases” (Wheeler, 2005, p.12), but 
he does not think that this detracts from the firmness of the distinction in the general 
case. However, it seems possible that Wheeler might be wrong here and that there 
could be something fundamentally problematic about this dichotomy. Wilson’s 
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suggestion, for example, that offline cognition might include planning, daydreaming 
and remembering “in contexts that are not directly relevant” (Wilson, 2002, p.626) to 
those plans, daydreams etc. seems to beg the question concerning what notion of 
‘relevance’ is being used here. The world that an individual inhabits, we might argue, is 
charged with significance such that any feature of it might bear directly on his/her 
plans, daydreams and memories in countless ways. If I am daydreaming about Paris it 
is not necessary that I be in Paris for my environment to bear a significant relation to 
my daydream. Likewise it is not clear in what sense an object’s being “distant in time 
and space” (Wilson, 2002, p.635) should count as a reliable indicator that the subject is 
indulging in offline cognition. The very act of asking “how far away does an event have 
to be, or how long ago does an event have to have occurred, for us to regard it as an 
object of off-line reasoning” draws our attention to a degree of arbitrariness about the 
question and to the problematic nature of ‘pure presence’ in the first place. 
 
We might suggest then that it seems possible that the offline/online distinction is 
another example of a case where something has been divided “into two mutually 
exclusive and jointly all-encompassing categories [and] it turns out on further 
examination that these opposites interpenetrate.” (Levins & Lewontin, 1985, p.284). To 
pursue such an analysis would involve arguing that even clear cut examples of offline 
cognition could be viewed as online in some respect or according to some description, 
and vice versa. It would also perhaps necessitate an examination of related dichotomies 
implicit in the online offline dichotomy (e.g. ‘object as perceived’ versus ‘object as 
represented’.) For space reasons we will not pursue such an analysis here. Nevertheless 
we might bear in mind this general idea of a fundamental problem with the 
dichotomous nature of the online/offline distinction if we now turn to a related 
proposition that has some currency in modern cognitive science, and which appears to 
run counter to its unifying trajectory. This is the notion that ‘proper’ cognition is 
offline, and thus that embodied, embedded etc. accounts of cognition – which in 
general are thought to line up with ‘online cognition’ – have a limited sphere of 
applicability. We find such a conception of things particularly clearly expressed in 
Clark & Grush (1999) where it is suggested that “truly cognitive phenomena are those 
that involve off-line reasoning” (ibid. p.12).  
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We should note that accounts like Clark & Grush’s are concerned with establishing an 
essential relatedness of sorts between the online and the offline insofar as they assert 
that the latter might have its historical origins in the former. Thus, for instance, Wilson 
(2002) provides many instances of cases which she thinks illustrate the principle that 
“offline cognition is body based” (p.632). These include Clark and Grush’s own 
argument that offline cognition is derived from the emulation of online mechanisms, as 
well as examples where working memory is said to make “off-line use of sensorimotor 
resources” (p.633, in reference to Baddeley, 1986), or where mental concepts can be 
shown to be rooted “in sensory and motoric knowledge” (p.634), as in Lakoff and 
Johnson’s work (Lakoff 1988; Lakoff & Johnson, 1999).  
 
However, because Wilson’s account, and those she cites, have no appetite for 
challenging the online/offline dichotomy itself, they also show no predilection for 
questioning the idea that there are distinctive modes of cognition matched to either side 
of the divide or that one such mode might be more genuinely cognitive than the other. 
 
It is here that we might suggest Sohn Rethel’s (1978) ideas could have something to 
offer, if only in its suggestion of a possibility not hitherto discussed in cognitive 
science. It will be remembered how Sohn-Rethel sought to derive our propensity for 
conceptual abstraction from the ‘material being’ of commodity exchange. Insofar as his 
argument is only that “commodity exchange is an original source of abstraction” (Sohn-
Rethel, 1978, p.28) it could be interpreted as meaning something not too dissimilar to 
Clark & Grush, or Lakoff & Johnson’s, position i.e. that offline abilities have their 
origin in online activity. However, although these parallels are warranted, as we have 
seen in chapter 3, Sohn-Rethel goes a little further than this. With the concept of “real 
abstraction” (ibid. p.19) he does not just want to argue that our capacities for 
abstraction are derived from practical activity, but that the practical activity is itself an 
example of abstraction. He is explicitly opposed to the idea that “abstraction is the 
inherent activity and the exclusive privilege of thought” (ibid. p.18) and suggests 
instead that, in commodity exchange, “the action alone is abstract” (ibid. p.28). 
 
It is true that Sohn-Rethel’s account is more suggestive than clear in its implications. 
Moreover we would at least need to go into greater detail about the mechanics of 
exchange and the origins of exchange value before we could hope to get a better idea of 
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what ‘abstract action’ might consist in. Nevertheless, we might say that in the very act 
of positing abstraction as a feature of activity Sohn-Rethel has thrown the cat amongst 
the pigeons. Abstraction, as a species of cognition, is typically considered to be located 
firmly within the ‘offline’ camp; or if, as Wheeler (2005) seems to suggest, the 
online/offline dichotomy is more like a continuum, then it would be found at the 
extreme limit of the offline end. If abstraction can be convincingly shown to be a 
species of action also, this would perhaps suggest the need to reconsider that scheme of 
things – of a need to reconsider traditionalist assumptions about the cognitive division 
of labour which still persist in some areas of contemporary cognitive science. 
 
Conclusion 
 
In this chapter our concern has been with the retreat from alienation in cognitive 
science. We have said that the introduction of embodied, embedded etc. conceptions of 
the agent constitutes an attempt to ‘unify’ the agent in a sense comparable with Marx’s 
vision of an unalienated agent – “the whole man” (Marx, 1844a, p.91). This striving for 
unification utilizes an anti-dichotomous stratagem and in some cases (e.g. dynamics) 
incorporates a more comprehensive dialectical analysis. In certain instances, such as 
Noë’s praxis-like conception of enactive perception, there is also evidence of Marxian 
influence (in this case, via Merleau-Ponty). 
 
In addition to outlining a retreat from alienation we have looked at some related issues. 
We have suggested that, on our interpretation of Marx, the retreat from alienation must 
be – and is – also a retreat from planning; that Lakoff & Johnson’s version of 
embodiment presents supplementary insights for a Marxian theory of materialism; and 
that Sohn-Rethel’s notion of ‘real abstraction’ perhaps points to a way out of a residual 
cognitivism founded on the idea of the inviolability of the online/offline dichotomy. 
 
In our remaining three chapters we will look in more detail at particular areas in 
cognitive science – enactivism in chapter 6, the extended mind in chapter 7 and 
epistemic vs pragmatic action in chapter 8. In each case we find further evidence of our 
hypothesized retreat, as well as elements that are open to criticism from the standpoint 
of Hegelian-Marxian theory. 
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Chapter 6 – Enactivism and The Embodied Mind 
 
Introduction 
 
We now turn to an examination of aspects of ‘enactivist’ perspectives, considered in 
relation to our theme of the ‘retreat from alienation’. This chapter is divided into two 
halves. In the first half we will consider ‘enactivism and autopoiesis’ in a general way. 
In the second we will concentrate on Varela, Thompson & Rosch’s 1991 book - The 
Embodied Mind. 
 
Enactivism & Autopoiesis 
 
As suggested in chapter 5, and as many have noted (Di Paolo et al, 2010; Torrance & 
Froese, 2011), the term ‘enactivism’ is open to a number of different interpretations. 
Previously we have used it to characterize Noë’s work. In this chapter we use it to refer 
to a cluster of “intertwined”( Di Paolo et al, 2010) ideas which are influenced in part by 
the autopoietic theories of Maturana and Varela (1980, 1987) as well as by Varela’s 
later – less explicitly autopoietic – work (1991). Current proponents of this type of 
‘enactivism’ include Thompson (2004; 2007), Torrance (Torrance, 2005; Torrance & 
Froese, 2011) Di Paolo (Di Paolo, 2005; Di Paolo et al, 2010) and Froese (2009). It 
should be made clear from the outset, however, that insofar as the following involves 
allusion to a generic ‘enactivist’ outlook this is necessarily something of a 
simplification, concealing differences of emphasis (e.g. between ‘enactivism’ and 
‘autopoietic theory’ per se), divergent areas of research, and changes in perspective 
over time. 
 
It is not our intention to look in detail, or systematically, at all of the ideas and their 
interrelations which make up an enactive perspective. Nevertheless, for the record it is 
perhaps worth noting that there is general consensus (Torrance, 2005; Thompson, 2007; 
Di Paolo et al, 2010; Torrance & Froese, 2011) that there are five main themes, even if 
there is less consensus regarding how these five themes are to be carved up. One 
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succinct summary of such themes is provided by Torrance & Froese (2011). On an 
enactivist analysis, to be a (cognizing, conscious) agent is to be: 
 
a) biologically autonomous (autopoietic) organism – a precarious far-from-equilibrium, 
self-maintaining dynamic system; b) with a nervous system that works as an 
organizationally closed network, whose function is to generate significance or meaning 
rather than…to act via a set of continually updated internal representations of the 
external world; c) the agent’s sense-making arises in virtue of its dynamic sensorimotor 
coupling with its environment, such that d) a world of significances is ‘enacted’ or 
‘brought forth’ by a process whereby the enacted world and the organism mutually 
codetermine each other; and e) the experiential awareness of that organism arises from 
its lived embodiment in the world.  (ibid., p.22)  
 
We perhaps notice a certain imbalance here since a) appears to incorporate 
‘autopoiesis’ per se, and thus implies a number of subsidiary theses regarding what it is 
to be a living organism (or ‘unity’), whereas c) and d) could be viewed as variations on 
the single theme of agent/environment coupling. Our concern in this section is chiefly 
with certain of the subsidiary theses associated with a), as well as with c) and d). (We 
are less interested in b) and e).) These themes are of interest because they appear 
consonant with ideas that we have already found in Marxian theory. 
 
Unity, Becoming and the Continuity between Life and Mind 
 
Before developing this point, however, we would do well to observe in a more general 
way how, as was the case with dynamics, enactivist theory often utilizes Hegelian and 
Marxian sounding ideas and terminology. Perhaps most significant of these is the 
aforementioned notion of a ‘unity’, a term used to characterize systems such as a “cell, 
immune network, nervous system, insect colony or animal” (Thompson, 2007, p.65) in 
accordance with certain of its features. We will look at one of these features shortly. 
Here we will just note how the enactivist use of this term compares with Marx and 
Hegel’s own uses of the term. Conceptually speaking a ‘unity’ for the Hegel of the 
Logic was a dialectical resolution of an antinomy – thus ‘reciprocity’ was the ‘unity’ of 
‘cause’ and ‘effect’ (Hegel, 1817a, p.218). Materially speaking a ‘unity’ was also what 
was achieved, according to Marx, when the agent’s relationship to the world, other 
agents and its own activity was no longer fragmented by an imposed division of labour. 
Perhaps noteworthy in the current context is the fact that, as we saw in chapter 2, this 
state of affairs was sometimes expressed in biological terms as “the unity of living and 
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active humanity with the natural inorganic conditions of their metabolic exchange with 
nature” (Marx, 1855, p.489), a fact which led Fromm to declare that for Marx “labour is 
man’s effort to regulate his metabolism with nature” (Fromm, 1966, p.13). 
 
For enactivists a ‘unity’ is similarly more likely to be a physically instantiated, 
biologically specified system, although, like its Hegelian forebear, a certain amount of 
conceptual dialectics is also involved in its characterization. Thus Maturana and Varela 
(1987): 
A unity (entity, object) is brought forth by an act of distinction. Conversely each time 
we refer to an entity in our descriptions, we are implying the operation of distinction 
that defines it and makes it possible. (p.40) 
 
Here the authors appear to be making the point that establishing the identity of a 
system, whether that establishing is done in practice by the system itself, or in theory by 
an external observer, also entails establishing a difference (with other components of 
the world). This perhaps provides us with an alternative interpretation of Engels’ 
observation that “every organic being is every moment the same and not the same” 
(Engels, 1887, p.35), for on an autopoietic reading this would not just imply that 
organisms are in constant flux, but also the stronger thesis that it is only by practically 
positing its un-sameness with the rest of the world that an organism can establish itself 
as a ‘unity’. 
 
The notion of a ‘unity’, then, is both important for enactivism and central to the theme 
of this thesis - for it is precisely a ‘unified’ account of the human agent which we are 
arguing constitutes an area of significant commonalty between Hegelian-Marxian 
theory and recent philosophy of cognitive science. This is not to say that the mere fact 
that enactivist theory utilizes the concept of a ‘unity’ implies that it thereby subscribes 
to every facet of our hypothesized ‘retreat from alienation’. Nevertheless, insofar as 
‘conservation of a unity’ might include, on an enactivist account, the conservation of a 
set of dialectical relations between individual agents and between those agents and their 
environment, it certainly has some strong affinities with a Marxian outlook. We will 
return to this point below. 
 
Other Hegelian-Marxian sounding concepts often used in the enactivist camp include 
that of the ‘continuity between life and mind’ (e.g. Thompson, 2004, Di Paolo, 2005) 
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and ‘becoming’. Whilst the former might not seem an obvious candidate for Marxian 
comparisons we might say that, as with the Marx of The German Ideology, it suggests a 
general predilection for starting from the “material life process” (Marx & Engels, 
1970b, p.47) and deriving consciousness from this. In this respect Marx’s assertion that 
“Life is not determined by consciousness, but consciousness by life” (ibid) seems 
particularly amenable to an enactivist interpretation.  
 
As regards ‘becoming’ (e.g. “we are constituted in language in a continuous becoming” 
– Maturana & Varela, 1987, p.235) we will not look at this notion in detail here. This is 
partly because we will return to it briefly later. It is also because there is perhaps only a 
limited amount of ground to be gained from pursuing comparisons where the parallels 
are chiefly with the ‘Hegelian’ side of an ‘Hegelian-Marxian’ outlook.  It is not news to 
current proponents of enactivism that portions of their approach are heavily indebted to 
the phenomenological tradition. Indeed this fact is everywhere acknowledged and 
explored – even if the names more commonly mentioned are Husserl, Heidegger and 
Merleau-Ponty, with the founder of phenomenology, Hegel, generally neglected. 
However some parallels are more significant than others and relate as much to Marxian 
theory as to Hegelian phenomenology. It is to these that we now turn. 
 
Self - Production 
 
One striking and central affinity between enactivism and the Marxian perspective lies 
in the autopoietic conception of living beings as ‘self-producing’. Thus Maturana and 
Varela (1987) assert that: 
 
…Living beings are characterized in that, literally, they are continually self-producing. 
We indicate this process when we call the organization that defines them an autopoietic 
organization.   (p.43) 
 
and this view of things is restated in more recent enactivist works, with Froese & Di 
Paolo (2009), for example, alluding to the centrality of “material self-production” 
(p.443) to autopoiesis. As we have seen in chapter 2, there does not seem to be much 
which separates this conception of living beings from Marx’s own conception of the 
defining characteristic of human agency. Man, as ‘Homo Faber’, was precisely “the 
result of his own labour” (Marx, 1844a, p.82) and so can likewise be understood in 
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terms of a ‘fundamental circularity’ – “by thus acting on the external world and 
changing it, he at the same time changes his own nature” (1867, p.283).  It was this idea 
of the “self-creation of man” (Marx, 1844a, p.101) that Marx had taken originally from 
Hegel and then concretized by annexing it to the human material life process rather 
than to the self-development of an abstract ‘spirit’ or ‘idea’.  
 
Of course, in drawing attention to this parallel between autopoietic and Marxian theory 
we are also perhaps drawing attention to a divergence. Self production, on the 
autopoietic account, is characteristic not just of human beings but of all living beings – 
and perhaps more generally of ‘systems’ of a certain sort (Maturana & Varela, 1980; 
Thompson, 2007; Froese & Di Paolo, 2009). Thus in one sense the autopoietic account 
could be seen as undermining the Hegelian-Marxian account which posits self-
production through labour as a defining feature of the human agent. To the extent that 
this is true we might take this as another area where modern cognitive science has 
improved upon Marxian theory. Marx, we might say, had rather narrowly imposed a 
strict line of separation between the human mode of ‘becoming’ and the mode of 
becoming of other organisms. Autopoietic theory has therefore established the 
existence of continuities where Marx had only seen a difference. 
 
However we perhaps should not make too much of this point, for it might be argued 
that the Marxian account of human self-production does contain elements which are 
absent from the autopoietic account, and these are perhaps sufficient to differentiate 
human self creation from mere organismic self creation. In particular the self-
production of the human agent, on a Marxian analysis, is developmental and open 
ended. Through labour human beings develop over time and, considered as a species, 
their potential to become ‘fully human’ – to be able to “produce in a human manner” 
(Marx, 1844b, p.121) – is contingent upon further events in the ongoing history of their 
self-creation. Moreover the portion of the spatial environment by means of which they 
realize themselves is also not a fixed quantity but an ever expanding one (e.g. through 
agriculture). This would seem to contrast with the situation of a simple autopoietic 
entity such as a cell. Whilst the latter “emerges as a figure out of a chemical 
background” (Thompson, 2007, p.99) its ongoing self-productive activity serves only to 
keep it in a stable state. Its “circular process of self-generation” (ibid) is not open-ended 
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or developmental in the same manner as human self-production, and its continued 
existence is dependent on the maintenance of spatial boundaries.   
 
Agent and Environment 
 
In drawing attention to the self-production of the organism we also draw attention to 
other features of an enactivist outlook. Indeed it is this fact itself, as much as the nature 
of such features, which suggests Marxian parallels, for ‘self-production’ is not a 
standalone component of enactivism. Rather, as on a Marxian account, it is internally 
related to other components. Di Paolo remarks in this respect that “these internal 
relations bespeak the strength of the associations under a single banner” (Di Paolo et 
al., 2010, p.4). We might say that our thesis of a ‘retreat from alienation’ is one that is 
in broad agreement with such a principle – although it would like to increase the 
number of features between which internal relations are held to obtain and would also 
like to write something else on the banner. 
 
Both enactivism and Marxian theory, then, start from the fact of ‘self-production’ and 
in elaborating on this elicit other internally related features. As one would expect if 
such internal relations are genuine, there is also a degree of agreement between Marx 
and enactivism on what some of these other features might be. Thus, for example, both 
seem to agree that self-production is also production of an environment. We have 
already examined in some detail the different senses in which this is true on a Marxian 
account and will not catalogue these senses again here. However by way of a brief 
summary we might say that, according to Marx, Man ‘realizes’ himself through 
productive interaction with the material world and this interaction is described in terms 
of a reciprocal relationship between agent and environment. We might also remind 
ourselves here that, contra Hegel, Marx thought there was a necessary separation of 
sorts between agent and environment but nevertheless that in dialectical fashion this 
separation also implied a unity: “A being that does not have its nature outside of itself 
is not a natural being” (Marx, 1844a, p.104). In unalienated labour this unity manifests 
itself in the fact that the agent’s product becomes an expression and extension of his 
being, so that there is no longer felt to be any separation between producer and product.  
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There are similar elements in the enactivist account. There too we find talk of self-
realization. Thus for example Maturana and Varela assert that through their autopoietic 
organization organisms “become real and specify themselves” (1987, p.48) and, in 
phraseology similar to Levins & Lewontin (1985), this self-realization is likewise 
presented as arising from a reciprocal coupling between agent and environment where 
the “enacted world and the organism mutually codetermine each other” (Torrance & 
Froese, 2011, p.22). Moreover, as with the Marxian account such codetermination is 
double-edged. Whilst, as we have seen, a unity is said to bring itself into being by 
distinguishing itself from the environment it is also true of living beings that “their 
organization is such that their only product is themselves, with no separation between 
producer and product” (Maturana & Varela, 1987, pp. 48-9), thus in this sense the 
modus operandi of the autopoietic entity resembles that of the unalienated labourer. 
However we perhaps ought to avoid over simplification here. Whereas on a Marxian 
account it is the self-same external environment that an agent is separate from and 
stands in reciprocal relation to, on an enactivist account things seem a little more 
complicated. On a narrowly autopoietic perspective the non-separation between 
producer and product seems to apply only to the internal milieu of a “self-constructing 
closed system” (Maturana &Varela, 1980, p.v – my emphasis). Thus, strictly speaking 
its product is not a construct out of external resources in the same sense as that of the 
Marxian agent. On the other hand, a broader, phenomenologically oriented, enactivist 
picture does seems to be one which incorporates the wider world into the package – 
thus Thompson: “the external world is constituted as such for the system by virtue of 
the system’s self-organizing activity” (2007, p.27.)  
 
In remarking on this close relationship between agent and environment in enactivist 
literature we should also note how such a theme is developed not only in relation to its 
implications for the self-productive subject but also in relation to its implications for 
our understanding of the object. In particular we should note the centrality for 
enactivism of the idea that the world of the agent is “brought forth or enacted” 
(Thompson, 2007, p.13). Our use of the phrase ‘the world of the agent’ here is 
deliberately vague for that which is brought forth is variously characterized as “a world 
or cognitive domain” (Di Paolo et al, 2010, p.5), “a world of significances” (Torrance 
& Froese, 2011, p.22), “the external world” (Thompson, 2007, p.27), and “an 
environment” (ibid. p.59). We will not explore such differences here but instead will 
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just note in general fashion how this ‘bringing forth of a world’ also has Marxian 
parallels. We saw in chapter 2 how one version of ‘praxis’ likewise entailed that ‘the 
world is brought forth through practical activity’. Some commentators, as we noted, 
had interpreted this in an overly metaphysical fashion, suggesting that on Marx’s 
account “reality is a product of the dialectical interaction of nature and human nature” 
(Rubinstein, 1981, p.170). However, we argued that a non-metaphysical reading was 
possible which did not call into question the objectivity or otherwise of the material 
constituents of the world.  It seems that similarly non-metaphysical readings might 
apply to enactivist accounts which ground themselves in the objectivity of biological 
systems. As we shall see in the second half of this chapter when we look at Varela, 
Thompson & Rosch’s ‘Embodied Mind’, one such reading, influenced to some degree 
by Levins & Lewontin, uses the notions of the enacting or bringing forth of the world 
as a counter to conceptions which view the agent as a passive victim of a pre-given 
environment to which he must adapt 
 
A Dialectical Whole 
 
We have said so far that enactivism has similarities with Marxian theory insofar as it is 
concerned with the material self-production of the organism and links this self-
production with production of an environment. We might add that it does not just 
concern itself with the relationship of the organism to itself and to the environment but 
also, on some accounts (e.g. Maturana & Varela, 1987; Thompson, 2001; Torrance & 
Froese, 2011), with the relationship of the organism to other organisms. We have 
already given some examples of this in the case of human agents when we broached the 
topic of intersubjectivity in the previous chapter. Here we will just note how, with this 
third element in place, the enactivist outlook can be seen as presenting a ‘dialectical 
whole’. This is particularly well illustrated in a diagram produced by Maturana & 
Varela (1987) a version of which is given below: 
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        ‘Third-Order Coupling’   (from Maturana & Varela, 1987, p.180) 
 
This diagram shows the “reciprocal structural coupling” (p.180) of two organisms 
(possessing nervous systems) with each other and with the environment. It can be 
viewed as ‘dialectical’ at least insofar as it is both holistic – with each component 
implicated in the activity of the others – and (as with the dialectics of Hegel, Marx, 
Engels, Merleau-Ponty and Lewontin) incorporates circular causal relationships.  
 
In terms of the ‘retreat from alienation’ we might say that the state of affairs depicted 
by the diagram has great similarities with that found in Marx’s account of free labour 
(e.g. in Marx, 1844b). To make this comparison clear we might modify the diagram as 
follows: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
“Our products would be so many mirrors in which we saw reflected our essential nature”  
                 (Marx, 1844b, pp. 121-122) 
 
 
Relationship of man 
to his fellow man 
Productive activity 
Self creation of the subject 
Product / Environment 
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The labels used in the modified diagram, we would argue, do not deviate greatly from 
the original intentions of Maturana and Varela, and perhaps just represent a ‘special 
class’ in this respect. We should note that although each component has been given a 
separate label, because of the internal relation between component processes, it would 
also be possible to use each label to describe the whole. Thus, for example, on a 
Marxian analysis the whole process could be viewed as ‘the self-creation of the subject’ 
for the latter arises from activity that is both social and productive. Similarly ‘the 
relationship of man to his fellow man’ is mediated by his productive activity and the 
results of this productive activity. (This latter point is illustrated by the quotation from 
On James Mill given at the bottom of the diagram.) Likewise again, strictly speaking 
the product and environment of product activity includes other agents as well as oneself 
– a point which is partially acknowledged by Maturana and Varela (1987, p.180). We 
should also note that the same diagram (perhaps with fuzzy arrows!) could also be used 
to illustrate the situation of the alienated labourer (as described in Marx, 1844a) who 
finds himself alienated from his product, his activity and his fellow men. 
 
A Dialectical Problem 
 
In saying above that the autopoietic/enactivist conception of a dialectical whole mirrors 
the Marxian account of free labour we are edging our way closer to a thesis that the 
enactivist outlook is in some way favourable to the normative ideal of freedom found in 
Marxian theory. We will develop this point shortly. Before doing so however we might 
note one respect in which an autopoietic outlook, or at least one argument for it, is 
perhaps less than dialectical. This argument is not central to our concerns in this section 
but is worth remarking upon in passing. The argument in question is given in Maturana 
& Varela (1987): 
 
Reproduction cannot be a part of the organization of living beings because to reproduce 
something, that something must first constitute a unity and have an organization that 
defines it. This is simple logic…  (p.57)  
 
It is perhaps surprising to find this line of reasoning in a work which in other respects 
has elevated circularity to a principle of life itself. Our dialectical objections to it are 
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twofold. The first echoes an earlier objection made to Arthur (chapter 2). It is not clear 
why, given that the authors accept the inherent circularity of self-production, they 
should find less acceptable any circularity inherent in positing reproduction as a 
defining feature of living systems. That they do view the latter as problematic perhaps 
suggests that they have some residual deference for ‘chicken/egg’ style reasoning 
(Kelso, 1995, p.9; see also Varela et al, 1991, p.172)  - in this case almost literally so. 
 
Secondly, given that one establishes the temporal priority of constitution to 
reproduction this does not seem to give one grounds for excluding the latter as part of 
the organization of a living being considered as a unity. To characterize reproduction as 
exterior to the organization of the system in this way seems to be to adopt an 
unwarrantedly fragmented approach. It would seem to involve a temporal prejudice 
according to which that which occurs after a certain defining event is viewed as 
inessential (at least to an account of what constitutes a living system.) Such a prejudice 
is perhaps incompatible with a process-oriented approach. In its place we might recall 
Hegel’s ‘temporal holism’ which viewed living systems in terms of “a necessary and 
complete process of becoming” (Hegel, 1807, p.20) rather than as fixed quantities 
comprehensible at a particular instant in time.  
 
It should be noted, however, that in directing this criticism at one twenty five year old 
autopoietic text, the intention is not to imply that such criticism applies across the board 
to present day enactivism or autopoietic theory. Insofar as our argument is that 
Maturana & Varela failed to give ‘temporality’ due consideration, for example, we 
might note that Di Paolo proposes an updated autopoiesis which, amongst other things, 
gives increased prominence to temporality (Di Paolo, 2005, pp.13-14).  
 
Alienated Labour and Autopoiesis 
 
We have found, then, many affinities between an enactivist perspective and a Marxian 
outlook – these include emphasis on the material self production of the agent, agent-
environment codetermination and the conception of these processes (expanded to 
include inter-agent interaction) as a dialectical whole. 
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These affinities may not be entirely coincidental. As we have remarked already, 
Varela’s (1991) work, to which we shall turn shortly, was influenced to some degree by 
the dialectical outlook of Richard Lewontin. Likewise, as briefly alluded to in chapter 
3, the work of the enactivist Evan Thompson (2007) draws heavily on that of the 
Marxian phenomenologist Maurice Merleau-Ponty, and particularly on the dialectical 
approach taken in The Structure of Behaviour (Merleau-Ponty, 1945). We might add 
also that, according to Maturana at least, the notion of ‘autopoiesis’ grew out of the 
revolutionary ferment of May 1968, and in particular in the occupation of the 
University of Chile, of which Maturana was a part (Maturana & Varela, 1980, p.xvi). 
We can perhaps surmise from this that Maturana was likely to have become acquainted 
with some Marxian ideas during this period.  
 
Such affinities as we have described however, have mainly been of a ‘theoretical’ sort. 
They have not implied any necessary common ground on political, social or normative 
issues. Whilst there is some talk in praise of ‘revolution’ and against ‘reform’ in recent 
enactivist accounts (e.g. Di-Paolo et al, 2010) such phrases are not to be understood as 
having any application outside the arena of philosophic paradigms. This is in keeping 
with the majority of the parallels between a Marxian outlook and the unifying trajectory 
of modern cognitive science described in this thesis. Although we have made links 
between particular conceptions of cognition and particular modes of social 
organisation, we have not suggested that such links are explored by the relevant authors 
themselves. The retreat from an alienated conception of the agent in cognitive science, 
insofar it remains restricted to the confines of cognitive science, has no need to align 
itself with any particular political or social program.  
 
Nevertheless, we might conclude this half of the chapter by noting that, in the case of 
enactivism, this line is occasionally crossed. One significant example is Maturana’s 
introduction to Autopoiesis and Cognition. Here Maturana appears to argue that for 
human beings to realize themselves as autopoietic systems a certain type of social 
organisation is necessary (Maturana & Varela, 1980, p. xxv). In such a system the 
activities of human beings “as social organisms must satisfy their autopoiesis” (ibid. 
p.xxvi). This move, we might observe, represents a transition from a description of the 
structural pre-requisites of living systems to a recommendation for a particular type of 
social order. However, rather like Marx’s human ‘essence’ (Marx, 1844a, p.80) or 
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‘species being’ the transition is made on the basis of what is necessary for the proper 
realization of the organism. There is thus a sense in which it can still be taken as non-
normative on the grounds that it is simply describing what conditions must prevail in 
order for a particular organism to function as it ‘should’.  
 
In elaborating on this position Maturana alludes to a social state of affairs wherein 
human beings are unable to satisfy their autopoiesis: 
 
A human being that through his interactions with other human beings participates in 
interactions proper to the social system in a manner that does not involve his 
autopoiesis as a constitutive feature of it, is being used by the social system but is not 
one of its members.   (ibid. p. xxix) 
 
Here comparisons with the Marxian account of alienated labour seem unavoidable. In 
both cases the object of criticism is a social state of affairs wherein human beings 
participate in a collective activity that does not facilitate the realization of their essential 
nature, yet where such activity is felt to be ‘proper’ to the system (an expression of its 
rationale) and is ‘used’ by it. Likewise, in both cases, insofar as this social system is not 
organised in accordance with the essential nature of human beings – their potential to 
realize themselves freely through activity  – those human beings are ‘not one of its 
members’ i.e. are objectively ‘alienated’ from it. 
 
Maturana goes on to specify what kind of social system would facilitate human 
autopoiesis and comes to the conclusion that “such a society is in its essence an 
anarchist society” (ibid. p.xxx). Whilst we do not wish to play down the differences 
between a Marxian outlook and an anarchist one (see e.g. Thomas, 1980) it will be 
remembered that the version of Marxian theory which informs our thesis is of a 
‘libertarian’ or ‘humanist’ variety and as such is relatively friendly to anarchism. If 
Maturana intends by his use of the phrase ‘anarchist society’ not just a society with an 
absence of hierarchy (Maturana & Varela, 1980, p.xxix), but one with an absence of 
coercion in all spheres of life, where production is not imposed on the individual by 
force or as an economic necessity but arises from his own “spontaneous activity” 
(Marx, 1844a, p.80) then there is little scope for disagreement here. 
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The Embodied Mind 
 
We have looked briefly, then, at enactivism and autopoiesis and noted how enactivist 
accounts contain many elements amenable to a Marxian interpretation. In this second 
half of the chapter our aim is to look at one particular text from the enactivist camp - 
Varela, Thompson & Rosch’s book ‘The Embodied Mind’ (1991). This might seem 
like an odd way of ordering things. However a look at Varela et al’s book in separation 
from a general analysis of enactivism seems warranted. This is so not just because of 
the influential nature of this text but also because it contains additional distinctive 
elements relevant to the perspective of this thesis. It should be noted that the following 
is not intended as a summary of the most significant parts of the text. Indeed much of 
what is generally taken to be important about the work will be absent from our account, 
which will focus only on a few areas that are key to our analysis. 
 
The Influence of Lewontin 
 
As mentioned earlier, one respect in which Varela’s 1991 book is of particular interest 
to us is in the reference it makes to Richard Lewontin (Lewontin, 1983; Levins & 
Lewontin, 1985)
12. Dennett suggests that Varela et al. “draw heavily on the claims by 
the geneticist Richard Lewontin that evolution must be understood from an enactive 
perspective” (Dennett, 1993, p.125). In fact Dennett seems to be conflating two points 
here, for while Varela et al. draw heavily on Lewontin’s work (in one section of the 
book), Lewontin did not describe his own position as “enactive”. Nevertheless the 
central point remains valid that Varela’s enactivism is significantly influenced by 
Lewontin. 
 
The authors introduce Lewontin in a discussion of what they refer to as ‘natural drift’. 
The latter is a conception of evolution which rejects the notion that selective pressures 
involve the optimization of fitness traits. The evolutionary process is not to be viewed 
in a prescriptive fashion as one that “guides and instructs” (Varela et al, 1991, p. 195) 
                                                 
12
 We have thus far referred to Levins & Lewontin’s (1985) text ‘The Dialectical Biologist’. Varela et al’s 
book refers to Lewontin’s (1983) paper. However a version of this paper appears as a chapter  in the 1985 
book attributed to both authors. 
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but rather in a proscriptive fashion as one that confines its operations to the discarding 
of traits that are incompatible with survival. It is concerned with ‘satisficing’ rather 
than ‘optimizing’ (ibid. p.196).  
 
For Varela there appears to be a direct connection between this position and Lewontin’s 
own position, insofar as both in different ways are opposed to a conception of the agent 
as passive product of environmental forces. The move from conceiving of “selective 
pressures as broad constraints to be satisfied” (ibid. p.198) to the idea that “the very 
notion of what an environment is cannot be separated from what organisms are and 
what they do” (ibid) is viewed as one that can be taken in a single step. Thus Varela 
proceeds to endorse Lewontin’s ‘anti adaptationist’ argument as a logical adjunct of the 
natural drift argument.   
 
As we have seen (in chapter 3) Lewontin’s argument hinges on a dialectic between 
organism and environment. We find all the elements of this dialectic reproduced in 
Varela’s account. Firstly there is the general notion that “the organism and the 
environment are not actually separately determined” (ibid p.198, citing Lewontin, 
1983). Taken by itself this could perhaps be interpreted as meaning nothing more than 
that full specification of an environment necessitates specification of its inhabitants and 
vice versa. There is an internal relation between the two because “just as there is no 
organism without an environment, so there is no environment without an organism” 
(ibid).  
 
Full blooded co-determination, however, implies more than this. It includes, for 
example, the fact that the organism will alter its environment. The environment is not 
just found but ‘enacted’. We have already seen on Lewontin’s account how this 
position implied the organism’s involvement in the literal creation of its physical 
environment. In the case of human agents Varela adds to this a cognitive component 
such that “the world we cognize is not pre-given but enacted through our history of 
structural coupling” (ibid. p.200). Clearly, as suggested in our survey of enactivism the 
term ‘world’ here is susceptible to multifarious interpretations – relating as much to the 
world as experienced as to the world objectively constituted in a physical environment 
(insofar as such a distinction can be made.) We will not explore this issue further here 
however. 
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In addition to an analysis of the effect of the agent on the environment a complete 
account of agent environment co-determination also involves recognition of the fact 
that the environment has a reciprocal influence on the agent. Thus “organisms have 
constructed environments that are the conditions for their further evolution” (ibid. 
p.202, citing Lewontin, 1983).  As we saw in chapter 3 in Lewontin’s case this full 
characterization of the agent-environment dialectic is expressly linked to Engels’ own 
account of evolution in Dialectics of Nature. Hence we have a clearly traceable path 
from Engels to one of the key components of Varela’s enactivist outlook. 
 
Three Points of Convergence 
 
The Embodied Mind is not just of particular interest to us because of its debt to Levins 
& Lewontin however. It also noteworthy because of an argumentative thread which 
runs through the book and which has three significant points of convergence with a 
Marxian account,  above and beyond those which we highlighted in our account of 
enactivism earlier. We might summarise these points as follows: 
 
1) The fragmentation of the individual subject 
2) The social roots of this fragmentation 
3) An explicitly pragmatic (rather than ‘theoretical’) solution to this 
fragmentation. 
 
We will deal with each of these in turn. 
 
1) The fragmented subject 
 
Varela et al. state in their introduction that: 
 
The existential concern that animates our entire discussion in this book results from the 
tangible demonstration within cognitive science that the self or cognizing subject is 
fundamentally fragmented, divided or non-unified.   (Varela et. al., 1991, p. XVII) 
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and this concern with the fragmentation of the subject is indeed reiterated throughout 
the book. Here then, as in Marx’s Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts, the central 
problematic is given as that of the disunified subject.  
 
With respect to the characterization of this disunity, the parallel with Marx is not an 
exact one, but there is significant overlap. For Marx, as we have seen, the disunity of 
the alienated labourer consisted in her separation from other individuals, from her own 
activity (and hence her alienation from self) and from the product of that activity 
(Marx, 1844a, p.77-96). In relation to the mental/manual division of labour this 
fragmentation was presented in terms of the severance of bodily being from mental 
activity (Marx & Engels, 1970b; Sohn-Rethel, 1978). 
 
The disunity of concern to Varela et al. is certainly bound up with the some of these. 
They are to some degree concerned with inter-agent unity (see next section) although 
they do not explore this issue in any detail. More notably they are concerned with a 
number of fragmentary and antinomous conceptions of the subject all ultimately 
related, on their account, to the philosophical mind-body problem (see next section). 
These include, as with Noë’s later account (and likewise influenced by Merleau-Ponty), 
the separation of perception from action, for which a similarly praxis-like remedy is 
proffered - “studying cognition not as recovery or projection but as embodied action” 
(Varela et. al., 1991 p.172). They also include the separation imposed by traditional 
cognitive science between experience and cognition (a theme also taken up in later 
enactivist accounts e.g. Varela & Shear, 1999; Thompson, 2004, Thompson, 2007).  
 
This latter, we might note, appears to have some internal relation to a wider critique of 
the dichotomy between “science” and “experience”. In this respect the authors see 
themselves as following in the footsteps of Merleau-Ponty in their search for an “entre-
deux” between these two poles. In their journey they confront this opposition in 
different guises according to context – as ‘realism’ vs ‘subjectivism’ (Varela et. al., 
1991, p172), as ‘objectivism vs subjectivism’ (ibid. p. 230) and, rather indirectly, as 
‘absolutism vs nihilism’ (ibid. p.143). Opting for either option in exclusion of the other 
is seen, in Hegelian fashion, as ‘one-sided’ (ibid. p.123) and gives rise to an inadequate 
conception of the predicament of the agent.  
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In one section of the book, appropriately titled “Selfless Minds: Divided Agents’ the 
situation is described in terms reminiscent of the ‘unhappy inwardly divided 
consciousness’ which is aware of the “self-contradictory nature of itself” (Hegel, 1807, 
p.125). Cognitive science, as represented particularly by Minsky (1986) and Jackendoff 
(1987), operates by hiving itself off from the realm of experience, says Varela. When it 
examines the human agent it is unavoidably drawn to the conclusion that the Self (or 
‘consciousness’, or ‘free will’ - there is some blurring here, Varela et. al., 1991, p.128) 
is redundant, either as a concept or as an efficacious force. Yet at the same time we as 
human beings (including human beings who work in Cognitive Science, such as 
Minsky and Jackendoff) find ourselves unable to abandon these constructs: 
 
Cognitive Science tells us that we do not have a Self that is efficacious and free. We 
cannot, however, give up such a belief – we are “virtually forced” [as Minsky says] to 
maintain it. (Varela et. al., 1991, p.129) 
 
It is noteworthy that when this dichotomy manifests itself as the separation between 
experience and sub-personal processing, the authors berate traditional cognitive science 
for dismissing or ignoring the former, and thereby presenting a “radical and alienating 
view of unconscious processing” (ibid. p.48). Taking their terminology at face value we 
might suggest that they have here highlighted another sense in which traditional 
cognitive science could be viewed as ‘alienated’. In terms of the arguments we gave in 
chapter 4 this disregarding of conscious experience, or its reduction to an 
epiphenomenon (Thompson, 2007, p.13), might perhaps also be viewed as a result of a 
‘production line’ conception of cognition. An account which characterizes agent 
mentality in terms of inputs, outputs and intermediate processing is free to dispense 
with consciousness as a causally irrelevant by-product, like smoke from a factory 
chimney. 
 
For purposes of our current argument, however, it is less important that we pay heed to 
the, sometimes confusing, detail of Varela et al’s version of the fragmented subject than 
to the fact that they take the fragmented subject as their starting point. 
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2) The social basis of fragmentation 
 
Like Marx then, Varela et al. start out from the fact of the fragmented subject. Having 
made the case for fragmentation the authors go on to relate the theoretical expression of 
this fragmentation to social practices which are also fragmented. Thus in the case of the 
‘mind body’ problem: 
 
It is because reflection in our culture has been severed from its bodily life that the 
mind-body problem has become a central topic for abstract reflection.          
(Varela et. al., 1991, p.30) 
 
Here we find, in condensed form, several of the theses already explored in our account 
of Marx in chapter 2, and in particular the Marx of the German Ideology. At the most 
general level we might say that the statement indicates a recognition that our conceptual 
outlook and concerns have their roots in social practice as “sublimates” of the “material 
life process” (Marx & Engels, 1970b, p.47). As such it is also consonant with that 
materialist approach which “does not explain practice from the idea but explains the 
formation of ideas from practice” (ibid. p.58). In Varela’s case it is not Marx but Lakoff 
and Johnson (see chap.5) who supply the materialist backdrop here, with the argument 
that our conceptual propensities can be traced back to “the structured nature of bodily 
and social experience” (Varela et. al., 1991 p.178, citing Lakoff, 1988), but the 
outcome is the same. 
 
As well as revealing a generally materialist orientation, however, the above passage 
from Varela et al explicitly mirrors elements of the Marxian critique of the 
mental/manual division of labour. As we have emphasized, Marx’s critique of capitalist 
social relations is in part concerned with the enforced separation of mental and manual 
activity brought about by the mental/manual division of labour. This “separation of 
head and hand” (Sohn-Rethel, 1978) at the material level is not only thought 
reprehensible for the material fragmentation it imposes on the agent but is also held 
responsible for a variety of aberrant productions at the conceptual level. These include 
a conception of the agent as fundamentally fragmented. The “organic and social unity” 
(Pannekoek, 1937, p.448) of mental and physical activity is neglected in our 
characterizations of the agent because “the division of labour separated these two parts 
into functions of different classes” (ibid).  Varela et al can thus be seen as making an 
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analogous connection when they link the theoretical “mind-body problem” with the 
material separation of thought from practical activity in the wider culture. 
 
In stating that the authors’ account mirrors Marx’s critique of the mental/manual 
division of labour, we do not mean to imply that they have made any systematic 
connections between the economic or productive organization of society and the 
fragmentation of the individual psyche. In fact such topics do not figure largely in their 
account. Nevertheless, it should be noted that when capitalist social relations are 
alluded to, it is in a critical way and one which at least suggests a critique of the 
fragmentation of the social whole. The authors are for example, against “the economic 
view of the mind” (Varela et. al., 1991, p.245) where the goal of the self “is assumed to 
be profit – getting the most at least cost.” In contrast with Damasio (1994, see our chap. 
4) they will have no truck with a “business deal mentality” (Varela et. al., 1991, p.246) 
and they see as misguided the “view of the self as an economic man”, a view which 
they think is prevalent in the social sciences. Perhaps confusingly – given the centrality 
of the idea of ‘boundaries’ to autopoietic theory – they link such a conception of man 
with the idea of boundary maintenance: 
 
The self is seen as a territory with boundaries. The goal of the self is to bring inside the 
boundaries all of the good things while paying out as few goods as possible. Since 
goods are scarce, each autonomous self is in competition with other selves to get them.  
(ibid) 
 
It is in countering such a conception of things that the authors make one of their few 
allusions to inter-agent unity, for here they wish to emphasize that “self-interest is 
always other directed” (ibid. p.247). Like the Lord in Hegel’s parable (Hegel, 1807), 
those who seek to attain self-realization through competition with their peers are 
engaged in a contradictory and ultimately futile enterprise – they are “struggling in a 
confused way to maintain the sense of a separate self by engaging in self-referential 
relationships with the other” (Varela et. al., 1991, p.247). The solution to this alienation 
of man from man is a pragmatic one – ‘mindfulness/awareness practice’ – which can be 
used to achieve a social unification of sorts, albeit by getting rid of selves altogether 
(ibid, pp.59-63). 
 
 218 
Coming full circle, it is also mindfulness/awareness practice which, according to the 
authors, provides a practical solution to the separation of mind and body; and it is to 
this idea of a practical solution to a theoretical problem that we now turn. 
 
3) A Pragmatic Solution to Fragmentation 
 
Our concern in this section is not with the content or likely efficacy of the activity of 
“mindfulness/awareness practice”. This topic will be broached shortly. Our interest is 
rather in the mere fact of its selection as a solution to the problem of fragmentation, for 
it is here that the pragmatic orientation of Varela et al’s account can be most clearly 
seen. From the outset the authors make known their pragmatic intent. In the 
introduction they state: 
 
..those human traditions that have focused on the analysis, understanding, and 
possibilities for transformation of ordinary life need to be presented in a context that 
makes them available to science.  (ibid. p. xv – my emphasis) 
 
In some respects this program is not too dissimilar to our own. Marxian theory (and 
practice) might also be regarded as one of those ‘human traditions’ which aim at 
understanding and transforming ordinary life – and we also are attempting to present it 
in a context which makes it available to cognitive science. The parallel we want to 
emphasize, however, is not this meta parallel (between Varela’s selection of meditative 
traditions and our focus on Marxian theory) but rather that between Varela’s own 
conception of the pragmatic application of ‘mindfulness/awareness practice’ and 
Marx’s conception of a practical solution to theoretical problems. As we have seen (in 
chapter 2) it is part of the Marxian outlook that merely theoretical solutions to 
philosophical problems can fail even on their own terms.  The eleventh ‘Thesis on 
Feuerbach’ which states that “the philosophers have merely interpreted the world, in 
various ways, the point is to change it” (Marx 1970a, p.123) carries with it not just a 
normative call to action but the suggestion (if not a logically deducible one) that in 
some instances the world can only be adequately understood through action. A similar 
meaning can also be attributed to Marx’s remark that “all mysteries which lead theory 
to mysticism find their rational solution in human practice and in comprehension of this 
practice” (ibid. p.122). As regards this latter statement, however, it will be remembered 
that were several possible interpretations. On one account it is the understanding of 
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human practice which facilitates solutions to philosophical problems. We saw in 
chapter 5 how this might apply to Noë’s account of enactive perception. It was a 
comprehension of the active nature of perception which enabled him to counter some of 
the assumptions made by the ‘argument from analogy’ and the ‘grand illusion’ 
arguments.  On a stronger interpretation, however, the above statement can be taken as 
suggesting that it is engagement in action itself which can facilitate solutions to 
philosophical problems; and on the strongest interpretation it is the action which 
constitutes the solution to a philosophical problem. It is this last interpretation which is 
implicit in Marx’s declaration that “the solution of theoretical oppositions is only 
possible in a practical way” (1844a, p.93) and in Fromm’s statement that “the 
resolution of theoretical contradictions is possible only through practical means” 
(Fromm, 1966, p.29).  
 
Varela’s enactivism seems to mirror Marx’s position in this respect – for Varela too 
seems to endorse a strong kind of pragmatism whereby theoretical problems are given a 
practical solution. We note for instance that Varela et al want to differentiate their 
position from passive phenomenological approaches, and in so doing dispense with the 
‘merely theoretical’. Husserl, say the authors, was unable to bridge the gap between 
science and experience because his approach “completely lacked any pragmatic 
dimension” (Varela et. al., 1991, p.19). Likewise Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty13 “both 
stressed the pragmatic, embodied content of human experience, but in a purely 
theoretical way” (ibid).  
 
Not confining oneself to the “purely theoretical” in Varela et al’s case means 
recognizing that the mind-body relation is not a fixed quantity but is something that can 
be changed. Descartes’ view of himself as a ‘thinking thing’ was a product of his 
original question (“whether body and mind are one or two distinct substances” - ibid. 
p.28) which in turn was “a product of specific practices – those of disembodied, 
unmindful reflection” (ibid) A different view is attainable, one involving recognition 
that “body and mind can be brought together” (ibid), if one adopts reflective practices 
that themselves bring about this unification: 
 
                                                 
13
 Here, of course, Varela et al are not referring to the Merleau-Ponty of Humanism & Terror or 
Adventures of the Dialectic. 
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The basic assertion of the progressive approach to human experience is that the mind-
body relation or modality is not simply fixed and given but can be fundamentally 
changed.  (Varela et. al., 1991, p.28) 
 
From a certain (analytical) perspective this style of argumentation can seem flawed or 
incoherent. We want to know if mind and body are irreconcilably separate things. 
Varela’s response is ‘they can become one’. This seems not to answer the question 
without further elaboration. Either the authors mean that mind and body were always 
one (in some metaphysically definite sense) and it is just that a particular style of 
reflectiveness can make this unity more apparent to us. Or they mean that mind and 
body might indeed be irreconcilably distinct substances (or properties or …) but that a 
subjective, experiential sense of unity can be achieved through the adoption of a 
particular reflective practice. In either case, it might be argued, the practice itself is not 
factually relevant to the original question about the relation between mind and body – 
for there must be an answer to that question which is true irrespective of any particular 
reflective practice.  
 
Varela et al’s point, however, seems to be that this is not the case, or - less radically – 
that the line between theoretical and practical solutions is not as distinct as, ‘Western’ 
philosophy  might suppose. The practice (of mindfulness-awareness meditation) is 
crucially relevant to the question not just as a possible aid to its solution but in some 
sense as constituting part of that solution. One of the consequences of a “pragmatic 
approach to the transformation of experience in everyday life” (ibid. p.244) is that the 
question of the relation between mind and body, when posed from the standpoint of 
inactive theoretical philosophy, comes to be seen as empty and abstract. A merely 
theoretical answer to such a question stands the risk of reinforcing that abstractness and 
the disembodied practices that underpin it. The call to meditation is therefore 
simultaneously a pointer to a means of finding a solution to the fragmentation of the 
subject and a recommendation for the abandonment of theoretical practices that help to 
maintain this fragmentation. 
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Limitations of The Embodied Mind 
 
We have suggested, then, that The Embodied Mind has significant commonalties with a 
Marxian approach. Insofar as its starting point is the fragmentation of the individual 
subject, it recognizes the practical/social roots of this fragmentation and proposes a 
pragmatic solution, the parallel with Marx is clear. Moreover insofar as its enactivist 
outlook is influenced by Lewontin’s work it has a direct line of descendancy from 
Marxian thought. To this extent we can say that it constitutes a good early exemplar of 
the ‘retreat from alienation’ in cognitive science. Nevertheless the book is clearly not – 
by any stretch of the imagination – Marxian in its outlook; and while we do not think 
that a Marxian perspective is a pre-requisite for truth in cognitive science, in this case it 
does seem that the author’s account might benefit from being more Marxian in certain 
respects. 
 
Perhaps surprisingly the limitations of Varela’s book have been expressed in a way 
agreeable to the general orientation of this thesis by Daniel Dennett. Dennett, somewhat 
satirically notes that “Reform, as we know, is the enemy of revolution” and goes on to 
affect disappointment at not finding anything revolutionary in the book, concluding that 
“I think I can proceed with business-as-usual cognitive science” (Dennett, 1993, p.122). 
One of the problems, he suggests, is that Varela et al are too accommodating to the 
views of traditional cognitive scientists such as Minsky. “Do these authors despise no 
one?” (ibid. p.124) he asks ironically, and observes that “This kinder, gentler vision of 
cognitive science runs the risk of diluting its revolutionary impact” (ibid). 
 
Dennett’s tone, of course, is only half serious and his use of ‘revolutionary’ talk is 
intended only for application within the realms of theoretical cognitive science. 
However we might take seriously the general point that Varela et al’s position is in 
certain respects too ‘liberal’ to be revolutionary on any terrain. 
 
At the most abstract level this is perhaps signalled in their approach to dialectics. There 
is much that might count as dialectical in their work. We have seen how the authors 
take up Lewontin’s materialist dialectic in describing the relationship between 
organism and environment. Likewise their central enactivist hypothesis is one that 
posits a unity between action and cognition/perception (Varela et. al., 1991, pp.172-
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173). Moreover there are many passages that we haven’t addressed, where the authors 
explicitly incorporate dialectical insights from Eastern philosophy. These include 
endorsement of the ‘Madhyamika dialectic’ (ibid. p.228) as well as the philosophy of 
Nagarjuna.  According to the latter “causes and effects, things and their attributes, and 
the very mind of the inquiring subject and the objects of minds are equally codependent 
on the other” (ibid. p.224), ideas that would be at home in Hegel’s Logic, even if they 
predate that work by 2000 years or so.  
 
Nevertheless when it comes to confronting the overarching dichotomy between science 
and experience, the authors approach seems less thoroughgoing. We have already said 
both that they are against ‘one-sided’ solutions to dichotomies, and that they advocate a 
practical solution to the problems posed by the separation of mind and body. However, 
in the case of science and experience, the outcome aimed at does not seem to be a 
synthesis of any kind but rather a “middle way” (ibid. p.230). Thus, for example, in a 
passage ripe with socio-political overtones, they remark that: 
 
Unless we move beyond these oppositions the rift between science and experience in 
our society will deepen. Neither extreme is workable for a pluralistic society that must 
embrace both science and the actuality of human experience.    (ibid. p.13) 
 
Here, the talk is ostensibly of ‘moving beyond oppositions’, yet the tone adopted is one 
of reconciliation rather than synthesis or supersession. The ‘pluralism’ alluded to 
appears to be one which recognizes the positive aspects of both antagonistic outlooks 
and is content to let them co-exist - an interpretation also borne out by a later remark 
that “experience and scientific understanding are like two legs without which we cannot 
walk” (ibid. p.14). The point is not to supersede or unify the two elements but merely to 
recognize their complementarity.  With our Hegelian hats on, then, we might say that 
the “middle way” does not so much suggest the forging of a new unity which 
transcends the categories of ‘science’ and ‘experience’ considered in separation. Rather 
it suggests the fostering of an agreement between the two spheres that leaves both of 
them extant as autonomous entities. Thus Dennett would seem to be right that this 
liberal solution leaves him free to pursue business as usual.  
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Moreover this “failure of spirit” (Thelen & Smith, 1994, p.41)14 in the dialectical realm 
seems to be matched by a failure of spirit in the authors’ conception of practice. We 
have highlighted parallels between Marx’s concept of a practical answer to a theoretical 
question and Varela’s call to (meditative) practice. ‘Mindfulness-awareness practice’ is 
Varela’s pragmatic answer to the problem of the fragmented subject. However we 
should perhaps question whether it is up to the task. 
 
It will be recalled (chapter 2) how the Marxian critique of the bondsman’s supersession 
of alienation through simple perseverance was that “only the bondsman’s 
consciousness had been transformed” (Rees, 1988, p.39). Those material factors which 
had been the original source of the bondsman’s alienation from his activity and the 
world had not themselves been the subject of any transformation, and thus it was 
difficult to see how the bondsman could pull off this trick. A similar critique might be 
directed at Varela et al’s supposition that the fragmentation of the individual could be 
overcome through mindfulness awareness meditation. The authors describe the 
unification achieved by this technique as follows: 
 
When the mindfulness meditator finally begins to let go rather than to struggle to 
achieve some particular state of activity, then body and mind are found to be naturally 
coordinated and embodied.  (ibid. p.29) 
 
The problem here would similarly seem to be that only the meditator’s consciousness 
has been transformed. There has been a “revolution in thought” (Rees, 1988, p.39) but 
none in material relations. We are not proposing, of course that the authors have erred 
in not seeing the necessity for social revolution. Rather we are suggesting that, on their 
own terms, if there is a problem with the fragmentation of the subject, and if this 
fragmentation is susceptible to a practical solution, then it seems logical that this must 
be one which embraces their own enactive conception of the agent. Their critique of 
traditional cognitive science is one which seeks to replace the separation of thought and 
activity with “cognition as enaction” (Varela et al, 1991, p.206). This crucially implies 
the non passive, practical engagement of the agent in different activities. Likewise their 
insistence that “mind and world arise together in enaction” (ibid. p.177) and that the 
environment “is enacted by histories of coupling” (ibid. p.204), as we saw earlier, 
                                                 
14
 Thelen & Smith characterize connectionism’s insufficient radicalism in these terms, cited also by 
Eliasmith, 1996. 
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entails that this practical engagement is with a material world that extends beyond the 
individual subject’s body. Like Marx’s ‘whole man’, then, insofar as Varela et al’s 
agent is a unified being she is an active, embodied being, embedded in an environment. 
 
Yet meditation implies the precise opposite of this. It is an inward looking, passive, 
solitary activity where the individual detaches herself from interchange with the 
material world. Like the activity of Hegel’s stoic it involves “withdrawing from the 
bustle of existence into the simple essentiality of thought” (Hegel, 1807, p.121). It is 
therefore difficult to see how it could be the means of unification for their fragmented 
subject. 
 
Conclusion 
 
In this chapter, then, have we looked at enactivist accounts in general and concluded 
that they incorporate a number of Marxian themes. These include (but are not 
exhausted by) the self-production of the agent, and a dialectical conception of the 
relationship between individual organisms, and between those organisms and the 
environment, as mediated by activity, which replicates Marx’s own account of free 
labour. We have also looked at The Embodied Mind, noting, amongst other things, the 
influence of Lewontin, as well as a significant argumentative thread which starts off 
from the fact of the disunified subject, locates its roots in social practice and seeks to 
resolve it by practical means. Whilst this is also a Marxian strategy, the suggested 
practical solution (meditation) seems flawed and at odds with an active, embodied, 
embedded conception of the agent. 
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Chapter 7 – The Extended Mind 
 
 
A being that does not have its nature outside of itself is not a natural being. (Marx, 1844a, 
p.104) 
 
Introduction 
 
In the latter half of the previous chapter we looked at a single work which has had 
significant influence on current cognitive science – Varela et al’s The Embodied Mind. 
We argued that this text, whilst forming part of our hypothesized ‘retreat from 
alienation’ also had some weaknesses on its own terms, and that these were weaknesses 
that a Marxian analysis could help to highlight. In this chapter we turn from the 
embodied mind to the extended mind. A similar story can be told here, although we 
ought to note two complicating factors. Firstly, although in this case there is again a 
main work which will be the focus of our attention – in this instance a single paper 
(Clark & Chalmers, 1998/1998a,  reprinted in Clark, 2008) – there are also other texts 
by one of the original authors (in particular, Clark, 1997; 2003a; 2003b; 2008) – which 
to varying degrees deal with the same topic. Secondly, and connectedly, there are not 
only different texts by the same author but also seemingly different senses of the 
‘extended mind’ given not only between texts but also within texts. Our task will 
therefore also involve giving some indication of which versions of the ‘extended mind’ 
we think are friendly to the ‘retreat from alienation’ and which present difficulties. In 
fact, a great deal more time will be spent on the latter rather than the former – although 
this should not be taken as indicating a devaluing of the former. 
 
We will begin with a summary of Clark and Chalmers original (1998) paper: 
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The Extended Mind 
 
Clark and Chalmers’ (henceforth C&C) initial target in this paper is the idea that 
cognitive processes are to be located only “in the head” (C&C, 1988, p.8). In place of 
such a conception of things they wish to advocate what they call an ‘active 
externalism’. To illustrate what is meant by this they point out that some of the tasks 
which can be completed using cognitive processes (traditionally so called) can also be 
completed using a mixture of cognitive processes and manipulation of the external 
environment. Taking examples from the work of Kirsh and Maglio (Kirsh & Maglio 
1994;  Kirsh 1995 – see next chapter) they argue for instance that one can assess the 
‘fit’ of 2 dimensional shapes into 2 dimensional sockets in a game of Tetris either by 
imagining them rotated in various ways or by actually rotating them using a rotate 
button. Similarly, when playing Scrabble, one can either ‘mentally’ rearrange letters to 
create a new word or one can physically rearrange the tiles.  Moreover, in many cases 
taking the latter course of action makes the task easier and can in addition be said to be 
‘enabling’ in a variety of ways (see Clark 1997, 2003a, 2008 for development of this 
theme) 
 
C&C’s next move is to suggest that in those instances where we do take the physical 
manipulation route rather than the imagination route, there is no reason why our doing 
so should be seen as choosing the ‘non–cognitive’ option. The justification for this 
position is what Clark later (2003b) comes to describe as a ‘parity principle’: 
 
If as we confront some task, a part of the world functions as a process which, were it 
done in the head, we would have no hesitation in recognizing as part of the cognitive 
process, then that part of the world is (so we claim) part of the cognitive process. 
(C&C, 1998, p.8) 
 
The traditional conception of the cognitive, then, is wrong – cognitive processes “ain’t 
(all) in the head” (ibid). With the case of the scrabble players for instance we can say 
that “In a very real sense, the re-arrangement of tiles on the tray is not part of action; it 
is part of thought” (ibid. p.10) 
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Having made the case for extended cognition C&C then want to “take things a step 
further” (ibid. p.12). They want to show that not only cognitive processes but also 
mental states are susceptible to extension. In particular they want to show that “beliefs 
can be constituted partly by features of the environment” (ibid). To this end they devise 
the now well-known scenario involving ‘Otto’ and ‘Inga’. Otto has Alzheimer’s 
disease, thus impairing his memory. In order to help him remember things he writes 
down any new information he ‘learns’ in a notebook which he carries with him. 
Included amongst his notes are addresses of buildings. Unlike Otto, Inga has normal 
memory function. She and Otto hear separately of an exhibition at the museum and 
both decide to go. Inga pauses to recall where the museum is located (53
rd
 Street) 
before walking there. Otto looks up the address in his notebook before walking there. In 
both cases we can say, according to C&C, that the individual concerned wanted to go to 
the museum and believed that the museum was on 53
rd
 Street. We can say this because 
“the notebook plays for Otto the same role that memory plays for Inga” (ibid. p.13). 
Moreover, in both cases it is legitimate to characterize the individuals concerned as 
having had their beliefs before they consulted their respective information sources; we 
can say of Inga that “the belief was sitting somewhere in memory waiting to be 
accessed” (C&C, 1998a, p.7) and there is no reason why we cannot say the same of 
Otto with his notebook. Hence we have shown that in the case of Otto “a belief is 
simply not in the head” (C&C, 1998, p.14) 
 
C&C are keen, however, not to open the floodgates to any kind of external information 
bearing artefact. They thus outline further conditions (later modified in Clark, 2003b) 
that the notebook fulfills (and which any other contending artefact or medium ought to 
fulfill) in order to count as part Otto’s extended mind. These are that: 
 
1) The item in question must be a constant in Otto’s life. 
 
     2) The information it contains must be directly available without difficulty. 
 
3) Otto must automatically endorse this information. 
 
     4) Such information must also have been consciously endorsed previously. 
 
Having developed this notion of extended belief, C&C conclude matters by indulging 
in some speculation about further possible applications of their thesis. “Socially 
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extended cognition” (C&C, 1998, p.17) is one such possibility. If having a belief can be 
partly constituted by having a notebook it could also be partly constituted by having a 
human being who is as readily accessible and reliable as a notebook. Thus “the waiter 
at my favourite restaurant might act as a repository of my beliefs about my favourite 
meals…In other cases one’s beliefs might naturally be seen to be embodied in one’s 
secretary, one’s accountant or one’s collaborator” (ibid. pp.17-18).  
 
Another such possibility is “the extended self” (ibid. p.18). Our mental states (such as 
belief) make up a large part of who we are, say C&C, so if we can talk about these 
being extended it would seem to follow that we can talk about the self being extended.  
Two possible consequences of this are that “interfering with someone’s environment 
will have the same moral significance as interfering with their person” and that “certain 
forms of social activity might be reconceived as less akin to communication and action 
and more akin to thought” (ibid). 
 
We should also note that the argument is advanced in several places by the introduction 
of ‘cyborgian’ style speculation about the physical integration of human beings with 
technical hardware (a theme Clark develops in greater detail in 2003a). Thus, for 
example, a third ‘Tetris’ scenario is considered wherein an individual has a neural 
implant that allows him to rotate the shapes just by willing it. This for C&C “seems to 
be a case of cognitive processing” (C&C, 1998a, p.2). Likewise, in response to an 
argument that ‘coupled systems’ (as exemplified by Otto and his notebook) are too 
easily decoupled to count as cognitive, C&C imagine a future scenario wherein an 
individual could plug ‘modules’ into his brain to help with various tasks such as 
geometric reasoning. In such a situation, they say, we would not deny that the processes 
involving these modules were “part of thought” (C&C, 1998a, p.5) despite their being 
easy to decouple.  And again, when attempting to counter the objection that Otto’s 
notebook lookups have a perceptual phenomenology and so cannot be treated as true 
cases of ‘belief’, C&C make reference to a scenario in the movie ‘Terminator’. The 
eponymous hero of that film has memories which are “displayed” before him in his 
visual field, but these displayed items, say C&C, still count as examples of “standing 
memories” and hence of “standing beliefs” (C&C, 1998, p.16). 
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The Parity Argument 
 
An initial critical response to this argument might be one that focuses on the ‘parity 
principle’. This is not an untypical move. As Menary points out “the parity principle 
has become the focus for some of the main criticisms levelled at EM” (Menary, 2010, 
p.5); and it does seem that there is perhaps a certain sleight of hand involved here. We 
might highlight this in our own way by drawing comparison with a passage from Marx 
on the subject of money: 
 
I may have no intellect, but money is the true mind of all things and so how should its 
possessor have no intellect? Moreover he can buy himself intellectuals and is not the 
man who has power over intellectuals not more intellectual than they? I who can get 
with money everything that the human heart longs for, do I not possess all human 
capacities? Does not my money thus change all my incapacities into their opposite?  
(Marx, 1844a, p. 109) 
 
There are perhaps two arguments at work here. One, implicit in the assertion that 
“money is the mind of all things”, recalls Marx’s account of commodity fetishism (see 
chapter 2) according to which we really do, collectively, externalize ourselves in money 
and commodities, which as a result appear to be endowed with minds of their own 
(Marx, 1867, pp.163-179). We will return to this idea later. 
 
The main argument, however, is an exploration of the hypothesis that an individual 
acquires certain capacities as result of acquiring money. Here then, we might say that 
Marx is putting forward his own version of a ‘parity principle’ where a different 
artefact - money - takes the place of the notebook. Despite my lacking certain 
capacities, money enables me to get results which are identical to those that I would get 
if I did have those capacities. There is thus a functional equivalence between having 
those capacities and having money – to such an extent that having the latter can be 
identified with having the former.  
 
Given that Marx’s account also centres on mental capacities, if we were to take it 
literally we could perhaps construct a thought experiment parallel to that of the Otto 
story. ‘Rich Otto’ does not have a notebook but instead has money. He wants to get to 
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the Museum of Modern Art on 53
rd
 Street. He consults his wallet and pulls out a £20 
note. He uses this money to pay for a taxi journey (or a bus ride, or a train journey – the 
‘vehicle’ is unimportant). Could it now be claimed that the money is part of Rich Otto’s 
extended mind? Presumably we would need to show that the money fulfils the same 
conditions that the notebook is said to fulfil. An attempt at this might run as follows: 
 
  
1) The item in question must be a constant in Otto’s life. This is surely the case 
with the money and so little argument is needed here. A sceptic might suggest 
that Otto does not have the self-same money available to him at every instant – 
but even C&C would probably dispute the relevance of this. If the original Otto 
had a helper at home who periodically transferred the information in the original 
notebook into a new notebook this would not make any difference to C&C’s 
argument. 
 
2) The information it contains must be directly available without difficulty. The 
issue here is perhaps with what constitutes the ‘information’ in the case of the 
money. There seem to be several possibilities. We might take what is literally 
written on the note as the information (e.g. £20 – or ‘I promise to pay the bearer 
on demand £20 etc.’), or maybe just the visual appearance of the note, or 
maybe, at a more abstract level, what that note means to Otto in that particular 
situation (here we are perhaps alluding to an ‘affordance’ (Gibson, 1979) based 
approach to information, though re-envisioned for economic life). In the latter 
case the money might be taken as expressing information along the lines of “I 
can get you from A to B”. In any case, however we interpret the concept of 
information here, there is no problem with the idea that the money conveys 
information of some kind. 
 
3) Otto must automatically endorse this information – Otto has no reason to 
question what money tells him, so this is unproblematic. 
 
4) Such information must also have been consciously endorsed previously -
Likewise Otto has put his trust in money before. 
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We can imagine many possible objections to this account – objections perhaps centring 
on the role that transport plays in the ‘Rich Otto’ story, or on the difference between the 
types of information presented in both scenarios; or perhaps of  relevance here would 
be Adams & Aizawa’s remark that “not just any functional equivalence is cognitive 
equivalence” (Adams & Aizawa, 2010, p.135). Some of these objections could perhaps 
be met – although probably at the expense of stretching a definition or two. Our aim, 
however, is not to develop an elaborate and detailed defence of this story but rather to 
present it as a kind of ‘reductio’, for the point with Marx’s ‘parity principle’ is surely 
that it is not intended to be taken literally. Despite the implication that the moneyed 
individual has the relevant capacities in a certain sense, Marx’s critical intent is to show 
that the literal construal of this state of affairs is flatly false. The individual who lacks 
an intellect does not gain genuine intellect just because he has the purchasing power to 
acquire intellectual results produced by others. A distinction might be made here 
between social appearance and the ‘fact of the matter’. It may be the case that within a 
particular mode of social organization, having a certain amount of money can have 
consequences commensurate with having a certain intellect, even perhaps consequences 
for how the moneyed individual is perceived by others in these terms – but there is also 
a fact of the matter outside of the arena of social consequence and social agreement. An 
individual does not gain certain capacities just because the use of a particular artefact in 
a particular social setting produces results identical to those which would be produced 
if he did have those capacities.  
 
It is clear how this argument might have implications for Clark and Chalmers’ account. 
At the very least, we might say, they should not take it for granted that functional 
equivalence (in a particular social setting) entails property equivalence. There is a fact 
of the matter outside of the social consequences of Otto’s use of the notebook. In his 
case the fact of the matter is that he has Alzheimer’s and therefore – on one reading at 
least - does precisely lack the properties that the Extended Mind argument seeks to 
attribute to him. No amount of functionally equivalent consequences can change this 
fact. 
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Externalization and Extension 
 
An attack on the parity principle, however, is not our chief concern in this chapter. 
Rather our main interest is in distentangling that which is both valid and chimes with 
Marxian perspectives, in Clark and Chalmers’ account, from that which seems to have 
gone awry. Our starting point is that of a general sympathy with Clark & Chalmers’ 
position for, unlike non-Marxian critiques of the extended mind, we begin from the 
assumption that there are senses in which agents do externalize themselves in various 
ways in the material world. Moreover some of these senses appear to match up with 
versions of the extended mind thesis. 
 
We might remind ourselves in this respect how Marx thought that individuals realized 
themselves through productive activity and that this process involved a dialectic 
between subject and object which he expressed as follows: 
 
By thus acting on the external world and changing it, he [the productive individual] at 
the same time changes his own nature.  (Marx, 1867, p.455) 
 
We saw in chapter 3 how Vygotsky (1930) made use of this idea in relation to our 
‘cognitive natures’ by introducing the notion of ‘psychological tools’. On Vygotsky’s 
account we develop our cognitive capacities through the creation and manipulation of 
external resources such as signs, diagrams and maps. This strategy “enhances and 
immediately extends the possibilities of behaviour” (Vygotsky, 1930, p.5). Vygotsky’s 
account, in turn has been very influential on Clark, in particular forming the backdrop 
for his own reworking of the concept of ‘scaffolding’ in (Clark, 1997), and it is clear 
that Otto’s notebook in the 1998 paper can be viewed as a psychological tool or 
‘scaffold’ in this sense. Thus we might suggest that there is a ‘strand’ or .version’ of the 
‘extended mind’ thesis, and one to which Clark sometimes confines himself, which 
makes use of the notion of scaffolding - along with other relevant concepts such as 
Kirsh & Maglio’s ‘epistemic action’ (see next chapter) - to describe what might be 
called a ‘figurative’ extension of mind. Here what is implied is not the literal extension 
of mind in space, but rather the metaphorical ‘extension’ of cognitive capacities 
through the manipulation of external resources.  
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It should be made clear from the outset, then, that we have no objection to this sense of 
‘extended mind’. Indeed this is grist to our mill for it is an example of a Marxian idea 
filtering down to contemporary cognitive science.  
 
Returning to Marx, however, it will also be remembered that his account of productive 
activity did include an element of spatial extension. He was concerned not just with the 
developmental consequences of man’s interaction with nature but with the various ways 
in which the product of the agent’s activity becomes an extension of his being. Nature 
was the “inorganic body of man” (Marx, 1844a, p.81) not just because it provided man 
with a means of physical sustenance but also because in altering it man saw himself 
reflected in it, and in using it, it became a practical extension of him. It was in relation 
to this latter point that Marx argued that in fashioning tools from natural resources 
“nature becomes one of the organs of his activity, one that he annexes to his own bodily 
organs” (Marx, 1865, p.456).  We saw in chapter 3 how this idea was taken up by 
Merleau-Ponty (1945). In his account of finding one’s way with a stick, the latter 
became “a bodily auxiliary, an extension of the bodily synthesis” (ibid. p.176). Again, 
in turn, this account has had some influence on Clark’s own work. In particular, in 
(2003a, pp.89-114), Clark, referencing Merleau-Ponty, considers the use of artefacts to 
extend ones subjective sense of space. This idea of ‘experiential augmentation’ seems 
to give us a second sense of ‘extended mind’ (although not one that is broached in the 
1998 paper.)  This version of an ‘extended mind’ also seems unobjectionable, and is 
again of interest to us because of its apparently Marxian lineage.  
 
More generally, we have no objection to the idea that agent and environment can be 
fruitfully thought of as a single system in certain circumstances, or that the interaction 
between them can be characterized as a single systemic process. As we have said in 
relation both to dynamical and autopoietic accounts of cognition, this conception of 
things meshes well with Marx’s own view of labour. It is precisely a unity between 
agents, their activity and their environment which Marxian theory sees as present, in 
distorted form, in alienated labour and which it thinks can be realized “in a human 
manner” (Marx, 1844b, p.121) with the end of alienation. Moreover we can agree that 
‘cognition’ is implicated in this reciprocal process and that, to a certain degree, it is a 
matter of context and convenience whether one attributes it to an individual agent 
conceived of in separation from her activity, or whether one includes her activity itself 
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(which inevitably incorporates features of the environment) as part of her cognition. 
Thus, for instance, there is nothing necessarily problematic in C&C’s assertion that the 
rearranging of scrabble tiles is “part of thought” (1998, p.10) – although it is not clear 
why, in one-sided fashion, they should therefore conclude that it is “not part of action” 
(ibid). 
 
All of these examples, then, provide legitimate senses of ‘mind extension’, senses 
which have some grounding in Marxian accounts of labour and externalization. We 
should note however that none of the senses of ‘externalization’ found in Marx’s work 
imply the literal, non subjective, spatial augmentation of statically conceived mental 
contents or their literal transference to external artefacts. It is this version of the 
extended mind, as exemplified in C&C’s interpretation of the Otto story, which, we 
might suggest, presents the most difficulties. 
 
Literally extended? 
 
Before pursuing this line of reasoning, however, we should perhaps sound a note of 
caution, for some may object that we are presenting a ‘straw man’. Clark and Chalmers, 
it might be argued, never explicitly advocate the literal, objective, spatial augmentation 
of mind. Rather, what they are concerned with are conditions for being “part of the 
physical substrate of a cognitive system” (Clark, 2008, p.88) or the “local mechanistic 
supervenience base” (ibid. p.118) for cognition and mental states, and an extended 
supervenience base is not the same thing as a literally extended mind. 
 
If this objection is both coherent and correct, then all well and good – our critique is not 
then directed at any version of Clark and Chalmers’ extended mind thesis but at a 
common misconstrual of it, albeit one which is popular (see e.g. Fodor, 2009). It is true, 
we might observe, that C&C for some reason decided to call their original paper ‘the 
extended mind’ rather than the ‘extended supervenience base for cognition’ but this 
rhetorical flourish should not be taken too literally. 
 
.We might want to consider, however, how the objection that C&C’s real concern is 
with ‘supervenience bases’ or ‘material substrates’ is supposed to play out as a counter 
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to a literal interpretation of mind extension, particularly in relation to the latter section 
of the 1998 paper where, as noted earlier, C&C make the transition “from cognition to 
mind” (C&C, 1988, p.12). In this section C&C unambiguously state that their concern 
is with “truly mental states” (ibid) which “can be constituted partly by features of the 
environment” (ibid. my emphasis). These mental states are “simply not in the head” 
(ibid. p.14) not because spatial talk is thought to be misguided but because they are 
located elsewhere (in the notebook).  
 
At this juncture a critic of the ‘literal’ interpretation of these passages may point out 
that C&C’s intention is not to suggest that mental states ‘themselves’ are located in the 
notebook but merely that the notebook acts as the physical substrate of such mental 
states. C&C can remain agnostic about whether mental states themselves are located 
anywhere.  
 
The problem with this line of reasoning seems to be that C&C don’t appear to be 
agnostic about the location of mental states (and cognitive processes) when they aren’t 
being extended. The suggestion rather seems to be that un-extended mind is “in the 
head” (ibid. pp. 7, 8, 9, 10, 14, 15). Indeed it is this spatial conception of things that 
justifies talk about ‘extension’ in the first place. Once we accept that Inga’s beliefs are 
“in her head” the implication is that Otto’s are “in his notebook”. Otto’s beliefs, the 
argument goes, stand in some relation to his notebook which is equivalent (in relevant 
respects) to that in which Inga’s beliefs stand to her own head/brain. Whatever that 
relation is (e.g. supervenience), if by virtue of it such phraseology is justified in Inga’s 
case, then by virtue of that same relation such phraseology is also justified in Otto’s 
case. Hence any agnosticism that might be attributed to, or professed by C&C (see e.g. 
Dartnall, 2004) in relation to the ‘actual location’ of mental states drops out of the 
equation as practically irrelevant. C&C’s argument boils down to this: “In any sense in 
which it is meaningful to say that Inga’s beliefs are ‘in her head’ (and C&C do think it 
is meaningful), it is just as meaningful to say that Otto’s are in his notebook.” 
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The Alienated Mind 
 
In making our case against this ‘literally extended mind’ we might draw further 
comparison with Hegel and Marx. Earlier we argued that none of the senses of 
externalization found in Marx’s work involved the literal, non-subjective, spatial 
augmentation of mental contents or their literal transference to external artefacts. What 
we do find however is the description of scenarios wherein certain artefacts are treated 
as if this literal leap from head to world had been achieved, for this is precisely the case 
with alienation. As we saw in chapter 1, on Hegel’s account of alienation the 
externalized products of consciousness manifest themselves as “an alien reality already 
present and given, a reality which already has a being of its own and in which it 
[consciousness] does not recognize itself” (Hegel, 1807, p.294).  Likewise we saw in 
chapter 2 how Marx took this theme up, characterizing the product of alienated labour 
as “an alien being, as a power independent of the producer” (Marx, 1844a, p.78) and 
later extending this analysis also to commodities, which “take on a fantastic form” 
(Marx, 1865, p.436) appearing as “independent beings endowed with life” (ibid). It is 
just such an analysis, we might argue, which applies to Clark and Chalmers’ literally 
extended mind. In their interpretation of the Otto story they present us with what can be 
usefully considered as an ‘alienated’ account of mind. 
 
In saying that the Otto story presents an ‘alienated’ account of mind we do not wish to 
imply, of course,  that there is anything amiss in Otto’s mode of externalizing himself 
in his notebook as there is, on a Marxian analysis, with the externalization of human 
mental properties in commodities for example. In this sense the analogy with the 
alienated object does not hold up. Otto is perfectly aware that his jottings in the 
notebook are his own product and he does not relate to them as to an alien being or as 
to something endowed with its own life and energy. As noted earlier, Otto’s activity 
with the notebook forms a straightforward and unproblematic example of the sort of 
phenomenon that Clark, under the influence of Vygotsky, links with the term 
‘scaffolding’. 
 
However the problem occurs when Clark goes the extra mile and describes the 
information in the notebook as constitutive of Otto’s beliefs, or when, as seems to be 
implied, the notebook itself is seen as constitutive of Otto’s memory.  It is this 
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interpretation of the state of affairs with Otto and his notebook which seems to meet 
the criterion for Hegelian/Marxian alienation. By projecting mental qualities onto the 
notebook C&C have succeeded in making human mentality itself seem strange and 
‘other’ to the reader.  Our everyday acts of externalization now appear as something 
mysterious to us. Like the commodity which evolves out of its brain “grotesque ideas, 
far more wonderful than if it were to begin dancing of its own free will” (Marx, 1867, 
p.164). Otto’s notebook seems to have developed ideas above its station. 
 
It is this very strangeness, we might add,  which has done so well for Clark and 
Chalmers, for the Otto story reads like a piece of ‘fantastic’ fiction - one which flies in 
the face of “common sense” (Clark, 2008, p.105) - and has thus remained popular 
partly because it represents what might be called ‘a good read’. In this way it far 
surpasses what Clark himself calls “the single best piece of philosophical fiction ever 
written” (Clark, 2003a, p.90) – Dennett’s short story about spatial displacement ‘Where 
Am I’? (Dennett, 1981a,  pp.310-323).  
 
Reification of mind  
 
This ‘making strange’ of mind occurs partly, we might say, as a result of reification. In 
projecting mental qualities onto the note book C&C have turned mind, or a subset of 
mind, into a kind of ‘thing’ with a specific spatio-temporal location. This reification, in 
turn, seems to be co-occurent with an objectified account of internal mind. Mind, even 
when it doesn’t ‘seep out’ (Clark, 2003b, p.8), is still thingified on C&C’s account.  
 
Such would appear to be the case, for example, with the ‘portability criterion’ for mind 
- that to count as part of an individual’s cognitive system an artefact needs to be 
‘reliably available’ – meaning in Otto’s case that he always carries his notebook with 
him (Clark, 2003b, p.6). This is thought to be on analogy with Inga’s carrying her 
beliefs around in her head even when she isn’t inspecting them. Both cases we might 
say are founded on a literalistic conception of what it is to ‘have a belief’ - beliefs are 
things that you carry around with you, like a piece of personal property,  either in your 
head or in a notebook. 
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This literal-mindedness is also evident in a later argument put forward by Clark (2003b, 
2008) in reply to the objection (attributed to Martin Davies) that the access which Otto 
has to his notebook is perceptual, unlike the ‘access’ which Inga has to her memories, 
and as such is directed at an object to which others also have access. Clark’s response 
(omitting some complicating references to ‘multiple personality disorder’) is as 
follows: 
 
..Why then suppose that uniqueness of access is anything more than a contingent fact 
about standard biological recall? If in the future science devised a way for you to 
occasionally tap into my stored memories, would that make them any less mine or part 
of my cognitive apparatus?...it seems to be at most a contingent fact that I and I alone 
have a certain kind of access to my own biologically stored memories and beliefs. 
(Clark, 2008, pp.100 -101, author’s emphasis) 
 
There are many assumptions made in this passage which could perhaps be questioned, 
but we will not look at them all here. Instead we will just make the single observation 
that Clark has taken as his starting point a traditional ‘privileged access’ perspective – 
according to which I have ‘access’ to my own beliefs in a way that others don’t - and 
has perhaps rightly decided that this picture needs reforming. However, instead of 
arguing that one’s relationship to one’s own memories or beliefs might not best be 
described in terms of objects to which one has ‘access’, (a move which may have 
enabled him to re-characterize beliefs in an enactive way – e.g. as manifest through 
practice),  he has gone the unusual route of leaving this element of the traditional 
picture untouched and has instead waived the ‘privileged’ part, so that anyone might 
have the same ‘access’ to my own internal ‘store’ that I have. This would seem to have 
the unusual repercussion that my beliefs are only ‘mine’ by virtue of their (literally 
conceived) spatial location, for in all other respects other people seem to be able to 
stand in the same relation to my beliefs as I do. I have my beliefs and memories, we 
might say, in the same sense that I have a wristwatch. Indeed, if we marry this 
conception with Clark’s conjectures elsewhere concerning the plugging in of neural 
implants to perform mental functions (e.g. Clark & Chalmers, 1998; Clark, 2003a), it 
seems that others might be able to steal my beliefs and memories just as they might 
steal my wristwatch – or any other piece of my property - by getting hold of my neural 
implants and plugging them into their own brains.  
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These two examples, then, evoke a reified conception of internal beliefs and memories 
as things that one has about one’s person (‘in the head’), and which another person 
might gain access to in the same way that I am held to gain access to them. Given that 
C&C had such a literalistic account of ‘internal’ mind, we might suggest that the 
transference of mental properties onto external artefacts was an easy next step for them.  
 
Mental Properties and Mental Property 
 
It will be noticed that in outlining this conception of reified mental properties we have 
occasionally alluded to the other sort of ‘property’. On a Clarkian view, we might say, 
my relationship to my beliefs, memories etc. is a little like my relationship to personal 
property. Both are only contingently mine. I might carry such items around with me but 
someone else could get hold of them. Such a view perhaps brings to mind Hegel’s own 
conception of property which, it will be remembered, also revealed a degree of 
literalism about vehicles for mental contents. According to Hegel: “I have my life and 
body as I have other things, only insofar as they express my will” (Hegel, 1821, p.53). 
In this way his will was also expressed in his property, although it was not “so vividly 
distinct” (ibid. p.55) as in his body.  
 
The similarity with Clark’s account is double-edged. Insofar as Hegel is simply saying 
that the objects of the world can become extensions of his being he is saying nothing 
which runs counter to his and Marx’s account of externalization and extension 
elsewhere, which Clark has taken up, in different ways, in his arguments for scaffolding 
(Clark, 1997) and augmentation of spatial presence (2003a). However, insofar as Hegel 
has an objectified conception of his being in the world, such that he relates to his body 
– as a vehicle for his will - in the exact same way that he relates to items of property, 
then this would seem to replicate C&C’s own reified conception of the mental. In both 
instances, a ‘plug-and-play’ view of vehicles for mental contents is at work. 
 
Inside Out 
 
We have criticized Clark & Chalmers’ ‘literally extended mind’ then, on the basis that 
it presents an alienated conception of mind, which conception is co-occurent with a 
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reified view of non-extended mental contents. We might also criticise it on separate 
grounds that it is insufficiently dialectical. The thesis of the literally extended mind, as 
exemplified in the Otto argument, fixates on the idea of mind seeping out into the 
world, but pays scarce attention to the converse notion of the world seeping into the 
mind. This oversight seems incompatible with the emphasis given, even in the same 
paper, on the more fluid, dialectical notion of ‘coupling’ (C&C, 1998, pp.8-12). 
 
Otto’s notebook, it will be recalled, is held to have functional similarity with Inga’s 
memory. In both cases the idea seems to be that Otto and Inga can ‘look things up’ in 
their respective information repositories (ibid. p.12). Insofar as this implies a ‘storage’ 
conception of memory we might say that objections to such a picture are well known 
both within the extended mind literature (e.g. Dartnall, as cited in Clark, 2008, pp.97-
98) and outside of it (e.g. Toth & Hunt, 1999). However Clark also alludes to another 
criticism put forward by Chrisley (personal communication), arguing for a disanalogy 
between biological memory and Otto’s note book for developmental reasons: 
 
…As children we do not begin by experiencing our biological memory as any kind of 
object or resource…because we do not encounter our own memory perceptually. 
Instead it is just part of the apparatus through which we relate to and experience the 
world. Might it be this special developmental role that decides what is to count as part 
of the agent and what is to count as part of the world? (Clark, 2008, p.101) 
 
Clark is not impressed by this as a line of attack. He suggests that it is possible that a 
child might begin by viewing her own bodily parts as objects, or conversely that 
nonbiological cognitive resources might be incorporated into her system at a young age 
such that they aren’t experienced by her as objects; or even that a child might be taught 
to view her own cognitive faculties in objectified fashion by being “plugged into 
biofeedback controllers” (ibid). Such developmental possibilities, says Clark, although 
interesting, are irrelevant to the notebook argument, for “what counts in the end is the 
resource’s current role in guiding reasoning and behaviour, not its historical positioning 
in a developmental nexus” (ibid. p.102).  
 
It seems possible however that Clark has not dealt with ‘the developmental issue’ 
sufficiently here, for – expanding on Chrisley’s point – we might say that it is not just 
that as children we don’t experience our memory as an object or resource, but that if we 
do view or experience it as such later on, this might well be the result of interaction 
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with external resources. Let us start from the premise that, as Chrisley suggests, the 
child does not view or experience his memory in a detached, objectified fashion. We 
might then contrast this with the conception of things according to which we do “look 
things up in memory” i.e. according to which memory is viewed as a resource to which 
we stand in a certain relation. It is implied by C&C’s own argument that at some point 
developmentally such a description becomes appropriate. A relatively reasonable 
developmental hypothesis to derive from this might be that the move from transparent 
memory to ‘looking things up in memory’ might not be unrelated to external practices 
such as “looking thing things up in a notebook” i.e. the development of biological 
memory, or our view of it, might have its roots in just such practices. 
 
Here we might draw comparison with Vygotsky’s notion that “outward, 
interpsychological relations become the inner, intrapsychological mental functions” 
(Vygotsky, 1934, p.xxxii). Exactly how this story should be told in relation to 
objectified memory is open to question. Possibly our very ability to remember at all, 
beyond a certain degree of competency, is co-dependent on our ability to retrieve 
information externally. Less radically, perhaps external acts of search and information 
retrieval scaffold internal acts of search and information retrieval. As Clark says 
elsewhere, in relation to mental arithmetic: “the trick…is to learn to manipulate a 
mental model in the same way as we originally manipulated the real world” (Clark, 
1997, p.61). At the very least, our conception of ourselves as users of memory as a 
resource in which things can be ‘looked up’, seems bound up with our external 
practices. We only think we can ‘look things up’ in memory, we might say, because we 
can look things up in a notebook.  
 
If we accept such an analysis then it seems that C&C’s uni-directional notion of an 
‘extended mind’ does not adequately capture the true state of affairs. If anything, the 
internal cognition of the agent is an extension of notebook bound processes rather than 
vice versa. The point however is perhaps that, literally speaking, Otto’s cognitive 
processes are no more part of an extended note-book than the notebook is part of Otto’s 
extended mind. 
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Appendages of the machine 
 
We have so far concentrated mainly on the extended mind hypothesis as it is presented 
in the Otto argument. In this last part of the chapter we will switch our attention to the 
‘cyborgian’ portion of Clark’s work. Although some of the issues this raises have 
already been broached in our critique of ‘reification’, and in our suggestion that the 
latter brings with it a ‘plug and play’ view of vehicles for mental contents, there are 
some additional concerns that need to be addressed. 
 
As we noted earlier, in The Extended Mind C&C speculate on the use of neural 
implants for a wide range of tasks (rotating tetris shapes, geometric reasoning, 
displaying ‘memories’). These implants are not typically discussed as examples of 
mind extension per se, but rather are used to illustrate the argument that if we are 
willing to consider such devices as part of our cognitive architecture when they are 
lodged within our nervous system we should also be willing to consider the use of other 
artifacts as part of cognition when they are external to us. However although not 
explicitly given as examples of mind extension in the 1998 paper, the implant examples 
are later utilized by Clark in a further variant of the extended mind argument – perhaps 
that whose proximity to functionalism is most clear. This is the argument that 
biological capabilities can be replaced/extended through the incorporation into the 
agent’s body/brain of hi- tech artefacts, with the resulting capabilities being viewed as 
no less human or cognitive than previously.
15
 To some extent this version of the 
extended mind argument could be viewed as a variant of that which we earlier 
characterized as the ‘figurative’ extension of mind, where cognitive capacities are 
‘extended’ though the use of artefacts, via processes such as scaffolding. However there 
is perhaps a difference here insofar as the cyborgian extended mind (as we shall call it) 
                                                 
15
  Dartnall (2004), with reference to an exchange between O’Brien and Clark (O’Brien, 1998) argues for 
a different distinction here – that between arguments for the extended mind which are dependent on the 
‘parity principle’ and ones which are dependent on the ‘complementarity argument’:  “The parity 
argument stresses ‘the way that extra-neural elements can play a role similar to internal ones’…But 
[Clark].. provided a ‘more interesting and plausible argument’ that turns on the way ‘external elements 
may play a role different from, but complementary to, the inner ones’…This is the complementarity 
argument.” 
Dartnall thinks that it is the latter style of argument which is developed in (2003). However I am not 
convinced of the usefulness of this analysis since it turns on an undefined conception of  ‘sameness’ or 
‘difference’ of role (as does functionalism generally.) One man’s ‘artefact which plays a similar role to 
internal elements’ is another man’s ‘artefact which plays a different but complementary role to internal 
elements.’ 
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is less about being an active manipulator of external resources and more about being a 
passive recipient of technological upgrades. 
 
This variant of the extended mind thesis is developed in most detail in Natural Born 
Cyborgs.  Here Clark argues for “the plain literal truth” (Clark, 2003a, p.3) that man is 
a ‘cyborg’. By this he appears to mean not only that human beings have the power to 
annexe themselves to various external media (artefacts, devices etc) but that realization 
of human developmental potential is conditional on such mergers. Thus: 
 
Minds like ours are made for mergers. Tools-R-US and always have been…What 
makes us distinctively human is our capacity to continually restructure and rebuild our 
own mental circuitry courtesy of an empowering web of cognition, education, 
technology and artefacts. (Clark, 2003a, pp.7/10) 
 
In some respects, Clark’s position here is not too dissimilar to that of Marx. We have 
repeatedly stressed that for Marx the self-creation of the human subject is a distinctive 
feature of labour. Moreover we have also emphasized that how this can involve the use 
of artifacts which the agent annexes “to his own bodily organs” (Marx, 1867, p.285). 
Some commentators have taken the latter as evidence of a central concern with “hybrid 
human-machine embodiment” (Wendling, 2009, p.141), arguing that for Marx “the 
integration of a set of instruments into the human corporeal schema defines the human 
species as such” (ibid. p.240). However, unlike Marx, what seems to be lacking in 
Clark’s account of the cyborgian extended mind is any systematic means of 
distinguishing between human/artefact interfaces that serve to facilitate human 
development and those that might serve to stifle it. 
 
 
Reservations 
 
This is not to say that Clark ignores completely the question of possible pitfalls in 
mind-machine ‘mergers’. In the concluding chapter of (Clark, 2003a) a number of 
worries are raised, all of which are centred on the loosely defined idea of a threat posed 
by the increasing dominance of technology in human life. Of these the most promising 
(from the point of view of this thesis) are those that he labels ‘Uncontrollability’ and, 
appropriately enough, ‘Alienation’. The former is given as the worry that the 
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dominance of technology, and our integration with it, might result in the loss of control 
over own lives – that “increased human-machine symbiosis directly implies decreasing 
control” (ibid. p.175) The latter is given as the worry that “agent technologies may 
harmfully degrade how people value themselves and treat each other.” (ibid. p.178). 
However, although Clark is prepared to treat such reservations with enough seriousness 
to spend a chapter on them it is clear that they have no decisive impact on his overall 
position. Because he has no critique of the ways in which the integration of agent and 
artefact have been enforced in the past, or the present (e.g. in mechanized labour), he 
has no principled concern with any future possibilities. It is thus a reassurance for him 
that:  
 
..The kind of control that we, both as individuals and as society, look likely to retain is 
precisely the kind we always had. (Clark, 2003a. p.175) 
 
Any threat posed by burgeoning cyborgianism can be met provided that we are careful 
enough and “pay closer attention” (ibid. p.179) to the social implications of new 
technologies. As a reward we will see the cybernetic equivalent of the end of alienation, 
the fusion of brain, body and implant, where Marx’s ‘whole man’ (Marx, 1844a, p.91) 
is replaced by the similarly unitary ‘single adaptive unit’: 
 
Our redesigned minds will be distinguished by a better and more sensitive 
understanding of the self, of control, of the importance of the body, and of the systemic 
tentacles that bind brain, body, and technology into a single adaptive unit. This 
potential, I believe, far, far outweighs the attendant threats of desensitization, overload 
and confusion.  (Clark, 2003a, p.179) 
 
 
Controlling Systems 
 
The problem with this positing of cyborgianism both as a virtue and as a unitary 
phenomenon, we might say, is that it leaves Clark ill-equipped to analyse factors which 
determine the direction and flow of control in the agent’s various encounters with 
technology. In particular he is unable to offer any coherent diagnosis of instances where 
the flow of control is dictated by the artefact itself.   
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We saw in chapter 2 how Marx described the factory worker’s predicament as being 
that of an “appendage of a machine” (Marx, 1867, p.799). Such a description was given 
not just for dramatic effect but had a particular analysis behind it. Human beings 
externalize themselves through productive activity and in so doing realize certain ends, 
which in a circular way facilitate the production and development of humanity itself. 
However when productive activity is determined by the machine, teleology also shifts 
over to the machine’s side – the ends realized are the ends of the machine and not the 
ends of the agent. Rather than the agent realizing herself through productive activity the 
machine is realizing itself through the productive activity of the agent. Of course, as we 
said in chapter 2, the machine itself has no intrinsic ends other than those it embodies 
for a separate class of agents for whom it carries out its operations, and whose 
knowledge it incorporates (Mclellan, 1977, p.374), so in this sense it is the externalised 
powers of the controllers/creators of the machine which dictate the activity of the agent. 
 
In contrast with this account Clark in the main treats the technological artefacts with 
which human agents mesh themselves as neutral enablers of potential. He does not 
recognize that they are also the products of other human agents and as such incorporate 
the knowledge and goals of those agents. He thus has little principled sympathy for the 
argument that, like a machine in a factory, a neural implant is as likely to impose its 
own logic on the cognitive functioning of the implantee as be a tool for the 
extension/development of his/her pre-existing cognitive potential. He does not see that 
this is as much a logical point as a moral worry – that if a neural implant ‘extends’ 
anyone’s mind, it could just as easily as be that of its designers as that of the recipient. 
 
 
Transparency 
 
It might perhaps be thought that such difficulties could be circumvented if we pay 
sufficient heed to the Heideggerian notion of ‘transparent equipment’ (Heidegger, 
1927; see also Clark, 2008, p.10), and indeed, as Mackenzie (2004) also points out, 
Clark’s ideal for enabling artefacts is that they be ‘transparent’, rather than ‘opaque’ to 
the user. Thus he talks of “well-fitted transparent technologies” (Clark, 2003a, p38) and 
“non penetrative cyborg technologies” (ibid p.28). The suggestion is that the 
technologies in question should be invisible to the user rather than obtrusive. 
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Transparent technologies do not disrupt the flow of human practical/cognitive activity 
but rather “dovetail or interlock with specific cognitive attributes or capacities” 
(Mackenzie, 2004, p.155). They thus become “integrated so deeply and fluidly with our 
existing biological capacities and characteristics that we feel no boundary between 
ourselves and the nonbiological elements” (Clark, 2003a, pp.23-4). 
 
This distinction between ‘opacity’ and ‘transparency’ perhaps has loose similarities 
with Marxian conceptions of alienated and unalienated labour. Interfacing with 
‘opaque’ technologies to some degree involves confronting the artifactual world as an 
‘other’, we might say, whereas interfacing with transparent equipment might be 
characterised in terms of a surmounting of the subject/object divide. The criterion of 
‘transparency’ might therefore, at first glance, seem to offer a possible means of 
avoiding scenarios where meshing with technology reduces the agent to an “appendage 
of the machine”. 
 
However there is a problem with transparency, which is succinctly articulated by 
Mackenzie: 
 
For any particular technology we need to ask: opaque or transparent for whom? 
...Transparency and opaqueness are not intrinsic to the technology. (Mackenzie, 2004, 
p.155) 
 
There are two points here. Firstly a degree of subjectivity is involved in deciding what 
counts as ‘transparent’. One person’s idea of a seamless merger might be another’s 
nightmare scenario of technological obstruction or invasion. Here we need look no 
further than one of C&C’s own examples, derived from the ‘Terminator’ movie, of an 
inner visual display (C&C, 1998, p.16) which acts as a stand-in for memory.  Ignoring 
for now the philosophical difficulties presented by this arrangement (viewing a series of 
images does not equate to ‘remembering’) we might say that whilst such an artefact 
might be regarded as a suitable, enabling and transparent substitute for biological 
memory from C&C’s perspective, some critics – including this author – might consider 
it an imposition on the agent’s private domain which, if feasible, would disrupt the 
natural flow of memory and reduce the agent to a passive spectator. 
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Secondly, this relativity concerning ‘transparency’ and ‘opaqueness’ becomes more 
significant if we consider our propensity to adapt to technology. Under certain 
circumstances initially obtrusive technologies might come to be experienced as 
‘transparent’ by an agent, in the sense that the agent will get used to them or take them 
for granted. Such adaptation need in no way be an indicator that the technology is 
dovetailing in an enabling way with the agent’s cognitive capacities or attributes. 
Clark’s declarations that “the most seamless of all integrations and the ones with the 
greatest potential to transform our lives are often precisely the ones that operate deep 
beneath the level of conscious awareness” (Clark, 2003a, p.34) and that “the trick .. is 
to acclimatize ourselves to a much more biological relationship with our technologies” 
(ibid p. 175) are thus far from reassuring, for it is precisely the transformative role of 
‘unconscious acclimatization’ to technological control that is the source of our concern. 
Marx’s labourers, dominated by the mechanized rhythms of mass production, may well 
come to view this domination ‘transparently’, insofar as they relate to it unreflectively, 
but this is not the kind of “fluid integration” with biological capacities that warrants 
approval or extends cognitive capacities. 
 
Master and Servant 
 
We have said that Clark’s conception of cyborgianism does not equip us with sufficient 
tools to differentiate between meshings with artefacts which extend and enable, and 
those which stultify development. Neither, we suggested, can the notion of ‘transparent 
equipment’ help us here. It will be noted that our critique of Clark’s position hinged 
partly on the idea of a ‘flow of control’. We argued that far from being enabling or 
extensive of the agent’s cognitive capacities, mergers with technology can be 
disempowering when the flow of control is from machine to agent rather than vice 
versa. As an addendum we might consider the possibility that this issue is not only 
relevant to the cyborgian version of the ‘extended mind’. It will be remembered that 
Clark & Chalmers considered a further application of the literal extended mind thesis - 
“socially extended cognition” (C&C, 1998, pp.17-18) - wherein other human beings 
functioned as extensions of a primary agent. Examples included “the waiter at my 
favourite restaurant [who] might act as a repository of my beliefs about my favourite 
meals”, as well as “one’s secretary, one’s accountant or one’s collaborator” (ibid) who 
might play a similar role. 
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It should be stressed that this suggestion is not central to their account and appears only 
as part of a stream of speculation towards the end of the paper. Nor, on the basis of it, 
do we wish to accuse C&C of any heinous anti-Marxian crime. Nevertheless, these 
remarks certainly demonstrate how questions of mind extension – with or without 
technological mergers – might overlap with wider issues of power relations. Although 
C&C, perhaps deliberately, do not confine themselves exclusively to hierarchically 
oriented examples – allowing in democratic fashion that one’s beliefs might also be 
contained in one’s collaborator – their comments could have ramifications if coupled 
with a belief in the appropriateness of a mental/manual division of labour.  The 
comparison that most suggests itself here, particularly with the examples of the 
secretary and the waiter, is that of Hegel’s (1807) account of the Lord and Bondsman. 
This fable, as we saw earlier, prefigures Marx’s own account of the mental/manual 
division of labour.  
 
The key issue, for our purposes is that, according to Hegel, in becoming an extension of 
his master’s mind, the bondsman loses his own autonomy. He is reduced to a 
“dependent consciousness” such that “what the bondsman does is really the action of 
the lord” (Hegel, 1807, p.114). Here we have the same dynamic that we saw at play in 
the case of mechanized labour, but without the technological intermediary. The 
bondsman is an extension of his master rather than the machine, but in both instances 
the flow of control is from outside in, rather than vice versa. Applied to Clark’s case we 
can thus see how cyborgianism and “socially extended cognition” present us with 
different manifestations of the same problem. The waiter, the secretary and the neural 
implantee are not (necessarily) having their minds extended but rather are reduced to 
extending the minds of others. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
In this chapter we have argued that there are different variants of the ‘extended mind’ 
hypothesis. We have expressed agreement with certain of these variants, some of which 
are Marxian in approach and, indirectly, in origin. However we have criticized the 
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‘literally extended mind’ as presenting an alienated account of mind, co-occurent with a 
reified view of ‘internal’ mind. In addition we have suggested that considerations 
relating to the origins of our ‘notebook-like’ conception of memory might pose 
problems for the unidirectionality of the Otto story. Finally we considered the 
cyborgian variant of the extended mind hypothesis. This has some parallels with 
Marxian accounts, but it lacks a principled understanding of the way in which the flow 
of control from artifact to agent might result in the latter becoming an “appendage of 
the machine” (Marx, 1867, p.799). 
 
In our next, and final chapter, we will consider a significant precursor to C&C’s 
extended mind hypothesis – Kirsh & Maglio’s work on epistemic action.  
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        Chapter 8 - The Epistemic/Pragmatic Dichotomy 
 
 
Introduction 
 
In the previous chapter we looked at Clark & Chalmers ‘extended mind’. In this, our 
final chapter, the intention is to look at one of the key influences on that account – 
Kirsh and Maglio’s distinction between ‘epistemic’ and ‘pragmatic’ action. Kirsh and 
Maglio’s work is of great relevance to this thesis insofar as it provides us with 
empirical grounds for calling into question the traditional dichotomy between action 
and cognition – and in so doing recalls Marx’s concept(s) of ‘praxis’. At the same time 
however their account is to some degree problematic insofar as it erects a new, and 
rather confusing, dichotomy in place of the old one – that between epistemic and 
pragmatic action. Things are further complicated by definitional issues, both within 
Kirsh and Maglio’s account and between their account and Clark’s (Clark, 1997; Clark 
& Chalmers 1998; Clark, 2008) interpretation of it. We will develop these points in the 
following: In Section 1 we will present a brief summary of Kirsh and Maglio’s original 
(1994) account, along with an equally brief note concerning Clark’s (and Chalmers’) 
take on the subject. In section 2 we will consider the relevance of their account to the 
Marxian analysis given in earlier chapters. In section 3 we will then attempt a loosely 
‘dialectical’ treatment of the concepts of ‘epistemic’ and ‘pragmatic’ action, outlining 
ways in which they might be thought to “interpenetrate” (Engels, 1887, p.35). In 
Section 4 we will draw some conclusions from this treatment, focussing particularly on 
problems with ‘pragmatic action’.  In section 5 we will then look at some additional 
conceptual issues with the notion of ‘epistemic action’, before returning to the topic of 
dialectics in our conclusion. 
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(I)  Epistemic and Pragmatic Action 
 
Kirsh and Maglio 
 
K&M (in 1994) conducted experiments with players of the game Tetris and, from the 
resultant data, concluded that the strategies adopted by players were not always best 
explained by the ‘planning’ perspective of classical AI. According to (at least one 
version of) a classical model players might be expected to complete a sequence of 
information processing and computational steps prior to making any move – with the 
move being thus viewed as the execution of a preconceived plan arising from those 
steps. However K&M found that players would frequently make moves (rotations or 
translations of ‘zoids’) that would be pointless (and unnecessarily costly) if a plan was 
already in place - moves which did not bring a zoid closer to its final position or 
orientation. K&M discounted the suggestion that such extra moves might be explained 
by a revised version of a planning strategy according to which “players begin execution 
before they have settled on all the details of a plan” (ibid. p.524/5) for, along with other 
considerations, it was found that in some cases rotations occurred before any details of 
a plan could have been settled on. 
 
K&M hypothesized that the extra moves were not standard ‘pragmatic actions’ at all 
i.e. they were not undertaken for the purpose of “bringing a piece closer to its final 
position” (ibid. p.516). Rather, they were undertaken for a variety of cognitive 
purposes. As such they were ‘epistemic’ actions - actions which “are not performed to 
advance a player to a better state in the external task environment, but rather to advance 
the player to a better state in his or her internal environment” (ibid. p.541). In the case 
of zoid rotation the epistemic functions served might include: 
 
1 Unearth new information very early in the game 
  2 Save mental rotation effort 
  3 Facilitate retrieval of zoids from memory 
  4 Make it easier to identify a zoid’s type 
  5 Simplify the process of matching zoid and contour         (ibid. p.527) 
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In later work (Maglio et al. 2003, 2008) this hypothesis was tested through experiments 
which established both that presentation of zoids in multiple orientations did lead to 
faster responses, and that this benefit outweighed the cost (in time) of taking extra 
actions to rotate the zoids. In short, epistemic actions improved game play. 
 
The existence of such actions, say K&M, undermines the assumption that “the point of 
actions is always pragmatic” (Kirsh & Maglio, 1994, p.526). In doing so it also 
undermines the exclusive emphasis on prior planning typical of some versions of 
traditional AI. In dialectical fashion K&M characterize the latter as “one sided” (ibid) 
because it “creates an undesirable separation between action and cognition” (ibid) such 
that “cognition is necessary for intelligent action, but action is never necessary for 
intelligent cognition” (ibid) 
 
Clark and Chalmers 
 
We have already seen how Clark and Chalmers developed one aspect of this idea. The 
external rotation of zoids for epistemic purposes was thought to be such a close 
functional substitute for rotations carried out internally that it seemed reasonable to 
suggest that the former might also be regarded as part of cognition, and thus was borne 
the Extended Mind thesis (simplifying the story somewhat!) We will not here consider 
the soundness or otherwise of such a move, which we have already discussed to some 
extent in our previous chapter. What we do want to highlight are two examples of 
Clark’s own characterization of epistemic and pragmatic action. The first is to be found 
in Clark and Chalmers’ (1998) paper: 
 
Epistemic actions alter the world so as to aid and augment cognitive processes such as 
recognition and search. Merely pragmatic actions, by contrast, alter the world because 
some physical change is desirable for its own sake (e.g. putting cement into a hole in a 
dam).  (Clark & Chalmers, 1998, p.8) 
 
The second comes from a more recent work by Clark (2008): 
 
Epistemic actions stand in contrast to pragmatic actions. The latter are actions which 
are designed to bring one physically closer to a goal. Walking to the fridge to fetch a 
beer is a pragmatic action. Epistemic actions may or may not yield such physical 
advance. Instead they are designed to extract or uncover information. Looking inside 
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the fridge to see what ingredients are available to cook tonight’s dinner is a mild 
species of epistemic action.  
(Clark, 2008, p.71) 
 
It is perhaps noteworthy that the above characterizations do not make reference to an 
‘internal’ ‘external’ divide when distinguishing between the ‘epistemic’ and the 
‘pragmatic’ – possibly because such a strategy is more problematic if one’s starting 
point is that cognition is spread out across the environment. For purposes of this 
chapter, however, what is significant is that that the above two characterizations offer 
some elements not found in Kirsh & Maglio’s own definitions. In the former passage 
there is the suggestion that pragmatic actions are aimed at bringing about physical 
changes that are ‘desirable for their own sake’; and in the latter passage there is the 
suggestion that any action undertaken for the purpose of extracting or uncovering 
information, even if this is achieved merely by ‘looking’, can be considered a species of 
epistemic action. We will return to these points shortly. 
 
(II) Epistemic Action and ‘Praxis’ 
 
We have given some indication, then, of the way epistemic and pragmatic action are 
characterized by Kirsh & Maglio, and also by Clark (and Chalmers). As implied in our 
introduction, the notion of ‘epistemic action’, at least as described by Kirsh & Maglio, 
seems particularly relevant to the concerns of this thesis insofar as it is explicitly 
presented as a means of confronting a dichotomy (Kirsh & Maglio, 1994, p.526), and 
the dichotomy in question is that between “action” and “cognition” (ibid). In this way it 
harmonizes with Marxian concept(s) of “praxis” (Marx & Engels, 1970a), considered 
both in general terms as the “synthesis of thought and action” (McLellan, 1969, p.10) 
and more specifically as the notion that ideas are generated from practical activity. 
Indeed we might say that the concept of ‘epistemic action’ provides us with a concrete 
example of how both of these components of praxis can be conjoined. The rotation of 
Tetris zoids for epistemic purposes facilitates further cognition, but at the same time 
can itself be viewed as a kind of practical cognition. The latter point, as noted last 
chapter, has been made by Clark & Chalmers who say of the manipulation of scrabble 
tiles for epistemic ends (another of Kirsh & Maglio’s examples – Kirsh, 1995; Maglio 
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et al. 1999): “in a very real sense, the re-arrangement of tiles on the tray is not part of 
action; it is part of thought” (C&C, 1998, p.10). 
 
In thus providing an empirical demonstration of how thought and action might be 
unified, K&M’s account is more radical and thoroughgoing than some Marxian 
accounts. In particular it will be remembered that the unification of theory and practice 
which Jha attributed to the Italian Marxist Labriola (1897) involved only a “cyclical 
movement of theory and practice” (Jha, 2010, p.208). This suggests a less than 
dialectical unity, reminiscent of Merleau-Ponty’s “mechanical action” (Merleau-Ponty, 
1942, p.160) or Clark’s “catch and toss explanation” (Clark, 1997, p.105) albeit in 
relation to a different domain of explanation. In contrast K&M’s account promises 
something beyond mere “interleaving” (K&M, 1994, p.524), a genuine synthesis of 
action and cognition in the form of epistemic action. 
 
Conversely, insofar as K&M do conceive of thought and action in separation, it is in a 
way which chimes well with Marxian critiques of idealism. The objection to the latter 
was that it emphasized “thought before the fact” (Labriola, 1897, p.10), or explained 
“practice from the idea” (Marx & Engels, 1970b, p.38). This critique is mirrored in 
K&M’s own critique of classical AI (as cited above) wherein “cognition is necessary 
for intelligent action, but action is never necessary for intelligent cognition” (K&M, 
1994, p.526). We note too that the rejection of the necessary priority of cognition brings 
with it a concomitant rejection of the necessity of prior planning to intelligent action. 
The account is thus in accord with our own interpretation of the spontaneous Marxian 
agent who must, in certain circumstances, be able to ‘act before he thinks’. 
 
(III) The non-exclusivity of the epistemic and the pragmatic 
 
However, having argued that the concept of ‘epistemic action’ provides us both with a 
praxis-like unity and a critique of idealism we have also to recognise that Kirsh & 
Maglio’s (and Clark’s) analysis presents us with some difficulties. One significant issue 
lies in the fact that, having posited this unity, Kirsh and Maglio then proceed to 
characterize it as one pole of a dichotomy, the occupant of the other pole being 
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‘pragmatic action’. Perhaps predictably from a dialectical perspective, it would appear 
that the two poles of the dichotomy “interpenetrate” (Engels, 1887, p.35) in different 
ways. Although Clark (2008) alludes to this when he says (above) that epistemic 
actions “may or may not” bring one closer to a goal, and the issue is also briefly 
touched upon by Kirsh (2006), it has not yet been discussed at any length in the 
literature, and neither, we would contend, has the extent of this interpenetration been 
recognised. In the following we will attempt to redress this balance in Hegelian fashion 
by outlining different ways in which ‘epistemic action’ and ‘pragmatic action’ seem to 
overlap or intermingle. En route we will also highlight some other possible difficulties 
with the notions of ‘epistemic’ and ‘pragmatic’ action, as they arise. 
 
 
 
1) Epistemic actions are also performed to bring one closer to goal state. 
 
In (K&M, 1994) pragmatic actions are defined as “actions whose primary function is to 
bring the agent closer to his or her physical goal”, a definition that is implicitly echoed 
most recently in Maglio et al.’s (2008) account, where it is said that epistemic actions 
“are used to simplify internal computations rather than to move close to an external 
goal state.” (my italics).  So, pragmatic actions have something to do with getting 
oneself closer to one’s physical goal state. At the risk of sounding pedantic, however, it 
should perhaps be pointed out that in a task bound environment any action motivated 
by the desire to complete the task can be characterized as having the purpose of 
bringing the agent closer to his or her physical goal. This would include those actions 
characterized as ‘epistemic’. Why, for instance, does the Tetris player carry out zoid 
translations which move the zoid physically further away from the goal? To help 
him/her verify the column placement of the zoid (K&M, 1994, p.539). But why is it 
important to get one’s bearings in this way? So that one can then place the zoid in the 
appropriate place (i.e. move to goal state.) Thus, on at least one interpretation of the 
phrase, the ‘primary function’ of an epistemic action is also to bring the agent closer to 
goal state. Indeed, as Clark (1997) also points out,  K&M not only acknowledge this 
but go further by suggesting that ‘state space’ might be redefined to include both 
physical states and informational states (K&M, 1994, p.515). On this analysis, a 
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relevant change in informational state arising from performance of an epistemic action 
presumably does bring one closer to goal state as measured by progress along the nodes 
of a revamped state-space graph.  
 
Bearing this in mind we could perhaps modify our definition of pragmatic action 
accordingly – pragmatic actions are those whose primary function is to bring the agent 
directly closer (in a non-informational sense) to his/her goal whereas epistemic actions 
are those taken for epistemic purposes in order eventually to reach that same goal. 
 
As an aside, however, we perhaps also ought to note a further complication concerning 
what counts as ‘moving directly closer to goal state’, one which has nothing to do with 
epistemic or informational considerations. In the Tetris example, and in Clark’s 
‘walking to the fridge to fetch a beer’ example, moving directly closer to goal state 
correlates well with moving physically closer to a particular configuration or locale, but 
this need not always be the case. In certain problem-solving scenarios – such as the 
Tower of Hanoi problem – one might need to move physically further away from a 
state of affairs that resembles goal state (for non epistemic reasons) in order to get 
closer to goal state. Likewise we might imagine that Clark’s fridge was placed in a 
maze so that one had to move further away from it in order eventually to reach it. Thus 
‘moving closer to goal state’ may sometimes be better understood as ‘making progress 
in a sequence of physical steps necessary to bring one to goal state’. (We will not 
explore this further here.) 
 
2) Epistemic actions have their own goals? 
 
The argument given above (in 1) is that epistemic actions are undertaken to bring one 
(indirectly) closer to the self-same goal that pragmatic actions are undertaken to bring 
one (‘directly’) closer to. So far, so uncontroversial. However it also seems that 
epistemic actions might bring one directly closer to a goal – albeit a sub-goal in relation 
to the ultimate goal of the pragmatic action. When I look inside the fridge to see what 
ingredients are available before I make a meal, my immediate goal is to see what 
ingredients are available and this is achieved by looking in the fridge. This kind of 
overlap seems to be acknowledged by Kirsh in a later paper where he says that 
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“epistemic actions could be seen as pragmatic with respect to advancing epistemic ends 
when these were the external goal” (Kirsh, 2006, p. 252). If an action which is 
epistemic in relation to a particular pre-defined goal can count as pragmatic in relation 
to its own separate sub-goal, could we then say that there is a degree of relativity 
concerning what counts as a pragmatic or epistemic action? 
 
In attempting to answer this question we come across what appears to be a significant 
problem, for it is not clear what characteristics of epistemic and pragmatic action are 
essential for them to count as such. In K&M’s original (1994) paper the distinction was 
tightly linked to a particular micro-story. Epistemic actions in Tetris were seen as 
possible replacements for internal operations. On a “classical information processing 
account of Tetris cognition” (ibid. p.518) a certain sequence of operations (early vision, 
attention-directed encoding, generate and test, motor planning and control) was thought 
to be a necessary pre-requisite for action. K&M’s revised account replaces or 
supplements elements of this sequence with external operations (e.g. zoid rotation) such 
that there is a “tight coupling” (ibid. p.542) between internal cognition and external 
manipulation, with a resultant increase in speed of processing.  
 
The ‘micro-epistemic actions’ of Tetris, then, are put forward as part of an explanation 
of the underlying structure of intelligent action. It would seem misleading, we might 
suggest, to characterize these actions as literal realizers of their own epistemic goals, 
for by their nature they cannot be underpinned by the modelling of a goal state. The 
agent does not rotate the zoid (when doing so for epistemic purposes) with a predefined 
configuration in mind for if s/he did so this would defeat the object of the action in the 
first place – which is to bypass the need for extensive internal planning by making use 
of external resources, thereby speeding up processing. Whilst it might be possible to 
talk in a figurative way of such actions as achieving ‘epistemic goals’, their modus 
operandi is actually the opposite of this, for they are precisely not underpinned by 
planning, goal-modelling cognition. They are not underpinned by anything for they are 
replacements for (steps in) an internal cognitive sequence that was itself previously 
thought to underpin action.  
 
However, we note that although epistemic action is linked to this kind of story in Kirsh 
and Maglio’s work there is nothing in either their or Clark’s definitions which makes 
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such an interpretation necessary. Whether they are actions “an agent performs to 
change his or her computational state” (K&M, 1994, p.514), actions which “alter the 
world so as to aid and augment cognitive processes such as recognition and 
search”(C&C, 1998, p.8), or actions “designed to extract or uncover information” 
(Clark, 2008, p.71), there is no explicit ruling regarding how such actions are to be 
carried out. (Nor for that matter is there any suggestion that such actions need to be 
ones which replace operations that could plausibly be carried out ‘internally’ on a 
classical account - a point we shall return to.)  Hence the door seems to be open to 
include actions which are underpinned by traditional planning style cognition. Looking 
in the fridge to see what ingredients are available to make a meal meets the loose 
definitional criteria for what counts as an epistemic action (or at least Clark asserts that 
it does) but might be satisfactorily implemented by a classical goal modelling agent.  
Likewise, the assertion that memory saving strategies such as placing a key in a shoe 
(Kirsh & Maglio, 1994, p.515; Kirsh, 2006, p. 252) count as epistemic actions, implies 
nothing about a requisite underlying structure for such actions. Presumably they could 
therefore be realizers of epistemic sub-goals in a more than figurative sense, unlike 
their micro-counterparts.  
 
3) (Almost) any action might have epistemic pay-off 
  
In the 1994 paper Kirsh and Maglio make the following observation: 
 
From a methodological standpoint, it is often hard to prove that an agent performs a 
particular action for epistemic rather than for pragmatic reasons, because an action can 
serve both epistemic and pragmatic purposes simultaneously. Rotating a zoid in the 
direction needed for final placement may also help the player identify the zoid. This 
frequently makes it difficult to quantify the relative influence of epistemic and 
pragmatic functions (Kirsh & Maglio, 1994, p.527) 
 
In fact K&M may be underplaying the extent of the difficulty here for it seems arguable 
that most actions in Tetris provide some kind of epistemic benefit. Each rotation or 
translation of a zoid whether or not it brings us physically closer to our goal can be said 
to have epistemic pay off insofar as it provides the agent with easy visual access to an 
updated physical state space. The resultant configuration will help the player decide 
what to do in the next move. Moreover it will do so not just by supplying abstract 
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information about the state space (which could be had non perceptually) but by 
providing a perceptual guide for the next move.  
 
It seems unlikely that Kirsh and Maglio would disagree with this. Would they then 
want to claim that most actions are epistemic actions? Perhaps they might want to avoid 
this by making a distinction between actions which have epistemic pay-off and ‘truly’ 
epistemic actions by reference to the purpose for which the action was carried out. Such 
a distinction seems implicit in the above passage (although “serving a purpose” is 
perhaps more passive than doing something for a purpose) and is expressed more 
clearly in a remark immediately following that passage – “there are clear cases where 
the only plausible rationale for a particular choice of action is epistemic.”(ibid.) It also 
seems implicit in purpose-laden language elsewhere in the paper: 
 
Epistemic actions – physical actions that make mental computation easier, faster or 
more reliable – are external actions that an agent performs to change his or her 
computational state. (Kirsh & Maglio, 1994, p.514, my emphasis) 
 
and we should note, too, definitions provided in (Maglio et al. 2003, 2008) which both 
describe epistemic actions as “physical actions people take to simplify internal problem 
solving.” (p.1 in both cases, my emphasis)  
 
There is the suggestion, then, that epistemic actions are motivated by epistemic 
purposes and we could conclude from this that not all actions which have an epistemic 
payoff are thereby epistemic actions. However there is perhaps a difficulty here which 
K&M themselves hinted at when they stated that ‘it is often hard to prove that an agent 
performs a particular action for epistemic rather than for pragmatic reasons’. As 
Destefano et al. put it, in a separate study of strategies adopted by Tetris players, “we 
have no access to an individual’s intentions” (Destefano et al., 2011, p.2709). Suppose 
we agree that a particular action in Tetris has epistemic payoff but we want to ask the 
further question of whether the epistemic payoff was deliberately aimed at before we 
are happy to baptise it as a truly ‘epistemic action’. How are we to go about 
ascertaining this? Are we to ask the players themselves? This does not seem to be a 
reliable strategy for there is no reason to suppose that players need be able to provide 
reasons for a particular move/set of moves retrospectively. We note in particular, that 
speed of play means that a certain degree of automaticity needs to be cultivated. 
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Moreover at the micro-level, as we have seen, part of the reason for singling out 
‘epistemic’ actions as distinctive is that, in some cases at least, they are undertaken 
before any internal deliberation could plausibly have been carried out (and indeed – on 
an extended mind analysis – they are thought to constitute part of the deliberation.) 
 
We have, of course, the suggestion that more experienced players tend to make more 
‘epistemic’ (i.e. epistemic only) moves (Maglio & Kirsh, 1996 - although this is to 
some degree disputed by Destefano et al., 2011). Insofar as this is the case it could be 
taken as implying the existence of a purposive strategy to improve game play. But 
again we might point out that if there is such a strategy it need not be one that could be 
consciously articulated by the agent. In fact, to an extent the proof of the pudding is 
taken to be in the eating. If an action is undertaken deliberately and has epistemic pay 
off which is relevant to and improves game play, it is assumed to be an action 
undertaken for epistemic purposes. We have, what might be called, ‘pragmatic’ (in a 
traditional philosophical sense) criteria for the individuation of epistemic actions. There 
is nothing wrong with this but it is not clear that such criteria can supply us with a 
means of differentiating between ‘truly’ epistemic actions and actions which ‘merely’ 
have epistemic pay-off.  
 
4) Are there any purely pragmatic actions? 
 
If we accept that actions which take us closer to goal state, but which also have 
epistemic pay off, might constitute a sub-species of epistemic action then it would seem 
to follow that (in the game of Tetris at least) there may be no purely pragmatic actions. 
We said that “most actions” in Tetris are likely to have some epistemic payoff. In fact 
the only exception to this would seem to be the final move (in a game or a sequence of 
moves) – the dropping of a zoid into a slot.  Here it perhaps could not be claimed that 
some goal-relevant epistemic advantage is obtained because the agent has already 
arrived at goal state (although this is not to say that there might not be epistemic pay off 
in relation to wider goals e.g. improving game play.) It seems problematic, however, 
that this is the only example of a purely pragmatic action which we can muster, for then 
‘purely pragmatic action’ would seem to have become a synonym for ‘arrival at goal 
state’.  
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5) Levels of action 
 
A further consideration – perhaps implicit in some of what has already been said – is 
that of ‘levels of action’. Without wishing to endorse any particular theory concerning 
the individuation of actions (see e.g. Goldman, 1970; Danto, 1973; Honderich 1988) we 
might say that there is an uncontroversial sense in which some actions can be said to be 
made up of other actions. For instance an action described as “switching the light on” 
might contain the sub actions of “raising an arm” and “flicking the switch”. Bearing 
this in mind we might note that the category used to describe an action at a macro level 
(‘epistemic’ or ‘pragmatic’) may not be applicable to all the actions that compose it. An 
action described as ‘pragmatic’ at the macro level might contain many ‘epistemic’ 
actions at the micro level. Likewise, an action described as ‘epistemic’ at the macro 
level, might contain many ‘pragmatic’ actions at the micro level. 
 
As an instance of the former let us take Clark and Chalmers’ example of a pragmatic 
action given in the Extended Mind paper (1998, p.8) – “putting cement into a hole in a 
dam.” This is contrasted with epistemic rotations of Tetris zoids or movement of 
scrabble pieces as an action which “alters the world because some physical change is 
desirable for its own sake” (ibid).  However we might suggest that “putting cement into 
a hole in a dam” could also be considered as a macro action, perhaps on a level with 
playing a whole game of Tetris or Scrabble, and as such could be viewed as made up of 
smaller sequences of actions. From this point of view there is no reason to think that 
some of the actions which make up the cement story should be any less epistemic than 
the various shape rotations in Tetris that K&M draw attention to. The hole filler – in 
manipulating the cement – may try various strategies which, although they do not bring 
him/her physically closer to the goal state, will help him/her to get a better grasp of the 
problem space e.g. toying with cement already in the hole may help to guide the agent 
in deciding where to place subsequent pieces of cement.   
 
As regards epistemic actions containing non-epistemic actions – here we could imagine 
a poorly designed mechanical version of the game of Tetris where three lever moves 
are required to rotate the shape through 90 degrees - the first lever move sets the 
direction of the rotation, the second sets the degree of the rotation and the third initiates 
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the rotation itself. The agent may then rotate the zoid for epistemic purposes – but 
his/her action will be composed of three sub actions which are not undertaken for 
epistemic purposes. 
 
 
 
(IV) Incommensurate Categories 
 
We have argued that there are various ways in which ‘epistemic action’ and ‘pragmatic 
action’ seem to intermingle or overlap – (1) epistemic actions are also undertaken to 
bring one closer to the self-same goal that pragmatic actions are undertaken to bring 
one closer to; (2) epistemic actions (loosely defined) bring one closer to their own 
goals; (3) most actions (at least in Tetris) have epistemic pay-off (thereby (4) making it 
hard to find a ‘purely pragmatic’ action); (5) epistemic actions contain pragmatic 
actions and pragmatic actions contain epistemic actions.  
 
How, then, are we to analyse these results? Kirsh himself recognizes that the distinction 
between epistemic and pragmatic action “is not hard and fast” (Kirsh, 2006, p.252) but 
the degree of intermingling and overlap we have described seems to suggest more than 
this. On the other hand, it does not seem appropriate to attempt a straightforward 
dialectical resolution here. For one thing, as we suggested earlier, if there is a 
dialectical ‘unity’ to be found in Kirsh and Maglio’s work it is that which is already 
contained within the concept of ‘epistemic action’ i.e. the synthesis of action and 
cognition.  
 
One thought that might strike us, particularly as regards (1) and (2), is that of whether 
the categories of ‘epistemic’ and ‘pragmatic’ action are really the right sort of things to 
constitute a dichotomy at all. Perhaps, despite being set up as antinomous, they could 
never be “two poles of an antithesis…inseparable as they are opposed” (Engels, 1887, 
p.35) because they are incommensurate categories. It seems possible that some of the 
overlap between epistemic and pragmatic action arises because ‘pragmatic’ and 
‘epistemic’ are not both ‘types of action’ in the same sense, but are rather more like 
answers to two different types of question about action.  One might imagine that a 
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theorist had come up with the following classification for actions – ‘actions that one 
undertakes whilst wearing shoes’ and ‘actions that one undertakes when on a train’. 
When one points out that many actions that one undertakes on a train are also actions 
that one undertakes when wearing shoes the theorist will admit that there is some 
overlap in the real world but will say that nevertheless the distinction can still be made 
in principle. One would be left with the nagging feeling that there is something 
fundamentally wrong with this reply. It is not merely that there is some overlap. 
‘Actions undertaken on a train’ is an answer to the question ‘Where were the actions 
undertaken?’ whilst ‘Actions undertaken whilst wearing shoes’ is an answer to the 
question ‘What were you wearing on your feet when you undertook the action?’ There 
is no useful material for a dichotomy here – even if classical theorists had traditionally 
conceived of all action as taking place on a train. 
 
Can something similar be said of the distinction between epistemic and pragmatic 
actions? As we saw, according to C&C: 
 
Epistemic actions alter the world so as to aid and augment cognitive processes such as 
recognition and search. Merely pragmatic actions, by contrast, alter the world because 
some physical change is desirable for its own sake (e.g. putting cement into a hole in 
dam). (Clark & Chalmers, 1998, p.8) 
 
 
This reference to a physical change that is ‘desirable for its own sake’ has a strange ring 
to it. Firstly, as alluded to earlier, it is something of a departure from the account given 
by Kirsh and Maglio which does not make any reference to the desirability of the 
consequences of a pragmatic action – just that it is carried out to bring one physically 
closer to a goal. Secondly it is surely often a matter of interpretation in any particular 
case whether an action is ‘desirable for its own sake’ – putting cement into a hole in a 
dam, for example, would not seem to be something that I would wish to do for its own 
sake, but rather something I would do to stop the dam leaking.  Perhaps eating a 
chocolate cookie or having sex are actions that I might take because they are desirable 
for their own sake, but then pragmatic actions would suddenly seem to have become 
linked with hedonistic actions and it seems unlikely that this was Clark and Chalmers’ 
intention. 
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We do not wish to be overly flippant here of course, and nor do we wish to read too 
much into one particular turn of phrase which Clark and Chalmers might well admit 
could be improved. On the other hand this attempt to express informally what 
pragmatic actions are about does perhaps bring to the fore a certain disparity between 
the two classes of action, for what motivates Clark and Chalmers’ suggestion here 
might be the thought that pragmatic actions are just actions ‘per se’. It is ‘epistemic 
action’, we might say, which wears the trousers in the epistemic/pragmatic dichotomy. 
An interesting class of actions called ‘epistemic actions’ has been unearthed and these 
need to be contrasted with non-epistemic actions of some sort. Hence epistemic actions 
are described as actions that are carried out to get some epistemic pay off whereas 
pragmatic actions are just carried out. However we might argue that most actions are 
likely to have been carried out for a purpose, epistemic or otherwise, and so this does 
not seem to be a true dichotomy. Rather what the distinction boils down to is, on the 
one hand, actions whose purpose is epistemic, and on the other hand, action when you 
aren’t talking about purposes at all. In this sense, epistemic action provides one answer 
to the question “why did you perform that action?” whereas the category of ‘pragmatic 
action’ is used merely to specify what the action is (an answer, perhaps, to the question 
“what action did you perform?”). 
 
Things seem a little more complicated if we turn from Clark & Chalmers’ to K&M’s 
definition of pragmatic and epistemic action, for here both types of action seem, on the 
face of it, to be offering explanations in terms of purpose and hence to be answering the 
same question i.e. ‘Why did you perform that action?’. In the case of pragmatic action 
the answer is ‘to get me physically closer to a goal, and in the case of epistemic action 
it is ‘to achieve some epistemic pay off (which ultimately will help me get closer to my 
goal)’. 
 
However perhaps there is some equivocation with the notion of ‘purpose’ here. 
Epistemic actions, as we suggested earlier can also be said to be undertaken for the 
purpose of bringing the agent physically closer to a goal, either directly or indirectly 
(depending on what sort of epistemic action we are talking about.) In fact, insofar as we 
adhere to a goal oriented conception of action then the ‘purpose’ of all action is to 
bring us closer to a goal. Thus this seems a very impoverished sense of ‘purpose’, one 
which provides a restricted – almost tautological – answer to the question ‘why did you 
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perform that action?’, and one which cannot be used to individuate a particular class of 
action per se. We might contrast it with the richer sense of ‘purpose’ implicit in asking 
the further question ‘Yes, but why did you want to get closer to that goal?’ We note that 
the answer to this might be ‘for epistemic reasons’, but it might equally as well be 
‘because someone told me to’, ‘because I like sandcastles’ or a host of other answers: 
 
 
 
 Question Answer Applies to: 
 1 
 
‘Why are you performing 
 that action’?  
To get closer to a 
 goal. 
All actions including  
epistemic. 
 2 ‘Why do you want to 
reach 
the goal?’ 
‘For epistemic  
reasons’  
‘Because someone 
 told me to’  etc 
All types of action e.g. 
epistemic 
 
The first question (on the K&M definition), then, does not provide us with an answer 
which specifies a particular class of actions. All actions (including epistemic ones) are 
performed to bring one closer to a goal, if one has a goal oriented conception of action. 
The second question provides us with a host of possible answers and thus a host of 
possible types of action, one of which is epistemic. Hence on this analysis we might be 
tempted to drop the notion of pragmatic action completely as it does not seem to 
designate a separate class of actions. Rather, as before, it just seems to denote ‘action’ 
per se, but considered from the perspective of goal fulfilment.  
 
Nevertheless – we must be wary of throwing the baby out with the bath water. There is 
nothing wrong in deciding to apply the term ‘pragmatic’ to particular actions in certain 
circumstances where rules for its use are clear. In the toy scenario of Tetris - where the 
goal is clearly specifiable, where all action is ultimately motivated by the desire to 
reach that goal, and where each discrete action results in a physical state of affairs that 
is either closer to or further from that goal – K&M have shown that it is useful to be 
able to distinguish between actions which take us physically closer to the goal and 
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those that don’t, and then to investigate the reasons for actions of the latter sort. In this 
scenario the former type of action might as well be labelled ‘pragmatic’ as anything 
else. As we implied earlier (in section III 2)) such actions can be seen as ‘pragmatic’ 
relative to a certain predefined goal which epistemic actions are not (directly) 
‘pragmatic’ relative to. Moreover, on one interpretation of ‘epistemic action’, there is 
also the suggestion that the micro-epistemic actions of Tetris might not be realizers of 
their own sub-goals, and so are not directly ‘pragmatic’ relative to anything. What this 
does not seem to give us however is a meaningful non-relative notion of ‘pragmatic 
action’ which could have general applicability in the real world, such that it does not 
just mean ‘action’. 
 
(V) The Generality of the Epistemic 
 
In the above section, then, we have suggested that insofar as ‘pragmatic action’ is 
identified with getting closer to a particular goal state, or bringing about changes which 
are desirable for their own sake, it is difficult to see how it can name a distinct type of 
action, outside of certain well specified toy scenarios. However we also face some 
problems with epistemic action. We saw (in section III) that in Tetris it was not easy to 
find examples of non epistemic actions if we allowed that any action with epistemic 
pay-off might count as an epistemic action. Once such a concession is made the 
problem would seem to be that, if almost any action might count as epistemic, then the 
category of ‘epistemic action’ loses much of its usefulness. It is open to question 
whether the considerations relating to the difficulty of ascertaining the purposeful 
epistemic intent of actions in Tetris are convincing, and if so, whether they also apply 
to actions in the world outside of Tetris. We can perhaps argue that it is less difficult to 
ascertain the intentions of an individual who places a key in her shoe, than one who 
rotates a zoid at speed. There is thus a sense in which everyday epistemic actions 
present less of a problem in this respect – although we might also acknowledge that 
there is a trade-off here, since there is no requirement that the latter be underpinned by 
a distinctive non goal-driven architecture.  
 
However, there are other considerations which might make it difficult to place 
limitations on the number of actions which qualify as ‘epistemic’.  
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Substitutability 
 
As remarked earlier (III – 2), epistemic action as it is presented in K&M’s account is 
linked with certain features which do not form part of its definition. One such feature is 
‘substitutability’. This is the idea that the action undertaken replaces an operation which 
could have been carried out internally e.g. internal rotations of zoids are replaced by 
external rotations of zoids. Whilst substitutability plays a significant role in K&M’s 
account it is not clear whether this is felt to be a necessary component of the 
‘epistemic-ness’ of an action or whether the direct substitutability of external for 
internal operations merely serves as a convenient illustration of the difference between 
two approaches to intelligent action. We might note that recently Kirsh seems to have 
abandoned the idea of substitutability, arguing that there are “epistemic activities we 
can perform outside that we cannot duplicate inside” (Kirsh, 2010, p.452). This is 
perhaps in keeping with that version of the extended mind thesis which posits a 
figurative ‘extension’ of cognitive capacities through the manipulation of external 
resources, rather than a literal extension of mind in space. However it is perhaps 
significant that in the same paper Kirsh seems also to have abandoned talk of 
‘epistemic actions’ as a narrowly defined class of action – preferring to talk more 
loosely of “epistemic activity” (ibid. p.449) and “epistemic interaction” (ibid. p.454).  
 
What is clear is that substitutability does not seem to be important to Clark’s (2008) 
account, an account which is very much concerned with ‘epistemic actions’ as a distinct 
class of actions. Whilst the idea of substitutability as outlined in K&M’s original (1994) 
paper seems to have been a key impetus in the development of Clark & Chalmer’s 
(1998) extended mind thesis, all that is required for an action to be epistemic on Clark’s 
later account is  that it is “designed to extract or uncover information” (Clark, 2008, 
p.71). Hence, as we have seen, “looking inside the fridge to see what ingredients are 
available” (ibid) serves as an example (albeit a ‘mild’ one) of such an action. There is 
no suggestion that ‘looking inside the fridge’ need be a substitute for an operation that 
could be undertaken without looking in the fridge. It is not implied, for example, that 
on a classical model the agent would be expected to remember what was in the fridge 
without looking inside it. 
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The problem here would seem to be that once epistemic action is generalized to include 
any kind of action undertaken to extract information it has become a much vaguer kind 
of notion – from this perspective, for example, science could be seen as a huge 
accumulation of epistemic actions. 
 
 
 
Perception 
 
Moreover if all that it takes for an action to be epistemic is that it uncovers information, 
there is the additional question of what we are to say about perception. Most action 
(traditionally conceived) is accompanied by perception, and most perception is likely to 
involve extracting relevant information.  
 
It might perhaps be objected that simple acts of perception are ruled out definitionally 
from being epistemic actions because the latter must have an effect on the local 
environment - they need to “change the world” (K&M, 1994, p.513) or “alter the 
world” (C&C, 1998, p.8) in some way. However a problem we face here is that of 
establishing what counts as changing the world. A fan of embedded/embodied 
cognition might argue - with some justification - that the agent is him/herself a part of 
the world. In moving his head to inspect the surrounding environment he is therefore 
altering the environment. Indeed, whilst K&M state in their original paper that their 
interest is with “ordinary actions not sensor actions” (K&M, 1994, p. 515) Clark’s own 
example of looking in the fridge seems to imply that mere ‘looking’ is substantial 
enough an action in itself to count as epistemic (although there is the possibility that he 
intended ‘opening the fridge door’ to be included as part of the action.) 
 
If ‘looking’ counts as an epistemic act are we then to say that most action is epistemic? 
As before this would seem to undermine the usefulness of ‘epistemic action’ as a 
category. Moreover it also makes it harder to differentiate between explanations in 
terms of epistemic actions and explanations which take a more classical approach 
according to which plans are updated via sensory input. What is to stop us from 
describing the ‘sense-model-plan-act’ cycle (Brooks, 1991) as ‘looping into the world’ 
at the sensing stage with sensing itself now recast as an ‘epistemic action’?  
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Our problem, then, would seem to be that loose definitions tend to make the notion of 
‘epistemic action’ too general to be helpful. If we allow that an epistemic action can be 
any action which is designed to uncover information – whether or not that information 
could have been uncovered by non-active (i.e. internal) means – then the gate is open to 
include simply ‘seeing something’ as an example of epistemic action.  
 
Conclusion - Back to Dialectics? 
 
The foregoing analysis perhaps places us in something of a quandary. Our earlier 
characterization of epistemic action (in Section II) was as a praxis-like ‘unity’ of action 
and cognition. This characterization proceeded from a wider dialectical perspective 
according to which one would expect action and cognition to be everywhere inter-
related rather than rigidly demarcated. Such an outlook also motivated our analysis in 
section III, 3, where it was suggested that it was difficult to find examples of non-
epistemic actions in Tetris if we allowed that any action with epistemic pay-off might 
be a subspecies of epistemic action. Likewise it was such a perspective which informed 
out argument in section III, 5. There we said that epistemic macro actions could contain 
‘pragmatic’ micro actions and vice-versa. Although we later argued that the notion of 
‘pragmatic’ action was to some degree problematic anyway, we can still make sense of 
that argument as asserting a generalised interdependence between the epistemic and the 
non-epistemic.  
 
However, in section 5, we have also complained about the loose way in which the term 
‘epistemic action’ is sometimes utilized. The underlying suggestion here is that more 
precision is needed if we are to retain what is distinctive in the phenomenon described 
in Kirsh & Maglio’s original paper. Thus it would appear that we are being pulled in 
two opposing directions. The dialectical portion of our analysis wants to generalise the 
epistemic dimension of action, whereas the analytical portion of our work wants clear 
demarcation between ‘epistemic action’ and other types of action, so that ‘epistemic 
action’ remains a useful category. Is it possible to reconcile these two tendencies? 
Perhaps an attempt might be made as follows: 
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It is true, we might say, that action and cognition are intertwined with each other as the 
general case. It is not just that “epistemic actions are everywhere” (Kirsh, 2006, p.252) 
but that cognition and action are coupled with each other, and the world, in an ongoing 
fashion. This does not mean, however, that we cannot isolate instances where external 
resources are utilized in a distinct or striking way, but it is perhaps misleading to 
present such instances as if they were hermetically sealed off from an otherwise non-
epistemic involvement with the world. 
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Conclusion 
 
In our exploration of the ‘retreat from alienation’ in cognitive science we have 
considered a diverse range of themes and issues. It is hoped, nevertheless, that the 
reader will see some underlying unity in this disparate collection of ideas. Indeed it is 
the notion of ‘unity’ itself which informs the majority of our discussions – a unified 
conception of the agent, facilitated by anti-dichotomous reasoning, as part of a broader 
dialectical, and hence unificatory, outlook. 
 
There is much that we have missed out of our analysis. One significant omission is 
perhaps a detailed comparison of our own Marxian take on cognitive science with 
contemporary Heideggerian accounts of cognitive science (e.g. Wheeler, 2005). Such a 
comparison would entail a summary of relevant parts of Heidegger’s work, considered 
in relation to Marx’s work, with some acknowledgement of areas of overlap (including 
the possibility of a ‘Heideggerian Marxism’- Wollin & Abromeit, 2005); and the 
application of the resultant insights to the arena of cognitive science. Whilst such an 
exercise would unquestionably be useful, and might resolve some of the issues left 
hanging in our own analysis, space considerations made it impractical. 
 
Nevertheless, even with such omissions, it is apparent that we have only managed to 
scratch the surface with the majority of the issues raised. The thesis should therefore be 
viewed only as an initial foray into territory that needs to be explored in a great deal 
more depth. 
 
________________________ 
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